Vereinigte Staaten. Nr. 7647. occasion to say, that the Government of the United States seeks this particular time for the discussion as most opportune and auspicious. At no period since 19. Nov. 1881. the peace of 1783 have the relations between the British and American Governments been so cordial and friendly as now. And I am sure Her Majesty's Government will find in the views now suggested and the propositions now submitted, additional evidence of the desire of this Government to remove all possible grounds of controversy between two nations which have so many interests in common and so many reasons for honourable and lasting peace. You will, at the earliest opportunity, acquaint Lord Granville with the purpose of the United States touching the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, and, in your own way, you will impress him fully with the views of your Government. I refrain from directing that a copy of this instruction be left with his Lordship, because, in reviewing the case, I have necessarily been compelled, in drawing illustrations from British policy, to indulge somewhat freely in the argumentum ad hominem. This course of reasoning, in an instruction to our own Minister is altogether legitimate and pertinent, and yet might seem discourteous if addressed directly to the British Government. You may deem it expedient to make this explanation to Lord Granville, and if, afterwards, he shall desire a copy of this instruction, you will of course furnish it. || I am, &c. James G. Blaine. Nr. 7648. Vereinigte 29.Nov.1881. Nr. 7648. VEREINIGTE STAATEN. Staatssecretär d. Ausw. an den amerik. Gesandten in London. Uebersicht über die früheren Verhandlungen über Abänderung des Vertrages. Department of State, Washington, November 29, 1881. Sir, One week after mailing my instruction to you on the 19th inStaaten. stant touching the presentation to Her Majesty's Government of a proposal for the modification of the Convention between the two countries of the 19th April, 1850, better known as the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, I received Mr. Hoppin's No. 218 of the 11th instant, communicating the response of Lord Granville to my Circular note of the 24th June last in relation to the neutrality of any canal across the Isthmus of Panama. I regret that Mr. Hoppin should not have advised me by telegraph of the purport of his Lordship's reply, as it would have enabled me to present the arguments of my despatch of the 19th instant in a more specific form, as meeting a positive issue rather than as generally dealing with a subject which for thirty years has been regarded in but one light by the public opinion of the United States. It seems proper now, however, in reply to his Lordship's note of the 10th November, to give a summary of the historical objections to the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, and the very decided differences of opinion between the two Governments to which its interpretation has given rise. Nr. 7648. Vereinigte I need hardly point out to you the well-known circumstance, that, even at the time of the conclusion of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, a very conside- Staaten. rable opposition was shown thereto on the part of far-sighted men in public 29. Nov. 1881, life, who correctly estimated the complications which the uncertain terms of that compact might occasion. It was ably contended in Congress, that its provisions did not, even then, suffice to meet the real points at issue with respect to the guarantee of the neutrality of the whole American isthmus on bases comporting with the national interests of the United States, and the differences of interpretation became soon after so marked as to warrant the extreme proposal of Her Majesty's Government to refer them to the arbitration of a friendly Power. || The justice of those doubts became still more evident six years later, when the pretensions put forth by Her Majesty's Government toward territorial protection, if not absolute control, of portions of Nicaragua and of the outlying Bay Islands brought up the precise question of how far the provisions of the Clayton-Bulwer compact operated to restrain the projected movement; and thereupon the interpretations respectively put upon that instrument by the United States and Great Britain were perceived to be in open conflict. The attempt made in the Clarendon-Dallas Treaty, which was negotiated on the 17th October, 1856, to reconcile these opposing contentions, and to place the absolute and independent sovereignty of Nicaragua over its territory on an unmistakable footing, so far as the United States and Great Britain were concerned, failed to be completed, by reason of the rejection by Her Majesty's Government of an amendment introduced by the Senate into the Clarendon-Dallas project. From that time onward the inability of the two Governments to agree upon a common interpretation of the letter and spirit of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty may be accepted as a historical fact. In the discussions between the two Governments which attended the failure of the Clarendon-Dallas Treaty the attitude of the United States with respect to the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was amply defined. As early as the 12th March, 1857, I find, that General Cass, then Secretary of State, in the course of a conference with Lord Napier, Her Majesty's Representative, "passed some