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ANTI-TRUST ACT.

See COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 8.

APPEAL AND ERROR.

Review of judgment of Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

The review by this court of final judgments in civil cases of the Supreme
Court of the Territory of Oklahoma is not controlled by the act of 1874
in regard to territorial courts but by 9 of the act of May 2, 1890,
26 Stat. 81, 85, providing the territorial government for Oklahoma,
and in an action at law where a jury has been waived the review is by
writ of error as in the case of a similar judgment of a Circuit Court,
and not by appeal. Oklahoma City v. McMaster, 529.

See FEDERAL QUESTION;

JURISDICTION.

Status of cadet at military academy.

ARMY.

A cadet at the West Point Military Academy is not an officer of the United
States Army within the meaning of §§ 1229, 1342, Rev. Stat., and, if
delinquent, may be dismissed by the President without trial and con-
viction by court-martial. Hartigan v. United States, 169.

ARMY REGULATIONS.

See NAVY PERSONNEL ACT.

ARREST.

See JURISDICTION, A 6.

ATTESTATION.

See WILLS, 2.

AUTOMATIC COUPLERS.

1. Equipment amounting to non-compliance with law.

The equipment of cars with automatic couplers which will not automatically
couple with each other so as to render it unnecessary for men to go
between the cars to couple and uncouple is not a compliance with the
law. Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 1.

2. Scope of words "any car" in act of March 2, 1893.
Locomotive engines are included by the words "any car" contained in the

second section of the act of March 2, 1893, 27 Stat. 531, c. 196, re-
quiring cars engaged in interstate commerce to be equipped with auto-
matic couplers. And although they were also required by the first
section of the act to be equipped with power driving wheel brakes, the
rule that the expression of one thing includes others does not apply,
inasmuch as there was a special reason for that requirement and in

addition the same necessity for automatic couplers existed as to them
as in respect to other cars. A dining car regularly engaged in inter-
state traffic does not cease to be so when waiting for the train to make
the next trip. Ib.

3. Act of March 2, 1903, construed.

The act of March 2, 1903, 32 Stat. 943, c. 976, reiterates the view herein
expressed and is declaratory thereof. Ib.

AVULSION.

See BOUNDARIES.

BANKRUPTCY.

1. Exemptions: right of bankrupt dependent upon laws of State.

The rights of a bankrupt to exempt property are those given by the statutes
of the State, and if such exempt property is not subject to levy and sale
under those statutes, it cannot be made to respond under the Federal
bankrupt act. Smalley v. Laugenour, 93.

2. Exemptions: right of creditor to contest bankrupt's claim-Appeals.
A creditor may contest the bankrupt's claim to exemption in the bank-
ruptcy court, or may invoke the supervision and revision of the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, but, failing to do that, cannot, unless the order
setting the bankrupt's exemption apart be absolutely void, question
its validity in another proceeding in the state court. Nor can the
judgment of the state court, following the order of the bankruptcy court
and giving effect to the exemption be reviewed by this court on writ
of error under § 709, Rev. Stat., on the ground that plaintiff in error
was denied a title, right, privilege or immunity, under the Constitu-
tion or authority of the United States specially set up or claimed in
the state court. Ib.

3. Jurisdiction of bankruptcy court-Appeals.
The bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to determine on a claim asserted by
the bankrupt whether property in the hands of the trustee is exempt;
and while an erroneous decision against the asserted right may be
corrected in the appropriate mode for the correction of errors, the
jurisdiction of the court is not in issue within the meaning of the act
of March 3, 1891, and a direct appeal to this court will not lie. Lucius
v. Cawthon-Coleman Co., 149.

4. Preference-Sums collected for bankrupt and withheld by creditor not a
voidable preference-Creditor acting as trustee not entitled to set off sums
collected.

The bankrupt was largely indebted to a corporation whose laborers pur-
chased supplies from him; periodically he rendered the corporation a
statement of amounts due from its laborers which it deducted from
their wages and remitted to him in a lump sum. Prior to, and within
four months of, the filing of the petition, the corporation several times

deducted from its pay roll, amounts aggregating over $2,000, so due
by its laborers but did not pay them over, and on filing its claim it
embodied as an integral part thereof the amounts so deducted and
retained as a proper credit or offset. The Circuit Court of Appeals
found that the corporation retained the amounts with the knowledge
of the bankrupt's insolvency and with the intention to secure a prefer-
ence to that extent thereby, but that the bankrupt had no such in-
tention, and ordered that the entire claim be expunged unless the cor-
poration paid the amount so retained to the trustee. On appeal
objections were taken to the jurisdiction of this court. Held, that as
the claim to set off is controlled by and is necessarily based on the
provisions of § 68 of the Bankrupt Act and its construction is neces-
sarily involved, and the question is one which might have been taken
to this court on appeal or writ of error from the highest court of a
State, this court has jurisdiction of the appeal. Under the facts as
found below the deductions from pay roll did not give rise to a voidable
preference nor was the corporation entitled to credit them as a set-off
as they were not mutual debts and credits within the set-off clause of
the bankrupt act, but were collections made independently of other
transactions and as trustee for the bankrupt. The corporation was
entitled to prove its gross debt with the alleged set-off eliminated and
was a debtor to the bankrupt for the amount of such deductions, and
the court below has power to protect the bankrupt's estate in respect
to dividends to the corporation in case it should not discharge its
obligations. Western Tie and Timber Co. v. Brown, 502.

