Executive officers of offending company liable.

Receiving trading stamps.

507. Any executive officer of a corporation or company guilty of an offence under the two last preceding sections who in any way aids or abets in or counsels or procures the commission of such offence, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to the punishment stated in the said sections respectively. 4-5 E. VII., c. 9, s. 1.

508. Every one is guilty of an offence and liable, on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding twenty dollars, who, being a purchaser of goods from a merchant or dealer in goods, directly or indirectly receives or takes trading stamps from the vendor of such goods or his employee or agent. 4-5 E. VII., c. 9, s. 1.

PART VIII.

WILFUL AND FORBIDDEN ACTS IN RESPECT OF CERTAIN
PROPERTY.

Interpretation.

509. Every one who causes any event by an act which he Wilfully knew would probably cause it, being reckless whether such defined. event happens or not, is deemed for the purposes of this Part to have caused it wilfully. 55-56 V., c. 29, s. 481.

Mischief.

510. Every one is guilty of the indictable offence of mis- Penalty. chief who wilfully destroys or damages any of the property in this section mentioned, and is liable to the punishment in this section specified, that is to say:

(A) To imprisonment for life if the object damaged is,

or boat.

(a) a dwelling-house, ship or boat, and the damage is Damage to
caused by an explosion, and any person is in such house, ship
dwelling-house, ship or boat; and the damage causes
actual danger to life; or,

(b) a bank, dyke or wall of the sea, or of any inland Bank, dyke
water, natural or artificial, or any work in, on, or be- or sea-wall.
longing to any port, harbour, dock or inland water,
natural or artificial, and the damage causes actual dan-

ger of inundation; or,

duct.

(c) any bridge, whether over any stream of water or not, Bridge, via-
or any viaduct, or aqueduct, over or under which bridge, duct or aque-
viaduct or aqueduct any highway, railway or canal
passes, and the damage is done with intent to render
and does render such bridge, viaduct or aqueduct, or
the highway, railway or canal passing over or under
the same, or any part thereof, dangerous or impassable;

or,

(d) a railway damaged with the intent of rendering and Railway. so as to render such railway dangerous or impassable;

Penalty.

Damage to ship.

To cattle.

Penalty.

Damage to ship.

Signal.

Bank, dyke or wall.

River or canal.

Flood gate or sluice.

Private fishery.

Flood gate.

Goods.

Machines.

Hop bind.

Penalty.

Damaging

tree or shrub.

Letter bag, etc.

Letter box, etc.

(B) To fourteen years' imprisonment if the object damaged is,—

(a) a ship in distress or wrecked, or any goods, merchandise or articles belonging thereto; or,

(b) any cattle or the young thereof, and the damage is caused by killing, maiming, poisoning or wounding; (C) To seven years' imprisonment if the object damaged is,

(a) a ship damaged with intent to destroy or render useless such ship; or,

(b) a signal or mark used for purposes of navigation; or, (c) a bank, dyke or wall of the sea or of any inland water or canal, or any materials fixed in the ground for securing the same, or any work belonging to any port, harbour, dock, or inland water or canal; or,

(d) a navigable river or canal damaged by interference with the flood gates or sluices thereof or otherwise, with intent and so as to obstruct the navigation thereof; or, (e) the flood gate or sluice of any private water with intent to take or destroy, or so as to cause the loss or destruction of, the fish therein; or,

(f) a private fishery or salmon river damaged by lime or other noxious material put into the water thereof with intent to destroy fish therein or to be put therein;

or,

(g) the flood gate of any mill-pond, reservoir or pool cut through or destroyed; or,

(h) goods in process of manufacture damaged with intent to render them useless; or,

(i) agricultural or manufacturing machines, or manufacturing implements, damaged with intent to render them useless; or,

(j) a hop bind growing in a plantation of hops, or a grape vine growing in a vineyard;

(D) To five years' imprisonment if the object damaged is,-
(a) a tree, shrub or underwood growing in a park, pleasure
ground or garden, or in any land adjoining or belonging
to a dwelling-house, injured to an extent exceeding in
value five dollars; or,

(b) a post letter bag or post letter; or,
(c) any street letter box, pillar, box or other receptacle
established by authority of the Postmaster General for
the deposit of letters or other mailable matter; or,

(d) any parcel sent by parcel post, any packet or package Mailable
of patterns or samples of merchandise or goods, or of matter.
seeds, cuttings, bulbs, roots, scions or grafts, or any
printed vote or proceeding, newspaper, printed paper or
book or other mailable matter, not being a post letter,
sent by mail; or,

night.

(e) any property, real or personal, corporeal or incor- Any other
poreal, for damage to which no special punishment is property by
by law prescribed, damaged by night to the value of
twenty dollars;

(E) To two years' imprisonment if the object damaged is Penalty.
any property, real or personal, corporeal or incorporeal, for Any other
damage to which no special punishment is by law pre- property.
scribed, damaged to the value of twenty dollars, 55-56 V.,
c. 29, s. 499.