reflections on the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty; he had voted for it; and in doing so he believed, that it abrogated all intervention on the part of England in the Central American territory. The British Government had put a different construction on the Treaty, and he regretted the vote he had given in its favour." (Despatch of Lord Napier to the Earl of Clarendon, 12th March, 1857.) On the 6th May, 1857, President Buchanan, in an audience given to Lord Napier, and in response to his Lordship's suggestion, that if the attempted adjustment of the difference between the Governments as to the Clarendon-Dallas Treaty should fail, the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty remained to fall back upon, characterised that instrument in much stronger terms than General Cass had done. To quote Lord Napier's words: "The President denounced the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty as one which has been fraught with mis Staaten. Nr. 7648. understanding and mischief from the beginning; it was concluded under the Vereinigte most opposite constructions by the Contracting Parties. If the Senate had 29. Nov. 1881. imagined, that it could obtain the interpretation placed upon it by Great Britain, it would not have passed. If he had been in the Senate at the time, that Treaty never would have been sanctioned." (Despatch of Lord Napier to the Earl of Clarendon, 6th May, 1857.) || These views are more explicitly and formally repeated in a note addressed by Secretary Cass to Lord Napier on the 29th May, 1857. He says:-"The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, concluded in the hope, that it would put an end to the differences which had arisen between the United States and Great Britain, concerning Central American affairs, had been rendered inoperative in some of its most essential provisions by the different constructions which had been reciprocally given to it by the parties. And little is hazarded in saying that, had the interpretation since put upon the Treaty by the British Government, and yet maintained, been anticipated, it would not have been negotiated under the instructions of any Executive of the United States, nor ratified by the branch of the Government intrusted with the power of ratification." || The publicity of these statements, and the strong feeling which then prevailed in all quarters that the Clayton-Bulwer Convention was inadequate to reconcile the opposite views of Great Britain and the United States toward Central America, led to a very decided conviction, that the Treaty should be abrogated. Lord Napier reflected this growing impression when, on the 22nd June, 1857, he wrote to Lord Clarendon that, "It is probable that, if the pending discussions regarding Central America be not closed during the present summer, an attempt will be made, in the next Session of Congress, to set aside the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. . There can be no doubt of the views of the President and Cabinet in this matter." || Before this tendency could, however, find its expression in any official act, a movement on the part of Her Majesty's Government placed the whole matter in a new aspect. Sir William Gore Ouseley was sent out, 30th October, 1857, as a Special Minister, with the double purpose of concluding with the Central American States, and especially with Guatemala and Honduras, settlements of the questions relative to the Bay Islands, the Mosquito territory, and the boundaries of British Honduras, and also of visiting Washington on the way, and conferring with the Secretary of State of the United States, for the purpose of ascertaining the views of his Government, and establishing a perfect understanding "with the United States upon the points respecting which differences have hitherto existed between the two countries." Among these differences was now superadded to the territorial question of Mosquito and the Islands the very question which to-day most concerns us-the question of interoceanic communication—which had for some time been the occasion of correspondence between General Cass and Lord Napier, and in relation to which General Cass wrote on the 20th October, 1857, as follows: "I have thus endeavoured to meet the frank suggestions of your Lordship by re-stating, with corresponding frankness, the general policy of the United States with respect to the Governments and the Nr. 7648. Vereinigte interoceanic transits of Central America; but since your Lordship has referred Staaten. to the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, as contemplating a 'harmonious course 29. Nov. 1881. of action and counsel between the Contracting Parties in the settlement of Central American interests,' you will pardon me for reminding your Lordship that the differences which this Treaty was intended to adjust between the United States and Great Britain still remain unsettled, while the Treaty itself has become the subject of new and embarrassing complications." Prior to the arrival of Sir William Ouseley in the United States, Lord Napier held an important interview with President Buchanan, on the 19th October, 1857, with the object of obtaining "further elucidation of the opinions of the President with reference to the adjustment of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty." On that occasion Lord Napier declared, that he believed it the intention of Her Majesty's Government, in Sir William