not enforce without further complications. It is my principal object, once the expedition is brought to a close, no tto impose any conditions or issue any orders which will involve us in any interference in the Dolbahanta beyond what we can exercise from the coast by pressure, if necessary, on the trade of the tribes. It will, however, be necessary, for order in the Protectorate and in the interests of our Ishak tribes, to keep a portion of the levy temporarily to watch the Dolbahanta. In this connection I shall have the honour of addressing your Lordship in a separate despatch. || In my final report on the expedition I shall have the pleasure of bringing prominently to your Lordship's notice the services of LieutenantColonel Swayne and Captain Mc Neill *). J. Hayes Sadler. Nr. 12957. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw. Neue Bewegungen Swaynes. Camp, Sheikh, July 23, 1901. (August 9.) My Lord, I have the honour to submit copy of a despatch from Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne, dated the 8th July, from Bohotele, in which he reports that he was about to leave for the Eastern Dolbahanta to deal with a body of the Mullah's late supporters, who had collected in force at Beretable and were looting on their own account, and subsequently to again attack the Mullah should he remain in the locality he was reported to be in about 50 miles south of that place. || I presume Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne had strong reasons for making this move without awaiting the further instructions he had asked for. || Beretable is situated near Hassan Ughaz, in the extreme south-east limit of the Protectorate near the junction of latitude 8° and longitude 48°. The instructions contained in your Lordship's telegram of the 25th June reached me on the 5th July. The same day a despatch was sent communicating these instructions to Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne. My despatch, however, did not reach Bohotele; the Sowars conveying it and other letters were met between Burao and Bohatele by Lieutenant Murray, who gave the despatch to six men of the Ararsama with instructions to follow up the column, which had already left Bohotele for Yahelle as rapidly as possible. A further despatch, repeating your Lordship's instructions and desiring Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne to return immediately on its *) Dem Bericht liegen drei Anlagen bei (Operationsberichte Swaynes und Mc Neill's), die hier fortgelassen sind. Ebenso bei den folgenden Berichten Sadlers. Red. receipt, was sent after him as soon as I received his despatch, now inclosed, and this left Burao with a party of thirty of the Camel Corps on the 13th. Again, another despatch was sent by Captain Bruce, who proceeded from Burao two days later to join the column at Yahelle with the remainder of the Camel Corps and some Mounted Infantry under Captain Merewether. || One or other of these despatches must have reached Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne ere this; but so far I have not heard from him. I am daily expecting messengers. || The question of future requirements will be dealt with on Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne's return. It will probably be held by His Majesty's Government that Ainaba is too far an advanced post to hold, more especially as there is no question either of administering that part of the country or of retaining troops in the interior of Somaliland longer than is absolutely necessary. Such at present is my view. J. Hayes Sadler. Nr. 12958. GROSSBRITANNIEN. - Derselbe an Denselben. Weiterer Bericht über die Operationen. Vorschlag, Camp, Sheikh, July 26, 1901. (August 9.) My Lord, I have the honour to submit copy of a despatch from Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne, dated, Cour Gerad, the 18th instant, describing the operations reported in my telegram of this day's date. This despatch reached during the night of the 24th instant. || Another severe defeat has been inflicted on the Mullah and his followers by the native levies commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne. The Mullah's karia has been burnt, his cattle captured, several of his relatives killed, and he and his force have been again driven back into the Mijjertein country with heavy loss, and scattered in every direction. Pursuit was carried on till it was useless to proceed further. || It is, however, an ominous fact that the Mullah was able to concentrate again so soon after his series of reverses in the course of the preceding month; this fact will have to be taken into consideration in connection with the proposals I hope shortly to do myself the honour of submitting with regard to the proposed post at Burao. The expedition should be back at that place about the 28th instant, and it will not again move from there. || I shall probably receive a further report from Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne giving details of these operations, which are missing in his present despatch. This was written in pencil, and was evidently drafted after a Staatsarchiv LXVIII. 13 heavy day's work. || The strength of the force Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne attacked is not stated, but it is reported that the Mullah's Mijjertein riflemen were present in considerable numbers. This shows that he has succeeded in enlisting the aid of the Mijjertein tribes, hostile to Yusuf Ali, on the eastern borders of the Dolbahanta, and it is to the rifle fire of these men that our casualties are principally due. || I regret to have to report that Captain Friedrichs, R. E., was killed in these operations In him the service loses a valuable and experienced officer. He met his death in the performance of a gallant action. || Our other casualties were Lieutenant Dickinson, severe flesh wound in the middle of left thigh, and nine of the levy killed, and sixteen wounded. No other British officers were hurt, and the wounded are all reported to be doing well. || I do not quite understand Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne's allusions to my despatches to him. The first that reached him was evidently the despatch I wrote on the 5th July, informing him of the instructions contained in your Lordship's telegram of the 25th June. In the second I wrote that if he had not already left Bohotele to return to Burao he should now do so; and with regard to the Nogal Valley, I said that no operations should now be undertaken there or elsewhere. I can, however, quite understand that when Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne came up with