The American ministers will recognise, without doubt, in this double overture, and in the exposition of the motives which produce it, the desire which the French Government has to terminate the negotiation in a manner satisfactory to the United States.

The ministers of France have the honor to assure, &c.

J. BONAPARTE.
FLEURIEU.
REDERER.

Extract from the journal of Messrs. Ellsworth, Davie, and Murray, dated PARIS, July 7, 1800.

"The next day the American ministers were invited to dine on the 11th with the president of the French commission, and as no answer had been received to the note of the 6th, it was agreed that the 11th should be considered by them as the time appointed for the conference; the object of which, on their part, was to ascertain the difficulties which seemed to have arrested all progress on the part of the French ministers; to designate, with more precision, the real grounds of difference, and, if possible, to adopt some arrangement that would accelerate the negotiation.

"On the 11th, before dinner, Mr. Bonaparte informed them that the whole business of the treaty was now under the consideration of the Premier Consul; and that his decision and instructions were expected in the course of a few days, when the notes and propositions received would be immediately answered. The American ministers repeated their regret at the long delay which had taken place; and, upon their expressing the desire that a conference should be held that evening, the French minis-ters readily consented.

"After the objects of requesting an interview were stated, the president of the French commission said they would frankly state the difficulties which had arisen with their Government. Although they had not received, officially, its determination or instructions, they believed they were possessed of its present sentiments and opinions, and could not avoid adding that they accorded with those of the commission. He then declared that it was the decided opinion of the Premier Consul that the ancient treaties ought to be the basis of negotiation; that compensation could only be a consequence of the existence of the treaties, and the re-establishment under them of the former privileges and relations; and that he would never consent to make a treaty which would surrender the exclusive rights of France, in effect, in favor of an enemy, or, in any event, make a treaty with the United States which would not place France on a footing of equality, at least, with Great Britain. He thought it would be derogatory to the present Government to make a treaty less advantageous and less honorable than that made by the royal Government. Discussions of some length took place on the most important points; but, as the whole business, on the part of the French ministers, was under reference to their Government, no point could, of course, be settled; and the conference closed with the request of the French ministers that all they had said should be considered merely as confidential.

"After several deliberations on the difficulties which had now completely arrested the progress of the negotiation, and the selection of some expe

dient which might remove them, the American ministers at length determined to request an early interview, and make a proposal, to the effect that the payment of the indemnities should be suspended until the Govern ment of the United States should have offered to France articles re-establishing her in the exclusive privileges she claimed under the treaty of '78. It was considered that the American Government might, or might not, perform this condition, after a further view of the political state of Europe, and the possession of more ample means to estimate a promise of indemnity. It was also clearly perceived that, unless the indemnities were secured, by some means, under the present negotiation, they would be forever lost."

66

July 15th. At an interview to-day with the French ministers, the following proposition was delivered to them in writing:

"Indemnities to be ascertained and secured in the manner proposed in our project of a treaty, but not to be paid until the United States shall have offered to France an article stipulating free admission, in the ports of each, for the privateers and prizes of the other, and the exclusion of those of their enemics; nor unless the article be offered within seven years; such article to have the same effect, in point of priority, as a similar provision had in the treaty of '78."

Extract from the journal of Messrs. Ellsworth, Davie, and Murray, dated PARIS, August 15, 1800.

An interview took place with the French ministers on the subject of their note of the 23d Thermidor, for the purpose of ascertaining, with more precision, their views on some points which were supposed to be covered under the general terms of their note.

The conference was opened, on the part of the American ministers, in a manner which they supposed would entitle them to the utmost candor and frankness. The French ministers were, however, extremely reserved, answering with great caution to every inquiry in the general terms of their note; the result of the conference was, of course, little satisfactory to the American ministers, who were consequently obliged to consider the French note in the general terms of its text. It now became necessary to decide whether the negotiation should be broken off, or the instructions departed from; whether the treaties should be revived, or the indemnities sacrificed; and, if the treaties were revived, whether, after considering the text of the French note, and the obstinacy with which the ministers adhered to it, an attempt should be made to effect a modification that might enable our Government to extinguish the exclusive privileges of France under the treaty of amity and commerce, as well as her claims under the treaty of alliance. The following note became the result of several deliberations and discussions on these points, and was sent to the French ministers on the 20th of August."

