Der Krieg gegen den Mullah im Somalilande.

1901-1902.*)

Nr. 12953. GROSSBRITANNIEN. - Generalkonsul Sadler an den Staatssekretär des Ausw. Swayne verfolgt den

Mullah; er fragt, ob er italienisches Gebiet berühren darf.

Camp, Sheikh, June 20, 1901. (June 20.**) (Telegraphic.) || I have just, within a few hours of the mail leaving, received a despatch from Swayne, dated south of Taguras, 13th June. || After reserve of the Mullah at Somala, he pursued the Mullah and his forces to border of Mijjertein country, part of following escaping towards Ilig, the Mullah fleeing, with all his property, to Mudug, enemy losing fifty killed; no casualties reported on our side; our advanced horse pursuing to within a day and a-half's march from Mudug. The horses were done up, and the pursuit was then abondoned. || All British officers well. || Swayne is proceeding to deal with the Aligheri, towards Bohotele, and prepare for further move against the Mullah, if this is approved. || Swayne reports it is proved Sultan Othman Mahmoud supplied the Mullah with arms, his emissaries escorted Mullah's live-stock to Mudug, and the Sultan has given him asylum there. | According to his present information, Swayne is of opinion that his present force is sufficient to deal with Mullah at Mudug; but, should Mijjertein prove stronger than he anticipates, he proposes to arrange for joint advance with Abyssinian force. || He asks for instructions whether he should move further against Mullah in Italian territory or leave matters alone. || If we now withdraw there will be no finality to the Mullah's movement, and he may at any time. return to the Dolbahanta and dominate that province again. || The Mullah has suffered heavily in morale, and Sultan Yusuf Ali, at Obbia, is hostile to him. All things considered, I am of opinion that we cannot leave the Mullah at Mudug, so close to our Protectorate. If he stays there,

*) Blaubuch Cd. 1006. Vgl. Bd. 66.

**) Die eingeklammerten Daten geben das Empfangsdatum. Red.

I would suggest our arranging with the Abyssinians for a concerted move against him, making Mudug our final objective. || Direct communications have been received, dated the 12th June, from Hanbury-Tracy, at Gerlogubi. || Sir Charles Eliot has been informed of the Mullah's flight.

Nr. 12954. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Der Minister des Ausw. an den Generalkonsul Sadler. Italienisches Gebiet

darf nicht berührt werden. Schluß der Opera

tionen.

Foreign Office, June 25, 1901.

(Telegraphic.) || After consideration of your telegram of the 20th instant, His Majesty's Government are unable to authorize pursuit of the Mullah into the Italian sphere, and they consider that the military operations should be terminated, subject to any action which may be indispensable in the Aligheri country. || You should convey to Colonel Swayne and his force the congratulations of His Majesty's Government. || It has been suggested that a mobile force should occupy Burao to watch and prevent the invasion of the Dolbahanta country by the Mullah, but the policy of His Majesty's Government not to retain troops in the interior of Somaliland, and, still less, to establish British Administration there, should be borne in mind. || Neither course would appear worth the cost. || His Majesty's Government await your views before finally deciding as to Burao. You should consult with Swayne on this point.

Nr. 12955. GROSSBRITANNIEN.

Generalkonsul Sadler an den Staatssekretär des Ausw. Neue Erfolge über den Mullah.

[Via Aden.]

July 26, 1901. (July 28.) (Telegraphic) || Colonel Swayne left Bohotele to proceed against force collected near Hassan Ughaz and to attack Mullah, who was reported to be in the vicinity, before I could convey to him the instructions contained in your telegram of the 25th June. || The Mullah's Mijjertein riflemen were in considerable force, and severe fighting took place on the 17th. Several of the Mullah's relatives were killed, and his cattle were captured and his huts burnt, while he himself was driven back with heavy loss into the Mijjertein country. || The pursuit was abandoned on reaching the Haud, as the enemy then scattered in every direction. || The expedition is now on its way back to Burao, whence no further

movement will be made. || I regret to report that Lieutenant Dickinson was severely wounded in the thigh, and that Captain Friedrichs was killed. He was shot whilst rescuing a wounded noncommissioned officer. || Levy had nine men killed and sixteen wounded; all the wounded are doing well.

Nr. 12956. GROSSBRITANNIEN.

Derselbe

an Denselben.

Näherer Bericht über die Operationen.

Camp, Sheikh, July 22, 1901. (August 9.)

My Lord, I have the honour to submit copy of a despatch from Captain M. Mc Neill, commanding the second column of the Somaliland expedition, reporting on the operations at Somala on the 2nd and 3rd June, and copy of two despatches from Lieutenant-Colonel E. J. E. Swayne reporting on the operations of the mnin column from the 1st to the 21st idem. I had the honour of reporting the result of both sets of operations to your Lordship in my telegrams of the 13th and 20th ultimo. I fully concur in what Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne writes in his despatch of the 21st ultimo as to the credit due to Captain Mc Neile for his able and successful defence of his position at Somala. He had been left in zariba there to guard a large number of live-stock captured from the Jama Siad and some prisoners. His force consisted of slightly under 500 men, of whom, including 20 Punjabi Sepoys, 370 were armed with rifles; the rest consisted of tribal spearmen and a few tribal horsemen. He also had one Maxim worked by a Somali detachment under the charge of Lieutenant Younghusband. || He was attacked on the afternoon of the 2nd June by a force of horse and foot men estimated to number 2000; the enemy advancing most bravely, and getting right up to the zariba, close to which several were shot. The same night a determined attempt was made by the enemy to rush the camel zariba. On the following morning he was attacked by a largely increased force, estimated at 5000 horse and foot and directed by the Mullah in person, when a determined attack was again made on the camel zariba held by a detachment under Lieutenant Lamprey. || All three attacks were ably and successfully repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy. Considering that the hostile force is reported to have had some seventy or eighty rifles, and that besides the main attack a dropping fire was kept up on the zariba till 10 P. M. on the 2nd, it is fortunate that our casualties in the two day's operations did not exceed ten of the levy killed and nine wounded. One of the wounded has since died. || Captain Mc Neill writes that he is much

