See COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE.
1. Commerce clause-Unconstitutionality of sections 2317, 2318, Code of Georgia.
The imposition, by a state statute, upon the initial or any connecting carrier, of the duty of tracing the freight and informing the shipper, in writing, when, where, how and by which carrier the freight was lost, damaged or destroyed, and of giving the names of the parties and their official position, if any, by whom the truth of the facts set out in the informa- tion can be established, is, when applied to interstate commerce, a violation of the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution; and §§ 2317, 2318 of the Code of Georgia of 1895, imposing such a duty on common carriers is void as to shipments made from points in Georgia to other States (Richmond & Alleghany R. R. Co. v. Tobacco Company, 169 U. S. 311 distinguished). Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Murphey, 194.
See CASES EXplained, 2;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
2. Contracts, impairment of—Validity of chapter 578, Laws of Massachu- setts of 1898.
Chapter 578, Laws of Massachusetts of 1898, providing for taxation of street railway companies is not void, as violating the impairment of obligation clause of the Federal Constitution, so far as this case is con- cerned, because it relieved a railroad company from the obligation to pave and repair streets under the terms and conditions of certain municipal ordinances which the company had duly accepted. Wor- cester v. Street Railway Co., 539.
3. Due process of law-Failure of taxpayer to avail himself of opportunity to test validity of tax.
If the taxpayer be given an opportunity to test the validity of a tax at any time before it is made final, either before a board having quasi judicial character, or a tribunal provided by the State for that purpose, due process is not denied, and if he does not avail himself of the opportunity to present his defense to such board or tribunal, it is not for this court to determine whether such defense is valid. Hodge v. Muscatine County, 276.
4. Due process of law-Validity of section 5007, Iowa Code. Section 5007, Iowa Code, imposing a tax against every person and upon the real property and the owner thereof whereon cigarettes are sold does not give a license to sell cigarettes, nor is it invalid as depriving the owner of the property of his property without due process of law, because it does not provide for giving him notice of the tax, §§ 2441,
2442, Iowa Code, providing for review with power to remit by the board of supervisors. Ib.
See CORPORATIONS, 2;
EXTRADITION, 1; TAXATION, 9.
5. Ex post facto laws-Alteration of state criminal statute subsequent to com- mission of crime, held not within prohibition.
By chapter 99, March 9, 1903, Laws of North Dakota, the statutes in force when plaintiff in error committed the crime for which he was tried, and when the verdict of guilty was pronounced were altered to the follow- ing effect: Close confinement in the penitentiary for not less than six or more than nine months after judgment and before execution was substituted for confinement in the county jail for not less than three nor more than six months after judgment and before execution, and hanging within an inclosure at the penitentiary by the warden or his deputy was substituted for hanging by the sheriff in the yard of the jail of the county in which the conviction occurred. Held that the changes looked at in the light of reason and common sense are to be taken as favorable to the plaintiff in error, and that a statute which mitigates the rigor of the law in force at the time the crime was com- mitted cannot be regarded as ex post facto with reference to that crime. Held that close confinement does not necessarily mean solitary confine- ment and the difference in phraseology between close confinement and confinement is immaterial, each only meaning such custody as will insure the production of the criminal at the time set for execution. Held that the place of punishment by death within the limits of the States is not of practical consequence to the criminal. Rooney v. North Dakota, 319.
6. Equal protection of laws not denied by state taxation of retail dealers and not of others doing an interstate business.
A classification in a state taxation statute in which a distinction is made between retail and wholesale dealers is not unreasonable and § 5007, Iowa Code, imposing a tax on cigarette dealers is not invalid as deny- ing equal protection of the laws to retail dealers, because it does not apply to jobbers and wholesalers doing an interstate business with customers outside of the State. Cook v. Marshall County, 261.
7. Equal protection of laws-State taxation of franchise of corporation at different rates from tangible property.
A railroad company in Kentucky claimed as its only ground of Federal jurisdiction in an action in the Circuit Court of the United States against members of the state board of valuation and assessment that under the tax laws of the State it was deprived of equal protection of the laws contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment, because while the law of the State required all property to be taxed at its fair cash value there was a uniform and general undervaluation of other property but the company's property was taxed at its full value. There was conflicting testimony as to the valuations, most of the members of the board
testifying that they tried in good faith to reach fair cash values. Held, that the court will not intervene merely on the ground of a mistake in judgment on the part of the officer to whom the duty of assessment was entrusted by the law. It is not beyond the power of a State, so far as the Federal Constitution is concerned, to tax the franchise of a corporation at a different rate from the tangible property in the State. Coulter v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 599.
