and relieve Pravadi, leaving general Krassoffski to continue the siege of Silistria. The march was difficult and toilsome, from the nature of the country and the state of the roads; but the Russian general conducted his operations with so much caution and skill, and the Turks displayed so much carelessness or inexperience, that Diebitsch effected his junction with Roth on the 10th of June, in front and towards the left of the grand Vizier, without the latter being aware of his approach. At the same time he rapidly occupied the direct road from Pravadi to Shumla, thus cutting off the retreat of the Vizier, who was not even aware of the vicinity of the Russian troops, till they were in possession of all the defiles on his left and in his rear. He was, therefore, now in a position, in which his defeat would leave Shumla defenceless; for the only roads, by which a defeated army could retire upon it, were in possession of the enemy.

The grand Vizier, imagining at first that his communications were merely threatened by a body of general Roth's army, instead of being already actually cut off by the whole force of count Diebitsch, broke up from Pravadi for the defiles of Kulertscha, hoping to destroy this corps. While he was doing so, count Diebitsch, on the morning of the 11th of June, with a view to pass still farther to the rear of the Turkish army, made a reconnoissance with 10,000 men, and some artillery, in the direction of Marasch; an operation which, if it had succeeded, would have completely cut off the grand Vizier from all access to Shumla. The latter, seeing the importance

of this movement, and still believing that he had only a detachment to deal with, sent forward a body of 3000 men to attack it; but, as the Russian columns came up one after another, he learned the truth of his critical situation. There seemed, however, surprised as he certainly was, to be no hesitation in his measures, and no confusion among his men. He brought forward his whole army; they were formed in regular squares of infantry, and well disposed columns of cavalry, supported by artillery. The numbers on both sides were nearly equal, and an obstinate and sanguinary conflict ensued. At the very beginning, count Diebitsch found himself obliged to bring up his reserve, and throw it into the hottest of the fire. By this movement he gained some superiority; but, so far from having made any important impression on the Turkish army, the grand Vizier, after a murderous combat of four hours, disappointed the operation of the morning, forced open the road to Shumla by Marasch, and retired a short distance to an advantageous position covered by a wood. The Russian commander, instead of disturbing him in that movement, took advantage of this interval of repose to substitute fresh troops for those which had been principally engaged, and to form a new reserve. Having completed these arrangements, he immediately renewed the attack. The first discharge of his artillery blew up some of the Turkish ammunition waggons, and this circumstance hastened a retreat on which the Vizier had already determined. As the Russian columns came on in quick time, the Turks, after one

general discharge of their artillery, took to flight in the direction of Marasch, leaving behind them fifty-six cannon, with all their baggage and ammunition. What they abandoned favoured their retreat; for the road lay through a forest, and the baggage and ammunition waggons, which blocked it up to such an extent as to render it necessary to employ a detachment of infantry to remove them, impeded, or rather prevented, immediate pursuit. The Russians stated the loss of the Turks at 2000 men killed, and 1500 prisoners. They admitted that the battle was sanguinary, and the fire of the enemy well directed, and that their own loss amounted to upwards of 2,200 privates killed and wounded, besides sixty-one staff and superior officers. During the two following days; different divisions of the Russian army were employed in the pursuit, but they did not advance far, and effected nothing beyond dispersing some scattered bodies of troops with which they fell in, and carrying some redoubts which the Turks had not only found means to throw up on their retreat, but which they defended with great obstinacy. The grand Vizier got into Shumla, and thus the most important object of count Diebitsch's very brilliant manoeuvre was not gained. It was unpardonable in the Turkish commander to have suffered himself to be turned, and to have even allowed the enemy to occupy the direct road to Shumla behind him; but, having been taken in the rear, surprised, and almost surrounded, to have escaped utter annihilation showed great firmness and bravery in the men, and skill in the commander. VOL. LXXI.

