court, or to any public office or employment, he is liable to penal servitude for three years, or imprisonment not above two years, with or without hard labour or solitude.

By 29th section of 24 & 25 V. c. 96, to steal, or for any fraudulent purpose conceal, cancel, obliterate, or destroy any will, codicil, or other testamentary instrument relative to real or personal property, is felony, subject to penal servitude for life, or not less than three years, or imprisonment not above two years, with or without hard labour or solitary confinement. Stealing or altering the writings or evidence relative to the title to lands, is penal servitude for three or imprisonment for two years.

The last offence against public justice we shall mention is the negligence of public officers intrusted with ministerial duties, as sheriffs, coroners, and constables; which makes the offender liable to be fined, and, in flagrant cases, will amount to a forfeiture of office, if a beneficial one. Other punishments for similar offences are in many cases provided by statute.

CHAPTER VIII.

Offences against the Public Pence.

THESE offences are either such as are an actual breach of the peace, or constructively so by tending to make others break it. Both these species of offence are either felonies or misdemeanours. The felonious breaches of the peace are strained up to that degree of criminality by several modern statutes: we shall begin with the less penal offences against the peace.

I. CHALLENGE TO FIGHT.

To challenge to fight, either by word or letter, or be the bearer of such challenge, is an indictable offence, punishable with fine and imprisonment. It is an offence, though the provocation to fight does not succeed; and it is a misdemeanour merely to endeavour to provoke another to send a challenge, 6 East. 464. But mere words which, though they may produce a challenge, do not directly tend to that issue, as calling a man a liar or knave, are not necessarily criminal, though it is probable they would be so if it could be shown they were meant to provoke a challenge.

II. AFFRAY,

From the French effrayer, "to frighten," signifies a fighting between two or more in some public place, for if the fighting be

private, it is not an affray, but an assault. No angry or threatening words, however violent, amount to an affray; but if a person arm himself with dangerous or unusual weapons in a way to excite terror in the people, it is an affray. Persons present and assisting at such disorder as a prize-fight, are guilty of an affray (Arnold on Public Meetings, 14). The punishment of common affray is by fine and imprisonment. Affrays may be suppressed by any private person present; but the constable, who is bound to keep the peace, may break open doors to suppress an affray, or apprehend the affrayers.

III. ROUT, UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY, RIOT.

A rout is a disturbance of the peace by persons meeting together to commit with violence an unlawful act, without actually committing it. If any step be taken to execute the unlawful act proposed, the riotous assembly become rioters. An instance has occurred of parties being indicted for a rout for having gone to the ground where a prize-fight was to take place, and for which all preparations were made, but no blow was struck, Wise on Riots, 28. The defendants pleaded guilty, and the point was not argued.

An unlawful assembly is any meeting of three or more persons under such alarming circumstances, either from large numbers, or mode of assebmling, as in the opinion of rational men may endanger the peace, without being actually guilty of any aggressive act, Reg. v. Vincent, 9 C. & P. 91. As to the degree of alarm arising from excessive numbers, or mode of assembling, essential to render a meeting unlawful, these are incidents for a jury to appreciate, duly impressed on the one hand with the importance of the maintenance of the public peace, and on the other with a proper regard for the invaluable right of good citizens publicly to meet and freely discuss any question of general interest or excitement.

A riot is a tumultuous disturbance of the peace by three persons or more assembling together without lawful authority, and jointly committing, to the terror of the people, some unlawful and violent act. Three persons are necessary to constitute a riot, as two are for an affray or a conspiracy; and, to make the unlawful assembly a riotous one, an outrage must be actually perpetrated. Women, whether married or single, are punishable as rioters, and also infants, if old enough to know that they were doing wrong. If parties meet with the intention of aiding and encouraging a prizefight, which is clearly illegal and a breach of the peace, and if, while so intending, the fight takes place, all the parties present are liable to be indicted for a riot.

The punishment of the three preceding offences, namely, a rout, unlawful assembly, and riot, is by the common law discretionary fine or imprisonment, or both.

Stat. 24 & 25 V. c. 97, ss. 11, 12, provides for the punishment of malicious injury to property by rioters. (See the next section.)

IV. RIOT ACT.

The unlawful assemblies described in the last section may be of such ordinary character as respects numbers, intentions, and acts, as renders the common law adequate to their punishment; but, from the violence and excessive numbers assembling, they may assume a more formidable form, and fall within the cognizance of a statute expressly made for their repression. This leads us to speak of the Riot Act, passed in the first year of the reign of George I., for the more effectual prevention of tumultuous assemblages of people.

By this act, the 1 G. 1, c 5, if twelve persons or more are unlawfully assembled, to the disturbance of the peace, and continue together one hour after being commanded by proclamation of one justice of peace, sheriff or under-sheriff, to disperse, they are guilty of capital felony. Silence must be commanded, and proclamation made with loud voice, in these, or words to the like effect:

"Our sovereign lord [lady] the king [queen] chargeth and commandeth all persons, being assembled, immediately to disperse themselves, and peacefully to depart to their habitations, or to their lawful business, upon the pains contained in the act made in the first year of King George I., for preventing tumults and riotous assemblies. God save the king [queen]."