5. Preference not constituted by mortgagor consenting to mortgagee's possession
of mortgaged property within statutory period.
The enforcement of a lien by the mortgagee taking possession, with the
consent of the mortgagor, of after acquired property covered by a
valid mortgage made and recorded prior to the passage of the act, is
not a conveyance or transfer under the bankrupt act; and, where it
does not appear that it was done to hinder, delay or defraud creditors,
it does not constitute a preference under the act although at the time
of the enforcement the mortgagee may have known that the mort-
gagor was insolvent and considering going into bankruptcy and the
petition was filed within four months thereafter. Thompson v. Fair-
banks, 516.

6. Property rights of bankrupt after discharge-Effect of secretion from trustee.
If a claim owned by a bankrupt is of value his creditors are entitled to it,
and he cannot, by withholding knowledge of its existence from the
trustee, after obtaining a discharge of his debts, immediately assert
title to and collect the claim for his own benefit. First National Bank
v. Lasater, 115.

7. Provable debt-Arrears of alimony not provable debt barred by discharge.
A husband owes the duty of supporting his wife and children not because
of contractual relations with the wife but because of the policy of the

law which will enforce the duty if necessary and the bankruptcy act
was not intended to be a means of avoiding this obligation. Arrears
of alimony awarded to a wife against her husband for the support of
herself and their minor children, under a final decree of absolute divorce,
is not a provable debt barred by a discharge in bankruptcy, nor does
the fact that there is no reservation in the decree of the right to alter
or modify it deprive the debt of its character of being for the support of
the bankrupt's wife and children. The amendment of February 5,
1903, excepting decrees of alimony from the discharge in bankruptcy
was not new legislation creating a presumption that such decrees were
not excepted prior thereto, but was merely declaratory of the true
meaning and sense of the statute as originally enacted. Wetmore v.
Markoe, 68.

8. Trustee's right of election as to bankrupt's property.
While a trustee in bankruptcy is not bound to accept property of an onerous
or unprofitable character, and in case he declines to take it the bank-
rupt may assert title thereto, he is entitled to be informed of the prop-
erty and have a reasonable time to elect whether he will accept it or
not. First National Bank v. Lasater, 115.

BANKS AND BANKING.

Relation of bank to customer in the matter of checks deposited.

The deposit of checks in a bank and drawing against them by a customer
constitutes the relation of debtor and creditor and the bank becomes
the absolute owner of the checks so deposited, and not the agent of
the customer to collect them; this relation is not, in the absence of any
special agreement, affected by the right of the bank against the cus-
tomer, and his liability therefor, in case the checks are not paid. Bur-
ton v. United States, 283.

See NATIONAL BANKS;
CRIMINAL LAW, 2.

BILL OF LADING.

See MARITIME LAW.

BONDS.

See LOCAL LAW (S. C.);

TAXATION, 6, 8, 10.

BOUNDARIES.

1. Rivers-Accretion and avulsion defined-Change of boundary not affected
by avulsion.
Accretion is the gradual accumulation by alluvial formation and where a

boundary river changes its course gradually the parties on either side
hold by the same boundary-the center of the channel. Avulsion is
the sudden and rapid change in the course and channel of a boundary
river. It does not work any change in the boundary, which remains

as it was in the center of the old channel although no water may be
flowing therein. These principles apply alike whether the rivers be
boundaries between private property or between States and Nations.
Missouri v. Nebraska, 23.

2. Missouri River as boundary not affected by avulsion of 1867.
The boundary line between Missouri and Nebraska in the vicinity of Island
Precinct is the center line of the original channel of the Missouri River
as it was before the avulsion of 1867 and not the center line of the
channel since that time, although no water is now flowing through the
original channel. Nothing in the acts of 1820 and 1836 relating to
Missouri or the act admitting Nebraska into the Union indicates an
intent on the part of Congress to alter the recognized rules of law
fixing the rights of parties where a river changes its course by accre-
tion or by avulsion. Ib.

BURDEN OF PROOF.

See FEDERAL QUESTION, 4;
WILLS, 3.

CARRIERS.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1;
PRACTICE, 2.

CASES DISTINGUISHED.

Richmond & Alleghany R. R. Co. v. Tobacco Co., 169 U. S. 311, distinguished
from Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Murphey, 194.

CASES FOLLOWED.

American Express Co. v. Iowa, 196 U. S. 133, followed in Adams Express
Co. v. Iowa, 147.

Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343, followed in Cook v. Marshall County, 261.
Flanigan v. Sierra County, 196 U. S. 553, followed in Wheeler v. Plumas
County, 562.

Slavens v. United States, 196 U. S. 229, followed in Travis v. United States,
239.

CASES EXPLAINED.

1. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 344. The writ of error in this case was
dismissed because it did not appear that the commerce clause of the
Constitution was relied on in, was called to the attention of, or passed
on by the state court, and the case is inapposite where it appears that
the protection of commerce clause was properly set up, relied upon in,
and denied by, the state court. American Express Co. v. Iowa, 133.

2. Bowman v. Chicago, 125 U. S. 465, Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, Rhodes
v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412, Vance v. Vandercook Co., No. 1, 170 U. S. 438,
rest on the broad principle of the freedom of commerce between the
States, of the right of citizens of one State to freely contract to receive

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