The difficulties of wise and just arbitration may be faintly comprehended when we fairly appreciate the qualities required of an arbiter of the first class. A judge upon the bench may wisely and justly administer his high office, and yet lack some of the essentials of an ideal arbiter in labor disputes; for the arbiter cannot be controlled by general rules or statutes, by precedent, by general information or opinion, or by technicalities, and he must investigate the facts of the case in such a way as the varied duties of the office of a judge will not permit. A combination of the qualifications of an arbiter is indeed rare, for he should be a person possessed of strong human sympathies, with a calm, judicial mind, with business training or natural business genius, a keen sense of right, true courage, a knowledge of the subject which he is called on to consider in all its phases, and a clear and almost prophetic view of the ultimate consequences of the verdict he is to render. A proper recognition of the true dignity of both labor and capital is an essential element when the equal rights of employer and employe are involved, and the arbiter who, at one and the same time, scorns the deification of Mammon and avoids demagogic allurements, and who will in turbulent seasons keep himself in mid-stream with every faculty intelligently, calmly and sympathetically outstretched toward either shore of feeling, can send upon the most troubled and vexed questions the satisfying unction of justice, which is ultimately synonymous with peace. There are few dangers for the arbiter who refuses to cling to the enticing shore of popular sentiment, which too often involves the wreckage of great enterprises on somebody's, or some corporation's, sordid little rock of individual interest.

It must thus be clearly seen that arbitration as a make-shift is an absurdity, utterly useless as a means of promoting industrial peace, and mischievous in its consequences. It must also be just as clear that arbitration is equally acceptable to employer and employe when both believe something is to be

gained by it, and it meets with equal opposition when there is a mutual conviction of impending loss. "Old Adam” is always on deck; crafty, cunning, but not wisely selfish. If wisely selfish, we should hear of "lockouts" and "strikes" only at long intervals, for the "wisely selfish," if not endowed with good business sense, seek at least to cultivate it, and here let it be understood that the labor problem is a business problem, and that the only relations existing between employer and employe are contract relations, while any other relations are purely voluntary or elective and can only exist by mutual agreement.

While firmly and confidently believing in the advantages of proper arbitration, it must be admitted that the only way to render arbitration effective is to render it so costly-so very difficult to obtain, that it will be resorted to as an heroic remedy and not as a panacea for every ill. That is to say, it should be applied to the labor malady in an extremity, or when every other remedy has failed.

The truth of this should be patent, for the secret of all absence of discord in the family system is the co-operative spirit harmoniously applied to the recognized rights of the individual members, and where this exists there is no need to resort to the undignified formality of calling in the traditional wise counsellor or friend of the family, to settle the internal difference. An industry, like a family, should not grow dependent upon an alien strength to settle its disputes, for its success and prosperity rests upon its own intelligent ability to adjust such differences. If arbitration is too easily accessible it may defeat the very end desired.

To illustrate, let us suppose there is either an understanding between disputants at a certain industrial plant to the effect that all parties shall continue at work pending an investigation of differences and disputes and of a decision of a board of arbitration agreed upon to adjust these differences or disputes, or there is not such an understanding. If such an understanding exists, the

as possible, and with the least possible delay. Introducing a third party often complicates and seriously delays a settlement. Weakness, vanity, error, like threads inharmonious in color woven in a fabric, run through our whole human nature from the most exalted to the most humble. All alike shrink from the exposure of personal weakness, error of judgment, or wrong-doing. All alike, whether base or noble, want to share in the final and wise adjustment. It is well, therefore, that arbitration is not only so remote from us as to keep us from temptation, but so difficult of access that all parties in interest will feel

very institutions formed to prevent trouble become nurseries where trouble is fomented and demagogues and timeservers are created. If arbitration is made so easy that employer or employe can resort to it upon any question that may arise between the employer and the employe, the result will be that wherever it is believed any advantage can be obtained on one side or the other, the responsibility of settling questions in dispute will never be assumed, as it should be, by those immediately in authority or interest, or it will be imposed upon the arbiters. Thus arbitration will, in the very nature of things, soon

go to seed and be in bad repute. No dignified plan of arbitration will ever be successful until all wise and honorable means have been exhausted in devising a simpler, quicker and equally fair method of settling the vast majority of such disputes as arise from day to day.