The first step taken by count Diebitsch after the battle of Kulertscha, was to offer negotiations for peace. On the 14th of June he despatched M. Fonton, councillor of state, with a flag, and a letter addressed to the Vizier, stating, that, under the instructions of his imperial master, he was desirous to use his victory as a means of terminating the war by negotiation, and that the bearer of the letter was authorized to enter into such explanations as the Vizier might require. To the Russian commander's assumption of victory the Vizier answered, in the true spirit of Ottoman theology and philosophy, "as victory and defeat are at all times events which depend on the Divine will, it is beyond the power of man to change what Providence has willed; and in the battles which took place, first at Dewno, and afterwards on the return from Pravadi, and at the defile of Kulertscha, the result of the engagement, and the victory, is manifest to the eyes of both parties; and as the loss, which was afterwards caused by the explosion of the powder-waggons, can be ascribed only to an accident brought about by the will of Heaven, it is entirely conformable to the order of things, and to the decrees of Providence, to be prepared at one time for victory, at another for defeat." He expressed his anxiety to see peace concluded on terms advantageous to both empires, but added, that as he had long been commander-in-chief and governor of Rumelia, and was wholly occupied in that country with military affairs, he was not acquainted with the state of things; and it would therefore be good to send [P]

M. Fonton thither, or to fix a day on which he might confer with Turkish commissioners.

Count Diebitsch now took up a position which enabled him to observe Shumla, although he did not regularly invest it, or make any preparations for a siege: he was waiting till the fall of Silistria should enable him either to advance, or undertake the reduction of Shumla. The operations against Silistria had, in the meantime, been proceeding with great effect; though the garrison, consisting of 8000 men, made a more obstinate resistance than had been anticipated. By the middle of June, the batteries of the third parallel had been mounted, and their fire was so effective against the artillery of the fortress, that the garrison could reply to it only by musketry. More batteries were erected, and the mining operations were commenced. Early in the morning of the 30th of June, a mine was sprung, the effect of which was, to open a practicable breach in the body of the fortress, and two other mines were ready to be sprung. The Pacha, now considering the place to be no longer defensible, and having lost all hope of being relieved by any operations of the Vizier, proposed a capitulation. The Russians refused the terms which he demanded, and, while they were explaining to him the only terms on which it would be granted, the fire from the works of the besiegers was kept up, and preparations were nade for mounting the breach. These demonstrations produced the Pacha's acceptance of the conditions which were offered; he and his garrison surrendered themselves prisoners of war, with

their arms and baggage, and the flotilla on the Danube. The siege had lasted only about six weeks, and had cost the conquerors above 1200 men in killed and wounded.

The surrender of Silistria having set at liberty the besieging army, count Diebitsch, instead of undertaking the doubtful enterprise of reducing Shumla, thought himself strong enough to leave before it a force sufficient to prevent any danger from its garrison, while he himself, with the main body of the army, should pass the Balkan, and descend into the plains of Adrianople on the road to the capital. Accordingly, general Krassoffsky was ordered, with the greater part of the besieging corps, immediately to join the army assembled before Shumla. The time employed, however, in taking possession of Silistria occupied some days, so that the last division of his troops did not join the main army till the 15th of July. The movements, preparatory to passing the mountain, had already begun. The troops were to advance in two columns. The right, consisting of 14 battalions, and two regiments of cossacks, under general Rudiger, took the direction of Kiuprikioi. The left, consisting of 18 battalions, 16 squadrons, and two regiments of cossacks, had orders to force the passage over the Kamtschik. Besides this, a reserve of 22 battalions, eight squadrons, and two regiments of cossacks, under count Pahlen, was to follow the columns at a short distance, in order to support either of them, if necessary. General Krassoffsky, with 23 battalions, 40 squadrons, and four regiments of cossacks, remained near Shumla, to observe the grand

Vizier and cover the line of operations of the troops that were to cross the Balkan.

The attention of the Vizier had been exclusively directed to the defence of Shumla, which he supposed to be seriously threatened, and he had consequently left the lower Kamtschik bare of troops. As the Turks thus favoured the Russian design, it was necessary to keep them in error as long as possible. With this view the march of the troops from the camp before Shumla always took place in the night, in profound silence, and not till the troops from Silistria supplied the vacancy.

In

this manner, in the night of the 13th, the place of general Roth's corps was supplied by the first division of general Krassoffsky's corps; and the place of general Rudiger was occupied, in the night of the 15th, by the second division. The reserve of count Pahlen did not leave the camp before Shumla, till the night of the 17th. The Vizier offered no interruption to these movements before Shumla, but contented himself with sending out, on the 18th, in the morning, 1000 cavalry, who cautiously stationed themselves in sight of the out-posts of the cossacks.

