there may be and provides for a suit brought by a stockholder against
the corporation and other parties on rights which may be properly
asserted by the corporation, and when such a suit is between citizens
of different States and is not collusive, but the corporation is con-
trolled by interests antagonistic to complainant, it involves a contro-
versy which is cognizable in a Circuit Court of the United States, and
the defendant corporation is not to be classed on the same side of the
controversy as complainant for the purpose of determining the diversity
of citizenship on which the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court must rest.
Doctor v. Harrington, 579.

3. Scope of power in case removed on ground of diversity of citizenship.
When a case has been removed into the Circuit Court of the United States
on the ground of diversity of citizenship, that court is entitled to pass
on all questions arising, including the question of jurisdiction over the
subject matter in the state courts or the sufficiency of mesne process
to authorize the recovery of personal judgment. The right to remove
for diversity of citizenship, as given by a constitutional act of Congress,
cannot be taken away or abridged by state statutes and the case being
removed the Circuit Court has power to so deal with the controversy
that the party will lose nothing by his choice of tribunals. Courtney
v. Pradt, 89.

LIVE STOCK.

See COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE.

LOCAL LAW.

California. County ordinance imposing license (see Statutes, A 1). Flani-
gan v. Sierra County, 553.

District of Columbia. See District of Columbia.

Georgia. Carriers, sections 2317, 2318, Code of 1895 (see Constitutional
Law, 1). Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Murphey, 194.

Iowa. Taxation, sections 5007, 2441, 2442, Code (see Taxation, 3). Hodge
v. Muscatine County, 276 (see Constitutional Law, 4). Ib. Sec-
tion 5007 (see Constitutional Law, 6). Cook v. Marshall County, 261.
Kansas. Anti-trust act of March 8, 1897 (see Constitutional Law, 8).
Smiley v. Kansas, 447.

Kentucky. Condemnation of lands (see Action). Traction Company v.
Mining Company, 239.

Massachusetts. Chapter 578, Laws of 1898 (see Constitutional Law, 2).
Worcester v. Street Railway Co., 539.

Montana. Code, section 3612 (see Public Lands, 3). Butte City Water
Co. v. Baker, 119.

New Mexico. Service of process, Compiled Laws of 1897 (see Process).
Caledonian Coal Co. v. Baker, 432.

New York. Foreign corporations (see Federal Question, 1). Allen v.
Alleghany Co., 458.

North Dakota. Criminal law, chapter 99, March 9, 1903 (see Constitu-
tional Law, 5). Rooney v. North Dakota, 319.

Ohio. Taxation (see Taxation, 8). Scottish Union & Nat. Ins. Co. v.
Bowland, 611.

Pennsylvania. Foreign corporations (see Federal Question, 1). Allen v.
Alleghany Co., 458.

Porto Rico. Estates of decedents-Rights of heir ab intestato-Payment by

debtor to designated heir during pendency of proceedings by other heirs.
Under the law of Porto Rico while an heir to an intestate may assert
his rights against one already designated heir ab intestato any time
within five years after the decree of designation, the heir so designated
may within the five-year period collect debts due to the intestate's
estate and, where the payment is made in good faith and under the
order of the court into which the money was paid by the debtor, and
without notice of existence and claims of other heirs, discharge the
debtor from liability, notwithstanding such other heirs subsequently
assert their claims and are also designated as joint heirs ab intestato.
Where, however, the debtor has legal notice from the court where the
matter is pending that one not originally designated has asserted and
is prosecuting a claim to recognition as an heir ab intestato, any pay-

ments he makes to the one first designated are at his own peril and
liability to account to the other heir after his claim has been estab-
lished for his proportionate share, and the debtor is not protected by
a decree and order of the court directing payment to the assignee of the
heir originally designated in a proceeding to which such asserting heir
was not a party. Where the payment to the heir originally designated
is made before the debt is due and after the other heir has asserted his
claim, and under circumstances indicating collusion, it is for the jury
to determine whether the payment was made in good faith and with-
out knowledge of the rights of the asserting heir. Sixto v. Sarria, 175.
South Carolina. Issuance of evidences of state indebtedness forbidden by
constitution. Article IX, § 10, of the constitution of South Carolina
of 1868, forbidding, except as specially authorized in the constitution,
the issue of scrip or other evidence of state indebtedness except for the
redemption of existing indebtedness of the State, forbade the issue of
scrip under an act passed in 1872 to take up the State's guaranty of rail-
road bonds under an act passed in 1868 subsequent to the ratification of
the constitution, notwithstanding that acts had been passed in 1852
and 1854 authorizing such guaranty. it appearing that the guaranty
had not actually been endorsed on the bonds prior to the ratification
of the constitution and that the act of 1868 was not an adjustment of
an old debt but the granting of new aid to the railroad and the au-
thorizing of an original issue of bonds. Lee v. Robinson, 64.

See COURTS, 1.

LOCUS CRIMINIS.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 2.

MAILS.

