veto any Bill to which the Governor has assented on his behalf within two years after the receipt of such Bill by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in which case the Bill is to be declared null and void by message of the Governor, and proclamation. Reserved Bills are to be laid before His Majesty in Council, and the King may allow them or not within a period of two years from the day on which they were reserved by the Governor. The King's assent to reserved Bills may be

transmitted by telegram.

By Act 7 Vic., No. 16, all Acts of Parliament which become law are required to be registered by the Registrar-General within ten days of their so becoming law.

The Governor of New South Wales is also Governor of Norfolk Island, under an order dated October 18, 1900, and it is incumbent on him to visit the possession once at least during his term of office.

The above is a summary of the powers and duties of the Governor, as defined by his instructions and the Letters Patent; but additional duties have been imposed upon him by the Constitution and Electoral Acts. In accordance with these enactments he must summon the Legislative Assembly; appoint the President of the Legislative Council; prorogue or dissolve Parliament; appoint his ministers proprio motu; also appoint, with the advice of the Executive, all public officers whose appointment is not vested in heads of departments; issue all warrants for the payment of money; issue the writs for general elections, and, in the absence of the Speaker, issue writs to fill vacancies occurring in the Assembly.

In summoning, proroguing, or dissolving Parliament, the Governor nsually acts according to the advice tendered him by the Cabinet; but he is in no way bound to do so, and, as a matter of fact, he has sometimes declined to be guided by his Ministers. This, however, has never happened except in respect to granting a dissolution. As to summoning or proroguing, a difference of opinion is hardly likely to arise. The relations established between the Ministry and the representatives of the people are in accordance with the time-honoured precedents prevailing in Great Britain, which may be thus defined. The Cabinet must be chosen from—"(1) Members of the Legislature; (2) holding the same political views, and chosen from the party possessing a majority in the House of Commons; (3) carrying out a concerted policy; (4) under a common responsibility, to be signified by a collective resignation in the event of Parliamentary censure; and (5) acknowledging a common subordination to one Chief Minister."

The Imperial rule as to the circumstances under which a Government is bound to resign is as follows:-Censure, involving loss of office, rests entirely with the Lower House, or popular branch of the Legislature ; hence, directly a Ministry fails to command a majority of the House of Commons, it must give place to another. Want of confidence in a Cabinet may be shown in three ways: first, by a direct vote of censure, or a specific declaration of want of confidence; second, by a vote disapproving of some act of the Government; or, third, by the rejection

of some important measure introduced by the Ministry. In any of these cases Ministers must either resign, or appeal to the country if they can get the Sovereign to sanction a new election.

These rules have been virtually adopted in New South Wales, and the undoubted right of the Governor, as the depositary of the Royal prerogative, to refuse to grant a dissolution, if he think fit, has been more than once exercised. In March, 1877, Sir Hercules Robinson refused to grant a dissolution to Sir John Robertson, and in September of the same year he also declined to enable Sir Henry Parkes to go to the country. The reason alleged in each case was that the Assembly refused to make provision for the expenditure of the year. It will thus be seen that a grave responsibility is thrown upon the Governor in the exercise of the unquestioned right of granting or refusing a dissolution of Parliament, and in the cases mentioned it can hardly be doubted that Sir Hercules Robinson acted within his powers. The Viceroy is the conservator of the rights and interests of the whole population, and it must be evident that grave evils would ensue were a dissolution to take place before supplies had been granted.

The exercise of the prerogative of mercy is such an important function of the Governor, and he is so liable on some occasions to have strong pressure brought to bear upon him in connection with it, that it will be well to quote at length the instructions received a few years ago upon this point. The mode of procedure in capital cases has already been referred to, and in other cases the Governor is instructed not to pardon or reprieve any offender without receiving the advice of one, at least, of his Ministers; and in any case in which such pardon or reprieve might directly affect the interests of the Empire, or of any country or place beyond the jurisdiction of the Government of the state, the Governor must, before deciding as to either pardon or reprieve, take those interests specially into his own personal consideration in conjunction with such advice as aforesaid. In another part of his instructions the Governor is permitted to act in opposition to the advice of the Executive Council "if he see sufficient cause," but he is to report any such matter to the Sovereign without delay.

