disable any person, or to do some other grievous bodily harm to any person, or with intent to resist or prevent. the lawful apprehension or detainer of any person, unlawfully by any means wounds or causes any grievous bodily harm to any person, or shoots at any person, or by drawing a trigger, or in any other manner, attempts to discharge any kind of loaded arms at any person. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 241.

Indictment.]-If the indictment charges that the accused did "inflict" grievous bodily harm, it sufficiently charges the "causing" of grievous bodily harm. R. v. Bray (1883), 15 Cox C.C. 197.

The instrument or means by which the injury was inflicted need not be stated in the indictment, and if stated need not be proved as laid. R. v. Briggs (1831), 1 Moo. C.C. 318.

Proof of intent.]-It was held in Rex v. Linneker, [1906] 2 K.B. 99, 22 Times L.R. 495, that the accused was rightly convicted of "feloniously attempting to discharge a revolver with intent to do grievous bodily harm, when he had drawn a loaded revolver from his pocket, with an expression of intention to use it, but was seized before he could take any further step towards discharging it.

The intent may be inferred from the act committed. R. v. Le Dante, 2 Geldert & Oxley (N.S.), 401.

A person who fires a loaded pistol into a group of persons, not aiming at any one in particular, but intending generally to do grievous bodily harm, and who hits one of them, may be convicted on an indictment charging him with shooting at the person he has hit with intent to do grievous bodily harm to that person. R. v. Fretwell (1864), L. & C. 443, 9 Cox C.C. 471.

Intent against one person; wounding another.]—-The statutory form 64, sub-sec. (f), shews that this section includes as an offence the causing of actual bodily harm to a person although done with intent to cause such harm to another; and also that where the intent is to prevent a lawful apprehension the person about to be apprehended is not necessarily the · person charged with the wounding or other offence under this section.

Not only will an indictment charging the accused with wounding A. with intent to do him grievous bodily injury be supported by evidence that he intended to go grievous bodily harm to the man he wounded, and who, in fact was A., although the accused did not think that he was A., but somebody else, R. v. Stopford (1870), 11 Cox C.C. 643; but it will be sufficient under this section that the defendant wounded, etc., any person with intent to maim, etc., a third person. R. v. Latimer (1886), 17 Q.B.D. 359. 16 Cox 707: Archbold Cr. Plead. (1900), 806. It will be observed that there is a possible distinction in this respect between secs. 264 and 273, for in the former the words "any person" do not follow the words "with intent to commit murder," and it may consequently be inferred that the intent to murder must be directed against the very person wounded, etc. See note to sec. 264.

Maim, disfigure or disable.]—To maim is to injure any part of a man's body which may render him, in fighting, less able to defend himself or to annoy his enemy. 1 Hawk., ch. 44, sec. 1; R. v. Sullivan (1841), C. & Mar. 209. To disfigure is to do some external injury which may detract from his personal appearance. To disable is to do something which creates a permanent disability and not merely a temporary injury. Archbold Cr. Plead. (1900), 807; R. v. Boyce (1824), 1 Mood. C.C. 29.

Wounding.

Bodily harm.

Grievous bodily harm.]—An injury seriously interfering with health or comfort, although neither permanent or endangering life, is sufficient. R. v. Ashman (1858), 1 F. & F. 88; R. v. Cox (1818), R. & R. 362.

Intent to prevent lawful apprehension.]—It must be shewn that the arrest would have been lawful. As to when an arrest is justified, see sec. 30 et seq. and secs. 646 to 652.

Wounds.]-A wounding may be "either with or without any weapon or instrument;" sec. 242; but the skin must be broken. R. v. Wood (1830), 1 Mood. C.C. 278; R. v. Briggs (1831), 1 Mood. C.C. 318; R. v. Withers (1831), 1 Mood. C.C. 294; R. v. Sheard (1837), 7 C. & P. 846.

Verdict for lesser offence.]—A charge of wounding or causing grievous bodily harm with intent is inclusive of the offence of common assault and a verdict for the latter offence may be returned by virtue of sec. 951. R. v. Laskey, 1 P. & B. (N.B.) 194; R. v. Taylor (1869), L.R. 1 C.C.R. 194. And likewise, if the jury are not convinced as to the intent, they may find the accused guilty of unlawfully wounding if wounding be charged, or of unlawfully inflicting grievous bodily harm if that be charged, in which case the punishment is under sec. 274. R. v. Waudby, [1895] 2 Q.B. 482.

Upon an indictment charging a shooting at a person with intent, a verdict for common assault may be rendered. Re Cronan (1874), 24 U.C.C.P. 106.

