trasts; a sort of progress made by rushing from one extreme to the other, as though the heart of humanity in its eagerness for the truth was moving ahead of the intellect, groping for light where all was darkness. But still progress has been made. The science of the State has at last been established on apparently firm foundations, and it seems to me extremely fitting in this third centennial year of Grotius's birth to examine the origin and teachings of that great book on the "Rights of War and Peace," which is acknowledged by all to be the corner-stone of modern Political Philosophy and Interna

tional Law.

Like all epoch-making works, this book was the joint product of the man and the peculiar conditions of the time. Grotius, although a man of such varied abilities, was preeminently a statesman and a philosophical historian. His editions of classical authors had been prepared mainly as the disciplining exercises of his boyhood. He afterwards read the classics as a humanist, for what they contained. His historical genius was impressed not only upon his specific histories, but upon all his writings. This is especially true of his theological works. One of the most distinguishing features of his commentaries on the Old Testament is the restriction of most of the prophecies to the Jewish nation, and the denial of their application to the whole Christian world.

This historical view of the Hebrew Scriptures involved him in frequent controversy with the chief expounders of the narrow theology of his time, but the world has long been coming round to the same view.

His attitude toward the great schism in the Dutch church had been that of a practical statesman, regarding the two great parties as factions which were to be dealt with and made use of. He stood, moreover, as the connecting link between two distinctive schools of statesmen. He was the representative and embodiment of the principles of the great school of Henry IV. and Sully, of Burleigh and Barneveld, though he was surrounded by the clerical absolutists of the school of Richelieu and Laud.

The time, moreover, was one of the most important epochs in the history of the world. The foundations of international relations, and even of law, had just been shattered in the wreck of the church. The Pope had ceased to be the international judge; he was rapidly ceasing to be the international arbiter. International morality was in a terrible state. The writings of Machiavelli, whatev er may be thought of the motives and character of the man, had produced an effect like poison. They had turned diplomacy into a game, at which only devils incarnate could play and win. From his pages Philip II. and Catharine de Medici had drawn those diabolical maxims of policy in accordance with which they pursued their despotic ends with perfect unscrupulousness in their choice of means. Politics was completely divorced from morals, and dissimu lation, treachery, and assassination stalked abroad like a pestilence at noonday. Add to this the horrible barbarities of the Thirty Years' War, and the terrible picture is complete. The dire need of the time was for a man of learning, fame, and piety, to speak the language of truth and soberness to the rulers of the world, to tell corrupt courts that there were laws which even kings and princes must respect. Such a man was Grotius, and such a message was his great treat ise, "De Jure Belli ac Pacis."

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The object of Grotius was two-fold: First lay down those rules of justice, which would be binding on men living in a state nature—that is, living in a social state inde pendently of any positive laws of human in stitution; and secondly, to apply those rul to the mutual relations of independent na tions living together in a similar state nature. In a rather extended introduction he sets forth his authorities and sources, b motives and object, and his general meth of treatment. He says in his preface:

"Now, amongst those things peculiar man is his desire for society, that is, a c tain inclination to live with those of his o kind, not in any manner whatever but pead ably, and in a community regulated accor ing to the best of his understanding. **

This sociability which we have now described in general, or this care of maintaining society in a manner comformable to the light of human understanding, is the fountain of Right, properly so called."

He then states his motives as follows: "Now, for my part, being fully assured by the reasons I have already given that there is some right common to all nations, which takes place both in the preparations and in the course of war, I had many and weighty reasons inducing me to write a treatise upon it. I observed throughout the Christian world a licentiousness in regard to war which even barbarous nations ought to be ashamed of; a running to arms upon very frivolous, or rather no occasions; which, being once taken up, there remained no longer any reverence for right, either divine or human, just as if from that time men were authorized and firmly resolved to commit all manner of crime without restraint."

The spectacle of this monstrous barbarity had provoked many, including Erasmus, to deny to the Christian the right of war altogether; but Grotius supposes that "they have the same view as those have who, in order to make the things that are crooked straight, usually bend them as much the other way." Grotius's method of proving and establishing this law is to "make use of the testimonies of philosophers, historians, poets, and in the last place orators; not as if they were to be implicitly believed **** but that when many men of different times and places unanimously affirm the same thing for truth, this ought to be ascribed to a general cause, which, in the questions treated by us, can be no other than either a just inference drawn from the principles of nature, or an universal consent. The former shows the law of nature, the other the law of nations.”

This method affords ample opportunity for the use of that vast erudition, that intimate acquaintance with classical authors and Ronan law, which was the delight of his immefiate successors. His pages fairly gleam with quotations from almost all the writers of clasical antiquity. This feature of his work has ed to those scornful charges of tediousness

and pedantry which have been heaped upon him by some modern writers, while it has been defended by others as his most charming characteristic.

