tinct causes.

one and the same cause. And when several diverse objects act on the senses, we believe each set of effects to belong to their separate disAnd no other reason can be assigned for this belief, but that constitution of mind imparted by the Creator which secures this result. The unity of our own mind, as the sole distinct cause of our own mental acts, and as the recipient of all the ministrations of the senses, is one of the particulars included under this general head. If any person should maintain (as some writers seem to do) that there are distinct and diverse agencies that per form our different mental acts, each receiving diverse external impressions which are not experienced by the others, nothing could be said to prove the contrary, except that all mankind talk, write, feel and act, as if each believed that his mind was one indivisible agent, performing all mental acts and receiving all external impressions. And thus of material units; if any one should maintain that a fruit or a flower was not the one and only cause of the sensations of color, figure, smell, taste, and touch, conveyed to the mind by the different senses, no argument could prove the fact. We could simply say, that mankind believe in this unity of cause, and prove their belief by their words and actions.

The fourth intuitive truth is, that those objects which act on the senses are real existences, or efficient causes. There are some philosophers who deny that there are two distinct classes of efficient causes. Such maintain that mind is the only real existence, and that matter does not exist as a real efficient cause of those effects on the senses which we call the qualities or properties of matter. What is generally believed as to the real existence of matter, is by them deemed a men tal hallucination, and not a reality. There are others, and among them Stewart abroad, and Tappan in this Vol. II.

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country, who seem to teach, that though matter may be a real existence, still it is not the efficient cause of its supposed effects on our senses, but that the direct volition of the Creator is the sole cause of every change in every particle of matter, and of all apparent effects of matter on our senses. How these things have been discovered, we are not informed; nor has any evidence of the truth of these theories been produced. They are assumptions without proof, and are contradictory to an intuitive truth. For all mankind always have believed, that matter exists, and that it produces its various effects on their senses; and it would be as impossible to destroy this belief as it would to destroy the belief of the existence of their own minds. And any person who should talk and act as if he disbelieved this truth would be deemed insane.

The fifth intuitive truth is, that mind is a separate distinct existence or efficient cause, and not matter, or a portion of the material body. Materialists maintain that mind is a peculiar organization of matter in connection with the body, and that with the body it will be dissolved and its powers annihilated. This is all a mere assumption, without a shadow of proof. For by the word matter, we mean that efficient cause which produces on our mind, through the senses, the effects called color, figure, and the other qualities of matter. Of course the only way of proving that the mind is matter, is to show that it has the qualities and properties of matter; that is, that it produces some of those effects on the senses or on other material existences which matter produces. Some have attempted the proof in this way. They say, 'Mind must exist in some place, so that it is there, and not elsewhere. This involves the ideas of position in space, extension, figure, and divisibility, which are four of the properties of matter. For if it is in one

place and not in another, there are limits to its extension, and this is figure, and this extension can be divided into two or more portions.' This is rendered plausible only by a want of discrimination as to the ideas of position, extension, figure and divisibility in regard to matter. For the position and extension of matter in space signifies simply this, that in a given point of space certain effects would be produced on the human senses if they were there. That is, in a given point of space, a certain cause called matter acts to produce the sensations of extension, figure, color, and other effects of matter. Now in regard to mind, it is true that it exists, and produces its appropriate effects in a given point of space, and that there is a limit to the extent of space in which it thus acts; but it is to be marked that matter produces not one of the acts of mind, and mind produces not one of the effects of matter, and therefore there is not one reason for calling them the same, or even similar things, but every reason there can be for calling them dissimilar and distinct things. It is true that both exist and act in limited points of space, which extension of space, of course, has limits and can be divided; but this does not at all involve the necessity of supposing the least resemblance of matter to mind in any one particular. They are no more one and the same thing, because they exist in space and act within certain limits, than fire and water are the same thing because they exist in space, and have the properties of figure and divisibility. In opposition to this unsupported assumption, it can be shown that every language on earth has terms to express the distinct existences call ed spirit and body, and every adult that is not insane, talks, writes, feels, and acts, as if he believed that the part of himself which feels and thinks is not his body, nor a part of his body.

