Slike strani

needs of the European nations, and the impact of the contemplated assistance upon our resources and upon our domestic economy. On December 19, 1947, President Truman sent his special message to Congress on the situation in Europe, requesting relief in the amount of $17 billion for a period to run from April 1, 1948 to June 30, 1952, with a recommendation for an appropriation of $6.8 billion for the 15-month period running from April 1, 1948 to June 30, 1949. The President also made a number of recommendations as to administration, the types of agreements to be made, and the financial arrangements which were to be embodied in the new program.


That was the original bill which, as you know, was passed sometime later. But there was very extensive preparation for those actions, I think, in marked contrast to the present situation.

Now, I think there is a very subtle difference here between the Senator from Oregon and myself about what consultation amounts to. I would regard all of the procedure as expressed, as described in these two reports, as genuine consultation, all up to the point at which we were asked to make a decision. I certainly approve of that. I think it is a model of consultation.

But in the present case I do not think that has been so at all. To have a few Members-the Majority Leader on the floor yesterday afternoon stated that some 40 Members of Congress had been requested to come to the White House for consultation. I submit this is not consultation within the meaning of the Constitution nor even as meant or as indicated by these two reports.

To be invited there to be briefed, without any opportunity for questions and discussion, a real opportunity for discussion of these questions, without any staff, and so on, to be asked one's attitude toward a proposal and to obtain a commitment, to me is not only not consultation, I think this is an avoidance, a way or a substitute for real consultation.

I think what you are doing this morning is a form of consultation. But I submit it is very sketchy compared to the usual procedure_with the House having acted already. We will be under pressure—I feel it is pressure-to act quickly.

There is very little time to have full hearings. I do not know that you want full hearings at this stage because you are not prepared to make a firm proposal for authorization. Those consultations took place prior to an authorization, and I do not wish to be too contrary about this.

What I really have in mind is the question of establishing a precedent, as the Senator from Rhode Island mentioned. Are we going to in the future be called upon to pass a resolution with what I think is very inadequate consultation, to approve in advance whatever the President wishes to do? I think it is a bad precedent. The President does not need it. I do not think there is any evidence that this Congress does not give general support to the President in this area.

If he were of a different party, as was the case during the last six years of the Eisenhower administration, there would be some reason, based on party matters, that you would want to seek understanding between the two parties.

I do not recall that General Eisenhower, except in the military situation in the Middle East, which I opposed then on the same ground

I did not oppose it in substance, I opposed it as a denigration of the congressional role. We were asked to approve in advance a program which later was submitted and which, I think, was a very great mistake. But anyway that is one example.

Then, of course, the Bay of Tonkin resolution which grew out of what was reported to be an attack, a violent attack, by force of arms upon American ships, which is quite different.

I submit that the situation in Latin America is nothing like as critical as it was in Europe, as it was described with regard to interim aid.

So I think the difference here is, what is proper consultation? To me this is not so much consultation as it is a foreclosure to a marked extent of our freedom of action, not only freedom of action but the freedom to judge independently the validity of the program.

The Senator from Missouri made it very clear, and I think your answers to a great extent fortified that belief, that he will be committed, as we all will be, when and if the program comes, morally bound to support whatever that program is. It would have to be extraordinarily at variance with this program in order to justify any change. That is the only way I feel about it.


I do not think you really run into any danger in promoting any substantive matter because there is genuine agreement on the objectives.

If this Congress were split wide open on its attitude toward Latin America, I think you would have a good excuse maybe to try to clarify it.

You know very well from discussion this morning that it is not split on the substance. Nobody believes that.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, may I comment briefly on that? The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. I do indeed hope that the Congress is not split on this matter.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not believe it is, do you?

Secretary RUSK. Well, we do want to find out.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean after all the measures we have enacted in recent years that you have any doubt about it? As a general proposition of objectives, you do not really have any doubts about it, do you?

Secretary RUSK. I do think, sir, that the roots of the things we are talking about here go back over a very considerable period, over which there has been a lot of congressional consultation and legislation. And I might put into the record a brief summary of the history of the idea of economic integration in the Hemisphere beginning with the charter of Punta del Este in 1961, incorporated in the recent amendments to the charter of the OAS. Similarly on the Alliance for Progress, which is another important point here, there has been exhaustive analysis of that by the Congress as we have made our various presentations. The purposes and functioning of the Inter-American Development Bank have been before the Congress time after time.

So we have in front of us a specific additional program related to all of these three, but turning crucially, as far as timing is concerned, on the idea of economic integration. And there it was important for us

to know where the Latin American governments, through their foreign ministers at Buenos Aires, whether or not they were prepared, they really meant from their own point of view and from their own. interest, to move ahead in this area. And on the basis that they indicated that they were prepared to move and spell it out, then it was for us to say what the President should say at Punta del Este.


So far as hearings are concerned, Mr. Chairman, it may be--we have no objection whatever to the committee's hearing whatever witnesses might make a useful contribution to it. I realize there are some problems of time, but a way can be found.

The CHAIRMAN. May I interject here, I am not sure hearings are warranted because, if the Majority Leader is correct, apparently there are people already sufficiently committed to this program. I do not wish to spin the wheels of this committee for no useful purpose. That is one of the aspects, it seems to me, which is unfortunate. I see no point in doing it if Senators are already committed to it. But go ahead.