Wilfully.]-See sec. 509.

"Artificial inland water."]-A drainage ditch filled with water is not an "artificial inland water" within the meaning of this section, making it an indictable offence to wilfully destroy or damage any inland water or canal. The King v. Braun, 8 Can. Cr. Cas. 397.

Killing cattle.]-On a charge of unlawfully and maliciously killing cattle it appeared that the animal was killed by the prisoners, when it was in a helpless and dying condition, and that the prisoners thought it was an act of mercy to kill it. It was held that the killing was not malicious; that the implication of malice was rebuttable, and had been in fact rebutted, a mens rea on the part of the prisoners being disproved. The Queen v. Mennel, 1 Terr. L.R. 487.

Destroying fruit trees.]-Two indictments were preferred against defendants for feloniously destroying the fruit trees respectively of M. and C. The offences charged were proved to have been committed on the same night, and the injury complained of was done in the same manner in both cases. Defendants were put on trial on the charge of destroying the trees of M. and evidence relative to the offence charged in the other indictment was admitted as shewing that the offences had been committed by the sams persons. It was held that such evidence was properly received. The Queen v. McDonald, 10 O.R. 553.

Exception where colour of right.]-See sec. 541.

Arson.

511. Every one is guilty of the indictable offence of arson Offence. and liable to imprisonment for life who wilfully sets fire to any Penalty. building or structure, whether such building or structure is completed or not, or to any stack of vegetable produce or of mineral or vegetable fuel, or to any mine or well of oil or other combustible substance, or to any ship or vessel, whether completed or not, or to any timber or materials placed in any ship

yard for building or repairing or fitting out any ship, or to any of His Majesty's stores or munitions of war. 55-56 V., c. 29,

s. 482.

Where building belongs to accused.]-Where the offence consists of an injury to anything in which the offender has an interest, the existence of such interest, if partial, shall not prevent his act being an offence, and if total, shall not prevent his act being an offence, if done with intent to defraud. Code sec. 541 (2).

D. was charged with having set fire to a building, the property of J. H., "with intent to defraud." The case opened by the Crown was that prisoner intended to defraud several insurance companies, but legal proof of the policies was wanting, and an amendment was allowed by striking out the words "with intent to defraud." The evidence shewed that several persons were interested in the premises as mortgagees, and J. H. as owner of the equity of redemption. The jury found prisoner intended to injure those interested. It was held that the amendment was authorized and proper, and the conviction warranted by the evidence. An indictment for arson is good without alleging any intent. R. v. Cronin (1875), 36 U.C.Q.B. 342.

At common law if the house were the prisoner's it was necessary to shew that his attempt to set fire to it was unlawful and malicious. R. v. Greenwood (1864), 23 U.C.Q.B. 250. And this was supplied by proof that the act might or would be an injury to or a fraud upon any person, and that the accused acted with intent to do such injury. R. v. Bryans (1862), 12 U.C.C.P. 166.

In R. v. Gray (1866), 4 F. & F. 1102, the accused was charged with setting fire to his house with intent to defraud an insurance company, and evidence was offered to shew that the prisoner had previously occupied two other houses in succession which had been insured, that fires had broken out in both, and that the prisoner had made claims on the insurance companies, for the losses occasioned. There was no other evidence offered to shew that the fires in the two houses had been set by the prisoner, yet the evidence was received as tending to prove that the fire set as charged in the indictment was the result of design, not of accident.

Arson at common law.]-Arson at common law was the malicious burning of another's house. 1 Bishop Cr. Law 414. It was an offence against the security of the habitation rather than of the property. 2 Bishop 24. A man was not guilty of arson by the common law if he burned a house of which he was in possession as owner or as tenant from year to year; R. v. Pedley, 1 Leach 242; or which he held under an agreement for a lease; R. v. Breeme, 1 Leach 220; or as mortgagor in possession. R. v. Spalding, 1 Leach 218, 2 East P.C. 1025.

Sets fire.]-It is sufficient if the wood has been at a red heat. R. v. Parker, 9 C. & P. 45. But the mere scorching the wood black is not enough. R. v. Russell, Car. & M. 541. It is not necessary that there should have been a flame. R. v. Stallion, 1 Moo. 398.

Any stack.]-Straw packed on a lorry ready for market has been held not to be a "stack." R. v. Satchwell, 28 Eng. L.T. 569; R. v. Avis, 9 C. & P. 348.

Evidence.]-A burning done by mischance or negligence is not arson. 3 Inst. 67. And the same is true where the burning results accidentally from the intentional commission of a mere civil trespass. 2 East P.C.