The proposition to arbitrate under any and all conditions is not unlike the proposition of a "New Englander," who, having been engaged in a game of poker with a Kentuckian and having lost, suggested that his money be returned to him and that a fresh start in a new game be made.

"No," replied the Kentuckian, "I have your money and the game is ended."

There is no more reason why under all circumstances the proposition to arbitrate should be agreed to than there was reason for the Kentuckian to return the money he had won in order that the unfortuate New Englander might renew the play.

Another story suggests itself which will further illustrate the absurdity of most proposals to arbitrate. In the wilds of the far West an Illinoisan and a Kentuckian met; the former had a deck of cards and the latter a bottle of "Bourbon." The Illinoisan proposed a game to the Kentuckian to determine who should possess the bottle. "No," said the Kentuckian, "the bottle is mine now, and much as I love the game, I do not play it and play fool at the same time, but to show my friendliness we will share the contents of the bottle as long as it lasts." Here was practical common sense and the spirit of conciliation.

Thus we see that no one wishes to submit to arbitration where all the chances favor a rival and where those who have something to lose have nothing whatever to gain. The man, whether employer or employe, who has everything to gain and nothing to lose by arbitration always favors it. Could anything be plainer?

Let us consider a serious dispute, fresh in the public mind, to illustrate

the unreasonableness of the proposition to arbitrate it.

The strike in the anthracite coal field in Pennsylvania was preceded by a proposition made by Mr. John Mitchell, President of the United Mine Workers of America, on behalf of the miners, to the operators in the anthracite coal fields of Pennsylvania. President Mitchell proposed for consideration of a board of arbitration four questions or points in dispute between miners and operators. These were, let us say:

1. An advance in wages.

2. Reduction in the hours of labor from ten to eight hours per day.

3. Paying for actual weight of coal instead of by the car.

4. Recognition of the union.

The anthracite coal miners declined to arbitrate. However much they may otherwise deserve censure, admitting for the sake of argument that censure is deserved-they not only acted properly in refusing to arbitrate, but they did exactly what Mr. Mitchell and the miners' organization would have done if the converse of the miners' proposition had been submitted to them.

Let us suppose the following proposition as coming from the operators and submitted to the miners: 1. A reduction of wages. 2.

Increase in the hours of labor from ten to twelve hours.

3. Enlargement of coal cars now used.

4. Refusal to employ any miners who are members of the United Mine Workers of America.

What reply would Mr. Mitchell have made? Mr. Mitchell would have said"it is absurd." Why? Because, as a result, no possible benefit could accrue to the miners. That would be a correct answer. The anthracite operators declined for the same reason, since they could not possibly gain anything by arbitration, and they might lose much. The fact is, Mr. Mitchell, who is a very able and a far-seeing man and as scrupulously honest as he is able, could never have expected the anthracite operators to accept his proposition, but he had a right to make such a proposition and he

had a reasonable right also to believe that the anthracite operators might offer a counter proposition, or at least make some reply less cold, more conciliatory, less defiant, than the now famous reply couched in the undiplomatic language "We have nothing to arbitrate."

This citation is not made in criticism of either Mr. Mitchell, or of the anthracite miners, or of the anthracite operators, nor do I mean to express an opinion on the merits of the dispute.

The anthracite operators are total

full of human weaknesses and yet stamped with God's likeness.

It is not, I say, my purpose to criticise either Mr. Mitchell or the anthracite coal operators. I only wish to make clear my opposition to indiscriminate arbitration, as seems to be universally urged in the present instance, and to any ill-considered reply to such a request as Mr. Mitchell's; for, after all, he was simply exercising the right of petition on behalf of 150,000 miners.

