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the markets of the advanced economies. The Europeans have given selective special regional preferences, primarily to the Africans.

We have opposed this type of approach. We opposed it for two reasons: We opposed it because of our traditional adherence to the most favored nation doctrine, and because we felt that the regional selective extension, this kind of discriminatory trading bloc created by the Europeans was not to the advantage of ourselves and to the free world generally.

Now, the question has arisen, and we have examined this, and we are still examining it, whether there are ways, and we do not know the answer to this yet, whether there are ways of having generalized advantages for all the developing countries in all of the markets of the advanced countries which would tend to eliminate these regional discriminatory trading blocs, and which would be compatible with our historic liberalization of trade policy, of reducing tariff barriers all through the world.

We have not yet come to any final decision on this. We would certainly consult with the Congress. We are simply considering this, and the Latin American presidents expressed their desire to simply talk about this. This is not a commitment in any form.

Senator SYMINGTON. It is a guideline for the preparation of the agenda for the meeting of the chiefs of state.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, considering together-that is correct.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, if this did turn out to have special tariff results would you plan to come back to Congress for additional authority?

Secretary RUSK. Oh, yes, indeed.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.


The guidelines further states, and I quote:

"(g) Support the financing and prompt initiation of the activities of the coffee diversification fund, and consider in due course the creation of other funds to make it possible to control the production of basic products of interest to Latin America in which there is chronic imbalance between supply and demand."

According to your interpretation, does this resolution authorize the appropriation or allocation of funds for a coffee stabilization fund and other stabilization funds?

Secretary RUSK. This resolution does not do that; no, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. Does not do that.

Secretary RUSK. No, sir. But we are always giving consideration to the possibility of contributing to development or diversification funds that meet our aid criteria.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you plan to come back to Congress to obtain approval of each commodity agreement that may be devised or obtain the necessary funds for its support?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, indeed, sir.


Senator SYMINGTON. When you were down in Buenos Aires last month the foreign ministers approved a protocol of amendment to the

Charter of the Organization of American States. Is it your intention to submit this to the Senate as a treaty?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, it is, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.


Articles 36 and 49 of this protocol, as well as the guidelines for the summit meeting, provide for additional financing in the establishment of technological and scientific research institutes and the exchange of scientific and technological information.

As you know, with a great deal of effort we supplied atom information around the world. Now we are worried about whether or not there are going to be bombs built from what we have supplied to other countries.

As I understand it, we now spend about $24 billion in research, of which $16 billion is supplied by the U.S. Government. We know there is a campaign on by other countries to give them as much as possible of the results of the American taxpayers' expenditures in research and development fields.

Could you tell use in what fields of technology and science this effort you plan will be directed?

Secretary RUSK. That would be a rather broad field. I think those things relating to agriculture would be very high in priority, also those things relating to engineering education. Basically, I would think that what would get urgent attention would be those things that are associated with our traditional land-grant universities in this country. They have done pretty well in the humanities and social sciences on their own. It has been one of the great strengths of their educational system, particularly in higher education. But there are a good many things in the technological and scientific field where they need to do a great deal more.

Here is a place where a very great difference can be made with relatively small funds in terms of the spread of science and technology, and they are making very rapid progress on that, and we would like to keep the momentum going.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

Are there not conceivable instances in which public funds would be invested in technological and scientific research that would compete with private industry?


Secretary RUSK. I suppose it is conceivable, Senator: yes, sir. Senator SYMINGTON. Some of my manufacturers are worried about Secretary RUSK. But

Senator SYMINGTON. My two final questions

Secretary RUSK. That surely happens in our own country, does it


Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, but it is more comforting for it to happen in our own country than for a government of another country to put a private corporation out of business in this country.


Is it not a fact that most of the industrial development capital in Latin America has come from private sources, and that most of the

government funds have been used in public works and import assistance programs?

Secretary RUSK. I think that is a fair generalization; yes, sir. Senator SYMINGTON. If this is the case, why is there no emphasis placed in the guidelines for the summit meeting, and in this resolution, on the importance of private capital investment in the economic development of Latin America?

Secretary RUSK. We would have no objection, Senator, to some strengthening of this resolution in the direction of private investment. Senator Hickenlooper talked about that a little earlier. We thought we would build it around those points which were points of emphasis in the meeting of the presidents. Industrial development in Latin America we expect to flow very strongly out of the integration movement itself, and we would expect a very strong private investment role there. But we could discuss with the committee whether that point should be strengthened further.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, let me thank you for your patience, and let me associate myself with the remarks made by my colleagues about your long and able tenure.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much, Senator Symington.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell?


Senator PELL. Mr. Secretary, in general it would seem there would be very little argument with the objectives of the resolution, but I am wondering if from the viewpoint of looking ahead we are not setting a dangerous precedent. If our Chief of State goes to future meetings of chiefs of state, not with a resolution of this sort, would that not inhibit his freedom to negotiate and give him less power than would be the case in this situation? If we move ahead on this, I wonder if we are not opening the door and saying that any future meeting of the chiefs of state is less important. If we do that we are then changing our process of government because in the past, at least in my past experience, the consultation that occurred prior would give you a feeling of the temper of the Congress.

Secretary RUSK. Actually we have consulted the Congress on a number of things recently, including food for India. The question involves substantial questions of whether it would be much better for the President and Congress to act in partnership.

