Letters murder. (e.)—Form of indictment for damage by explosion.]-That A. unlawfully and maliciously did at by the explosion of a certain explosive substance, that is to say, gunpowder, destroy (or damage) a certain building situate with intent thereby then unlawfully, wilfully and of his malice aforethought, one J. N. to kill and murder, against the peace, etc., and of the statute, the Criminal Code sec. 264. (h.)-By any other means attempts to commit murder.]-Where a woman jumped out of a window to avoid the violence of her husband, it was held that to constitute this offence it must be proved that he intended by his conduct to make her jump out. R. v. Donovan (1850), 4 Cox C.C. 401. The sending or placing of infernal machines with intent to murder is within this sub-section. R. v. Mountford (1835), Mood. C.C. 441, 3 Russ. Cr., 6th ed., 280 (n). Attempts to commit suicide are, however, not included. R. v. Burgess (1862), 9 Cox C.C. 302, L. & C. 258, 32 L.J.M.C. 55; but come under sec. 270 of the Code. Circumstances disclosing intent.]-On the trial of a person accused of attempt to murder by shooting, evidence that he had burglar's tools in his possession at the time is admissible, as tending to prove criminal intent. It is proper for the judge, in charging the jury in a trial for an attempt to murder, to instruct them that they may draw an inference as to the prisoner's intent to kill from the circumstances of his being a stranger loitering in a street or park, between four and five o'clock in the morning, with a loaded revolver and burglar's tools in his possession. The King v. Mooney, 11 Can. Cr. Cas. 333. 265. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable threatening to ten years' imprisonment who sends, delivers or utters, or directly or indirectly causes to be received, knowing the contents thereof, any letter or writing threatening to kill or murder any person. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 233. Penalty. Conspiring to murder. Counselling murder. Threats verbally made to burn the complainant's buildings are not indictable under the Criminal Code, and give rise only to proceedings to force the offender to give security to keep the peace. Ex parte Welsh (1898), 2 Can. Cr. Cas. 35. But a threat in writing to burn a building is punishable under sec. 516. As to extortion by threats see secs. 453 and 454. 266. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to fourteen years' imprisonment, who,— (a) conspires or agrees with any person to murder or to Counselling murder.]-The offence of counselling murder may be committed by the publication of a newspaper article exulting in the assassination of a foreign monarch and commending it as an example to revolution ists throughout the world; and the counselling need not be directed to any particular person. R. v. Most (1881), 7 Q.B.D. 244; 14 Cox C.C. 583. To solicit and incite a person to commit a felony was a misdemeanour at common law. Arch. Crim. Plead. (1900), 1224. Where the indictment is for soliciting another to commit murder it is unnecessary to negative the commission of the murder which, if committed, would render the accused guilty of the principal offence as an accessory before the fact (sec. 69), for it cannot be intended that the principal offence has been committed where it is not charged. 1 Stark. Cr. Plead., 2nd ed., 148; R. v. Higgins (1801), 2 East 5. at un Form of indictment.]-That A., B. and C. on lawfully and wickedly did conspire, confederate and agree together one J. N. unlawfully, wilfully, and of their malice aforethought to kill and murder, against the form of the statute, the Criminal Code sec. 266. 267. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable Accessory to imprisonment for life, who is an accessory after the fact to after the murder. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 235. The accused must be proved to have done some act to assist the murderer personally: R. v. Chapple (1840), 9 C. & P. 355; or by employing another person to harbour or relieve him. R. v. Greenacre (1837), 8 C. & P. 35; R. v. Butterfield (1843), 1 Cox C.C. 39; R. v. Lee (1834), 6 C. & P. 536; R. v. Jarvis (1837), 2 M. & Rob. 40. See also note to sec. 71. The accessory may be indicted without proceeding against the principal or jointly with the principal. Sec. 849. fact. 268. Every one who commits manslaughter is guilty of an Punishment indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life. 55-56 for manslaughter. V., c. 29, s. 236. Not applicable to corporation.]