Supplement to The Queensland Law Reporter, August 4, 1922. unable to distinguish this case in principle from The Metropolitan Railway Company v. Jackson (1), a House of Lords case, Bullner v. London, Chatham and Dover Railway Company (2), Drury v. North-Eastern Railway Company (3), Taylor v. Great S. and W. Railway Company (4). As to 1 (a) of the jury's findings, assuming that there was evidence to support that finding, I am of opinion that such negligence was not the cause of the accident. And as to 1 (b), I think there is no evidence to support the finding. I think, therefore, I must enter judgment for the defendant, notwithstanding the findings of the jury. Judgment will be therefore entered for the defendant, with costs, which are fixed at 20 guineas. The plaintiff appealed to the Full Court on the grounds(i.) that the judgment was against the findings of fact by the jury in favour of the appellant; (ii.) that the judgment was against the evidence and the weight of the evidence; (iii.) that the judgment was against and contrary to law; (iv.) that upon the findings of the jury, the appellant was entitled to judgment for £200 and costs; and (v.) that upon the evidence, the appellant was entitled to judgment for £200 and costs. Stumm K.C. and Watson, for the appellant: The learned Judge in the District Court was wrong in considering that the cases cited by him were indistinguishable from the present case. In each of those cases there was some act done voluntarily by the person injured. In the present case there was no such act. The standard of duty and degree of care which is considered reasonable by the defendant is stated in the defendant's regulations. Apart from the regulation, it is a reasonable precaution to fasten carriage doors. The jury reasonably found negligence in the failure to fasten the door. That original default led to the necessity of closing the door after the train started, and produced a continuing or combined negligent act which caused the injury. Without the original default or want of care, the necessity for rectifying that default would not have arisen. The jury's findings were justified on the evidence, and judgment should be entered for the plaintiff, with costs. Hart, for the respondent, was not called on. (1) 1877, 3 A.C. 193. (2) 1885, 1 T.L.R. 534. (3) [1901] 2 K.B. 322. (4) [1909] 2 Ir. 330. F.C. DICKSON V. THE COMMISSIONER FOR RAILWAYS. Supplement to The Queensland Law Reporter, August 4, 1922. F.C. DICKSON V. THE COMMISSIONER FOR RAILWAYS. McCawley C.J. Lukin J. Macnaughton J. MCCAWLEY C.J. I am of opinion that the appeal should be dismissed, with costs. I agree with the reasons for the judgment given by the Judge in the Court below. LUKIN J. In my opinion, the appeal should be dismissed. This case is concluded by, and in all relevant particulars is not distinguishable from, the following cases:-Drury v. North-Eastern Railway Co. (1), Taylor v. Great Southern and Western Railway Co. (2), Metropolitan Railway Co. v. Jackson (3). I therefore think the learned Judge was right in entering judgment for the respondent. The appellant must pay the costs of the appeal. MACNAUGHTON J. I agree. Appeal dismissed, with costs. Solicitors for appellant: J. B. Price & Daly. Solicitor for respondent: The Crown Solicitor. (1) [1901] 2 K.B. 322. (3) 1877, 3 A.C. 193. [IN THE FULL COURT.] PUSEY v. WAGNER, Ex parte WAGNER. Stock-Travelling of stock-Permit-Failure to obtain permit—- He was W. applied for a permit to travel stock. In the notice of application he stated that he proposed to start about 18th January, 1921. He received a permit in January, 1921. He then decided not to move the stock at the time. In August he travelled the stock, and relied on the permit issued in January. convicted of travelling stock without having previously obtained a permit. Held, the permit was applicable only to the proposed departure mentioned in the notice, and that it was a question of fact whether the permit applied to the August departure, and the finding that it did not apply was reasonable. Held also, that the complaint substantially described the offence; and as the evidence disclosed an offence against s. 18 of The Diseases in Stock Act of 1915, the complaint should have been amended if any variance existed between it and the evidence. ORDER NISI FOR QUASHING ORDER. On 10th January, 1921, the appellant, by notice, applied for a permit to travel 400 mixed cattle to a certain destination, and gave the "date of the proposed departure of the stock" as 18th January, 1921. The Diseases in Stock Act of 1915, s. 18. He obtained his permit pursuant to his application on 14th