by yourself and the commanders of army corps makes no objection to the same, but gives the following directions as to its execution : 1st. Leave such force at Manassas Junction as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that position and line of communication. 24. Leave Washington entirely secure. 3d. Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac, choosing a new base at Fort Monroe or anywhere between here and there; or at all events move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by some route.* Transmitted 7 o'clock 45 minutes. D. EDWIN M. STANTON, HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Brig. Gen. LORENZO THOMAS, Adjutant-General U. S. Army: GENERAL: I have to request that you will lay the following communication before the honorable Secretary of War: The approximate numbers and positions of the troops left near and in rear of the Potomac are about as follows: General Dix has, after guarding the railroads under his charge, sufficient troops to give him 5,000 for the defense of Baltimore and 1,988 available for the Eastern Shore, Annapolis, &c. Fort Delaware is very well garrisoned by about 400 men. The garrisons of the forts around Washington amount to 10,600 men; other disposable troops now with General Wadsworth being about 11,400 men. The troops employed in guarding the various railways in Maryland amount to some 3,359 men. These it is designed to relieve, being old regiments, by dismounted cavalry, and to send forward to Manassas. General Abercrombie occupies Warrenton with a force which, including Colonel Geary at White Plains and the cavalry to be at his disposal, will amount to some 7,780 men, with twelve pieces of artillery. I have the honor to request that all the troops organized for service in Pennsylvania and New York and in any of the Eastern States may be ordered to Washington. I learn from Governor Curtin that there are some 3,500 men now ready in Pennsylvania. This force I should be glad to have sent at once to Manassas. Four thousand men from General Wadsworth I desire to be ordered to Manassas. These troops, with the railroad guard above alluded to, will make up a force under the command of General Abercrombie to something like 18,639 men. It is my design to push General Blenker's division from Warrenton upon Strasburg. He should remain at Strasburg long enough to allow matters to assume a definite form in that region before proceeding to his ultimate destination. The troops in the valley of the Shenandoah will thus-including Blenker's division, 10,028 strong, with twenty-four pieces of artillery; Banks' Fifth Corps, which embraces the command of General Shields, 19,687 strong, with forty-one guns; some 3,652 disposable cavalry, and the railroad guards, about 2,100 men-amount to about 55,467 men. * See also Stanton to McClellan, March 13, 5.20 p. m., and McClellan to Stanton, 6.15 p. m., same date, Series I. Vol. V, pp. 750, 751. It is designed to relieve General Hooker by one regiment, say 850 men, leaving, with some 500 cavalry, 1,350 men on the Lower Potomac. To recapitulate: There would thus be left for the garrisons and the front of Washington under General Wadsworth some 18,000 men, exclusive of the batteries under instruction. The troops organizing or ready for service in New York I learn will probably number more than 4,000. These should be assembled at Washington, subject to disposition where their services may be most needed. I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, E. Major-General, Commanding. HDQRS. MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON, Hon. SECRETARY OF WAR: Washington, D. C., April 2, 1862. SIR: I have the honor to submit the following condensed statements of the forces left under my command for the defense of Washington: I have no mounted light artillery under my command. Several companies of the reserve artillery of the Army of the Potomac are still here, but not under my command or fit for service. From this force I am ordered by General McClellan to detail two regiments (good ones) to Richardson's division (Sumner's corps) as it passes through Alexandria, one regiment to replace the Thirty-seventh New York Volunteers in Heintzelman's old division, one regiment to relieve a regiment of Hooker's division at Budd's Ferry; total, four regiments. I am also further ordered this morning by telegraph to send 4,000 men to relieve General Sumner at Manassas and Warrenton, that he may embark forthwith. In regard to the character and efficiency of the troops under my command, I have to state that nearly all the force is new and imperfectly disciplined; that several of the regiments are in a very disorganized condition from various causes which it is not necessary to state here; several regiments having been relieved from brigades which have gone into the field in consequence of their unfitness for service; the best regiments remaining having been selected to take their place. Two heavy artillery regiments and one infantry regiment, which had been drilled for some months in artillery service, have been withdrawn from the forts on the south side of the Potomac, and I have only been able to fill their places with very new infantry regiments entirely unacquainted with the duties of that arm, and of little or no value in their present position. I am not informed of the position which Major-General Banks is directed to take, but at this time he is, as I understand, on the other side of the Bull Run Mountains, leaving my command to cover the front from Manassas Gap (about 20 miles beyond Manassas) to Aquia Creek. I deem it my duty to state that, looking at the numerical strength and character of the force under my command, it is in my judgment entirely inadequate to and unfit for the important duty to which it is assigned. I regard it very improbable that the enemy will assail us at this point, but this belief is based upon the hope that they may be promptly engaged elsewhere and may not learn the number and character of the force left here. I have the honor to be, your obedient servant, JAS. S. WADSWORTH, Answer. WASHINGTON, D. C., April 2, 1862. In compliance with your instructions we have examined the papers submitted to us, and have the honor to make the following report: 1. The President's War Order, No. 3, dated March 8, requires that on taking up any new base of operations the city of Washington shall be left entirely secure. The other points of the order it is unnecessary to consider, as the enemy, since its date, have abandoned their position and batteries on the Potomac and retired behind the Rappahannock. 