Verdict of "guilty without malicious intent."]-Upon the trial of an indictment for wounding with intent to disable, a verdict of "guilt without malicious intent" is equivalent to a verdict of acquittal, although the jury were instructed that if intent to disable were negatived they might still convict of the simple offence of wounding. Such verdict is to be construed as a finding that the act of the accused which resulted in wounding the complainant was done without malice. (The King v. Slaughenwhite (No. 1), 9 Can. Cr. Cas. 53, 37 N.S.R. 382, reversed.) Slaughenwhite v. The King; The King v. Slaughenwhite (No. 2), 9 Can. Cr. Cas. 173, 35 Can. S.C.R. 607.

Self-defence.]-Upon a charge of shooting with intent to do grievous bodily harm in which the plea is self-defence, it is a question for the jury, whether the assault upon the accused, which had provoked the shooting, had ended or was still being pursued. It is mis-direction to charge the jury that, to support the plea of self-defence to the infliction of grievous bodily harm, they must find that the accused could not otherwise have preserved himself from death or grievous bodily harm, it being a sufficient justification if the accused had a reasonable apprehension of grievous bodily harm to himself from the violence of the assault upon him, and if he believed on reasonable grounds that he could not preserve himself from grievous bodily harm otherwise than by inflicting grievous bodily harm upon his assailant. The King v. Ritter, 8 Can. Cr. Cas. 31; Cr. Code secs. 53 and 54.

Attempt to commit murder.]-See sec. 264.

Pointing fire-arm loaded or unloaded.]—See sec. 122.

274. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable. to three years' imprisonment who unlawfully wounds or inflicts any grievous bodily harm upon any other person, either with or without any weapon or instrument. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 242. Indictment for unlawfully wounding.]—That A. at one W. unlawfully and maliciously did wound against the form of the Criminal Code

sec. 274 (add a count charging that the defendant "did inflict grievous bodily harm upon W.").

Grievous bodily harm.]—In Reg. v. Ashman (1858), 1 F. & F. 88, Wills, J., said that in order to constitute grievous bodily harm "it is not necessary that the injury should be either permanent or dangerous, if it be such as seriously to interfere with the comfort or health it is sufficient." In Reg. v. Clarence (1888), 22 Q.B.D. 23, the effect of a similar enactment, sec. 20 of 24-25 Vict., ch. 100 (Imp.), was considered. It provided that "whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously wound or inflict any grievous bodily harm upon any other person, either with or without any weapon, or instrument, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour," Mr. Justice Wills expressed the opinion that "the section points to the infliction of direct and intentional violence, whether with a weapon or the fist or the foot, or any other part of the person or in any other way not involving the use of a weapon, as for instance by creating a panic at a theatre whereby people trampled on one another." (Reg. v. Martin, 8 Q.B.D. 54.) And Mr. Justice Stephen, in the Clarence Case, said: "The words appear to my mind to mean the direct causing of some grievous bodily harm to the body itself with a weapon, as by a cut with a knife, or without a weapon, as by a blow with the fist, or by pushing the person down."

A conviction for inflicting grievous bodily harm under sec. 274 which provides a punishment for the person "who unlawfully wounds or inflicts any grievous bodily harm upon any other person" need not state that the act was done "unlawfully," that term in the section being referable only to the offence of wounding. R. v. Treadwell (1902), 5 Can. Cr. Cas. 461.

The words "actual bodily harm" in sec. 295 would be fully covered by the least bodily harm, whilst the offence provided in sec. 274 has added to it an aggravating element which makes the bodily harm grievous. R. v. Hostetter (1902), 7 Can. Cr. Cas. 221.

Powers of justices.]-Justices of the peace have no power on a preliminary investigation before them of a charge of unlawfully wounding, to reduce the charge to one of common assault, over which they would have summary jurisdiction. R. v. Lee (1897), 2 Can. Cr. Cas. 233; Miller v. Lea (1898), 2 Can. Cr. Cas. 282. A conviction recorded by justices in such a case upon a plea of guilty to the charge as reduced, is not a bar to an indictment for unlawfully wounding, based upon the same state of facts, and does not support a plea of autrefois convict. Ibid.

Verdict.]-Upon an indictment for assaulting, beating, wounding and inflicting grievous bodily harm, the prisoner may be convicted of a common assault. Sec. 951. R. v. Oliver (1860), Bell C.C. 287, 30 L.J.M.C. 12; R. v. Yeadon (1862). L. & C. 81; and a verdict for common assault was held good where the indictment charged only the infliction of grievous bodily harm. R. v. Canwell, 20 L.T. 402, 11 Cox C.C. 263, and see R. v. Taylor, 11 Cox C.C. 261, L.R. 1 C.C.R. 194.

275. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable Penalty. to fourteen years' imprisonment who wilfully,—

(a) shoots at any vessel belonging to His Majesty or in the Shooting at service of Canada; or,

the King's vessels.

(b) maims or wounds any public officer engaged in the execu- Wounding tion of his duty or any person acting in aid of such officer. public 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 243.

officer.

Penalty.

Offence.

By strangling.

By narcotic.

Administering poison to en

danger life.