The Executive.

The Executive Council is now composed of seven salaried Ministers, namely the Premier and Chief Secretary, the Colonial Treasurer and Minister for Railways, the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, the Secretary for Lands, the Secretary for Public Works, the Minister of Public Instruction and Minister for Labour and Industry, the Secretary for Mines and Agriculture, with a Vice-President, and three members without portfolio. These form the Cabinet, and, of course, are responsible to Parliament. The Ministry, as the advisers of the Governor, must also retain his confidence; but, practically, this is seldom likely to be withdrawn, so long as they command a working majority in the Assembly. The Governor may dissolve

Parliament although the Ministry have not sustained a defeat, and in this case the continued existence of any Government would depend directly on the vote of the constituencies, but such a contingency can happen but seldom.

Apart from the Vice-President of the Executive Council, who holds no portfolio, it is rare for more than one Minister to be selected from the Upper House, and it will thus be seen that the principle of the responsibility of members of the Government to Parliament is fully carried out. For every act of the Governor as Viceroy some Minister is responsible to Parliament; and even in matters of Imperial interest, where the final onus rests upon the Governor, he himself is responsible to the Imperial Government, whose members. are under the control of the House of Commons, so that no loophole is left for the exercise of any arbitrary act. The Crown, except in two instances (appeals to the Privy Council, and the bestowal of titles), acts towards the Executive through its representative, the Governor; and so long ago as the inception of Responsible Government, Earl Grey declared, in an official despatch, that he should make "a judicious use of the influence, rather than of the authority, of his office," which wise maxim has usually been followed. But in extreme cases, such as when his sanction is requested to any illegal proceeding, the Governor is bound, without question, to keep the law, though he may thereby be brought into hostile relations with the Cabinet. Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, in a communication to the Governor-General of Canada in 1879, clearly laid down the doctrine that the Governor of any British Colony "has an unquestionable constitutional right to dismiss his Ministers, if from any cause he feels it incumbent on him to do so." This does not militate against the doctrine of responsibility; for if the Ministry appointed by the Governor do not possess the confidence of Parliament, they cannot hold office, and the Governor will be forced to give way, or else persevere till he can select a Ministrywhom the Assembly will accept. The final control will thus be, as in every other case, with the representatives of the people. In matters of routine the Governor will necessarily act on the advice of his Ministers, and in most cases relating to the internal economy of the departments, he will even adopt the individual recommendations of the Ministers by whom they are severally controlled.

As regards matters of purely Imperial interest, the Governor is responsible to the British authorities for their due conservation. If in consequence of his action in any such matter, he is involved in a dispute with his Ministers, he is bound to refer them to the Sovereign, should his action have been endorsed by the Colonial Office. If his conduct were not approved of in England he would most likely be recalled. It follows from this, that in no case can the Governor be held to be responsible directly to Parliament for his conduct. His Ministers are responsible, but personally he has only to render an account to the Crown itself that is, to the Imperial Parliament.

The Executive Council cannot discharge any function unless duly summoned by the Governor, and unless at least two members, in addition to the Governor or presiding member, be present to form a quorum. Formal minutes are, of course, kept of all proceedings.

Since the introduction of Responsible Government there have been thirty Ministries; but as four of these became merged into those next succeeding without the resignation of their members, the actual number of cabinets holding power may properly be said to have been twenty-six, whose average tenure of office, excluding the Ministry at present in power, has been about one year and six and a half months. Ten Governments were displaced by votes of censure, expressed or implied; three resigned in consequence of defeat on important measures of policy; two retired on being saved from defeat only by the Speaker's casting-vote, and three others through a motion for the adjournment of the House being carried against them; four, as previously stated, were merged into the succeeding Ministries; five resigned without a direct vote being carried against them, but in consequence of not possessing a working majority; one Government fell to pieces through internal disagreements; and one resigned in consequence of the Governor declining to appoint to the Legislative Council a certain number of its nominees.

