blance of punishment may even be a thing understood all round. As yet, nothing more than imprisonment is known to have taken place; and it is very poffible that final impunity may attend Wafcovich and his colleagues; though, from the character of the directory, if neceffary to their purpofes, they would find no difficulty in the facrifice of these men, by hurrying them to the guillotine after a mock trial, or by giving them, as in the cafe of Carnot, a fecret paffport to the other world.

This comment upon the affair, is juftified by the facts afcertained in our cafe. The participation of the French minifter for foreign relations, in the propofitions of the fecret agents to our envoys, admits of no queftion. To be convinced of this, we have only to compare the declarations and propofals of the agents with thofe of the minifter himself.

In the communications of thofe agents, the leading ideas are, that the directory were greatly, incenfed at fome paffages in the prefident's fpeech; that reparation must be made for them; that money might be a fubftitute for other reparation; that this money was to be offered by our envoys, and to ferve as pocket-money, as a gratuity for the directory; and that in addition to it there must be a loan to the republic, in the fhape of a purchase of Dutch refcriptions, or in fome other shape. The gratu

ity to be about £.50,000 fterling. The fame ideas fubftantially appear in the conferences with Talley rand himself. In that of the 28th October, he begins by ftating that the directory had paffed an arrete, in which they had demanded of the envoys an explanation of fome parts, and reparation for other parts of the prefident's fpeech to congrefs; that he was fenfible difficulties would exift on the part of the envoys rela tive to the demand, but that by their offering money, he thought he could prevent the effect of the arrete.

The characteristic features in both cafes are, offence given by the speech,

reparation to be demanded by the directory, and a commutation of the required reparation for money. The only difference is, that the agents call this pocket-money for the directory, a gratuity, &c. while the minifter gives it no fpecific name or deftination. But, we difcover ftill more clearly, from what follows, that he means the fame thing with the agents. The envoy having anfwered, that he and his colleagues had no power to make a loan, but could fend one of their number for inftructions on the propofition, if deemed expedient, provided that the other objects of the negociation could be difcuffed and adjufted: Talleyrand replied, that this matter about the money must be fettled directly, without fending to America; that he would not communicate the arrete for a week; and that if the envoys could adjuft the difficulty with refpect to the Speech, an application would, nevertheless, go to the United States for a loan. The loan is here manifeftly a different thing from the money to be advanced for reparation. The laft must be arranged immediately, though the firft might wait the iffue of an application to the government of this country. The firit is plainly the .50,coo fterling for pocket-money; the laft is the contribution by way of loan to the republic. This coincidence fixes definitively the concert between the minifter and the agents, and traces unequivocally to the former, the double demand of a bribe and a loan. The conclufion is inevitable.

It is also confirmed by what took place on the 17th December. When one of our envoys mentioned to the minifter, that the perfon defignated as Y, had that morning made him propofitions (alluding to thofe for the gratuity and loan) the minifter replied, that the information which Y had given was just, and might always be relied upon. This was explicitly to recognize Y as his agent, and to authorize the giving of credit to his propofitions. A quibble has been ftarted on this point. It is pretend

ed, that the declaration that the information given by Y was juft, did not import that the propofitions he had made were authorized. But, befides that it was natural to look for vaguenefs of expreffion in fo myfterious and fo foul a tranfaction; as the term information was used in reply to the fuggeftion that propofitions had been made, it must neceflarily be underderstood to intend that the information, which Y had given in reference to the propofitions fpoken of by the envoy, was juft and might be relied upon. Again, information was the moft apt term that could have been employed. Y and the other agents profeffed not to make propofitions, but to inform our envoys what propofitios made by them were likely to be acceptable.

Such are the wretched fhifts to which the factious adherents of France are driven in the attempt to obfcure the truth, and to mislead their countrymen. Their futility is palpable. It is evident that the agents, who conferred with our envoys, were not impoftors, but were truly the emiffaries of the French minifter; and that their most odious propofitions were not only fanctioned, but even reiterated by him. The connection between the minifter and the directory, from the nature of the thing, can only be inferred from his office and from his perfonal character. The moft circumfpect man in the world, it is utterly incredible that he would hazard himself in fuch a way, unlefs, acting for the directory, he was affured of their omnipotent fupport. Whether he be himself a mercenary partaker of the bribes which are extorted, or only the inftrument of the rapacity of the directory to maintain his influence with them, for the accomplishment of fome great ulterior defign, muft be referred to time, and is of little moment to the United States.

