"I find no difficulty in agreeing with your statement, that by the general principles of international law private or merchant vessels entering the ports of another nation than their own are subject to the local jurisdiction; and I also recognize at once the convenience and desirability of the rule you suggest as that adopted by France, and followed by some other nations, that local courts should decline to take jurisdiction of cases involving acts of mere interior discipline of the vessel. Such, indeed, has been the course recommended by the execu tive branch of this Government to the courts, and it gives me pleasure to be able to add that both the Federal and State courts have as a general rule conformed their proceedings in such cases to that sugges tion. These tribunals, however, are bound under the Constitution and laws of the United States to entertain every complaint in which is presented a prima facie case of violation of the local laws, and it consequently becomes necessary in such cases that the judge should hear the evidence before he is able to determine whether the case is one of mere discipline connected with the ship, or whether it is of such a nature as to involve a disturbance of the public order in port or on shore; and bound by the same constitutional and statutory provisions the execu tive branch of the Government must refrain from all interference with the judicial tribunals in regard to cases or questions that may be pending before such tribunals. No doubt is entertained, however, but that the declarations of the courts will always be had, and their decisions be always rendered with a due regard for the obligations of the Government under its treaty stipulations with foreign powers. "The President, I need scarcely add, will ever deem it his duty to give full effect, in spirit and in letter, to the provisions of the convention of July, 1870, between this Government and that of Austria-Hungary, which you so worthily represent." Mr. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, to Baron Schaeffer, Nov. 13, 1883. MSS. In For. Rel. for 1883, 17 ff, is given a full report of the trial of Com. v. Ferlan, As to treaty, infra, § 141. As to consular jurisdiction, infra, § 125. "A merchant vessel in port is within the jurisdiction of the country owning the port, with reference to offenses committed on shore or by any member of the crew on board, when the peace of the port is disturbed. In the United States police officers have frequently gone on board vessels of foreign nations in harbor and arrested persons accused of crimes under our laws, for whose arrest proper warrants were issued. A case of this kind, with which you perhaps are familiar, was decided by a Philadelphia court about a year ago, which arose from the arrest of the master of an Austrian vessel.” Mr. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, to Mr. Randall, Mar. 14, 1834. MSS. Dom. Let. "It may be safely affirmed that when a merchant vessel of one coun try visits the ports of another for the purposes of trade, it owes temporary allegiance and is amenable to the jurisdiction of that country, and is subject to the laws which govern the port it visits so long as it remains, unless it is otherwise provided by treaty. "Any exemption or immunity from local jurisdiction must be derived from the consent of that country." Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. Hall, March 12, 1885. MSS. Inst. Cent. Am. "Generally speaking, the consul in Hayti has jurisdiction of all disputes on ship board, not affecting the peace of the port, but as this right is not specially conceded by treaty it could only be claimed and exercised by comity, and in the absence of any competent claim of jurisdiction by the local courts, unless indeed the right may spring from Art. XXXIII of said treaty, the most-favored nation clause." Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. Thompson, July 31, 1885. MSS. Inst., Hayti. The local port authority has jurisdiction of acts committed on board of a foreign merchant ship while in port, provided those acts affect the peace of the port, but not otherwise; and its jurisdiction does not extend to acts internal to the ship, or occurring on the high seas. The local authority has right to enter on board a foreign merchantman in port for the purpose of inquiry universally, but for the purpose of arrest only in matters within its ascertained jurisdiction. 