Meantime the columns of generals Roth and Rudiger had proceeded towards the Kamtschik. This river, which is not a broad, but a rapid stream, with few fords, and those dangerous, was the first obstacle to be overcome to reach the Balkan. The Turks had thrown up intrenchments, provided with artillery, at every accessible point.

General Rudiger, as he approached Kiuprikioi, where he was to cross, learned that the

enemy had there a body of 3000 men, which could not be attacked in front without great loss. He therefore sent two battalions and a regiment of cossacks directly towards Kiuprikioi to engage the Turks in front, while he himself, with his main force, resolved to turn their position, and pass the river to Cralamaly, five or six versts lower down. On the 17th, he appeared before Cralamaly, where he surprised a corps of about 1000 Turks, who dispersed at his approach, leaving their camp and three pair of colours. During the night he constructed a bridge, and crossed the river, and, on the 18th, marched against Kiuprikioi. Jussuf, a Pacha of two tails, who commanded in Kiprikioi, attempted to resist, and drew up his men in order of battle on an eminence near the village; but, after a mere show of resistance, they fled before a shot had been fired, or a man had fallen. While the right had thus made good the passage, the left, under general Roth, had crossed the river in a similar manner on the night of the 19th, by throwing bridges across below the fortified points, and thus turning and dispersing the Turks stationed on the opposite bank. On the 20th, he pushed his advanced guard to Palisbano; on the 21st, general Rudiger reached Erketsh,both of them situated on the ridge of the Balkan: and the gates of that mountain bulwark of the Ottoman empire were at last passed by an European invader.

On the 21st of July, the Russian army began to descend the southern declivity, and encountered no serious resistance. Count Diebitsch, by the rapidity of his

movements, gave the enemy no time to recover from the panic, with which his passage of their natural rampart seemed to have struck them. At various points small detached bodies presented themselves; but they either withdrew so soon as the Russians appeared, or, after a short conflict, were dispersed. On the 22nd, the army reached Mesembri, which immediately capitulated; 300 men, who occupied a strong intrenchment, having thrown down their arms, and surrendered at discretion. On the 24th, general Roth's advanced guard made the more important capture of Bourgas. Its garrison marched out to meet him, but, being routed, the Russians entered the place along with the fugitives, while the Turks continued their flight in disorder through the opposite gate.

The passage of the Balkan had been so successfully concealed from the Vizier, that it was not till the 21st of July, four days after the march of the Russians from before Shumla, that he detached a considerable corps to reinforce the post of Kiuprikioi, for the purpose of opposing the passage of the Kamtschik, two days after that passage had actually been effected. These troops marched from Shumla under the command of Ibrahim, a Pacha of three tails, and Mehemed, a Pacha of two tails, who had recently arrived from Constantinople to take the command of the regular troops of the Turkish army. When they arrived on the Kamtschik, they learned that the Russians had already taken and occupied the intrenchments on that river. Upon this, they directed their march on

Chengi and the village of Chuluko, where they remained, uncertain what resolution to take. However, having learned the occupation of Bourgas, they directed their march towards Aidos, where they arrived on the 24th of July.

On the 25th, general Rudiger was directed to march upon Aidos, and take a position within four or five versts of that place, till the troops should be concentrated. General Roth was to advance by a forced march, and establish himself in a double line behind the troops of general Rudiger. The corps of count Pahlen was to march upon Rumely-Kioi and Aidos, to within a distance of about four versts of the latter place. The Pachas thought the moment favourable to the execution of their plan. They resolved to attack the advance of the invading army, before it could be supported by the troops which were coming up. The Turkish cavalry, and a division of infantry, made a sortie from Aidos, and attacked Rudiger's cossacks, who retired on the position. Gen. Rudiger assailed the Turks in front, and detached, at the same time, a brigade of hulans who took them in flank. In an instant, the Turkish advanced guard was overthrown, and obliged to retreat in disorder to Aidos. The Russians pursued the enemy, and, on arriving in front of the place, found a corps of Turkish infantry, from 6000 to 7000 men strong, posted in the rear, and on the flank of the town. These were immediately attacked, and at first defended themselves obstinately; but, being forced back within their works, and into the narrow streets of Aidos, they were on all sides beaten in detail, and put to the