January, 1921. He then decided not to travel the cattle at that time. In July, 1921, he wished to move 320 cattle (which were assumed to be part of the 400 mentioned in his January notice), and in August, 1921, he travelled the cattle towards the same destination named in that notice. He did not obtain another permit, apparently considering the January permit to be sufficient. He was convicted and fined, and appealed under s. 209 of The Justices Act of 1886 to the Full Court. The complaint, the grounds on which the order nisi was granted, and the relevant section of the Diseases in Stock Act are stated in in the judgment of McCawley C.J. Graham and Collier moved the order absolute. The appellant was entitled to act on the permit. Permits of long or even indefinite duration are necessary under the condition of the cattle industry, or at least are reasonable. The postponement of departure did not necessitate a fresh application and a new permit. 1922. May 4, 5. McCawley C.J. PUSEY V. WAGNER, Ex parte WAGNER. McCawley C.J. [MACNAUGHTON J. The regulations require inspection of the stock before the permit is issued. Does not that indicate that the permit is not for an indefinite time ?] The freedom of stock from disease would be a continuing condition of permission to travel. No time is fixed by the statute. Penal statutes are construed strictly. Broadhead v. Holdsworth (1), Halsbury, Vol. 27, p. 177; Beal on Cardinal Rules of Interpretation, 2nd Ed., pp. 443-4. The defendant reasonably believed that the life of the permit had not closed. The Criminal Code, ss. 22-24; Stroud on Mens Rea, pp. 55-60. The complaint did not disclose the offence whereof the defendant was convicted. No amendment was made; and amendment should not after the long lapse of time be now made. Kennedy v. MacMahon (2), Toohey v. Kerr (3), Ashe v. Watson (4). Webb, S. G., and J. S. Hutcheon, for the respondent: The complaint disclosed an offence against ss. 18 and 20, subséc. 2, of The Diseases in Stock Act of 1915, and against ss. 18 and 28, subsec. 1. Any necessary amendment should have been, and now will be, made. Hall v. Sweetman, Ex parte Hall (5), Kelly v. Wigzell (6); The Justices Act of 1886, ss. 48, 214, 223. The defence of bona fide claim of right is not applicable. The defendant made a mistake of law, if he made any mistake. The permit was not valid for the removal of cattle in August. It contemplated removal about 18th January. It applied to a different number of cattle, and not necessarily to the cattle removed in August. Further, on the evidence, the defendant abandoned his intention of travelling under the permit. He afterwards proposed to make another removal of cattle in respect of which he did not obtain or apply for a permit, and he was rightly convicted. The judgment of the Court was delivered by MCCAWLEY C.J.: The Justices at Eidsvold convicted Benjamin Wagner, the appellant in this case, on a complaint charging him that, on 30th August, 1921, he, being the owner of stock within the meaning of The Diseases in Stock Act of 1915, travelled such stock a distance, he, before starting to travel them such distance, not having obtained a permit containing the prescribed particulars from the nearest Inspector of Stock contrary to the Act in such (1) 1877, 2 Ex. D. 321. (4) 1918, St. R. Qd. 126. case made and provided. The appellant seeks to quash the conviction on various grounds, which may be shortly stated(i) That the complaint discloses no offence; (ii.) that because of ss. 22 and 24 of the Code, he should not have been convicted; (iii) that he had the requisite permit. Section 18 of The Diseases in Stock Act of 1915 provides that— "Every owrer of stock shall, before starting to travel them any distance, give notice in writing, as prescribed, and obtain a permit containing the prescribed particulars from the nearest inspector. "In such notice the following particulars must be supplied :— "(a) The number and description of the animals; '(b) The holding on which they are located; (c) The name and place of abode of the owner; (d) The route by which he desires to travel the stock; "(f) The date of the proposed departure of the stock; The appellant, on 10th January, 1921, gave notice to the Stock Inspector, Gayndah, in the following terms:- -"Please forward a permit to travel 400 head mixed cattle from Glenlee, Rawbelle, to Halfway, Eidsvold. Proposed date of starting, about 18th January, 1921, also 25 bulls and fifty head of mixed cattle from Halfway to Glenlee, proposed date of starting, 21st January." The Inspector issued a permit as follows:- F.C. PUSEY V. WAGNER, Ex parte WAGNER. McCawley C.J. |