The Parliament.

It seems a singular omission in the Constitution Act that no definition is given of the relative powers of the Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly. Such is the fact, but little inconvenience has arisen thereby, since by common consent it has been agreed that the precedents regulating the proceedings and relations, inter se, of the two Houses of the Imperial Parliament shall be followed, so far as applicable, in New South Wales. The Constitution Act provides that all money Bills shall be introduced in the Lower House only. The important rule of the House of Commons, affirmed two hundred years ago and constantly enforced ever since, that "all aids and supplies, and aids to His Majesty in Parliament, are the sole gift of the Commons, and it is the undoubted right of the Commons to direct, limit, and appoint in such Bills the ends, purposes, considerations, conditions, limitations, and qualifications of such grants, which ought not to be changed or altered by the House of Lords," is also held to be in force as regards the Parliament of this state, and has generally been recognised and acted upon.

The two Houses, however, do not possess the most important of the privileges of the Imperial Parliament, namely, the right of punishing for contempt, although the Legislative Assembly has, on one occasion, punished one of its members, by expelling him for conduct, beyond its precincts, assumed to be dishonourable. As regards disorderly conduct within the walls of the Chamber, it has been held by the Supreme Court, and affirmed by the Privy Council, that the Assembly only possesses the power of suspending a member for disorderly conduct for the period of the sitting at which he displays such conduct. A member may also

be removed from the House by order of the Speaker if he persists in obstruction or contemns the Standing Orders; but fortunately this course has seldom been rendered necessary.

Witnesses may be summoned to give evidence before either House, or before committees of the Council or Assembly, the necessary powers for compelling their attendance having been conferred by an Act passed in 1881. Any person disobeying a summons may be arrested on a Judge's warrant; and the maximum penalty for refusing to give evidence is imprisonment for one calendar month.

The number of members of the Legislative Council is not limited by the Constitution Act, although the minimum number is fixed at twenty-one. It will be seen that this gives power to a Governor to quash any possible obstruction on the part of the Council to the will of the Government and the Lower House by "swamping " the Council. Such a proceeding, however, can hardly be held to be allowable, except under extreme circumstances. As a matter of fact, an attempt to "swamp" the Council was made during one of the premierships of Sir Charles Cowper, but public opinion condemned the course most strongly, although the somewhat peculiar circumstances of the case were thought at the time to justify the Governor's action. The authorities in England severely rebuked the Governor (Sir John Young) for the course he had taken, and since then "swamping" the Council has never been seriously entertained, nor is there much chance that it will ever again be attempted. The principle in fact has been affirmed, on the basis of an understanding entered into between Sir John Young and the leading statesmen of the day (on both sides of the House), that the members of the Legislative Council should be limited to a convenient number, and that no nominations should ever be made merely for the purpose of strengthening the party which happens to be in power. A deadlock between the two Houses is provided against by the universal feeling that the Assembly represents the will of the people, and in such case the Council would certainly have to give way to the deliberate will of the people's representatives. The Council is intended as a check to hasty legislation; and it doubtless acts as a useful "brake" to violent party feeling.

The Legislative Council.

As before stated, the members of the Upper House are nominated by the Governor, the minimum number composing the House being fixed at twenty-one. No limit to the number is fixed by the Constitution Act, but, in accordance with the arrangement already described, the number of members is practically kept down by the exclusion of all purely political appointments. As the number of members of the Assembly has increased to 125, the number of members composing the Council in October, 1903 (fifty-eight), cannot be considered an unfair proportion, as the ratio of increase has not been much greater than in the case of the Lower House. Every member of the Council must be of full age, and either a natural-born or a duly naturalised subiect. Four-fifths