Ouseley's mission, to carry the "Clayton-Bulwer Treaty into execution according to the general tenour of the interpretation put upon it by the United States; but to do so by separate negotiation with the Central American Republics, in lieu of a direct engagement with the Federal Government," and asked, that pending the negotiation intrusted to Sir William Ouseley "no proposal to annul the [Clayton-Bulwer] Treaty would be sanctioned or encouraged" by the President or the members of the United States' Government. To this the President cheerfully consented, and promised to modify the statements in his annual Message to Congress accordingly, and, under no circumstances, to countenance any attempt against. the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty in Congress. || Matters being in this state, with Sir William Ouseley's mission announced, and the benevolently expectant attitude of the United States toward it assured, Lord Napier, on the 27th October, 1857, in conference with General Cass, brought up contingently, as a discarded alternative of his Government, a former proposal to refer the disputed questions to arbitration. || "The General remarked in reply", says Lord Napier, writing to the Earl of Clarendon, "that he did not repudiate the principle of arbitration on all occasions; he had invoked it, and would do so again where it seemed justly applicable, but that in this matter it was declined by the American Government for the following reasons:- The language of the Treaty was so clear that, in his opinion, there ought not to be two opinions about it. . . . Then it was a mere question of the interpretation of the English language, and he held that a foreign Government was not so competent to decide in such a question as the United States and England, who possessed that language in common". | The Earl of Clarendon, in reply, approved of Lord Napier's course in broaching anew the suggestion of arbitration, and authorized him to renew formally, in writing, the offer to refer the disputed questions arising out of the interpretation of the Clayton - Bulwer Treaty to the decision of any European Power (Instruction of November 13, 1857), and this was accordingly done by Lord Napier in a note to General Cass, dated Vereinigte Nr. 7648. 30th November, 1857. || In his annual Message to Congress in December, 1857, Staaten. President Buchanan, after narrating the negotiation and failure of the Claren29.Nov. 1881. don-Dallas Treaty, said: "The fact is, that when two nations, like Great Britain and the United States, mutually desirous, as they are, and I trust ever may be, of maintaining the most friendly relations with each other, have unfortunately concluded a Treaty which they understood in senses directly opposite, the wisest course is to abrogate such a Treaty by mutual consent, and to commence anew. . . Whilst entertaining these sentiments, I shall, nevertheless, not refuse to contribute to any reasonable adjustment of the Central American questions which is not practically inconsistent with the American interpretation of the Treaty. Overtures for this purpose have been recently made by the British Government in a friendly spirit which I cordially reciprocate." || Meanwhile, the Earl of Clarendon had instructed Sir William Ouseley, under date of the 19th November, 1857, "not to commit Her Majesty's Government to any course whatever in respect to the Bay Islands till the intentions of the Congress of the United States in regard to the Treaty of 1850 are clearly ascertained". The Situation, then, at the close of 1857, presented a triple deadlock. The United States had agreed not to move toward the abrogation of the Treaty until it could be seen what interpretation of its provisions would result from Sir William Ouseley's mission. Sir William had received positive instructions not to move until the United States should decide whether to abrogate the Treaty or not; and Lord Napier was forbidden to move until the United States should make formal answer to the proposal for arbitration. The instructions of Lord Clarendon to Lord Napier, the 22nd January, 1858, contained these words: "We are decidedly of opinion, that it would neither be consistent with our dignity or our interest to make any proposal to the United States' Government until we have received a formal answer to our formal offer of arbitration. In event of the offer being refused, it will be a great and hardly justifiable proof of the spirit of conciliation by which we are animated if we then show ourselves disposed to abrogate the ClaytonBulwer Treaty; but we must not be in too great haste." In order, apparently, to break this deadlock, Lord Napier wrote to General Cass, the 17th February, 1858, that:-"Something in the nature of an alternative was thus offered to the American Cabinet. Should the expedient of arbitration be adopted, a great portion of Sir William Ouseley's duty would be transferred to other agencies. Should arbitration be declined, it was hoped that the efforts of Her Majesty's Envoy would result in a settlement agreeable to the United States, inasmuch as in essential points it would carry the Treaty of 1850 into operation in a manner practically conformable to the American interpretation of that instrument." || On the 10th March, 1858, the Earl of Malmesbury, who had succeeded Lord Clarendon in the Foreign Office, instructed Lord Napier that, until an answer was returned to the proposal for arbitration, |