2. The council of general officers held at Fairfax Court-House, March 13, took place after the enemy had retired from Manassas and destroyed the railroads in their rear. The council decided unanimously to take up a new base of operations from Fort Monroe, and three of the generals, a majority, decided that the force necessary to be left should be sufficient to "fully garrison" the forts on the right bank of the Potomac, and to "occupy" those on the left bank with a covering force of 25,000. It is, we think, the judgment of officers that some 30,000 men would be necessary thus to man these forts, which, with the number of the covering force, would make a total of 55,000. 3. The President's directions of March 13 to General McClellan directs: 1st. To leave such a force at Manassas Junction as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy may not repossess it. 2d. That Washington shall be left entirely secure. 3d. That the remainder of the army move down the Potomac or move in pursuit of the enemy. In regard to occupying Manassas Junction, as the enemy have destroyed the railroads leading to it it may be fair to assume that they have no intention of returning for the reoccupation of their late posi tion, and therefore no very large force would be necessary to hold that position. 4. Major-General McClellan's report to the Adjutant-General of April 1, after giving the several positions of the troops proposed to be left for the defense of Washington, gives a representation as follows: And there would be left for the garrisons and the front of Washington, under General Wadsworth, some 18,000. In the above enumeration General Banks' army corps is included, but whether this force operating in the Shenandoah Valley should be regarded as part of the force available for the protection of the immediate front of Washington the undersigned express no opinion. 5. General Wadsworth's report of April 2 gives his force as follows: From this force General Wadsworth is directed to detach two good regiments to Richardson's division, Sumner's corps, which should be deducted from his command; one regiment to replace the Thirty-seventh New York in Heintzelman's old division, and one regiment to relieve a regiment of Hooker's division at Budd's Ferry; total, four regiments. He is also ordered to send 4,000 men to relieve Sumner at Manassas and Warrenton. General Wadsworth represents that he has no mounted light artillery under his command; states there are several companies of reserve artillery still here, but not under his command or fit for service. General Wadsworth further reports that nearly all the force is new and imperfectly disciplined; that several of the regiments are in a very disorganized condition, some of them having been relieved from brigades which have gone into the field in consequence of their unfitness for service, the best regiments remaining having been selected to take their places. Two heavy artillery regiments and one infantry regiment which had been drilled for months in artillery service have been withdrawn from the forts on the south side of the Potomac and their places supplied with new infantry regiments entirely unacquainted with the duties of that arm and of little or no value in their present position. If there was need of a military force for the safety of the city of Washington within its own limits that referred to in the report of General Wadsworth would seem to be entirely inadequate. In view of the opinion expressed by the council of the commanders of army corps of the force necessary for the defense of the capital, though not numerically stated, and of the force represented by General McClellan as left for that purpose, we are of opinion that the requirement of the President that this city shall be left entirely secure, not only in the opinion of the General-in-Chief, but that of the commanders of all the army corps also, has not been fully complied with. All of which is respectfully submitted. L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General. E. A. HITCHCOCK, Major-General Volunteers, U. S. Army. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, ORDER OF MARCH. Porter's and Hamilton's divisions, of the Third Army Corps, and Sedgwick's and Averell's cavalry, of the Second Army Corps, under Brigadier-General Heintzelman, will move on the 4th instant in the following order: Porter's division, with Averell's cavalry, at 6 a. m., over the New Market and New Bridges, on both roads, to Big Bethel and Howard's Bridge. This division will send forward to the batteries where the road to Ship Point diverges from the main Yorktown road a force sufficient to occupy that point and cut off the garrison of Ship Point batteries. The remainder of the division will camp at Howard's Creek. Hamilton's division will march at 7 a. m. by the road over the New Bridge to Big Bethel, and will camp as near as possible to Howard's Creek. Sedgwick's division will march at 8 a. m. over the New Market Bridge, taking the direct road to Big Bethel. This division will camp as close as possible to Hamilton's. The first two divisions of the Fourth Corps, under Brigadier-General Keyes, will move on the 4th instant at 6 a. m. by the James River road. Smith's division to Young's Mill, sending one brigade forward to the road from Big Bethel to Warwick. Couch's division will camp at Fisher's Creek. The reserve artillery and infantry will move at 9 o'clock on the 4th instant by the New Market Bridge and the direct road to Big Bethel, then taking the Warwick Court-House road, and camp in the vicinity of the junction of this road with the Young's Mill road. By command of Major-General McClellan: Assistant Adjutant-General. HAMPTON ROADS, April 3, 1862–12.15 a. m. Hon. E. M. STANTON: Have seen Goldsborough, and feel sure that he will crush the Merrimac if she appears. Hope to move to-morrow. My only trouble is the scarcity of wagons, but I will overcome the difficulty in some way or other. We shall not get through without a hard battle, and perhaps more than one, but I am confident that we will win. Hon. JOHN TUCKER, GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, HAMPTON ROADS, April 3, 1862—12.20 a. m. Assistant Secretary of War: We need many more tugs; please send ten more here at once. If you can procure promptly about six light-draught ferry-boats they would be of great use. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, |