Secretary RUSK. Well, that would be


The CHAIRMAN. You know, you had the Members of Congress at the White House. The President stated the leaders were unanimously for it; so it is already foreclosed, I guess, so far as votes go. But I think this in a way denigrates our role. It really does make the Congress look like a rubber stamp, and you ought not to go out of your way to make us look more ineffectual than we are.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, you know my great respect for your views on almost every subject except one or two. [Laughter.]

But let me say I really do not understand how what we are doing today, what the President did on Monday, what he did with the leadership on the Friday before, can be looked upon as avoiding the Congress.

Here we are, we are coming to you, we are in your presence. We want you to help us and we want to get your views. I do not see how we are avoiding the Congress. This is what we are here for.


The CHAIRMAN. Well, there are many imponderables. The Senator from Tennessee raises these questions. How do you know that your concept and ours of the common market is the only one, and the best solution to these problems? You may think so. I thought that was a matter for the conference. We surely should not take the attitude of imposing upon them our concept of a common market. There may be variations. There usually are.

I think we should be careful not to appear to be setting all the standards and all the criteria and guidelines for the Latin American

countries. In other words, it should be a cooperative venture.

I feel the Latin Americans may feel left out as many of us in the Congress do, that the United States, because it is large and powerful and is giving them money, is going to call the tune. They may feel much as I do, that maybe they ought to be consulted; that the decisions and recommendations are made, and then we just pass upon them. I do not know how they feel. They evidently feel very happy, at least they did the day before yesterday.

Now, the Senator from Ohio in his statement about Uruguay revealed, I think, one of the things that is involved. He is undertaking to pass judgment upon the people of Uruguay's judgment as to what kind of society they want.

I do not approve of this. No matter what I think about the Uruguayan society, I think it is their business to set it. If they want to have a high degree of state ownership or a great welfare program, I do not think we should use the aid program to tell them they cannot do it. He evidently, from what he said, would like to do that.

We want to make them all in our image. I think in the long run this is an unfortunate attitude for this great country to take. We ought to be very lenient with other countries as to what kind of society they want or can have. I do not think we can successfully lay down the rules for every other country in Latin America or anywhere else to manage their economic and political affairs.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, we are not attempting to do that. In the first place, it would be utterly impossible for us to do that, because in these countries our aid is only one or two percent of their gross national product.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you interpret the remarks of the Senator from Ohio?

Secretary RUSK. He was involved with inflation. For the first time there is no government now that I know of that is committed to the idea that inflation is a good thing, and those who are troubled with the problem are taking steps, with the help of the Monetary Fund and other international agencies, and some aid from us to do something about inflation.

But we certainly are not trying to, and we are not trying to tailor the common market. This is not for us to do. They must work this out themselves because this is an utterly fundamental decision for them. We cannot make it for them.

The CHAIRMAN. If we pass it, you are sure you won't, or some of your people won't, go to Latin America and say, "Unless you want this in the common market the Congress won't support the program and you won't get any money.'


Secretary RUSK. In the common market; that is something which as standby fund of a standby function in the range of $250 million is not going to buy, as the President expressed it, among economies with a gross national product of $92 billion. It just won't happen this way. They will do this in their own interest or not at all. They will do

it in their own interests.

They have indicated they want to do it, and our problem is can we be of some help to them in that process? I strongly feel, and the President feels, we should be of help to them.

The CHAIRMAN. In my personal opinion and from my knowledge it would be a good thing, but I am not prepared to say we can lay down exactly how, and under what circumstances they form a common market. Look at what difficulty the Europeans had, with much more advanced societies. They have been struggling with this for a long time.

Secretary RUSK. It will be a long and complicated process for them. The CHAIRMAN. I am not at all sure that our insistence and I may have been guilty of it because I used to talk about it-may not have inhibited them, by their thinking "Well, we are not going to be pushed around by the Americans." At least the French have shown some indication of resenting the attempt of Americans to dictate what kind of policies they should follow.


Well, I only throw that out. I hope you understand my point. I am trying to preserve, to a small extent, the function of Congress, because I think Congress has a contribution to make to our democratic system; and it should not be minimized and denigrated to the point where it is simply a cipher in this whole Governmental process. That is as long a lecture

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I thoroughly agree with you that Congress should in no sense be a cipher. That is why we come to you instead of going away to this meeting without coming to you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it seems to me a very unusual way to come. Of course, the way I thought you should come is when the President returns to say, "This is what we did." I do not think there is much danger that the executive would not be supported in general. We would then have felt that we had some part to play and would take that function seriously.

But, if we pass a resolution, there is really not much left to be done. I am sure whatever you send up will be passed equally rapidly, and I can understand from the executive point of view that they like that. They do not like to bother with the Congress. It is a troublesome body, I will admit. I have great sympathy with your role in that connection.

The Senator from Oregon?

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, in view of this colloquy I want to ask a few questions and make a few statements for the record.


The Chairman knows the high regard I have for him in the areas in which we usually agree.

In this area this morning we just completely disagree. I do not share the view of my Chairman in an argument by analogy, when the comparisons are not analogous. Therefore, for the purpose of the legislative history of the resolution, a point of view different from that just expressed by my very able Chairman needs to be put on this record.

The Chairman, Mr. Secretary, has read at some length, and I am glad he did, part of the legislative history of the development of the Marshall Plan.

« PrejšnjaNaprej »