confidence, and produce a very radical, but very desirable change in the internal political relations of the country. Nothing was more inconsistent with the habits of a people accustomed to the working of popular institutions, or more unfriendly to the spirit by which such institutions are intended to keep in life and exercise, than the mode of administration established in the territorial divisions of the country, the communes and departments. It was a system, under which the whole administration of all affairs, in every local district, was lodged in persons named directly by the Crown, which placed the authority of the remotest village in the hands of the minister of the day, and left towns, cities, and departments no shadow of self-government. No municipal body, no ancient corporation, no independent council, no delegation of the people, was interposed between the head of the government and the most minute or remote fraction of the monarchy. Every arrangement of local order, every movement of local authority, was the action of the supreme government, through its gradations of functionaries. Communes, districts, or towns, which had common property to manage, or common rights to protect, were obliged to intrust them to strangers nominated by a Royal decree, over whose conduct they had no influence or control. Thus, in all but times of general excitement, the government, by its prefects, sub-prefects, mayors, military governors, collectors of taxes, and other agents, had all the interests of the country within its grasp, and could direct the returns of the electoral colleges at their pleasure, thus rendering almost nugatory

the chief provisions of the charter. It was by wielding this instrument that so many unpopular measures had been carried; and the representative body, which it thus formed, in its turn placed the obsequious agents beyond the reach of punishment or shame. Hence the infamous scenes of open injustice, or mean trickery, which disgraced the elections, and so many of which had been exposed, after the universal outcry against the late ministry had rendered them all unavailing.

Ever since the Restoration, this system had been the subject of frequent and bitter complaint; but each successive administration had found it too useful to be willing to part with the influence which it bestowed. The triumphant party in the Chamber, however, now insisted upon changes more suitable to the spirit of free institutions, and better calculated to prevent the necessity of such struggles as had lately taken place. Immediately after the commencement of the session, M. de Martignac, Minister of the Interior, presented two bills, or projects of law, the one of which had for its object to regulate the internal administration of the communes, and the other, the councils of the arrondissements and departments. The general tendency of the measures was to make the councils, intrusted with these subordinate branches of administration, elective. The nomination of the prefects, sub-prefects, and mayors, was still to belong to the Crown; but the municipal and departmental councils were to be chosen by the communes and departments, to advise with the agents of government, and to control their operations. "In submitting," said the Minister who

to public discussion a system, which extends election and its consequences even to villages, we are not unaware of the attacks to which it must be exposed. We can easily conceive that the changes, which are in preparation, may excite disquiet in some minds. It is natural that quiet-minded men should be pre-possessed against the inconveniences which may result from them. The movement which accompanies electoral meetingsthe intrigues which mingle with them-the influence which ardent characters often exercise over them, -the embarrassment which may be created for the man invested with the royal delegation, by the habitual contact of a body which has a different origin;-in all this we confess there are just subjects for examination and uncertainty. We determined, however, on our course, because the time has arrived when the prudence of government, is at last apprised of the wants of society, as manners and institutions have constituted it. We determined on the measures, because they appeared to us to be just, and because we can always derive real strength from justice,-because we have found in the past, securities for the future, and because reason appeared to us to be satisfied with the precautions by which we have surrounded the exercise of acknowledged right.

"It would be vain to attempt to conceal it from ourselves-the government, which our kings have given to France, has been adopted by her, not as a form-not as an illusion-but as a fruitful reality. The call of the citizens to the making of laws, the liberty of the tribune, and the liberty of the press, the progress of public in

of the charter have diffused among all ranks of our existing society a lively interest in the affairs of the country, and a sort of necessity of taking part in them by wishes, by writings, and by acts. This is true of persons of all ages, but particularly true of the generation which advances upon us, and which is going to succeed us. The men born under the old monarchy, and who have lived successively under the laws of the Revolution, under those of the empire, and, finally, under the government which Louis XVIII. bequeathed to us, adopted our institutions with love and gratitude, as we bless a harbour after a long storm. But their first impressions-their political education-their first steps in their career of life, were foreign to our new condition, and recollections of more than one kind still mingle with their adhesion to it. It is not so with the men who follow us.