Public officer.]-This term is inclusive of any inland revenue or customs officer, officer of the army, navy, marine, militia, North-West Mounted Police, or other officer engaged in enforcing the laws relating to the revenue, customs, trade or navigation of Canada. Sec. 2 (29).

Describing the offence.]-To justify a sentence of more than three years' imprisonment for assault and wounding a public officer, the charge must allege that the offence was committed while the officer was engaged in the execution of his duty. R. v. Dupont (1900), 3 Can. Cr. Cas. 566 (Que.). A mere description of the assaulted party in the information as an acting detective does not justify a sentence of seven years on a plea of guilty, nor does it imply that the assault took place while the officer was engaged in the execution of his duty. Ibid.

276. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life and to be whipped, who with intent thereby to enable himself or any other person to commit, or with intent thereby to assist any other person in committing, any indictable offence,

(a) by any means whatsoever, attempts to choke, suffocate

or strangle any other person, or by any means calculated to choke, suffocate or strangle, attempts to render any other person insensible, unconscious or incapable of resistance; or,

(b) unlawfully applies or administers to, or causes to be taken by, or attempts to apply or administer to, or attempts or causes to be administered to or taken by, any person, any chloroform, laudanum or other stupefying or overpowering drug, matter or thing. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 244.

at

Form of indictment.]-That A. on unlawfully did attempt to choke, suffocate and strangle one J. N., with intent thereby then to enable him, the said A., the monies, goods and chattels of the said J. N., from the person of the said J. N., unlawfully to steal, take and carry away, against the peace, etc., and against the form of the Criminal Code sec. 276.

Attempt to murder.]-See sec. 264.

277. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to fourteen years' imprisonment who unlawfully administers to, or causes to be administered to or taken by any other person, any poison or other destructive or noxious thing, so as thereby to endanger the life of such person, or so as thereby to inflict upon such person any grievous bodily harm. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 245.

at

Form of indictment.]—That A. on unlawfully and maliciously did administer to one J. N. a large quantity, to wit, two drachms of a certain deadly poison called white arsenic, and thereby then did endanger the life of the said J. N. (or inflict on the said J. N. griev

ous bodily harm) against the form of the statute, the Criminal Code sec. 277.

"Administering."]-See note to sec. 264.

Any poison or other destructive or noxious thing.]-Some drugs are noxious only when taken in large quantities; and it is doubtful whether the administering of a drug in so small a quantity as to be incapable of doing harm although a larger quantity of the drug would be a poisonous dose, is administering a "poison." R. v. Hennah (1877), 13 Cox C.C. 547; R. v. Cramp (1880), 5 Q.B.D. 307. In the latter case it is suggested that where the drug administered is a recognized "poison" it may be that the offence is complete although the quantity administered is too small to be

noxious.

But if grievous bodily harm in fact results although the intent was merely to annoy (as to which see sec. 278), the offence is complete under sec. 277. Tulley v. Corrie, 10 Cox C.C. 640.

with intent

278. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable Administerto three years' imprisonment who unlawfully administers to, or ing poison causes to be administered to or taken by, any other person any to injure. poison or other destructive or noxious thing, with intent to injure, aggrieve or annoy such person. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 246.

If any grievous bodily harm is in fact inflicted, the offence comes under sec. 277. Tulley v. Corrie (1867), 10 Cox C.C. 640.

Any poison or other destructive or noxious thing.]-See note to sec. 277. Intent to injure, aggrieve or annoy.]—Where the defendant adminis tered cantharides to a woman and the jury found that it was administered with the intent to excite her sexual passion and desire, in order that the defendant might have connection with her, this was held to be an administering with intent to "injure, aggrieve and annoy" her. R. v. Wilkins (1861), L. & C. 89, 9 Cox C.C. 20, 31 L.J.M.C. 72.

279. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable Causing to imprisonment for life who unlawfully and by the explosion bodily injuries by of an explosive substance burns, maims, disfigures, disables or explosives. does any grievous bodily harm to any person. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 247.

Explosive substance.]-This expression includes any materials for making an explosive substance; also any apparatus, machine, implement or materials used, or intended to be used or adapted for causing, or aiding in causing, any explosion in or with any explosive substance, and also any part of any such apparatus, machine or implement. Sec. 2 (14).

Dangerous storing of explosives.]-Keeping naphtha in a populous place in such quantities as to cause terror or danger is a common law nuisance as being an act injurious to public safety. R. v. Lister (1857), D. & B. 209. And so is keeping gunpowder or other explosives in dangerous proximity to streets or houses. R. v. Taylor (1742), 2 Str. 1167: 1 Russ. Cr. 6th ed., 734 (n). And where defendants were charged with having unlawfully knowing and willingly deposited in a room in a lodging or boarding house in the City of Halifax near to certain streets or thoroughfares and in close proximity to divers dwelling houses excessive quantities of dynamite by