On the negotiation side there has been a great deal of discussion among the Latin Americans themselves, and we have taken part in that: about what it is they really expect to do and expect to do with that particular situation. The integration of the Hemisphere is itself an extraordinary and most unusual and important development, and it is not going to come up time and time again. There may be different meetings of different heads of states, different situations.

For example, the President went to a meeting at Manila, and made no commitments that were not already covered by existing law and appropriations, on the economic side and things of that sort.

So I would not expect that this would be a cyclical problem that the President-after all, this is only the second meeting of the Presidents in the hemisphere.

Senator PELL. Right.

You do not think this will inhibit the President going to another abroad?

Secretary RUSK. I do not think we ought to foreclose the possibility that the President and Congress can at any time-as Senator Morse suggested, can at any time consult with each other about what is required in the national interest and how the President and Congress might work together. But I just do not envisage a program of these meetings coming down the track.

Senator PELL. All right. Thank you.

Just reverting to the specific before closing, I hope in the kind of technology that would be envisaged under this action, that we not only think of technologies developed in our land-grant colleges but technologies developed in our sea-grant colleges, too.

Thank you very much.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you.


The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, do I understand that the authorization in the Gulf of Tonkin resolution is sufficient to cover the meeting in Guam?

Secretary RUSK. Beg pardon, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Is the Gulf of Tonkin resolution sufficient to cover the meeting in Guam? You are going there tomorrow, I believe. You do not need any additional resolution for that meeting?

Secretary RUSK. We have not asked for an additional resolution for Guam; no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not need it.


Mr. Secretary, I think in the interest of the committee that I would like to read just a brief account of the European Interim Aid Act of 1947 leading up to the Marshall Plan, and excerpts from the Marshall Plan just for the record. Senator Hickenlooper, and others, I think, are interested in it. Many of us have forgotten the details. It is not very long. This was taken from the report of November 21, 1947, by Senator Vandenberg for the Committee on Foreign Relations. It says:

The committee was impressed with the extensive documentation which was available during its examination of the interim-this was the interim aid bill preceding the Marshall plan-the interim aid bill and the recovery program. Rarely has any legislative proposal been accompanied by such thoroughly prepared documentary materials. These include the reports of the Paris Conference of 16 nations, the Nourse, Krug, and Harriman reports, the documentation presented by the State Department on the interim aid program, and the handbook on the European Recovery Program prepared by the staffs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The committee was likewise impressed with the fact that no opposition appeared to testify against the interim aid bill. All witnesses were heard who asked to be heard. Below is a complete list of the witnesses who testified before the committee.

I won't read them all, but a few that are well known, George C. Marshall, Secretary of State: Robert Lovett, Under Secretary of State; Lewis Douglas, Ambassador to Great Britain: Charles Bohlen, Counselor to the State Department: William Averell Harriman, Secretary of Commerce.

I will skip down to some-John Foster Dulles, New York City; George Romney, managing director of the Automobile Manufacturers Association, Detroit, Mich.; Christian A. Herter, Congressman from Massachusetts; and Clinton Anderson, Secretary of Agriculture; and a number of others. I won't take the time to read them all.

During the summer of 1947, UNRRA expired without having restored Europe to a condition of economic and political stability. Not only did the extreme cold of last winter curtail European crops, but they were even more severely affected by the severe drought of the summer just passed. Moreover, the internationa! monetary system was thrown out of balance by the rapidly rising cost of imports and the suspension of the convertibility of the pound sterling. These developments made it particularly difficult for the countries of Europe to secure needed supplies. As a consequence, the financial reserves of France, Italy and Austria have practically disappeared and the twin spectors of hunger and cold attended by political chaos threatened Western Europe. As a result President Truman called Congress into special session on November 17, 1947, to deal with the "rise in prices. . . . [and] the crisis in Western Europe."


I think that is significant in that even then there was a real crisis brewing.

Five hundred and ninety-seven million dollars was requested for emergency aid for France, Italy, and Austria.

Although closely related to the so-called European Recovery Plan, interim aid thus emerged as a distinct and separate problem by itself.

Already on May 8, 1947, Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and later, on June 5, 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall, had indicated that the United States stood ready to consider the extent to which she might be able to help Europe help herself to recovery.

I emphasize "ready to consider the extent to which she might be able to help herself to recovery." It is very different from any very specific proposal at that time.

Sixteen Western European nations on their own initiative responded to the suggestion, and met in Paris to prepare a report stating their needs.

The U.S. Congress, agencies in the form of committees-that was the Herter Committee, as you will recall-and its traveling observers and special committees appointed by the President studied the impact of the contemplated assistance upon our resources and our economy.

But before Congress could begin its deliberations on the broader recovery program, the immediate relief needs of these countries in question arose and demanded immediate attention. On that bill there had been--although it was an emergency bill in a crisis-there had been very extensive, as it says, preparation and documentation.


It is very interesting. I shall skip over to the European Recovery Program itself, just a short paragraph from the report on S. 2202 on February 27, 1948. It says:

The present legislation was anticipated by two addresses, one by the Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson on May 8, 1947, the second by Secretary of State George C. Marshall, on June 5. 1947, in which both indicated that the United States stood ready to consider how far they might be able to help Europe help herself on the road to recovery. On July 11, 1947, 16 Western European nations on their own initiative responded to the suggestion, and met in Paris to prepare a report setting forth their needs and their willingness to cooperate in a joint recovery program. Meanwhile, United States agencies, Members of Congress traveling abroad, and special committees appointed by the President, studied the

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