The latter have not seen the ancient monarchy. Its usages, and the disorders of the Revolution which succeeded its fall, are for them traditions, and almost history. Some pride of our military glory is the only remnant of the past, which they have seen. Their political instruction has been grounded upon our institutions, and their first impressions of the affairs of their country are blended with its new organization. not, then, occupied with that host of men, accomplished, laborious, active,-whom publicity instructs and awakens-whom their social position, the feeling of their capacity, and the example of so many elevations as unexpected as theirs would be, impel towards public affairs by so many different roads? What means have you of satisfying

Are you

their natural and legitimate impatience? What part can you give them in the direction of the great interests of the state? Open to them a new career. Their commune, their department, have likewise interests to watch over and defend-plans of improvement to be carried into execution-important works to regulate-communications to extend. They are anxious to obtain honourable suffrages, they wish to be invested with the care of watching over the happiness of their fellow citizens. Give them the means of satisfying at home this noble ambition, and draw round them an honourable circle, within which they may find profit and glory. The movement of the general mind is difficult to restrain. Direct it with prudence, -divide it, so as to render its action less violent and pressing, and to turn it to the greatest advantage of the country. Concentrated in the heart of the monarchy, and tending to one common object, this increasing activity may lead to dangers: call it to different points, give it different aliments, occupy it with numerous cares, and you will be able at once to weaken it, and to render it salutary."

These sentiments, and the measures which they introduced, were received with loud approbation in the Chamber, and by the public; but no sooner had the measures themselves been remitted to committees, than difficulties and dissensions began to appear. Both committees were composed almost entirely of liberal members; M. Dupin was the reporter of the committee on the Communal bill, General Sebastiani of that on the Departmental bill. The committees were well satisfied with the general principles on which the VOL. LXXI.

new laws were founded, but came to be of opinion, that they did not go far enough. And in their respective reports they proposed various amendments, the general effect of which was, to carry the elective principle and the controlling power of the elective bodies to a greater length than the ministers themselves had intended. As each of the bills embraced a whole system of local administration, comprehending immense detail, and as each of them possessed an interest which would invite to the discussion a great host of conflicting orators, apprehensions were entertained that both of them could not be carried through the legislature during the present session. The popular party, at the same time, considered them as of very unequal urgency; they held the most momentous object to be, to rescue the departments from the hands of the Crown. It therefore became a question of some importance, to decide which of the measures should be first taken up. Ministers and their friends proposed that the Communal bill should be first discussed; the liberal party, and the ultra opposition, insisted that the preference should be given to the more important law for regulating the Departments. On this question a debate took place, after the reports of the two committees had been read. It terminated in the defeat of the ministerial party, the Chamber having resolved to proceed with the Departmental bill.

This failure of the ministry, in a matter apparently so insignificant as the mere order of time in which the bills should be discussed, did not in itself threaten any serious consequences; but it shewed that they would no longer

[L]

be the masters of their own measure, now that it was in the hands of the Chamber; that it must take such a form and complexion, as the liberals might think fit to impose upon it; and that the liberals, even in this seemingly unimportant vote, acted from a jealousy of the ministers, to which the latter had perhaps given some occasion, by imprudently trying their strength, in attempting to give precedence to the other, and less important, proposition. The amendments proposed by the committee brought on a much more serious and dangerous collision. No amendments were proposed, but such as were unanimously adopted by its members. They even attempted to come to an understanding with the minister regarding such amendments as might be admissible; and they probably might have sacrificed some of their opinions, if ministers had consented to give up the most vicious parts of the bills as originally framed. But M. de Martignac was inflexible. He had obtained, he said, from the king, every concession which his majesty had determined to grant, and, if more were required, he threatened that the bills would be withdrawn. The committee, thereupon, followed out its own principles, and introduced such amendments as it deemed proper. These were principally directed to make the provisions of the bill fitter instruments for securing its ostensible object; for, although the measure, when first proposed, had gained universal applause, its detail, when it came to be taken to pieces, was found to be so arranged and combined, as to render it a much more imperfect remedy than the country was inclined to accept. While the committee determined to insist on