The Envoys Extraordinary and Ministers Plenipotentiary of the United States to the Ministers Plenipotentiary of the French Republic, dated

CITIZEN MINISTERS: The undersigned

with your note of the 23d Thermidor.

PARIS, 20th August, 1800.

ministers have been honored

It adds to the regret occasioned by three months' delay for further instructions, that they confirm the obstacles which had brought the negotia tion to a stand.

To abandon indemnities would be illy to select the means of restoring France to the confidence of a nation too long accustomed to revere and practise justice ever to forget its demands. Nor could America ever conceive that protecting from depredations her property which remains, had impaired a claim for that of which she has been despoiled. More difficult, still, of comprehension would it be, that she had aggressed by declaring the, truth for doubtless declaring that the treatics ceased to bind her, which the other party had long and greatly infracted, was no more. If, however, that declaration, as necessary for judicial purposes as it was conformable to truth, had amounted to a cause of war, yet, as the wisdom of France reconciled it to peace, its application, on the principle of war, to the extinguishment of claims, would be inexplicable. And, even as to war itself, though it does by its rights, or rather by its usages, enforced against weaker Powers, merge the injuries it operates, it does not cancel obligations prior to its existence. If war had actually commenced when it is suggested there was cause given, still, how could its rights be seen to extinguish the claims of America, as the mass of her sufferings was at a time when her conduct towards France was remarkable for nothing but the patience with which she endured, and the moderation with which she sought to remove them.

If, in applying the principle, or exercising the natural right of self-defence, in a state of things now mutually and equally lamented, certain events have taken place, which might be regretted, when considered in connexion with their cause; if these events have been attended with a sensation which the French ministers are pleased to term "eclat," they will have candor enough to admit that this sensibility was natural among men sore by repeated losses, and citizens who had thought their country degraded by her patience and long suffering. A mutual stipulation, however, of restoration or indemnity, will save the honor of both nations, and efface with the hand of justice every irritating remembrance.

It is but proper here to remark, that, if the action, or the notice of it, towhich the French ministers plenipotentiary have particularly alluded, be taken in connexion with dates and distances, the American Government cannot be charged with neglecting to avail itself of conciliatory measures. In a word, while nothing would be more grateful to America than to acquit herself of any just claims of France, nothing could be more vain than an attempt to discover to her reasons for the rejection of her own.

It is time for the two nations to return from a state of things difficult to name, and more difficult to account for, to the correcter views of '78; to the confidence inspired by co-operating for an object equally interesting to both; to that spirit which disavowed the idea of founding pretensions on exertions; and, finally, to that friendship which knew not the alloy of purchase.

Too much concerned with that epoch not to recollect its professions, and too confident in the wisdom of those professions to despair of their fruits, the American ministers have persevered in efforts for a reconciliation. To remove obstacles interposed, they have developed their views and their doubts with more frankness than effect; to go further, they must take on themselves a high responsibility.

If, then, the dignity of one party cannot be satisfied without the recognition of former treaties, still less can the interests of the other dispense with a remodification of them.

The 17th article of the commercial treaty, which stipulated an exclusive admission for the privateers and prizes of each in the ports of the other, was but nominally reciprocal, not only because America would seldom be at war, but, also, by reason of the prior engagements of France under the treaty of Utrecht, then in force, and since renewed. The real reciprocity of that article was to be sought for in another, which made free goods in free ships-a stipulation greatly beneficial for the United States, could they have enjoyed it. This stipulation, however, proved inconvenient to France, as appeared from her defeating the use of it so early in the present war, and, for that reason, the undersigned ministers, in their project of a treaty, proposed to give it up, trusting that it would be deemed a full equi valent for abandoning, on the part of France, the first mentioned privilege stipulated to her.