The sixth intuitive truth is, that the mind is the sole efficient cause of its own volitions, and that, in given circumstances, it has the power of deciding to deny or to gratify any excited desire. The advocates of the doctrine of fate deny this principle. They maintain that mind is constituted with susceptibilities of desiring diverse species of good, which can be excited with different degrees of intensity; and that in all cases, it chooses to gratify the most intensely excited desire, so that there is the same invariableness of antecedence and sequence between the most highly excited desire and volition, as there is between certain conceptions and their invariably sequent emotions. And, in consequence of this, they maintain that mind, in the given circumstances, has no direct power to choose any other way than as it does choose.

In opposition to this, it is maintained that mind is formed not only with these susceptibilities of desir ing different kinds of good with different degrees of intensity, but also with a quiet, never-ceasing de sire for happiness in general, and with faculties (called usually reason and conscience) enabling it to judge which modes of enjoyment will se cure the most happiness on the whole;-that when various desires coëxist it can, and sometimes does, deny the most highly excited desire in obedience to reason, and some. times it does not ;-and that, in all cases of volition, there is power to decide in either of two ways, i. e. either to deny or to gratify any giv en desire. This, it is maintained, is an intuitive truth, believed by all men, as proved by their words and actions. Should it be claimed that this susceptibility of desiring hap piness in general, is one of the susceptibilities which can be more or less highly excited, and that when the dictates of reason are obeyed, this is the strongest desire; it is replied, that the different degrees of

desire are matters of consciousness, and that when a susceptibility is more highly excited at one time than another, we are conscious of these different states. But the testimony of consciousness is opposed to this assumption of such varieties of degree in our desire for happiness in general. It is an assump. tion, made to support a theory, which has no foundation in fact.

The seventh intuitive truth is, that we are the same persons now as we were in times past. Personal identity can be established by no process of reasoning, but all mankind believe it, and any one who acted as if he disbelieved it would be regarded as insane.

The eighth intuitive truth is, that what we distinctly remember is a reality. By this it is not intended that we are never mistaken in our recollections, but that there are things so distinctly remembered that it is impossible to disbelieve the testimony of memory. A person just returning from a scene of terror and distress could by no process be made to doubt that it really was as he remembers it.

The ninth intuitive truth is, that our own acts and states of mind belong to ourselves and are realities. If a person maintains that what we think and feel is not as we are conscious that it is, or that it is another mind and not our own, that has this experience, though we could not disprove the assertion, we could by no means be made to believe it. It is this certainty as to the nature of our ideas, together with confidence in our memory, which is the foundation of the certainty we feel in what are called mathematical axioms. For example, the axiom twice two are four is not believed as an intuitive truth, but because the idea expressed by twice two is felt to be the same as is expressed by the word four. It is the certainty we feel as to the identity of the ideas and the memory of the words used

to recall them, which has led to the naming of such expressions intuitive truths. So the expression the whole is greater than a part, is not an intuitive truth, but the confidence felt in its reality rests on intuitive truths. For we have always had a given idea recalled by the word whole, and another idea by the word part, and another by the word greater, and when these words are announced they recall ideas which are perceived to be true to past experience. So that this maxim is no more an intuitive truth than the expression white is not black, or the top is not the bottom. Our confidence in the truth of such expressions rests wholly on our confidence in the reality of just experience, and confidence in our memory of ideas and words.

The tenth intuitive truth is, that mind never WILL choose what involves evil without compensating good. The conscious power of free-agency is so strong, that many persons, if asked, do you feel that you can choose to put your hand in the fire, when no good will be gained by it, will reply in the affirmative. But if asked, whether they believe they ever shall do it, and all would answer in the negative. Much of our confidence in human testimony rests on this principle. Whenever it is shown that a witness knows that he will gain evil and no good from falsehood, all must believe that he will speak the truth.

The eleventh intuitive truth is, that contrivance proves an INTELLIGENT CAUSE, and the nature of a contrivance proves the design of the author.