1. Contract for carriage; power of Postmaster General to terminate.
Under the mail contract in this case, which was made in pursuance of the
Postal Laws and Regulations, and after the service had materially de-
creased by changed methods of transporting mail and the Postmaster
General had offered the contractor, who had refused to accept it, the
remaining work at a lower compensation, it was within the power of
the Postmaster General to put an end to the contract by order of
discontinuance, allowing one month's pay as indemnity, and to relet
the remaining service; the power to terminate the contract on allowing
a month's pay as indemnity was not predicated on an abandonment
of the entire service. Slavens v. United States, 229.

2. Contract for carriage; changed service within.
While the provisions in a similar contract that the contractor should per-
form without additional compensation all new or changed service that
the Postmaster General should order, might not be construed as ex-
tending to services of different character and not within the terms of
the contract, where the changed service is to take the mail to and from
street cars, met at crossings, instead of landings and stations, it comes

within the power reserved to the Postmaster General and the con-
tractor is not entitled to additional compensation therefor. Ib.

3. Contract by local postmaster not binding on Government.
In the absence of authority shown, a local postmaster has no power or au-
thority to contract in respect to mail messenger service, and is not the
agent of nor can he bind the Government for that purpose, and if a
contractor performs services which he protests against as not being
within his contract, solely on the postmaster's order, he is not entitled
to extra compensation therefor after his protest has been sustained
and the service let to others. Ib.

MARITIME LAW.

Liability, under Harter Act, for damages due to negligence in unloading cargo
-Application of act to foreign vessels.

A foreign vessel from Liverpool arrived at its destination, New York, and
made fast to the wharf. Owing to unusual gales and weather she was
heavily weighted with snow and ice and made top heavy. While the
cargo was being unloaded she suddenly rolled over and sank, damag-
ing the cargo remaining in her, some of which had been shipped from
points east of Liverpool on bills of lading to Liverpool, thence to be
forwarded to New York, and containing certain exemptions of the
carrier from liability. The owners and insurers of cargo libelled the
vessel; it was found by the District Court and the Circuit Court of
Appeals that the damage was due to negligence in unloading cargo
and ruled that the negligence fell within section one of the Harter Act
and not within section three of the same as negligence in the naviga-
tion or management of the vessel. Held, that this court will not go
behind the findings of the two courts as to negligence and that the
rule was correct. When a case may fall under section one and sec-
tion three of the Harter Act the question which section is to govern
must be determined by the primary nature and object of the acts which
cause the loss. Semble. The standard of conduct is external and
not merely co-extensive with the judgment of the individual. The
Harter Act will be applied to foreign vessels in suits brought in the
United States, and where claimants set up and rely upon the act they
must take the burden with the benefits and cannot claim a greater
limitation of liability under provisions of bills of lading. The Germanic,
589.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

Safe appliances-Increased hazard-Knowledge of employé.

An employé is entitled to assume that his employer has used due care to
provide reasonably safe appliances for the doing of his work. Knowl-
edge of the increased hazard resulting from the negligent location in
dangerous proximity to a railroad track of a structure will not be
imputed to an employé, using ordinary diligence to avoid it if properly
located, because he was aware of its existence and general location.
It is for the jury to determine from all the evidence whether he had

actual knowledge of the danger. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Swearin-
gen, 51.

MINING CLAIMS.

Adverse proceeding by owner of tunnel against patentee of lode claim held not

necessary.

As between the Government and the locator, it is not a vital fact that there
was a discovery of mineral in a lode claim before the commencement
of any of the steps required to perfect a location, and by accepting the
entry, and confirming it by a patent, the Government does not deter-
mine as to the order of proceedings prior to the entry but only that all
required by law had been taken. Adverse proceedings, are called for
only when one mineral claimant contests the right of another mineral
claimant, and, as a tunnel is not a mining claim but only a means of
exploration, the owner, prior to discovery of a lode or vein within the
tunnel, is not bound to adverse the application for the patent of a lode
claim, the lode of which was discovered on the surface; and his omis-
sion to do so does not preclude him from asserting a right prior to the
date of discovery named in the certificate of location on which the
patent for the surface lode claim is based. Mining Company v. Tunnel
Company, 337.

MINES AND MINING.

See MINING CLAIMS;
PUBLIC LANDS, 3.

MONOPOLIES.

See COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE.

MORTGAGE.

Analogous nature of chattel mortgage and deed of trust.

A deed of trust and a chattel mortgage with power of sale are practically
one and the same instrument as understood in the District of Columbia.
Hunt v. Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co., 47.

See BANKRUPTCY, 5;
FEDERAL QUESTION, 2.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

1. Defined as creature of the State.

The city is the creature of the State. A municipal corporation is simply
a political subdivision of the State existing by virtue of the exercise
of the power of the State through its legislative department. Wor-
cester v. Street Ry. Co., 539.

2. Property rights of---Obligation of street railways to repair streets.
While a municipal corporation may own property not of a public or govern-
mental nature which is entitled to constitutional protection, the ob-
ligation of a railroad company to pave and repair streets occupied by
VOL. CXCVI-43