pleased with the work done by all the British and native officers serving under him, and he particularly mentions Lieutenant Lamprey as deserving of credit for the manner in which he held the camel zariba against two attacks, and brings to notice the good work done by Jemadar Jama Siad, of the old Berbera police force, in keeping the enemy in check whilst the camels were being driven in prior to the first attack. || After leaving Captain Mc Neill's zariba on the 1st June Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne marched 15 miles east and interposed his main body between the Mullah and the Mahmud Gerad, in order to sever all connection between that tribe and the Mullah's force. On the Mullah's moving back to his headquarters after his reverses at Somala Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne fell upon his scattered detachments and effectually routed his force; a projected attack on our rear-guard being frustrated. The pursuit was kept up till I o'clock that night when the tracks were lost in dense jungle. Thence by a series of rapid marches the Mullah was pursued and driven outside the furthest limits of the Protectorate into the Mijjertein country, one of the advanced parties under Lieutenant O'Neill penetrating as far as latitude 8°5', longitude 48° 30′, and another under Ressaldar Musa Farih to within a day and a-half's journey of Mudug. || The horses were done up and the pursuit then ceased. The Mullah with some scattered remnants of his force was presumed to have fled to Mudug, others of his followers having gone in the direction of Ilig. During the pursuit some fifty of the enemy were killed and a number taken prisoners.

Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne then wrote to ask for instructions as to whether any further proceedings were to be taken against the Mullah in Italian territory, and pending the receipt of instructions proceeded to Bohotele to punish the Aligheri tribe of the Dolbahanta, into whom the Mullah had married and who have been his principal supporters throughout. On the way a forced march was made and some 3009 camels and 620 head of cattle were captured from the Rer Hagar and Ararsama tribes, who were implicated in the series of attacks on Mc Neill's zariba. ¦ It appears, from information subsequently conveyed to Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne by prisoners, that at one time, when separated from his column. with a few men, he narrowly escaped capture, the enemy being hidden in a ravine 500 yards from where he was inspecting a water supply. The greatest credit is due to Lieutenant-Colonel Swayno for the able disposition he made of his force, and the energy and rapidity with which the pursuit of the Mullah was pushed on, the men often marching 25 miles a-day, and on one occasion completing 41 miles with only the water they could carry with them in skins. The result of these opera

tions has been that three determined attacks in force on one of our positions were repelled with severe loss; the forces of the Mullah were completely broken up, and he and the remnants of his force were driven in hot pursuit out of the Protectorate. That the Mullah was not caught appears to be owing to the fact that he did not stand, that he and his horsemen split up into numerous parties, and that but little time was left for pursuit in a most difficult country before nightfall. || I have had the pleasure of communicating to Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne the congratulations of His Majesty's Government conveyed to him and the force in your Lordship's telegram of the 25th June, but I have not yet heard that my communication has reached him. The question of the further pursuit of the Mullah in Italian territory is decided by the orders received in the same telegram. It will be observed from LieutenantColonel Swayne's despatches that he is of opinion that it is proved that Sultan Othman Mahmood, the Sultan of the Mijjertein, is proved to have aided the Mullah in his escape, and that a caravan was seized conveying, amongst other things, three rifles and a quantity of ammunition, in rice bags, on its way from Bosasa to the Mullah. It is difficult to say how far this assistance was rendered by the Sultan and how far by the Mijjertein tribesmen on their own account. It is not unlikely that the Sultan sent the Mullah small consignments of arms and ammunition as well as supplies. On the other hand, it is as equally likely that they may have been supplied by individual tribesmen, attracted by the large gains to be made by dealing with the Mullah's camp. I have always held it improbable that the Sultan would join for ces with the Mullah; the latter fled south and not towards the northern Mijjertein coast, where Sultan Othman Mahmood now is; and the latest reports from Aden are that the Sultan has refused to afford the Mullah any assistance whatever, and is putting him off with excuses. We know nothing yet for certain, but the probabilities are that he will not afford the Mullah active assistance. The conditions I propose to make with the Dolbahanta tribes are that they refrain from any further dealings with the Mullah, agree to settle up for caravan and other loots, and cease from further disturbances. On their agreeing to these terms a general amnesty will be proclaimed for all concerned in the late disturbances, except the Mullah and a few of his principal advisers, and the tribes will be allowed to trade with our ports without restriction or the imposition of any punitive tax. The Dolbahanta tribes have been sufficiently punished in life and property. And I am against the imposition of fines which the deputations would doubtless agree to pay willingly enough, but which we could