its amendments, the ministry was divided. One section was of opinion, that government was bound to realize the intentions expressed in the Speech from the throne; that, therefore, instead of withdrawing the bill, the amendments should be adopted, and a close alliance formed with the left side of the Chamber. The other ministers, and the king, were opposed to concession, and wished rather to govern by the support of the right. They trusted that Villèle's party would adhere to them in the contest, since that party were the most determined opponents of all popular measures, and had most to dread, if power should come to be lodged in the hands of popular men. But in this, too, they were disappointed for, although Villèle's friends were the enemies of all measures except their own, they were the enemies, likewise, of all ministries except their own. Whatever tended to drive the present Cabinet from its place, gave them a chance of returning to power. Accordingly, when the Chamber divided on the question which of the bills should be first discussed, the Villèle party, to the dismay of the ministers, voted with the left side.

When the discussion of the bill took place in the Chamber, the great question turned on an amendment of the committee regarding the persons who should be entitled to vote for the members of the departmental councils. To quiet the alarms of those who entertained a horror of elections and popular assemblies in every shape, the ministers had fixed on a qualification, so high in point of property, as precluded the hazard of democratic turbulence and encroachment. But for this very.

reason the liberals opposed it. This franchise, they said, was much narrower than that which the constitution required in the electors of deputies. It was absurd to say that certain classes of the citizens might be safely intrusted with the election of the men who were to decide on all the great interests of the empire, and that nevertheless they could not safely be allowed to choose the persons who were to give advice, or exercise control, in managing the affairs of a department-matters to which they were infinitely more competent. To legislate on such a principle was not to follow out the spirit of the constitution, but to retrograde both from its spirit and its letter. The committee accordingly had proposed as an amendment, that all persons, qualified to vote in the election of deputies, should be entitled to vote in the election of the members of the departmental councils. The amendment was supported by members of very opposite principles. The liberals supported it, because the original bill was not sufficiently popular; the ultra royalists joined them because the very principle of the original bill was, in their estimation, dangerously popular, and the minister himself had told them, that the best way to defeat the measure altogether was to render it more popular and dangerous still. They inveighed against it as the commencement of a Revolution; they maintained that it was inconsistent with the charter, which reserved to the king the nomination of administrative councillors; that such bodies of elected councillors would destroy the power of the prefects, control the royal prerogative, mischievously interfere with the inde

pendence, or despotically sway the votes, of the legislature, and ultimately endanger the public liberties, by overturning that balance of power on which their permanent preservation depended.

After a protracted and very keen debate, the result of the division was, that the amendment was lost by a minority of only 28; 167 deputies having voted for it, and 195 for the original proposition.

The ministry, now convinced that they could not resist the coalition opposed to them, immediately withdrew both bills. This was a fatal blow to their influence with the popular party. That party had never trusted them; it now denounced them as having framed their whole management regarding these measures with a view to their ultimate failure. One part of the conduct of the ministry gave some countenance to the charge. They had threatened that, if the amendments were carried, they would withdraw the bills, and leave matters on their old footing. Such a termination, they knew well, was all that the ultra-royalists desired; in doing so, therefore, they bribed the latter to make common cause with the liberals, in order that those amendments might be carried, which, it had been declared from authority, would give the ultras all they desired, viz. the total defeat of these measures of improvement. Nor were the popular party free from the blame of imprudence in throwing away much that was offered, because they could not obtain all that they demanded. They ought to have taken warning from the assurances of the minister, that government could go no further, and to have accepted the