8. Fourteenth Amendment-Validity of Kansas Anti-Trust Act. The act of the legislature of Kansas of March 8, 1897, defining and pro- hibiting trusts, is not in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution as to a person convicted thereunder of com- bining with others to pool and fix the price, divide the net earnings and prevent competition in the purchase and sale of grain. Smiley v. Kansas, 447.
1. Effect of words "more or less" in contract to furnish goods.
In engagements to furnish goods to a certain amount the quantity specified governs. Words like "about" and "more or less" are only for the purpose of providing against accidental and not material variations. Under the contract in this case for delivery of "about" 5,000 tons of coal the United States cannot refuse to accept more than 4,634 tons but is liable for the difference in value on 366 tons tendered and acceptance refused. Moore v. United States, 157.
2. Custom and usage affecting --Demurrage.
Usage may be resorted to in order to make definite what is uncertain, clear up what is doubtful, or annex incidents, but not to vary or contradict the terms of a contract. Under contracts between a San Francisco coal dealer and the United States for the delivery of coal at Honolulu "at wharf" or "on wharf as customary," the customs referred to held to be those of Honolulu and not of San Francisco, and that the United States, in the absence of any provision to the contrary, could not be held liable for the demurrage paid by the shipper to the owners of vessels carrying the coal for delay in discharging their cargoes on account of the crowded condition of the harbor. Ib.
3. Construction of contract by United States for use of patented process— Denial, by United States, of validity of patent not available defense in
The United States made a contract with the steel company for the use of
a process described as patented. The contract provided that in case it should at any time be judicially decided "that the company was not legally entitled under the patent to the process and the product the payment of royalties should cease. In a suit by the company for royalties the United States attempted to deny the validity of the patent while admitting there was no outstanding decision against it. Held, that this defense was not open. Held further, that under the circumstances of this case, the contract, properly construed, extended to the process actually used even if it varied somewhat from that described in the patent. United States v. Harvey Steel Co., 310.
1. Right of creating power to impose regulations concerning ownership of stock. The sovereign that creates a corporation has the incidental right to impose reasonable regulations concerning the ownership of stock therein and it is not an unreasonable regulation to establish the situs of stock for purposes of taxation, at the principal office of the corporation whether owned by residents or non-residents, and to compel the corporation to pay the tax for the stockholders giving it a right of recovery therefor against the stockholders and a lien on the stock. Corry v. Mayor and Council of Baltimore, 466.
2. Validity of regulation establishing situs of stock for purposes of taxation. Where valid according to the laws of the State such a regulation does not deprive the stockholder of his property without due process of law either because it is an exercise of the taxing power of the State over persons and things not within its jurisdiction, or because notice of the assessment is not given to each stockholder, provided notice is given to the corporation and the statute either in terms, or as construed by the state court, constitutes the corporation the agent of the stockholders to receive notice and to represent them in proceedings for the correc- tion of the assessment. Ib.
3. Provisions of constitution and general laws of State as part of charter. While the liability of non-resident stockholders for taxes on his stock may
not be expressed in the charter of the company if it existed in the gen- eral laws of the State at the time of the creation of the corporation or the extension of its charter, and the constitution of the State also contained at such times the reserved right to alter, amend and repeal, VOL. CXCVI-42
those provisions of the constitution and general laws of the State are as much a part of the charter as if expressly embodied therein. Ib.
1. Federal Circuit Court as court of the State in which it sits-Controlling force of state law.
In the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon it of controversies between citizens of different States, a Circuit Court of the United States is for every practical purpose a court of the State in which it sits and will en- force the rights of the parties according to the law of that State taking care, as a state court must, not to infringe any right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States. And in a case of condemnation it would proceed under the sanction of, and enforce, the state law so far as it was not unconstitutional. Traction Company v. Mining Company, 239.
2. Rule as to interference by Federal court with State's administration of its
Where the only constitutional ground on which the complainant can come
into the Circuit Court obviously fails the court should be very cautious in interfering with the State's administration of its taxes upon other considerations which would not have given it jurisdiction. Coulter v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 599.
3. State-Power to prescribe extent of state statute.
The power in the state court to determine the meaning of a state statute carries with it the power to prescribe its extent and limitations as well as the method by which they shall be determined. Smiley v. Kansas, 447.
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