the Mullah's rear-guard at Cour Girad he felt himself bound to go on. He could not have done otherwise || It will be observed that Mahmud Girad, the powerful tribe occupying the northern Dolbahanta, joined the expedition, but would not face the Mullah's rifles. This is typical of the situation throughout; the tribes are powerless against the Mullah's rifles. || The Mullah has now twice been attacked and routed with heavy loss. In each case he has made good his escape. This only emphasizes the extreme difficulty of catching an individual who has a large area to fall back on in a very difficult country interspersed with dense thorn bush; were he to stand it would be different; but his plan is to keep well out of the fighting line, and bolt as soon as he sees that all chance of success is up. I would invite your Lordship's attention to the fact that, in the course of nine days, this column, self-contained in every way, and operating at a distance from its most advanced base, had made a march of considerably over 100 miles, fought a successful action, and pursued the enemy to a distance in the Haud. J. Hayes Sadler. Nr. 12959. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw. Bericht Swaynes über die Lage. Camp, Sheikh, August 1, 1901. (August 19.) (Extract.) I have the honour to submit proposals for the temporary occupation of Burao, and the location there of a movable force to watch the Dolbahanta, and prevent invasion by the Mullah Muhammad-bin Abdullah. || Annexed are two despatches from Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne. That written on the 26th ultimo is supplementary to his despatch of the 18th idem reporting on the operations at Beretable. In that of the 31st ultimo he records his views on the situation in the eastern province and on its border as left after those operations, and notes the strength of the force he considers it necessary now to retain at Burao. The expedition returned to Burao on the 28th July, and LieutenantColonel Swayne came on at once here, and is now in my camp. I have had several conversations with him on the situation, and I am quite in accord with him as to the measures we should now take in connection with the location of a force at Burao and the strength at which it should, for the present, be maintained. These proposals are framed with the object of insuring a sufficient safeguard without incurring more expenditure than is absolutely necessary, in view of a possible state of affairs which will be fraught with considerable danger to the Ishak tribes and the nearer portion of the Protectorate. We cannot yet predict what the results of the series of reverses the Mullah has sustained will be, but he has the whole of the Dolbahanta again open to him, and we must be prepared to repel any attack from that quarter, and protect our Ishak tribes from further molestation by the Mullah's raids. It is interesting to note that after twice traversing the whole breadth of the Dolbahanta, and after our expedition has thrice encountered the Mullah's forces and routed them, the facts recorded by Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne in the two inclosures to this despatch fully bear out the opinions I have expressed to your Lordship from time to time as to the character of this movement, the absence of any hostility to the Administration on the part of the Dolbahanta per se, the defenceless position of the tribes in the face of the Mullah's riflemen, and the great danger, and still further danger to be apprehended, from the influx of arms from without among a savage population hostile to civilization. || After the Mullah's defeat and rout in June I was of opinion that 250 infantry and 100 Camel Corps would be a sufficient force to maintain at Burao with a militia reserve. The fact that the Mullah was able to concentrate so soon after his defeat, and that he was only routed again after some severe fighting in which we lost one British officer killed and one wounded, besides nine of levy killed and sixteen wounded, has caused me to modify my views. Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne, too, is no longer of opinion, in the face of a possible advance of the Mullah, that we control and administer the Dolbahanta with the small force stationed ad Ainaba, suggested in his despatch of the 8th July. || The Dolbahanta have no wish to be inimical to us, but, if the Mullah returns and again dominates their country, they will be forced to be so. They have all submitted to us. Now they will naturally ask, "If the Mullah attacks us, will you defend us?" This will be a somewhat awkward question. It is evident we could, under no circumstances, undertake to send an expedition to the far end of the Dolbahanta every time the Mullah threatened the border. The Dolbahanta have now come in to us because they found us in strength in their country. They are a turbulent race, always fighting and raiding among themselves, and until this expedition entered their country we have interfered but little with them, and never attempted to administer the country. Writing last year in June, I pointed out that it would not be worth the expense to do so. Nor are we under the same obligations to defend them from the Mullah they themselves created, supported, and followed, as we are to protect the Ishak tribes who, at first attracted partly by the Mullah's movement, eventually resisted it, and, finally, actively joined us to suppress it, and secure them from further molestation by the Mullah, now imbued with fanatical hatred towards them. I take it from the instructions received in your Lordship's telegram of the 25th June that His Majesty's Government would not be prepared to incur the increased expenditure which would be entailed by holding the Dolbahanta, where a small force would be constantly exposed to risk. We must, therefore, leave the Dolbahanta alone, and confine our attention to watching that country and safeguarding against attack on our ports and the nearer portions of the Protectorate which may be threatened by any further move on the Mullah's part. || By retaining 500 infantry and 100 Camel Corps at Burao, a reserve company at Berbera, and providing for the rest of the infantry being formed into a militia, we shall have a movable force available, which can be brought up to the strength of the present levy in case of emergency at very short notice. The permanent transport and 100 ponies will be retained and grazed near Burao. The 150 mounted infantry will be disbanded. There was always difficulty in getting the tribes to supply mounted men, and it is not now thought worth while to proceed further |