The American ministers have shown, in their note of the 8th May, that the free admission of privateers is inconvenient to the United States, and the ministers plenipotentiary of France have reasoned, in a note of the 8th Thermidor, and assumed in others, that an exclusive admission of those of one nation compromits their independence. France, then, will not insist on that privilege for herself, exclusively and forever. She will not embarrass that progress to greatness, which, with so much reason and so much solicitude, she seeks to cherish; nor, least of all, compromit the independence she guaranties. Doubtless, upon a review of this claim, her ministers will be satisfied with the footing of the most favored nation; and, as to rights beyond that, will relinquish them gratuitously, or, at most, on terms not difficult to be complied with.

With respect to the 11th article of the treaty of alliance, it has produced mischievous apprehensions, and never can produce an effect which will not contravene its professed design. If France should not discern the utility of relinquishing this article, she will acquiesce in a specification which may render it less incompatible with her policy.

If the American ministers, in attending to the note before them, have avoided retracing the measures of the late French Government, which forced the United States to take the defensive position in which the present negotiation found them; if they have declined to renew former discussions, or have not availed themselves of the opportunity of commencing others, it is because time has become precious with them, and because, also, they yet think it may be more useful to search for means of healing the breach, than for the causes which produced it.

As a further effort on their part to ascertain those means, they make the following propositions, predicated on the adoption of the first alternative in the overture of the French ministers plenipotentiary:

1st. Let it be declared that the former treaties are renewed and confirmed, and shall have the same effect as if no misunderstanding between the two Powers had intervened, except so far as they are derogated from by the present treaty.

2d. It shall be optional with either party to pay to the other, within seven years, 3,000,000 francs, in money, or securities which may be issued for indemnities, and thereby to reduce the rights of the other, as to privateers and prizes, to those of the most favored nation. And during the said

term allowed for option, the right of both parties shall be limited by the line of the most favored nation.

Sd. The mutual guaranty in the treaty of alliance shall be so specified and limited that its future obligation shall be, on the part of France, when the United States shall be attacked, to furnish and deliver at her own ports military stores to the amount of 1,000,000 francs, and on the part of the United States, when the French possessions in America in any future war shall be attacked, to furnish and deliver at their own ports a like amount in provisions.

It shall moreover be optional for either party to exonerate itself wholly of its obligation, by paying to the other within seven years a gross sum of 5,000,000 francs, in money, or such securities as may be issued for indemnities.

4th. The articles of commerce and navigation, except the 17th article of the treaty, shall admit of modifications, reserving for their principle the ⚫ rights of the most favored nation, where it shall not be otherwise agreed, and be limited in their duration to twelve years.

5th. There shall be a reciprocal stipulation for indemnities, and these indemnities. shall be limited to the claims of individuals, and adjusted agreeably to the principles and manner proposed by the American ministers in a project of a treaty heretofore delivered, except when it shall be otherwise agreed; public ships taken on either side shall be restored, or paid for.

6th. All property seized by either party, and not yet definitively condemned, or which may be seized before the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, shall be restored on reasonable, though it should be informal proof of its belonging to the other, except contraband goods of the United States, destined to an enemy's port: this provision to.take effect from the signature of the treaty; and if any condemnation should take place contrary to the intent of this stipulation, before knowledge of the same shall be obtained, the property so condemned shall be paid for without delay.

The ministers of the United States pray the ministers of the French republic to accept the assurance of their high consideration.

O. ELLSWORTH.
W. R. DAVIE.
W. V. MURRAY.

Extract from the journal of Messrs. Ellsworth, Davie, and Murray, dated August 24, 1800.

As the French ministers dined, to-day with Mr. Ellsworth and Mr. Davie, they were requested to attend a conference after dinner, for the purpose of giving some explanations of the propositions subjoined to their note. Mr. Bonaparte and Mr. Fleurieu, mentioning they had some urgent business at the Council, went away, leaving Mr. Roederer authorized to give any explanation required. After a conversation of some length, during which Mr. Roederer discovered how unsatisfactory those propositions were to the American ministers, he suggested the following idea for consideration, viz. "that the option contained in the note of the American ministers, to extinguish, by an equivalent of eight millions of francs, cer