in effect, is, "You go down there and you discuss the type of program that can be worked out, that you hope can be worked out, on a mutuality basis in the future."

One of the items for the discussion will be the strengthening of the Inter-American Development Bank and the building up of greater authority within the bank to administer aid programs on a hemispheric basis rather than continue on this bilateral government to government basis which, as you know, I have been critical of as a general policy.

Do you think that one of the strengths of this resolution is that it is going to strengthen the President's hand to raise this program of multilateral, international financial institutions such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank, to be of assistance in administering programs that the Congress may subsequently, and I stress the word subsequently, approve?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir. Two very important elements in this program affecting the Inter-American Development Bank. One is the possibility of standby funds in connection with integration; and, secondly, the strengthening of the bank's ability to undertake these multinational projects, and we think both of them are very important. Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I close by saying to you, sir, I am sorry I took this time-I hope you understand, sir, we are not worlds apart. If we got down to a discussion of the objectives we would find ourselves more in agreement than in disagreement. But I thought I owed it to you, and certainly to myself, and I happen to think also to the record of the case, to express the views I have just expressed.

DIFFERENCE IS PROCEDURAL

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Secretary, I do not wish to prolong this. I do not think there is any difference on substance. I think the difference is essentially procedural.

I did not mention the Tonkin Bay resolution to give the impression that there is any relevance or any analogy, in substance, to the current resolution. It was only for the procedure that was followed.

In that case I think we had one day of executive hearing. A resolution was passed very quickly, for it was considered very urgent by the administration.

It is the procedural urgency with which we dealt with it that is analogous, because it is expected that this proposed resolution will be passed. As I have already stated, the House committee reported it out, and undoubtedly the House will pass it. I assume this is probably what may happen here. There is that similarity, I would say, that we are expected to act very quickly.

RESOLUTION WOULD NOT ENLARGE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY

Furthermore, I do not think the resolution would give the President power he does not already have.

We cannot limit or change his powers as Chief Executive. It is not the President's power that is being affected. It is neither enlarged nor restricted in any respect. What it does do, as the Senator from Missouri pointed out, and the Secretary agreed with him, I thought, is very severely limit our freedom of action in the future, those who

vote for it, because they will feel morally bound to support anything that is reasonably similar to what is involved in the President's message and resolution. It is the Senate's role that I am talking about, not the President's.

I do not think we are enlarging his authority. He has all the authority he needs. In fact, he has very large authority.

TONKIN BAY RESOLUTION BECAME SUBSTITUTE FOR DECLARATION OF WAR

I think the constitutional restrictions upon these matters are becoming very fuzzy. Take the Bay of Tonkin resolution. What it really did was not affect the President's authority. He had authority to respond to an emergency attack. It has been exercised on numerous

occasions.

What was the final effect? It proved to be a substitute for a declaration of war, and the Senator from Oregon has made some of the most eloquent addresses of anybody in the Senate about the question of the declaration of war. He has stated on numerous occasions that it is illegal, and that we ought to have a declaration of war if we are going to pursue the war in Vietnam.

What the Bay of Tonkin resolution did was to be a substitute for a declaration of war.

I had a long exchange with the chairman of the Armed Services Committee only a couple of weeks ago on this very subject, and it was quite clear, in my view, from that exchange, that the Tonkin Bay resolution is regarded as a substitute for a declaration of war.

I do not so regard it, because I do not think we can so cavalierly change the constitutional requirement.

That is what is involved here. I do not think-I do not regard myself as differing with the Senator from Oregon, in substance, at all. I cannot recall any matters such as arms control-you have already mentioned economic matters, the OAS Charter-where we have not been in agreement. I do not remember any substantial difference on substance.

I am arguing here that we should not again set a precedent for the future, whereby we take action within a day or two on an important matter, without the usual thoroughgoing hearings.

EXTENT OF SENATORIAL COMMITMENT UNCLEAR

The Senator interprets this quite differently from the Senator from Missouri. Senator Morse seems to feel this resolution means nothing, that he is in no way committed. If that is true, then it is of no use to you then, Mr. Secretary. If the Senator from Oregon's interpretation of the lack of force-the lack of commitment on him or other Members is true then you certainly are getting an empty shell.

Yet, I think, a correct answer to the Senator from Missouri would be "Yes." If the Congress does support it and they approve it, in your opinion-and I think you are correct-it should feel morally bound to support a program that is reasonably relevant to the proposals in the President's message. I do not think the Senator can have it both ways. It either means something, or it does not.

If it does not mean any more than Senator Morse says, we are making an idle gesture.

Senator MORSE. Would you yield at that point?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Senator MORSE. All I am saying is I am not bound by any commitment until I see to what extent the Latin Americans have committed themselves to carry out a mutual objective. That is what I am saying. I think that I did not receive anything from the Secretary of State that indicates he would not share that point of view.

We have to take a look at the program that the administration works out down there and decide whether or not that program is in keeping with the obligation of the Latin Americans to engage in a mutuality of commitment. That is what I am saying, and I am not going to commit myself to vote for anything until we reach that point.

If the program is one that meets that test, why, I say, "Hurrah”! There has been a mistaken emphasis here that we are doing something only for Latin America and nothing for the United States. As we strengthen the economies and the educational forces and the literacy of Latin America, we perform a great service for the United States. You cannot have that part of the Western Hemisphere go to pot and have any stability left in this country for long.

The CHAIRMAN. I submit the Senator is still talking about substance. I agree with that. It has nothing whatever to do with the procedural matter as to how we should deal with it. It has nothing to do with it.

It is purely a matter of procedure, as I raised the question yesterday, as I stated in my statement on the floor, and as clearly as I know how this morning. I am not arguing about that or the needs of Latin America.

There are many uncertainties in this picture. The Senator from Oregon has been one of the most outspoken critics of the war in Vietnam. He does not know right today whether the war is going to cost $50 billion or $75 billion this coming year. Last year's estimate of what it was going to cost was just about one-half of what it proved to be. There are all kinds of imponderables.

I do not know whether he thinks he is bound or not, but it is quite obvious that others think they will be morally bound to support whatever comes out of it.

The Senator from Missouri, I think, spoke of what has been the practical matter. Technically, of course, nobody is bound. Practically they are morally bound, in the sense that they feel they give the President approval of what he does at Punta del Este before he goes. He does not need it. They simply bind themselves.

AUTHORIZATION IN THE TONKIN BAY RESOLUTION

Senator MORSE. Will you yield for just one more minute? I do not think that you understand my position procedurally. You say we agree substantively.

The Tonkin Bay resolution authorized the President to act. It was an authorization of action.

The CHAIRMAN. He had the authority without that Tonkin Bay resolution.

Senator MORSE. No; he did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes.

Senator MORSE. Under our Constitution he only has the right to pursue immediately the self-defense of the Nation. He does not have the authority under the Constitution to proceed to make war. Only Congress can give him that. That is where I left you off.

Now, this resolution does not authorize the President to act.
The CHAIRMAN. It just forecloses us.

Senator MORSE. No; it does not at all. Quite to the contrary, it makes clear we assume an obligation in the future to act depending upon the kind of an agreement that may come out of Punta del Este.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am sure this has been an education to you, Mr. Secretary. We apologize. This is the first time I have had a good argument with the Senator from Oregon. We have not had anything to argue about for a long time, so it has been an exercise for me. Unless you have something very urgent to add, I think maybe we might adjourn. Do you have anything you want to say? Secretary RUSK. I would settle for that, Mr. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much.

that, Mr.

Chairman.

(Whereupon, at 1:35 o'clock p.m., the committee was adjourned.)