8 Op., 73, Cushing, 1856. (For an account of the cases of the Newton and the Sally, involving the question of the jurisdiction of United States consuls over crimes committed on board United States vessels in French ports, see 1 Phillimore Int. Law (3 ed.), 484.) The circuit courts of the United States have not jurisdiction, under the crimes act of the 30th of April, 1790, of a manslaughter committed on an American vessel in a river within the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign. U. S. v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheaton, 76. But see Thomas v. Lane, 2 Sumu., 1, and U. S. v. Coombs, 12 Pet., 72, cited infra. It was held by the English judges, on a case reserved in 1868, that "The admiralty jurisdiction of England extended over British vessels, not only when they are sailing on the high seas, but also when they are in the rivers of a foreign territory at a place below bridges, where the tide ebbs and flows, and where great ships go. It was also held that all seamen, whatever their nationality, serving on board British vessels, are amenable to the provisions of British law." R. v. Anderson, L. R., 1 C. C. R., 161. "It is clear," said Bovill, C. J., in the course of his opinion, citing Ortolan, "that with regard to merchant vessels of foreign countries, the French nation do not assert their police law against the crews of those vessels unless the aid of the French authority be invoked by those ou board, or unless the offense committed leads to some disturbance in their ports.” "As far as America is concerned " (the defendant was an American citizen), "she has by statutes made regulations for those on board her vessels in foreign ports, and we have adopted the same course in this country. When vessels go into a foreign port they must respeet the laws of that nation to which the port belongs, but they must also respect the laws of the nation to which the vessel belongs." To sustain the position that in such cases the admiralty has jurisdiction. were cited: Thomas v. Lane, 2 Sumner, 1, and U. S. v. Coombs, 12 Pet., 72, which cases, it was maintained, overruled U. S. v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat., 76. In R. v. Keyn, L. R., 2 Ex. D, 23; 13 Cox, 403, a case growing out of the Franconia disaster, it was ruled in England, that the court of criminal appeal has no jurisdiction to try a foreigner, who, in a foreign ship, is chargeable with a negligent collision, producing death in the colliding English ship, though the collision was within three miles of the English coast. The vote of the court, however, on this point was seven to six: Aff., Cockburn, C. J., Kelly, C. B., Bramwell, J. A., Lush, J., Pollock, B., Field, J., and Sir R. Phillimore; diss., Lord Coleridge, C. J., Brett, J., Amphlett, J. A., Grove, Denman, and Lindley, JJ. This case, with the subsequent legislation, is discussed in 1 Crim. Law Mag., 701, ff. The points taken by Cockburn, C. J., in which a majority of the judges agreed, were as follows: "The extent of the realm of England is a question, not of international but of English law. "There is no evidence that the sovereigns of this country ever either claimed or exercised any special jurisdiction over a belt of sea adjacent to the coast, though there is evidence that the admiral has always claimed jurisdiction over persons on board of British ships, wherever they might be, and that he formally claimed jurisdiction over all persons and all ships in the four narrow seas. This claim, however, has long since been given up and no other claim has ever been substituted for it. "Hence there is no evidence that any British court has jurisdiction over a crime committed by a foreigner on board a foreign ship on the high sea, but within three miles of the coast."" 2 Steph. Hist. Cr. Law, 31; 1 Wbart. Cr. Law (9 ed.), § 269. In R. v. Keyn, above cited, it was said by Sir R. Phillimore that "the consensus of civilized nations has recognized a maritime extension of frontier to the distance of three miles from low-water mark, because such a frontier or belt of water is necessary for the defense and security of the adjacent state." By Lindley, J., it was said that "it is conceded that even in time of peace the territoriality of a foreign merchant-ship, within three miles of the coast of any state, does not exempt that ship or its crew from the operation of those laws of that state which relate to its revenue or fisheries." In this doctrine the judges generally concurred, though it was held, by a majority of seven to six, that the jurisdiction, without some legislative action, could not be exercised for the purposes of criminal prosecution over foreigners within such limits. In 1878 was passed the act of Parliament giving such jurisdiction. [Quoted supra, § 32.] See Whart. Conf. of Laws, § 818. XIII. NOT SO AS TO PUBLIC SHIPS. § 36. As to reception in neutral ports of belligerent cruisers, see infra, § 394. As to permitting such cruisers to arm and proceed to sea, see infra, §§ 393, 396, 399. A ship-of-war, when in a foreign friendly port, is ordinarily exempt from the jurisdiction of such port. Mr. Randolph, Sec. of State, to Mr. Hammond, July 23, 1794. MSS. Notes, For. Mr. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, to Mr. Romero, May 25, 1882. MSS. Notes, Mex. But the officers of a vessel-of-war belonging to a friendly foreign nation cannot set up extraterritorality when unofficially on shore in a port in whose harbor their vessel is temporarily moored. Mr. Randolph, Sec. of State, to Mr. Hammond, July 23, 1794. MSS. For. Leg. "The President highly disapproves that a public vessel-of-war, belonging to a foreign nation, should be searched by officers of the customs upon a suspicion of illicit commerce. The propriety of representing such a suspicion to the consul of that nation, or the commander of the vessel, will not be controverted, this being a course respectful and customary. A general instruction will be therefore given to pursue this course, with the view that if it should be ineffectual the Government of the United States may adopt those measures which the necessity of the case and their rights may require." Mr. Randolph, Sec. of State, to Mr. Fauchet, Nov. 17, 1794, cited in letter of same to same, June 13, 1795. MSS. Notes, For. Leg. A foreign ship-of-war admitted by courtesy into a port held by military occupation, in time of war, by forces of the United States, is subject, so far as concerns the right to carry off persons from such port, to the military orders governing the port. Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Tassara, July 2, 1863. MSS. Notes, Spain; "Having submitted the question thus raised to the President of the United States, I have now to express to you my regret at the conclusion at which the Spanish Government has arrived. It seems to me, in effect, to set up, although unconsciously, a claim that a Spanish ship-of war, admitted by courtesy into a place actually held in military occupation by the forces of this Government, may disregard existing military orders, which are issued with a view to the military situation of that place. This seems, in effect, nothing less than a claim of Spanish sovereignty over American citizens on board a Spanish ship, not merely within the civil jurisdiction, but even within the military lines of the United States in their own territories. The claim thus understood cannot be conceded. I am, therefore, to inform you that the Government adheres to its former declaration that no ship-of-war, of whatever nation, will be expected to carry into or out from any port of the United States, which is either occupied by their forces or is in possession of the insurgents, any person who does not actually, belong to the civil, military, or naval service of the country whose flag that vessel carries, and especially that such ships of war shall not, without express leave of the military authorities, carry into or out of such ports any citizen of the United States. It can be only on an expected compliance with these terms that any foreign ship-of-war can enter ports of the classes I have designated during the continuance of the present civil war." Ibid. If there be no prohibition, the ports of a friendly nation are considered as open to the public ships of all powers with whom it is at peace; and those vessels are supposed to enter such ports and remain in them under the protection of the Government of the place. Whether the public ships-of-war of one nation enter the ports of another friendly nation under the license implied by the absence of any prohibition, or under an express stipulation by treaty, they are equally exempt from the local jurisdiction. The Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch, 116, 145. (See The Pizarro r. Matthias, 10 N. Y. Leg. Ob., 97.) The exemption of foreign public ships from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States is not founded upon any notion that a foreign sovereign has an absolute right, in virtue of his sovereignty, to an exemption of his property from the local jurisdiction of another sovereign when it comes within his territory. It stands upon principles of public comity and convenience, and arises from the presumed consent or license of nations, that foreign public ships coming into their ports and demeaning themselves according to law and in a friendly manner shall be exempt from the local jurisdiction. But as such consent and license is implied only from the general usage of nations, it may be withdrawn upon notice at any time without just offense, and, if afterwards, such public ships come into our ports they are amenable to our laws in the same manner as other vessels. The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheaton, 283; aff'd., 1 Brock., 478. Whatever may be the exemption of a public ship herself, and of her armament and munitions of war, from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, any prize property which she brings into our ports is liable to such jurisdiction for the purpose of examination and inquiry, and, if a proper case is made out, for restitution. And if goods are landed from the public ship in our ports, by the express permission of our Government, this does not vary the case, since such permit in |