Whatever, then, may have been the cafe with refpect to the Portuguese minifter, it is demonftrated that our envoys have not been, as alleged,

the dupes of unauthorized agents; but have had the dexterity to afcertain the corruption and oppreffion from the mouth of the minifter himfelf. The probability is, that in the other inftance, likewife, the corrup tion which is now denied, did really exift; as it moft certainly does in our cafe; though it is to be looked for, that here alfo it will be denied, and our envoys, if within the grafp of the monfters, made the victims of their fraudulent tyranny. The abject partifans of France, anticipating this refult, are preparing the way for its juftification.

DETECTOR.
Philad. January 13, 1798.

From the Aurora.
The Catastrophe.-No. I.
HE crifis is arrived, which was

foreseen by the philofopher, and predicted by the friends of liberty and peace. Perhaps hiftory cannot furnish an example of a nation rushing with fuch rapidity from profperity to ruin, as that unhappily exhibited by our own country. The termination of the late war with Great Britain, left the United States with a character admired by the world, and with profpects flattering to the patriot, and confolatory to the philanthropift. The flight web which bound us together under the confederation was ftrengthened in its texture, without any of thofe rude shocks that mark political changes in the trans-Atlantic world. The conftituonal machine, the work of compromife and peace, began to move with eafe, commerce railed its head, agriculture revived, and a general elafticity feemed to pervade the community, when a new era in human affairs commenced in the French revo lution. Unhappily for the United States, this event was viewed either with the eye of jealoufy or of abhorrence by the American administration, from the moment the republic of France was announced to the world. This difpofition of jealou

fy or of hoftility is the caufe of all the evils under which we at prefent labour. It is in the weakness or wickedness of the administration, that we must look for an explanation of thofe ills which afflict our country. It is far from my intention to justify the feverities which have been exercifed by the government of France on unoffending individuals; perhaps true magnanimity would have dictata more generous policy. My object is to fhow, that the fyftematic efforts of the adminiftration have generated thofe evils which we all experience, and have raised thofe dark clouds in the political horizon, that menace ferious calamity.

It will be recollected, that in the day of our revolutionary difficulty, when we had to contend with a nation whose ferocity was commenfurate to its power, a nation whose object and whofe efforts were to fubjugate these ftates; France extended her hand to us in friendship, and as an evidence of her fincerity, bound herself to us in a treaty of alliance. The laws of nations and the obligations of morality, made no change in this pact, when the government of France experienced a tranfition from monarchy to republicanifm. Under the faith of that treaty, and under an impreffion that the preffure of our revolutionary difficulties would beget a fympathy for her fituation, did the infant republic difpatch a minifter, charged with full powers to ftrengthen the bonds of amity which united the two nations. The American administration kept aloof from the overtures made by the minifter of the French republic, and parried every attempt to ftrengthen the bonds of amity, by diplomatic fineffe. Nay, fuch was the fecret hoftility to the caufe of France, that the prefident of the United States balanced as to the propriety of recognizing the minifter of the republic, or of acknowledging the agent of the pretended regent, who was then in this city, and in habits of the ftricteft intimacy with the chief of the prefident's council.

Q. 3. If received, fhall it be abfolutely or with qualifications; and and if with qualifications, of what kind?

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Q4. Are the United States obliged by good faith, to confider the treaties heretofore made with France, as applying to the prefent fituation of the parties? May they renounce them, or hold them fufpended till the government of France fhall be eftablished?

"Q. 5. If they have the right, is it expedient to do either, and which?

Q. 6. If they have an option, would it be a breach of neutrality to confider the treaty ftill in operation?

Q7. If the treaties are to be confidered as now in operation, is the guarantee in the treaty of alliance applicable to a defenfive war only, or to a war either offenfive or defenfive?

Q. 8. Does the war in which France is engaged, appear to be offenfive or defenfive on her part; or of a mixed and equivocal character?

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Q. 9. If of a mixed and equivocal character, does the guarantee in any event apply to fuch a war?