-There is no power under Code sec. 920 or otherwise to impose a fine or any other punishment, in lieu of imprisonment, for the offence of manslaughter, and there is consequently no judgment or sentence applicable to a conviction of a corporation for that offence even if a corporation can be guilty of manslaughter. R. v. Great West Laundry Co. (1900), 3 Can. Cr. Cas. 514 (Man.). A corporation from its artificial nature cannot be guilty of any crime the essence of which is either personal criminal intent or such a degree of negligence as amounts to a wilful incurring of the risk of causing injury to others. Ibid. Under sec. 247 of the Code a corporation may be indicted for omitting, without lawful excuse, to perform the duty of avoiding danger to human life from anything in its charge or under its control. And the fact that the consequence of the omission to perform such duty might have justified an indictment for manslaughter in the case of an individual is not a ground for quashing the indictment. As the Criminal Code provides no punishment for the offence, the common law punishment of a fine may be imposed on a corporation indicted under it. Union Colliery Co. v. R., 4 Can. Cr. Cas. 400, 31 Can. S.C.R. 81. Extradition.]—"Manslaughter, when voluntary," is extraditable by the first article of the Convention of 12 July, 1889, between Great Britain and the United States of America. Aiding or Previous indictment for murder.]—A previous conviction or acquittal on an indictment for murder shall be a bar to a second indictment for the same homicide charging it as manslaughter; and a previous conviction or acquittal on an indictment for manslaughter shall be a bar to a second indictment for the same homicide charging it as murder. Sec. 909 (2). Previous conviction for assault.]—In Reg. v. Friel (1891), 17 Cox C.C. 325, it was held that when there had been a summary conviction for assault, and the person assaulted dies of the injuries, a plea of autrefois convict is no answer to an indictment for manslaughter, because the death, is a new fact, not a mere matter of aggravation, or a mere consequence, because in cases of manslaughter based on death resulting from culpable negligence there is no criminal offence unless death ensues and gives rise to a charge of manslaughter. See also secs. 733, 734 and 909. Suicide. 269. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable counselling. to imprisonment for life who counsels or procures any person to commit suicide, actually committed in consequence of such counselling or procurement, or who aids or abets any person in the commission of suicide. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 237. Attempt. Neglecting to obtain assistance Aiding suicide.]-If two persons mutually agree to commit suicide together, and accordingly take poison or attempt to drown themselves together, but only one of them dies, the survivor is guilty of murder. R. v. Dyson (1823), R. & R. 523; R. v. Alison (1838), 8 C. & P. 418; R. v. Jessop (1877), 16 Cox C.C. 204; R. v. Stornouth (1897), 61 J.P. 729; Com. v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356; Com. Mink, 123 Mass. 429; Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio State R. 146; Burnett v. State (1903), 204 Ill. 208. 270. Every one who attempts to commit suicide is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to two years' imprisonment. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 238. Attempted suicide.]-This offence was a misdemeanour at common law. R. v. Burgess (1862), L. & C. 258; 9 Cox C.C. 302, 32 L.J.M.C. 55. Mere intention to commit the offence does not constitute an attempt; same act immediately connected with the principal offence must be proved to have been done by the accused. R. v. Eagleton (1855), Dears. 515, 538, 24 L.J.M.C. 158; R. v. Roberts (1855), Dears. 539, 25 L.J.M.C. 17; R. v. Cheeseman (1862), L. & C. 140, 9 Cox C.C. 100. In cases of attempted suicide the mere fact of drunkenness is not an excuse for the crime, but it is "a material fact in order to arrive at the conclusion whether or no the prisoner really intended to destroy his life." Per Wightman, J., in Regina v. Doody (1854), 6 Cox C.C. 463. Neglect in Childbirth and Concealing Dead Body. 271. Every woman is guilty of an indictable offence who, with either of the intents in this section mentioned, being with child and being about to be delivered, neglects to provide rea sonable assistance in her delivery, if the child is permanently in childinjured thereby, or dies, either just before, or during, or shortly birth. after birth, unless she proves that such death or permanent injury was not caused by such neglect, or by any wrongful act to which she was a party, and is liable,— (a) if the intent of such neglect be that the child shall not Penalty. live, to imprisonment for life; (b) if the intent of such neglect be to conceal the fact of her Penalty. having had a child, to imprisonment for seven years. 55 56 V., c. 29, s. 239. It has been held that a woman cannot be convicted of manslaughter on evidence that, knowing she was near the time of delivery, she wilfully abstained from taking the necessary precautions to preserve the life of her child after its birth, in consequence of which neglect it died. R. v. Knights (1860), 2 F. & F. 46; but see R. v. Handley (1874), 13 Cox C.C. 79, where Brett, J., held that if the woman, without intending the death of the child, determines to be alone at the birth for the purpose of temporary concealment, and the child afterwards dies by reason of her wicked negligence, she is guilty of manslaughter. Cf. R. v. Middleship (1851), 5 Cox C.C. 275. of child. 272. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable Concealing to two years' imprisonment, who disposes of the dead body of dead body any child in any manner, with intent to conceal the fact that its mother was delivered of it, whether the child died before, or during, or after birth. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 240. at Form of indictment.]—The jurors, etc., present that A. on was delivered of a child; and that the A., being so delivered of the said child as aforesaid, did then unlawfully endeavour to conceal the birth of the said child by secretly burying the dead body of the said child, against the form of the statute, the Criminal Code sec. 272. (State the means of concealment specially, when it is otherwise than by secret burying.) Evidence.]-Leaving the dead body of a child in two boxes, closed but not locked or fastened, one being placed inside the other in a bedroom, but in such a position as to attract the attention of those who daily resorted to the room, is not a secret disposition of the body, within the meaning of the statute. R. v. George, 11 Cox C.C. 41. Concealment of birth was dealt with by sec. 61 of 32-33 Vict., ch. 20. Although the mere denial of the birth will not support a conviction; R. v. Turner (1839), 8 C. & P. 755, it is a factor in proof of the offence. R. v. Piché (1879). 30 U.C.C.P. 409. What is a secret disposition must depend on the circumstances of each particular case. The most complete exposure of the body might be a concealment, ex gr., if placed in a secluded p'ace where the body would not be likely to be found. R. v. Brown (1870), L.R. 1 C.C. 244. The former statutes, R.S.C. 1886, ch. 162, sec. 49, and 24-25 Vict., ch. 100, sec. 60, required that there should be a "secret disposition" of the dead body. A disposal in any manner with the intent here specified is sufficient under the Code. Wounding A final disposition of the body of the child is not essential, and it is an offence if it be hid in a place from which a further removal was contemplated. R. v. Goldthorpe (1841), 2 Moo. C.C. 244; R. v. Perry (1855), Dears. 471. Where the only evidence was that the woman had been delivered of a child the body of which was taken away by two other persons, but the prisoner did not know where it was put, it was held insufficient. R. v. Bate (1871), 11 Cox C.C. 686. There must be an identification of the body found as being that of the child of which she is alleged to have been delivered. R. v. Williams (1871), 11 Cox C.C. 684. It must also be proved that the body concealed was that of a child dead at the time of the disposal or concealment. R. v. Bell (1874), Irish R. 8 C.L. 541; R. v. May (1867), 16 L.T. Rep. 362, 10 Cox C.C. 448. The mere denial of the birth is not sufficient proof of intent to conceal. R. v. Turner (1839), 8 C. & P. 755. It must be shewn that the accused did some act of disposal of the body after the child was dead. Ibid. The fact that the mother had previously allowed the birth to be known to some persons is not conclusive evidence negativing concealment. R. v. Douglas (1836), 1 Mood. C.C. 480; R. v. Cornwall (1817), R. & R. 336. Confession as evidence.]—A. being questioned by a police constable about the concealment of a birth gave an answer which caused the officer to say to her "It might be better for you to tell the truth and not a lie"; and it was held that a further statement made by her to the officer was inadmissible in evidence, as not being free and voluntary. She was taken into custody on the same day, placed with two accomplices, and charged with concealment of birth. All three then made statements. It was held that those made by the accomplices could not be deemed to be affected by the previous inducement to A. and were therefore admissible against themselves, although that made by A. was inadmissible. When before the magistrate for the preliminary enquiry the three prisoners received the formal caution (sec. 684) from the magistrate as to anything they wished to say in regard to the charge, and A. then made a statement which was taken down in writing and attached to the deposition, and this latter statement was admissible in evidence against her. R. v. Bate (1871), 11 Cox C.C. 686. And see as to confessions and admissions as evidence, sec. 685 and note to same. "Child."]-A foetus which has not reached the period at which it might have been born alive is not a "child." R. v. Berriman (1854), 6 Cox C.C. 388; but see R. v. Colmer (1864), 9 Cox C.C. 506. Verdict of concealment of birth on charge of child murder.]-If any person tried for the murder of any child is acquitted thereof the jury by whose verdict such person is acquitted may find, in case it so appears in evidence, that the child had recently been born, and that such person did, by some secret disposition of such child or of the dead body of such child, endeavour to conceal the birth thereof, and thereupon the court may pass such sentence as if such person had been convicted upon an indictment for the concealment of birth. Sec. 952. Bodily Injuries and Acts and Omissions Causing Danger to the 273. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable with intent. to imprisonment for life who, with intent to maim, disfigure or |