Grotius next proceeds to divide his treatise into three books: the first treating of war in general, the second of the causes from which war may arise, and the third of what is lawful in war. In his definition of the object of war, he justifies the title of his work. As all war has peace for its object, and as war may arise out of any controversy, a treatise on the Rights of War may be made to include everything that comes within the scope of international law, and much besides. Then, in making the distinction between a public and a private war, he is led into an examination of the nature and extent of the idea of sovereignty, and the mutual relations and duties of subjects and sovereigns. In like manner, when discussing the causes of war in the second book, we find him examining at great length the various rights one person may have over another, and the general rights and obligations arising from property in goods, etc. In this way many of his so-called digressions may be explained.

The foundation of natural law is in the social nature of mankind. He defines it as "the dictate of right reason pointing out a moral guilt or rectitude to be inherent in any action, on account of its agreement or disagreement with our rational and social nature; and, consequently, that such an action is either forbidden or enjoined by God, the author of nature.

Voluntary or positive law, as the term im plies, is that derived from some will, and, accordingly, is either human or divine. Human law is subdivided into that of the State, which he defines as a complete body of free persons, associated together to enjoy peaceably their rights and for their common benefit; and the law of nations, which derives its authority from the will of all, or at least of many nations.

Divine voluntary law, or revealed law, is also divided into two kinds-general and special: the former intended for all the world; the latter for the Jews only. The

Mosaic law, he says, is not binding upon the world at large as a law, but much of it is reiterated in the New Testament, and is also reinforced by the law of Nature and the consent of nations, when, of course, it becomes binding upon all.

We have here a clear distinction between morality and religion; and Grotius deserves the great honor of having been the first to enunciate a principle of right and a basis of society and government outside of the church and the Bible. Religion, International Law, and Natural Law seem to be clearly defined and distinguished from each other.

But in spite of all his efforts at classification and arrangement, Grotius does not keep his own distinctions clearly in mind. He founds the law natural in the sociable nature of man, and the law of nations in the universal consent, and thus distinguishes between international morality and international law; and one would naturally expect that he would first lay down his general principles, and then proceed to apply them to a code regulating the intercourse of nations; but in this we are disappointed. From the first to the last, he mixes up these two conceptions in inextricable confusion, so that we are never certain whether he is treating of law or morality-of what is or of what ought to be.

This theory of natural law, whose foundations were so broadly and deeply laid by Grotius, is about the same as the jus gentium of the Romans, though Grotius looks at it from a different point of view. Its influence in the world has been tremendous, both for good and evil. Grotius's piety and his mild and tolerant disposition caused hi'n to constantly modify its teachings by an appeal to experience and the examples given in the actual conduct of states For this perfect, legitimate, and only really scientific mode of investigation, he was charged by Rousseau with confounding the duties with the practices of states, which he never did.

The reaction of the French revolution and the rise of Benthamism has greatly discredited the theory of law natural, and with it the reputation of Grotius. Bentham called it "an obscure phantom, which, in the im

aginations of those who go in chase of it, points sometimes to manners, sometimes to laws; sometimes to what is, sometimes to what ought to be."

Sir Henry Maine gives a brief and somewhat unsatisfactory history of the theory, in his Ancient Law, Chap. IV.

The literature of the subject is interminable. The theory dominated the thought of the 17th and 18th centuries in all social and political science. The present reaction against it may be somewhat transitional, and it is possible that its true scientific value is not yet determined. But in the field of international law, the permanent value of the work effected by Grotius is not a doubtful matter. The conception of man living in a state of nature, whatever may be its philosophical defects and its practical shortcomings, when applied to political or economic speculation, has undoubtedly been productive of incalculable good to mankind when applied to the mutual relations of independent states. It proceeds upon the supposition that all sovereign communities, whatever may be their relative strength, associate together upon terms of equality, and that, as there is no common superior and no positive law, the principles of abstract justice can be applied to them, with proper modifications, just as to individuals living together without positive institutions.

Granting the idea of territorial sovereignty and the distinct personality of the individual units, the ground plan of the international edifice becomes theoretically perfect.

But Grotius did not only lay the foundations: with the hand of a master builder he also erected the superstructure. It has been said that there can be found in the work of Grotius some principle applica ble to the settlement of every question that may arise from the intercourse of nations though this is doubtful.

Grotius begins this part of his work oster sibly in the middle of the second book, bu had already mixed it up with the first pai of his book.