The mind is so made that it can not believe that existence can originate without an efficient cause. Yet the existence of unorganized matter would not prove the existence of an intelligent cause. But when an existence is discovered where there is an adjustment of parts, all fitted to accomplish an end, no person could observe it without believing that the

cause of it is an intelligent mind, with the capacity of adjusting means to ends. Nor could the end designed be observed, without the belief that it was the intention of the author to accomplish this end. If a savage should find a watch in his forest shades, nothing could convince him that it sprang into being there without any cause. If he should notice its delicate machinery and nicely adjusted parts, he could not be made to believe that a brute, or any but an intelligent mind contrived it. If he should have its movements explained, and should perceive that it accurately pointed out the hours of the day, he could not be convinced that the author had no such design in the contrivance. An interesting case is recorded of the exhibition of this principle in the mind of a young child. His father had planted a bed with seeds arranged in the form of letters to spell the child's name. When the green symbols sprang up, and were discovered by the delighted child, the father in vain endeavored to force his belief that they came by chance. "No, father, somebody planted them -somebody meant to have them come up and spell my name," was the persevering response.

It is this principle which is the foundation of some most elaborate arguments to prove the existence of God, and the benevolence of his character, one of the most interesting of which is found in Paley's Natural Theology.

The last intuitive truth is, that things will be according to past experience, when there is no reason to the contrary.

The mind is so constituted that whenever any regular succession of antecedents and sequents has been discovered, the belief always follows that this uniformity will continue. Why do men expect that the sun will rise, the seasons return, and harvests wave in the fields? It is simply because their minds are

constituted to believe that things in future will continue to be as they have been in past experience. All the business of life, all the projects, the hopes and the enjoyments of mankind, rest upon this principle of the mind.

Every process of inductive or analogical reasoning rests upon this principle as the foundation. Every inductive process consists in accumulating facts to establish a certain uniformity of phenomena in given circumstances, and when this is done, the belief always is secured that this uniformity is perpetual. Thus, it is by a process of induc. tive reasoning that we arrive at the conclusion that all iron is magnetic. The principle that things will be according to past experience, is the major proposition, or truth conced. ed. Then facts are brought to light to show that in all past experiments all iron has been found magnetic. When this is done, the belief is se cured that all iron is and will be magnetic.

Analogical reasoning differs from inductive, in having some want of uniformity in certain respects, so that the expectation of entire uni formity is not so strong. For ex ample, when we reason from analogy that the moon is inhabited, the argument runs thus. The only plan. et we know of by experience is the earth, and we are to reason from our past experience. According to this, a planet has inhabitants. But in two respects this differs from an inductive argument. The first is, there is but one case in which experience has been known, and the second is, that this experience in sev eral points is dissimilar from what we find is true of the moon, which in some respects is unlike the earth, and therefore may be unlike in respect to inhabitants. Analogical reasoning, therefore, is far less conclusive than inductive.

One of the most interesting spe cimens of analogical reasoning is

found in Butler's Analogy. In that work the foundation principle is, that things will be according to past experience where there is no reason to the contrary. The writer then exhibits evidence that in past experience the soul goes through various changes resembling death and yet survives; that the dissolution of the body is no evidence of the destruction of the soul; that there is no kind of evidence that the soul is destroyed when the body is dissolved, and therefore, according to the above principle, its existence continues when the body dies.

This enumeration, it is supposed, embraces all that may properly be called intuitive truths, according to the test indicated at the commencement. Some writers have placed other propositions among the intuitive truths, but it is believed that a

rigid analysis will show that they are only specific instances included under some one or other of these more general principles. Several of those enumerated as intuitive truths in this article, have never be. fore been thus presented in any work which the writer has examined.

These principles, it will be seen, are the foundations of all our knowledge. There is no proposition that can be announced, the belief of which can not be traced back to one or the other of these maxims as the basis on which it rests. And the grand hope for the future develop. ment of truth and exposure of error, is connected with a full development of these principles, together with expert methods of developing errors, as contradictory to them.

once the representative and champion. He is known to many as the author of a sermon preached at South Boston, May 19, 1841, entitled "A Discourse on the Transient and Permanent in Christianity," which attracted much attention at the time, and gave rise to a somewhat spirited discussion in the Boston newspapers. The views advanced in the sermon were given more fully to the public during the winter following, in a series of lectures delivered in Boston, and, as we are informed, to a large, intelligent, and highly interested audience. These lectures are embodied in the volume of which the title is given below.

The reason why his volume and the opinions which it advances have not been made more extensively the subject of criticism, may be the strangeness of these opinions. To a common man, even if intelligent or learned, they seem more like the