indeed, a New South Wales Protectionist, boasted that they were gradually whittling away the powers of the Crown and creating for the future the Republic of the United States of Australia. ( To cut the last link of connexion with the Crown, and to establish the Republic of Australia, that is what we are coming to, and it is the inevitable destiny of the people of this great country.' But his words found little echo at the Convention; and were severely handled by Mr. Gillies, who had been the Prime Minister of Victoria, and by Sir Henry Parkes. More interesting was the intervention into the general debate of Sir George Grey, who, in three different Colonies, had done splendid work as the representative of the Crown, and now eagerly demanded that every member of the Government, including the Governor-General, should be elected by the people of the country. Sir George Grey was not greatly interested in the question of a general federation. To him the important point was that the elected legislatures of every State should have an absolutely free hand to determine what should be their form of government. But Sir George Grey was in closer touch with the future trend of events when he proposed that the Bill constituting the Commonwealth of Australia, before being laid before the British Parliament, should be submitted to and adopted by a majority of a plebiscite of the people of Australia.

One of the most suggestive speeches in the discussion was that of Sir Samuel Griffith. Recognizing the necessity under a federal system, modelled on that of the United States in leaving to the separate States the residuary powers of government, of a Senate possessing equal powers with those of the Legislative Assembly, he expressed grave doubts as to how far the British system of responsible government could be worked under such a Constitution. Another delegate went further, and affirmed that 'either responsible government would kill federation, or federation would kill responsible government'.

The Bill as it finally emerged from the Constitutional Committee was mainly the handiwork of Sir S. Griffith; and was with a few alterations, of which none was of importance, adopted in its entirety.

The main crux in the way was with regard to finance. All were agreed that, side by side with the Commonwealth', there should be the States, with equal representation in the Senate; but the further question arose, Was the House of Representatives to be predominant in questions of finance; and, if so, would not the Senate be reduced to a position of inferiority? Under the compromise of 1891, laws appropriating any part of the public revenue or imposing any tax or impost must originate in the House of Representatives (sec. 54). The Senate had equal powers with the House of Representatives in respect of all proposed laws, except laws imposing taxation and laws appropriating the necessary supplies for the ordinary annual services of the Government, which the Senate might affirm or reject but could not amend. But the Senate might not amend any proposed law in such a manner as to increase any proposed charge or burden on the people. Laws imposing taxation must deal with the imposition of taxation only.

In the case of a proposed law which the Senate might not amend, it might at any stage return it to the House of Representatives with a message requesting the omission or amendment of any items or provisions therein; and the House of Representatives might, if it thought fit, make such omissions or amendments, or any of them, with or without modifications.

(It should be noted that the Bill of 1891 did not contain the provisions regarding the measures to be taken in the event of a deadlock between the two Houses, which are found in section 57 of the Commonwealth Act of 1900.)

The mode of electing the Senate presented another difficulty. A nominated Second Chamber, in spite of the Canadian precedent, is perhaps an impossibility in a

genuinely federal Constitution, and in any case it would have been an abomination to these stalwart Radicals. For the present, however, they were content that the members of the Senate should be elected by the State Legislatures.

With regard to the Executive, there was no direct injunction, such as is found in the later Act, that the members of the Executive Council must sit in Parliament. The intention, according to Sir S. Griffith, was so to frame the Constitution that responsible government might, not that it must, find a place in it. The actual words of the Bill were: 'Such officers shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor-General, and shall be capable of being chosen and sitting as members of either House of Parliament.' It must be remembered, however, that in neither the British Constitution nor in the Colonial Constitutions which imitated it, with the exception of two Australian Constitutions, was there any express enactment that ministers must be in Parliament; so that the practical results of the clause as originally drafted would probably have been the same as those of the existing law.

The provisions of the Bill with regard to a federal judicature did not materially differ from those of the Commonwealth Act, except that they left to the Parliament discretion as to the establishment of a Supreme Court. With regard to appeals to the Privy Council, the Bill, after making final the decisions of the Supreme Court, after its establishment, provided that the Queen might in any case in which the public interests of the Commonwealth, or of any States, or of any other part of the Queen's dominions, were concerned, grant leave to appeal to herself in Council against any judgement of the Supreme Court. It would seem that the subjects on which a right of appeal is given, with the exception of the last, are precisely the subjects on which a right of appeal is taken away by section 74 of the Commonwealth Act, as it was drafted in Australia for introduction into the Imperial Parliament.

Notwithstanding the demand for guarantees in the opposite directions from both Victoria and New South Wales, it was impossible to fetter the freedom of the Commonwealth Parliament in the framing of a tariff; and it was merely declared that trade between the Colonies should be free, on the adoption of a uniform tariff.

The question which most puzzled the delegates was the question upon what basis of apportionment should the surplus revenue be returned to the different States. Inasmuch as the customs revenue would be collected by the Commonwealth, and the revenue of the Australian Colonies had been to a very great extent made up of the proceeds of customs duties, the income of the Commonwealth would be very great; while, as the States maintained their public debts and expenditure, the demands upon the Commonwealth income would be much less than its returns. Was the revenue to be returned according to population, or according to contribution, or according to a basis depending upon both? The Bill of 1891 made contribution the sole basis. After the federal expenditure had been provided for, the surplus was to be returned to the several States in proportion to the amount of revenue raised therein respectively'. It is unnecessary here to go into the complications connected with this subject. With regard to the amendment of the Constitution, the Bill of 1891 made State Conventions, elected in such manner as the Parliament might decide, the bodies whose ratification was necessary. Any proposed alteration must be approved by Conventions of a majority of the States.

Although the Bill of 1891 had been the outcome of some five weeks' hard work on the part of the delegates, there was no readiness on the part of any of the Colonial Legislatures to accept its conclusions as more than the starting-point of a future measure. In New South Wales the Labour Party, which had now come into prominence, was sceptical as to the benefit to be derived for its own class interests from

federation; whilst many Free Traders shrank from putting their principle of free trade in the power of the Victorian Protectionists. So threatening was the situation that Sir Henry Parkes despaired of carrying federation through by parliamentary action alone. The only feasible plan was, he wrote, 'for the people themselves, the electors, who sent us into this Assembly, the electors themselves throughout the Colonies, to elect another Convention to revise the draft Constitution of the late Convention, or to frame a new Bill, if in their wisdom they think proper to do so.' In the light of the subsequent history we see the wisdom of Sir Henry Parkes's advice, but at the time it was neglected. The subject was up to a certain point dealt with by the Victorian, the South Australian, and the Tasmanian Legislatures; but there was little driving force behind, and when, in 1893, the consideration of the Bill by the New South Wales Parliament was indefinitely postponed, the fate of federation throughout Australia was for the time sealed. Financial depression further played its part in the nineties in occupying men's minds with other thoughts than those of political federation. The Australian Parliaments had failed in their attempts to bring about federation; it remained to create a public opinion amongst the rank and file of the people in favour of the movement. To the Australian Natives Association, a social and political organization, which advocated a federated Australia for an Australian nation, belongs the credit of having aroused public opinion from its long apathy. An Australian Federation League was formed, with numerous branches, and in the summer of 1893 a resolution was passed at a numerously attended Conference, which first made possible the subsequent course of events. It recommended that the legislature of each Australian Colony should pass an Act providing for the election of representatives to attend a Statutory Convention or Congress to consider and adopt a Bill to establish a federal Constitution for Australia,