A person who has opened and improved a coal mine on the public domain in order to secure a preference right must file his papers within 60 days after the date of actual possession and the commencement of the improvements on land, except in case where the township plat is not filed in the district office. Ackert, In re, 17 L. D. 268, p. 269. A coal-land claimant who appears at the receiver's office on the last day of the life of his claim and during business hours, is within time, though he is prevented from submitting his final proof and making payment because of the receiver's office being closed. Skoyen v. Harris, 24 L. D. 46, p. 49. No right is gained by filing a declaratory statement before coal is discovered and developed on the land. Reed v. Nelson, 29 L. D. 615, p. 620. Coal-land filings and entries can be allowed only after the land has been surveyed. Rider, In re, 42 L. D. 505. The claimant must, when the township plat is on file, make and file his declaratory statement for the tract claimed 60 days from and after the first day of his actual possession and improvements; and 60 days, exclusive of the first day of such possession, must be allowed. Circular, In re, 1 L. D. 687, p. 691. The 60-day period for the filing of declaratory statement does not mean 60 days from the date on which the locator enters into possession of the tract and commences the prosecution of the work, but refers to the origin and existence of the preference right provided for in the preceding section. Morrison, In re, 36 L. D. 126, p. 129. From the date a mine is opened upon the coal and improvements thereon commenced and possession is taken the period of 60 days within which a declaratory statement may be filed begins to run, and within that time the preference right acquired by the preceding sections may be exercised, or it may be preserved and continued by filing the declaratory statement provided for by this section. Morrison, In re, 36 L. D. 126, p. 129. A delay in the presentation of the declaratory statement can not operate to enlarge the right beyond that fixed by the statute and which can be enjoyed only by filing within the time limited. Morrison, In re, 36 L. D. 319, p. 322. C. FILING AFTER TOWNSHIP PLAT IS FILED. Claims for a preference right of entry must be presented within 60 days after the date of actual posession and the commencement of actual improvements if the township plat is on file, otherwise the filing must be made within 60 days from the receipt of such plat. Broad v. Ray, 20 L. D. 422, p. 423. Lyon, In re, 20 L. D. 556. Town Site of Coalville, In re, 4 C. L. O. 46, p. 47. Where the absence of the township plat prevents earlier filing, the period for filing is extended 60 days from the receipt of such plat and the period for purchase is extended 1 year longer, or 1 year and 60 days from the filing of the plat. Rose v. Dinneen, 26 L. D. 107, p. 110. d. TIME IN ALASKA. See 31 Stat. 658, p. 782; 33 Stat. 525, p. 783. Coal claimants in Alaska, under the act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat. 525), are given one year from making their locations within which to file notices of their claims, and such notices are required to be filed in the proper recording district and with the register and receiver of the local land office. Alaskan Coal Lands, In re, 27 Op. Atty. Gen. 412, p. 413. 6. TIME FOR MAKING PROOF AND PAYMENT. The law does not require that the purchase of coal land shall be made within one year from the filing of the declaratory statement, but the regulations give one year from and after the expiration of the period allowed for filing the declaratory statement in which to make proof and payment. Rose v. Dinneen, 26 L. D. 107, p. 109. The time of filing of a segregation plat may be taken as the point from which to compute the time within which a purchase of the coal lands must be made, and an application to purchase made 1 year and 60 days from the filing of a segregation plat is in time. Rose v. Dinneen, 26 L. D. 107, p. 110. 7. WHEN FILING IS UNNECESSARY. Where the privilege of postponing entry in the manner provided for by this and the following section, after a preference right of entry has been acquired, is not desired by a claimant, then the filing of a declaratory statement before application or entry is not necessary and is not required; and in such case, even where a claimant fails to make application to enter and pay for the lands within 60 days, neither his failure in this respect, nor his failure to file his declaratory statement, would operate to forfeit his right to purchase and enter the land except in faver of some other qualified application. Lehmer v. Carroll, 34 L. D. 447, p. 451. 8. PROOF AFTER FILING. On filing the declaratory statement required by this section the entryman of coal lands must prove his right and pay for the land within one year of the time prescribed for filing his claim, in default of which his preference right expires. Coal Lands, In re, 1 L. D. 540, p. 541. 9. GROUNDS FOR REJECTING. An entry for coal lands will not be permitted where the lands contain no outcroppings or other surface indications of coal and where none was discovered in a shaft sunk by the applicant and a declaratory statement previously made is void. McGillicuddy v. Tompkins, 14 L. D. 633, p. 634. The offer to file coal declaratory statements should be rejected where at such time the tract is covered by a valid homestead entry. Bullard v. Flannagan, 11 L. D. 515, p. 517. A declaratory statement may be rejected where the Land Department is satisfied that it is filed in the interest of others. Durango Land, etc., Co., In re, 18 L. D. 382, p. 384. 