I have merely sought in mentioning these incidents, to demonstrate how a

strangers to me, and therefore I could not be for or against them on personal grounds. I do know Mr. Mitchell, and my confidence is so strong in his ability, in his disinterested devotion to the cause of the laborer, in his love of truth and justice, that I wish with all my heart these anthracite operators, who are painted as black as darkest night, would take him into their confidence, just to show the world that the so-called "cruel coal baron" and the "walking delegate" are not so far apart and not so unlike, but like the rest of us, are

short answer will have the opposite effect of a soft answer, and to show how far from the truth are those who think that arbitration is always a fair and simple thing, as well as to point out what tragedies may follow from seemingly unimportant mistakes.

Under existing conditions I do not know that the strike in the anthracite field could have been averted, but I do believe that it has been prolonged by an utter absence of tact on the part of the operators and by the intermeddling of well-meaning parties who have con

sidered themselves specially qualified to adjust the dispute.

Political intrigue and interference have not helped in the present instance, nor will a wise precedent be established for the future, should the present strike be terminated through such an agency.

The most persistent advocates of indiscriminate arbitration are generally of the class who know least about the danger of arbitration, for the reason that the proposition to arbitrate is seldom carried home to them. Those who have most to say upon the subject among the class of our citizens who are at the same time the most intelligent, are notably our clergymen, our lawyers and our editors.

Some of the difficulties of arbitration, as they appear to others, might be carried home to them.

Let us say, for example, there is a dispute as to the salary a certain widelyknown, distinguished city clergyman should be paid, and to settle the controversy it is submitted to a board of arbitration. Again, here is the question of the fee of a prominent city lawyer in dispute; this also is to be submitted to arbitration. Here is an editor, or newspaper publisher, the subscription price of whose paper is in dispute. All of these the representatives of the learned professions-have acquired the habit of saying that honest and intelligent arbiters will untangle the knottiest proposition. Suppose the city clergyman's salary is to be decided by a board of arbitration, and it is submitted to one composed of rural preachers, who are admitted to be honest and intelligent men. The salary of the famous city clergyman would in all probability assume the sorry proportions of a bar of soap after a day's hard washing.

Then, again, let a board of arbitration made up of fair and honest country lawyers, pass upon the fee of a city lawyer. Does anyone wonder what the result would be?

Here is the publisher of a newspaper in a town of 50,000, and the public complains at the obligation to pay five cents per copy for a local paper. The question of the subscription price of the paper is submitted to arbitration and the

board is made up of newspaper readers of a large city. If they render a decision based upon the ordinary rules, what will be the result? They will decide that the rural paper is worth certainly no more than the great newspapers published in New York and Chicago, or Philadelphia and Boston.

In the coal mining industry of Illinois arbitration by outsiders would be wellnigh impossible, whether the interests of employers or employes are to be considered. Why? Because in the coal in-dustry of Illinois certain fixed or accepted principles of political economy were thrown overboard long ago. It is no longer a question of the survival of the fittest a question of natural conditions-a question of the earning capacity of the workmen. It is the competitive conditions which must be taken. into consideration in order to determine the scale of wages for mining coal; it is a question of giving or of dividing work in mines and among miners in the different coal fields of the state. Arbiters not thoroughly familiar with all the details of coal mining or with the peculiar conditions of the coal mining industry in Illinois might succeed in either arbitrating some of the operators out of business, or in arbitrating a large number of deserving workmen out of employment, because most men not in the industry itself would be governed by the general laws of trade or of political economy. Is it surprising, therefore, that corporations representing great industrial interests, or labor organizationsrepresenting the sacred and vital interests of laborers, hesitate to arbitrate, and especially to arbitrate through an alien body?

The coal miners and coal mine operators came together in 1898 and adopted what is known in the bituminous coal fields of the central states as the system of "joint agreements," or what is called in the schools of economics, a system of "joint bargaining." A wiser, fairer, more equitable system has never been devised, because it not only recognizes the contract relations of employer and employe, but it sometimes provides a way of adjusting differences and dis