requires otherwise. There is no doubt that the expression "every one" is, whether in a legal or popular sense, a wider term than the word "person," Union Colliery Co. v. The Queen, 4 Can. Cr. Cas. 400, 407. In the case of Pharmaceutical Society v. London and Provincial Supply Association, 5 App. Cas. 857, Lord Chancellor (Selborne), said: "There can be no question that the word "person" may, and I should be disposed myself to say primâ facie does, in a public statute include a person in law; that is, a corporation as well as a natural person "That if a statute provides that no person shall do a particular act except on a particular condition, it is prima facie, natural and reasonable (unless there be something in the context, or in the manifest object of the statute, or in the nature of the subject-matter, to exclude that construction) to understand the legislature as intending such persons, as, by the use of proper means, may be able to fulfil the condition; and not those who, though called "persons" in law, have no capacity to do so at any time, by any means, or under any circumstances, whatsoever."

A corporation is not subject to indictment upon a charge of any crime the essence of which is either personal criminal intent or such a degree of negligence as amounts to a wilful incurring of the risk of causing injury to others. R. v. Great West Laundry Co. (1900), 3 Can. Cr. Cas. 514 (Man.).

Justices.]-The Dominion Parliament has jurisdiction to confer upon justices of the peace appointed under provincial authority jurisdiction to summarily try criminal offences. Rex v. Wipper (1901), 5 Can. Cr. Cas. 17 (N.S.).

Other deadly or dangerous weapons.]-General words are to be given their common meaning unless there is something reasonably plain on the face of the instrument to be construed, to shew that they are not used with that meaning; the mere fact that general words follow specific words is not enough. Parker v. Marchant (1842), 1 Y. & C. 290.

Officials.]-The acts of a de facto officer, assuming to exercise the functions of an office to which he has no legal title, are, as regards all persons but the holder of the legal title, legal and binding. O'Neil v. AttorneyGeneral (1896), 1 Can. Cr. Cas. 303 (S.C. Can.).

The distinction between an officer de jure and an officer de facto is, that an officer de jure is one who has the lawful right or title without the possession of the office, while an officer de facto has the possession and performs the duties under the colour of right without being actually qualified in law so to act. 19 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 394.

The acts of a justice of the peace, duly commissioned, but who has not qualified by taking the prescribed oath, or who has not the property qualication without which he is prohibited by statute from acting and is declared to be incapable of "being a justice," are sustained as valid if done in a judicial character, and sufficient effect is given to the statute by considering it as penal upon the party acting; and therefore persons seizing goods under a warrant of distress, signed by a justice who had not taken the oaths required, are not trespassers because of the defect. Margate Pier v. Hannam (1819), 3 B. & Ald. 266.

Prize fight.]-An exhibition of fighting with fists or hands to witness which an admission fee is charged to the public and at which it is announced that the stake money will go to the contestant who knocks out his opponent in a stipulated number of rounds is a "prize fight" within sec. 92 of the Criminal Code. Such an exhibition made for gain must be viewed as it appeared or was intended to appear to the public, and it is no defence that the participants had merely feigned to fight. Steele v. Maber, 6 Can. Cr. Cas. 446.

Property.]-The phrase in Code sec. 236 as to lotteries, is "disposing of any property," and this clause of interpretation as to "property" simply states that it includes "every kind of real and personal property." The property need not be "specific property," for it would be an easy evasion if the statute could be got rid of by designating no particular thing, although the winner would be able to exercise his choice among the available prizes offered. Taylor v. Smetten, 11 Q.B.D. at p. 212; R. v. Lorrain (1896), 2 Can. Cr. Cas. 144.

Trade combinations.]—See secs. 496, 497 and 498.

Valuable security.]-It was formerly held that the term "valuable security" meant a valuable security to the person who parted with it on the false pretence, and that the inducing a person to execute a mortgage on his own property was therefore not obtaining a "valuable security." R. v. Brady (1866), 26 U.C.Q.B. 13; R. v. Danger, 3 Jur. N.S. 1011; but the present definition expressly includes any deed, bond, etc., which evidences title.

Defendant was indicted for forging an order for the payment of money, the order being in the following words: "John McLean, tailor, please give M. A. S (defendant) to the amount of $3.50 and by doing you will oblige me, A. McP." It was proved that the signature A. McP. was forged by the prisoner, and prisoner was convicted and sentenced. It was held that this was an order for the payment of money, and not a mere request, and the conviction was affirmed. R. v. Steel (1863), 13 U.C.C.P. 619 (following R. v. Tuke (1858), 17 U.C.Q.B. 296).

The true criterion as to whether a document is an order for payment of money or only a request, is, whether, if the instrument were genuine, and the person to whom it was directed paid it, he could recover the amount from the party by whom the order was given, or charge it to him, for if such be the case it is an order. R. v. Carter, 1 Cox 172; R. v. Ferguson, 1 Cox 241; R. v. Dawson, 3 Cox 220; R. v. Vivian, 1 Den. C.C. 35.

value.

3. For the purpose of this Act a postal card or any stamp Post card a referred to in the last preceding section shall be deemed to be chattel a chattel, and to be equal in value to the amount of the postage, rate or duty expressed on its face in words or figures or both. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 3.

4. Valuable security shall, where value is material, be Valuable deemed to be of value equal to that of the unsatisfied money, security. chattel personal, share, interest or deposit, for the securing or payment of which, or delivery or transfer or sale of which, or for the entitling or evidencing title to which, such valuable security is applicable or to that of such money or chattel personal, the payment or delivery of which is evidenced by such valuable security. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 3.

5. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,

(a) finding the indictment includes also exhibiting an Finding information and making a presentment;

indictment.

(b) having in one's possession includes not only having in Possession. one's own personal possession, but also knowingly

Joint

(i) having in the actual possession or custody of any other person, and

(ii) having in any place (whether belonging to or occupied by one's self or not) for the use or benefit of one's self or of any other person.

2. If there are two or more persons, and any one or more of

possession. them, with the knowledge and consent of the rest, has or have

anything in his or their custody or possession, it shall be deemed and taken to be in the custody and possession of each and all of them. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 3; 56 V., c. 32, s. 1.

Meaning of 6. In every case in which the offence dealt with in this Act expressions relates to the subject treated of in any other Act the words and expressions used herein in respect to such offence shall have the meaning assigned to them in such other Act. 55-56 V., c. 29, S. 4.

in other Acts.

Carnal knowledge.

7. Carnal knowledge is complete upon penetration to any, even the slightest degree, and even without the emission of seed. 55-56 V., c. 29, s: 266.

PART I.

GENERAL.

Application of this Act.

8. Nothing in this Act shall affect any of the laws relating This Act not to the government of His Majesty's land or naval forces. to affect 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 983.

H. M. forces.

of Act to Saskatche

9. Except in so far as they are inconsistent with the North- Application west Territories Act and amendments thereto as the same existed immediately before the first day of September, one wan, Alberta thousand nine hundred and five, the provisions of this Act and the Terextend to and are in force in the provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta, the Northwest Territories, and, except in so far as inconsistent with the Yukon Act, the Yukon Territory. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 983.

Application of the Criminal Law of England.

ritories.

10. The criminal law of England, as it existed on the Criminal seventeenth day of September, one thousand seven hundred and law of England ninety-two, in so far as it has not been repealed by any Act of applicable the Parliament of the United Kingdom having force of law in to Ontario. the province of Ontario, or by any Act of the Parliament of the late province of Upper Canada, or of the province of Canada, still having force of law, or by this Act or any other Act of the Parliament of Canada, and as altered, varied, modified or affected by any such Act, shall be the criminal law of the province of Ontario. R.S., c. 144, s. 1.

The Quebec Act, 1774.]-The Criminal Law of England was introduced into the Province of Quebec by Royal Proclamation in 1763, and subsequently extended by 14 Geo. III., ch. 83 (Imp.) to what is now Ontario. After the erection of Upper Canada, now Ontario, into a separate province, the Provincial Legislature, after reciting the Imperial Act, 14 Geo. III., ch. 83, passed 40 Geo. 111., ch. 81 in July, 1800, enacted that the Criminal Law of England as it stood on the 17th September, 1792, should be the Criminal Law of Upper Canada. R. v. Malloy (1900), 4 Can. Cr. Cas. 116 (Ont.).

Champerty a criminal offence.1-Champerty is a criminal offence, and a champertous contract will not be enforced by the courts. The English

Criminal

land appli

cable to British Columbia.

champerty laws were introduced or continued in Ontario and Quebec under the Quebec Act, 1774 (Imp.). Meloche v. Deguire, 8 Can. Cr. Cas. 89; Hopkins v. Smith (1901), i O.L.R. 659.

Champerty and maintenance may almost be considered obsolete offences as regards criminal prosecutions therefor. The English Criminal Law Commissioners appointed to draft a Criminal Code, which however never was enacted, recommended that both offences should be abolished, it being considered by them that this law had been used vexatiously in many cases of prosecutions commenced thereunder and not persevered in. Commissioners' 5th Report, pages 34-39.

11. The criminal law of England as it existed on the ninelaw of Eng- teenth day of November, one thousand eight hundred and fiftyeight, in so far as it has not been repealed by any ordinance or Act-still having the force of law-of the colony of British Columbia, or the colony of Vancouver Island, passed before the union of the said colonies, or of the colony of British Columbia passed since such union, or by this Act or any other Act of the Parliament of Canada, and as altered, varied, modified or affected by any such ordinance or Act, shall be the criminal law of the province of British Columbia. R.S., c. 144, s. 2.

Criminal

cable to Manitoba.

Champerty.]-A bargain by which A., a stranger to B., having no interest recognized by law in a given property, agrees to help B. to recover such property in a court of justice in consideration of getting a portion of the fruits of the suit, is champerty and is an indictable offence by the common law of England. Briggs v. Fleutot, 10 B.C.R. at p. 316.

The criminal law of England on this subject was introduced into British Columbia by the statute R.S.C. 1886, ch. 144, sec. 2.

12. The criminal law of England as it existed on the law of Eng- fifteenth day of July, one thousand eight hundred and seventy, land appli- in so far as it is applicable to the province of Manitoba, and in so far as it has not been repealed, as to the Province, by any Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, or by this Act or any other Act of the Parliament of Canada, and as altered, varied, modified or affected, as to the Province, by any such Act, shall be the criminal law of the province of Manitoba. 51 V., c. 33, s. 1.

Civil remedy not suspended.

Effect of Act on Remedies.

13. No civil remedy for any act or omission shall be suspended or affected by reason that such act or omission amounts to a criminal offence. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 534.

No suspension of civil remedy for criminal act.]—This section formerly sec. 534 of the Criminal Code, 1892, has been held in Quebec not to be "criminal law" legislation but legislation dealing with civil rights and