Q. 10. What is the effect of a guarantee, fuch as that to be found in the treaty of alliance between the United States and France?

refufe to recognize the minister of the republic, and to receive the agent of the regent, every infidious mean was employed to produce that effect indirectly, which would have involved the authors in difgrace, and rendered their schemes abortive, if openly avowed. The minifter Genet was thwarted in every measure; embarraffments were multiplied upon him at every step he took-every artifice was employed to produce irritation in a mind keenly fenfible of the interefts of its country, and alive to the great caufe of humanity. The calculations were well conceived, the means certain of the end in view, and the effects were a natural result. To render the minister odious, was to compromit the caufe of his nation; for it is an unfortunate feature in human affairs, that the caufe in which men embark, however lauconfounding principles with their dable, too frequenly fuffers injury by thrown off his pivot by the wiles of agency. Perhaps the minifter was his antagonists, and committed some indifcretions; be this, however, as it

may,

ed by the adminiftration, and the he was entrapped and denouncFrench nation was implicated in the denunciation.

Previously to the rupture between him and the adminiftration, overtures were made by him to draw the two nations clofer, by a treaty mutually comprehenfive of their interefts. A fubterfuge, by no means honourable, was reforted to by the administration, to prevent the fatal confequences to their views which would refult from a more intimate connection. The minifter was told, that the fenate was in recefs, and that, therefore, a negociation could not be entered upon. An influential fecretary predicted at this period, that the republic of France would not left three months; to delay the negociation, then, until the meeting of the fenate, was, in his view, to delay it until the republic fhould be in the management of his Pilnitz friends. No ftumbling-block of this fort was thrown in the way of the

British negociation; for the fenate was kept ignorant, that a treaty was the object of Jay's miffion, until it was actually concluded. Evidence cannot be ftronger, of the early hoftility of the adminiftration to the French republic, and of its affection for Great Britain. The memorable declaration of the late prefident, that the friends of France, were "the partizans of war and confufion", need not be recurred to, in proof of this pofition.

It will be unneceffary, and perhaps tedious, to bring into view the fubordinate circumftances of embarrassment to France, which arofe out of the fovoritifm of the admiftration for Great Britain. Let us pafs to that inftrument of ruin, the British treaty. After a declaration had been made to the minister of the French republic, that no negociation with him could be entered upon, because the fenate was in recefs, was mr. Jay taken from the prefidency of the bench of the fupreme court of the United States, as a special envoy, to negociate a treaty with Great Britain, without the privity or confent of that fenate, whofe concurrence had been declared previously neceffary to a negociation. A veil of the deepest secrecy covered this tranfaction. The diffimulation of the administration on this fubject was profound. The minifter Fauchet was affured, that nothing more was intended by the miffion, than to obtain a redrefs of wrongs, that a treaty was not contemplated by the executive. Mr. Monroe was inftructed to give fimilar affurances to the government of France. Thus, while the adminiftration were actually negociating a treaty with Great Britain, was the belief imposed upon the French republic, that a treaty was not meditated. Was fuch a conduct juft or honourable? Was it calculated to keep up a good understanding with a nation with whom we were in treaty? If this treaty contained no features of hoftility to France, the hypocrify and treachery of the adminiftration might have ef

caped her contempt or her indignation; but when there was fuperadded to the vileft hypocrify and treachery, a facrifice of her juft claims upon us, refentment must have been looked for as a natural effect from a caufe of our own creation. This treaty contains not only a dereliction of our engagements with France; but the neutral rights of our country are by it completely furrendered into the hands of Great Britain. If ftipulations fo hoftile to an ally merited a better treatment than we have received, it must have been looked for, rather from the magnanimity of the French republic, than from the texture of our own virtues. No one in the leaft converfant with the affairs of the United States, whose mind foars above party prejudice, but must admit, that the British treaty is the fource from whence have iffued all our embaraffments and all our misfortunes. It exhibits fuch palpable evidence of attachment to Great Britain and enmity to the French republic, that the French government must have been blind to their own intereft or traitors to their own country's caufe, if their indignation remained unexcited. By it, the pofition the adminiftration affected to take at the commencement of the war, by the declaration of neutrality, was completely abandoned; and the United States were made acceffaries of the Pilnitz coalition, by a change in the ftate of things which gave to the enemy of France additional refources.

NESTOR.

Philad. April 16, 1798.

No. III.

IT is an ungracious duty to profecute an enquiry into the mifconduct of a government. The partizans of it, whofe mouths are already stopped from clamour by fops, or are wide ftretched to receive them, bellow forth the direft imprecations against every attempt to rend the veil of governmental iniquity. They have already been boisterous here, and doom thofe to the fate of Dathan, and Abiram,