10. SINGLE FILING ONLY PERMITTED- -EXCEPTIONS. While the statute does not expressly limit a party to one filing of a declaratory statement, it also does not expressly give him the right to more than one, but provides that on the prescribed condition he shall be entitled to a preference right of entry and the departmental regulations limiting a party to one filing is not in conflict with any express provision of the statute and the regulation is needful for carrying into effect the provisions of the law. Eisemann, In re, 10 L. D. 539, p. 540. A construction which will admit a second filing as to mineral claims would allow an indefinite number successively for the same or different tracts and a party might continue to file for the same tract of land until he had exhausted the coal therein. Eisemann, In re, 10 L. D. 539, p. 540. The prohibition against more than one coal entry does not relate strictly to the filing of a declaratory statement, but a second statement may be filed on giving valid reasons for failure to prove title under the first. McMillan, In re, 7 L. D. 181, p. 182. E. NOTICE-FAILURE TO GIVE-EFFECT. The failure to file the notice required by this section, or to pay for the land within the required period, renders the land subject to entry by any other qualified applicant, and in either event the preference right acquired under the preceding section is lost. Morrison, In re, 36 L. D. 126, p. 129. The notice required of the filing of the approved plat of a survey of a township, or when an amendment thereto adds to the area of public lands included therein, is not necessary on the filing of a segregation plat. Rose v. Dinneen, 26 L. D. 107, p. 110. SECTION 2350, REVISED STATUTES. The three preceding sections shall be held to authorize only one entry by the same person or association of persons; and no association of persons any member of which shall have taken the benefit of such sections, either as an individual or as a member of any other association, shall enter or hold any other lands under the provisions thereof; and no member of any association which shall have taken the benefit of such sections shall enter or hold any other lands under their provisions; and all persons claiming under section 2348 shall be required to prove their respective rights and pay for the lands filed upon within one year from the time prescribed for filing their respective claims; and upon failure to file the proper notice, or to pay for the land within the required period, the same shall be subject to entry by any other qualified applicant. A. COAL-LAND ENTRY. B. DECLARATORY STATEMENT PURPOSE, p. 778. A. COAL-LAND ENTRY. 1. CONSTRUCTION AND APPLICATION OF SECTION. 2. EXTENT OF PROHIBITION. 3. SINGLE ENTRY ONLY PERMITTED. 4. SECOND FILING PERMITTED EXCUSE. 5. ENTRIES IN ALASKA-SURVEYED LANDS. 6. ENTRY BY AGENT PROHIBITED. 7. CORPORATION CAN NOT ENTER BY OFFICERS OR DUMMIES. 8. CONSPIRACY TO ENTER. 9. DISQUALIFIED PERSONS. 10. DISQUALIFIED ASSOCIATIONS. 11. DISQUALIFIED CORPORATIONS. 12. ASSIGNMENT OF INTEREST BY RIGHTS. ENTRYMAN-EFFECT AND 13. TIME FOR MAKING PROOF AND PAYMENT. 14. FAILURE TO MAKE PROOF AND PAY WITHIN TIME-EFFECT. 15. FAILURE TO COMPLETE ENTRY-EFFECT OF ADVERSE CLAIM. 16. TIME FOR MAKING PROOF IN ALASKA. 1. CONSTRUCTION AND APPLICATION OF SECTION. This section can not be construed to permit the doing by indirection of that which the statute expressly declares shall not be done. United States v. Keitel, 211 U. S. 370, p. 388. The construction of this statute in a civil case may be applied in a criminal case subsequently arising. United States v. Keitel, 211 U. S. 370, p. 392. The right to sell coal lands lawfully acquired neither directly nor indirectly implies the authority to unlawfully acquire such coal lands in violation of an express statute. United States v. Keitel, 211 U. S. 370, p. 389. 2. EXTENT OF PROHIBITION. It is definitely settled that the prohibitions contained in this section apply to all entries for coal lands whether or not there has been a prior location and possession by an entryman under the preceding sections. United States v. Allen, 180 Fed. 855, p. 860. The prohibition can not be read out of the statute and thereby cause it to be inoperative by permitting a disqualified person to enter by an agent coal lands which he himself is prohibited from doing. United States v. Keitel, 211 U. S. 370, p. 388. The absence of a limitation on the power to sell coal lands after properly acquiring them affords no ground for saying that the express prohibition of the statute against more than one entry by the same person should not be enforced according to its plain meaning. United States v. Keitel, 211 U. S. 370, p. 389. United States v. Munday, 222 U. S. 175. The construction of this statute as to its limitations on the right of entry is not based upon the question of public policy alone, but upon the express prohibition to the effect that one person is permitted to make but one entry. United States v. Keitel, 211 U. S. 370, p. 392. United States v. Munday, 222 U. S. 175. The limitation in this section prohibiting any other person from making more than one coal-land entry is part of the amendments of the coal mining laws making them applicable to Alaska. United States v. Doughten, 186 Fed. 226, p. 232.. 3. SINGLE ENTRY ONLY PERMITTED. This section permits only one entry by the same person or association of persons, and an entry will not be permitted which is in contravention of this provision. Peterson, In re, 6 L. D. 371, p. 372. McGillicuddy v. Tompkins, 14 L. D. 633. Durango Land, etc., Co., In re, 18 L. D. 382, p. 384. Burrell, In re, 29 L. D. 328, p. 330. Hutchings, In re, 4 C. L. O. 142. Northern Pac. Coal Co., In re, 7 L. D. 422. Only one entry by the same person or association of persons can be made, and no association of persons, any member of which shall have taken the benefit of the preceding section, either as an individual or as a member of any other association, shall enter or hold any other location. Kerr v. Utah-Wyoming Imp. Co., 2 L. D. 727, p. 729. This section permits but one entry by one person or association of persons, and such entry when made under section 2347 is limited to 160 acres by one individual person or 320 acres by an association of persons severally qualified. Peterson, In re, 6 L. D. 371, p. 373. This section expressly limits the rights of individual coal entrymen and the rights of an association of persons, any member of which shall have taken the benefit of the preceding sections, either as an individual or as a member of any other association. Dally, In re, 41 L. D. 295, p. 301. Stough, In re, 41 L. D. 616, p. 620. |