If the reading of the proclamation be by force opposed or hindered, such hinderers and opposers are felons; and all persons to whom such proclamation may have been made, and knowing such hindrance and not dispersing, are felons. But the death punishment under this statute has been mitigated by 1 V. c. 91, to transportation for life, or fifteen years, or imprisonment for three years, at the discretion of the court.

It appears from the decision of Mr. Baron Vaughan, and Mr. Justice Alderson, Rex v. Child, 4 C. & P. 442, that if the magistrate, in reading the proclamation, omit the words "God save the king," persons remaining together an hour after the reading of it cannot be convicted under the statute.

By 24 & 25 V. c. 97, s. 11, if any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled shall, with force, begin to demolish any church or chapel, or other place for divine worship; or any house, stable, coachhouse, outhouse, warehouse, office, shop, mill, malthouse, hop-oast, barn, or granary; or any building or erection used in farming or carrying on any trade or manufacture; or any machinery employed in any manufacture, or for sinking, ventilating, draining, or working any mine; or any staith, building or erection used in any mine, or any bridge, waggon-way, or trunk, they are punishable with penal servitude for life or not less than three years, or im

prisonment not above two years, with or without hard labour or solitary confinement.

Upon the trial of the Bristol rioters, Jan. 2, 1832, Chief Justice Tindal explained the law with great minuteness relative to riotous and tumultuous meetings, and the duties of private individuals in relation to such gatherings. He said, "By the common law, every private person might lawfully endeavour, without any warrant or sanction of the magistrate, to suppress a riot by every means in his power he might disperse those who were assembled and prevent others who were coming up from joining the rest; and to do this to his utmost ability was his duty as a good subject. If the riot be general and dangerous, he might arm himself against the evil-doers to keep the peace. Such was the opinion of all the judges in the time of Elizabeth; though the judges add, 'It would be more discreet in an individual to attend and be assistant to the sheriffs, justices, and other officers.'

By 13 H. 4, c. 2, two justices, with the sheriff, may come with the power of the county to arrest rioters, and every one is bound to attend them on pain of fine and imprisonment.

The duties imposed on private persons, in case of riots, are equally obligatory on soldiers, as already adverted to.

V. TUMULTUOUS PETITIONING.

The offence against the public peace, by tumultuous petitioning, was carried to a great height in the times preceding the civil war, and it was to prevent the recurrence of the disturbauce that the 13 C. 2, c. 5, was passed. By this statute it is enacted that the soliciting or procuring the names of above twenty persons to any petition to the king, or either house of parliament, for any alteration in church or state, unless the contents thereof be approved by three justices of the peace of the county, or the majority of the grand jury, either of the assize or quarter sessions; or, in London, by the lord mayor, aldermen, and common council; or presenting any petition to the king or parliament, accompanied by more than ten persons, incurs, in either case, a penalty of £100, and three months' imprisonment.

It is only under this statute that the corporation of London, since the Restoration, have usually taken the lead in petitions to parliament for the alteration of any established law or grievance; but it seems not to warrant a petition from the Common Hall.

On the trial of Lord George Gordon, it was contended that the article in the Bill of Rights which declares that it is the right of the subject to petition, had, virtually, repealed the act of Charles II. This, however, was denied by Lord Mansfield, Douglas, 571; but the better opinion appears to be that the people have a right to petition their representatives in parliament, and that the

act of Charles, so far at least as limiting the number of names, is abrogated by the Bill of Rights, and the acknowledged practice is consistent with this opinion.

VI. APPEARING OR GOING ARMED.

When the wearing of swords was fashionable, and arms were part of a gentleman's personal equipment, any unusual or dangerous weapons were prohibited; as arms not suited to the person's quality, or as the showing of force at unsuitable times, caused terror, or were incentives to breaches of the peace. The 13 E. 1 (statuta civitatis Londin.), and the 2 E. 3, c. 2, expressly prohibit the riding or going armed, upon pain of forfeiture of the arms, and imprisonment. The law allows every Englishman to use arms to defend himself against violence, to suppress rioters, or that he may defend his dwelling-house against felonious attack; but a person would not be justified in the use of fire-arins, or other deadly weapon, to resist the perpetration of a misdemeanour; and the preparing or collecting arms for the purpose of violating the law or resisting lawful authority is clearly illegal.-(Attorney-General, Chester, Aug. 14, 1839.) The frequenting public meetings armed is indictable; a justice may hold a party to bail for so doing. The Bill of Rights does not repeal, but confirms the old statutes, by enacting that Protestants may have arms suited to their condition, and as allowed by law.

A person appearing armed with a gun, or other offensive weapon, with intent to commit a felonious act, is punishable, under the Vagrant Act, as a rogue and vagabond.

Training to military exercises, without the sanction of public authority, is expressly prohibited. See p. 637, ante.

VII. EXTORTION BY THREATENING LETTERS.

By 24 & 25 V. c. 96, ss. 44-46, if any person knowingly send or deliver any letter or writing, demanding with menaces, without reasonable cause, any money or valuable, or accuse or threaten to accuse, or send or deliver any letter or writing accusing or threatening to accuse, any person of any crime punishable with death or penal servitude, or of any assault with intent to commit a rape or unnatural crime, he is liable to penal servitude for life, or not less than three years, or imprisonment for two years, with or without hard labour or solitary confinement.

Persons accusing others, or threatening to accuse others, of the crimes referred to, are guilty of felony, subject to penal servitude or imprisonment.