He begins with the "rights of embassage and of embassadors, and after a long, discu

sive disquisition on punishments, takes up and discusses, in an exhaustive and fearless manner, the real and pretended causes of war, just, unjust, and doubtful. His mild, tolerant disposition, his elevation of mind and deep Christian piety are conspicuously exhibited in these passages.

He denies the right of war against those who refuse to become Christians, or for of fenses against God only, though he justifies a war against infidels and against those who persecute Christians on account of their faith. He inveighs strongly against the persecution of heretics, and exhorts princes to abstain from all wars waged upon doubtful grounds, and to avoid even a just war as long as possible.

Wars for subjects, for allies, and for strangers are defended with a warmth that does great credit to his goodness of the art. Mercenaries are worse than executioners, because the latter put only criminals to death. A good example of Grotius's looseness of arrangement, and also of his diffuseness, is the chapter on burial. This could scarcely become a question of public dispute except in case a war was already in existence, and could much more appropriately have been treated in the third book. But he puts it in the second book, and it affords him an opportunity for a prodigal display of learning.

Book III. relates entirely to rights in war. It treats of what is allowable, of deceit and lying, of reprisals, of killing enemies, of wasting and pillaging, of rights over booty and prisoners, rights of neutrals, etc. Moderation is in all cases enjoined. A thorough analysis of Grotius's contributions to International Law will not be attempted here. To do so would be to give a pretty complete outline of the science itself, for probably no science (with possibly one exception) has ever owed so much to its founder.

We perceive at once in reading two pecuiarities: (1), a constant reference to the Ronan lawyers, especially to Paulus and Ulpiin, and (2), the rigid casuistry of the author. Most of his modifications of the Roman aw were caused by his anxiety to make all

public acts of rulers square with the requirements of the Christian conscience.

The excellence of the Roman law, as a source of International Jurisprudence, has been wonderfully vindicated. It is surprising, says Sir H. Maine, how large a proportion of the additions which have been made to International Law since the time of Grotius have been simply transferred bodily from the corpus juris of the Romans. This is to be accounted for, probably, by the fact that these lawyers being less hampered by arbitrary legislation than those of modern nations, could surrender themselves more unreservedly to the reasonings of abstract justice. One addition to the science, and only one, so far as I know, has tended to disturb the foundations of International Law as laid by Grotius, and that is the introduction of the principle of utility. This was first introduced by Dr. Richard Cumberland, who was a follower of Grotius; but since the rise of the general utilitarian philosophy, it has become much more important. Grotius denies it to be the foundation of justice, and seems to remand it to the science of politics. This, however, has been considered by many as the ultimate test in matters of international morality, and it wonderfully simplifies some of the trouble-some questions in these matters-as for instance, in the case of promises extorted by force, in regard to which Grotius seemed unable to escape the conclusion that they ought to be kept. The true principle is, that it would not consist with the general good of the community that such promises should be fulfilled.

The book closes very characteristically with an earnest exhortation to keep faith in all cases, and to seek peace as a condition of a quiet conscience, and as the end and object of all war.

Such is a brief and necessarily incomplete outline of the history and teachings of this great work and of its illustrious author. But after all, the most marvelous thing about the book was its wonderful success and political influence.

The great fame and learning of the author, the speculative and political tendencies of

the age, the terror and dismay excited by the horrors of the Thirty Years' War, and the revival and study of the Roman Law from which Grotius had drawn so many of his principles, all conspired to make men welcome the sublime international edifice contained in the "Rights of War and Peace." It passed through eight editions during the life-time of Grotius, and after his death was the subject of endless disputations.

King Gustavus Adolphus lugged the heavy volume around with him through all his German campaigns, and it was found in his tent after his death. Charles Lewis, Elector Palatine, established a special professorship at Heidelberg for the explication of the new science, and appointed Puffendorf to fill it. The other leading universities followed his example. Translations into all the principal languages, with annotations by famous jurists, were constantly published; until, within fifty years after Grotius's death, an edition was published cum notis variorum-a thing

which had never happened to any author except the writers of classical antiquity.

The only works of modern genius that can be at all compared with it are Montesquieu's "Spirit of Laws," and Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations," and these are perhaps inferior to it in originality, and widespread and lasting influence.

In the words of Dr. Bluntschli, "The elegance of his language, the pearls of classical antiquity with which he adorned and enliv ened his pages, his humane disposition, the warmth of his love for moral order, his heroic effort, writing as he did amidst the horrors and barbarity of the Thirty Years' War, to subdue the fierce spirit of warfare by the gentle admonitions of law and humanity, and the logical vigor with which he perceiv ed the remotest causes of human legal development, won for him the general love and admiration of mankind; while the deficiencies of his doctrine were not as yet perceived."

Arthur Yager.