service in the late affair. They were henceforth to be subject to no order but those from headquarters. Arnold called on Gates on the evening of the 22d to remonstrate. High words passed between them, and matters came to an open rupture. Gates, in his heat, told Arnold that he did not consider him a major-general, he having sent his resignation to Congress-that he had never given him the command of any division of the army-that General Lincoln would arrive in a day or two, and then he would have no further occasion for him, and would give him a pass to go to Philadelphia, whenever he chose.* Arnold returned to his quarters in a rage, and wrote a note to Gates, requesting the proffered permit to depart for Philadelphia; by the time he received it his ire had cooled and he had changed his mind. He determined to remain in camp and abide the anticipated battle. Lincoln, in the meantime, arrived in advance of his troops; which soon followed to the amount of two thousand. Part of the troops, detached by him under Colonel Brown, were besieging Ticonderoga and Fort Independence. Colonel Brown himself, with part of his detachment, had embarked on Lake George in an armed schooner and a squadron of captured gunboats and bateaux, and was threatening the enemy's deposit of baggage and heavy artillery at Diamond Island. The toils so skillfully spread were encompassing Burgoyne more and more; the gates of Canada were closing behind him. A morning or two after Lincoln's arrival, Arnold observed him giving some directions in the left division, and quickly inquired whether he was doing so by order of Gen *Col. Livingston to Schuyler. Schuyler Papers. eral Gates; being answered in the negative, he observed that the left division belonged to him; and that he believed his (Lincoln's) proper station was on the right, and that of General Gates ought to be in the center. He requested him to mention this to General Gates and have the matter adjusted. "He is determined," writes Varick, "not to suffer any one to interfere in his division, and says it will be death to any officer who does so in action." Arnold, in fact, was in a bellicose vein, and rather blustered about the camp. Gates, he said, could not refuse him his command, and he would not yield it now that a battle was expected. Some of the general officers and colonels of his division proposed to make him an address, thanking him for his past services, particularly in the late action, and entreating him to stay. Others suggested that the general officers should endeavor to procure a reconciliation between the jarring parties. Lincoln was inclined to do so; but, in the end, neither measure was taken, through fear of offending General Gates. In the meantime Arnold remained in camp, treated, he said, as a cipher, and never consulted; though when Congress had sent him to that department, at the request of General Washington, they expected the commander would at least have taken his opinion on public matters. On the 30th, he gave vent to his feelings in an indignant letter to Gates. "Notwithstanding I have reason to think your treatment proceeds from a spirit of jealousy," writes he, "and that I have everything to fear from the malice of my enemies, conscious of my own innocency and integrity, I am determined to sacrifice my feelings, present peace, and quiet, to the public good, and continue in the army at this critical juncture, when my country needs every support. "I hope," concludes he, "you will not impute this hint to a wish to command the army, or to outshine you, when I as· sure you it proceeds from my zeal for the cause of my country, in which I expect to rise or fall."* All this time the Americans were harassing the British camp with frequent night alarms and attacks on its pickets and outposts. "From the 20th of September to the 7th of October, writes Burgoyne, "the armies were so near that not a night passed without firing, and sometimes concerted attacks upon our advanced pickets. I do not believe either officer or soldier ever slept in that interval without his clothes; or that any general officer or commander of a regiment passed a single night without being upon his legs occasionally at different hours, and constantly an hour before daylight.” † Still Burgoyne kept up a resolute mien, telling his soldiers, in a harangue, that he was determined to leave his bones on the field, or force his way to Albany. He yet clung to the hope that Sir Henry Clinton might operate in time to relieve him from his perilous position. We will now cast a look toward New York, and ascertain the cause of Sir Henry's delay in his anxiously expected operations on the Hudson. * Gates's Papers, N. Y. Hist. Lib. CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE Preparations of Sir Henry Clinton-State of the Highland Defenses -Putnam Alarmed-Advance of the Armament up the Hudson -Plan of Sir Henry Clinton-Peekskill threatened-Putnam deceived-Secret March of the Enemy through the MountainsForts Montgomery and Clinton overpowered-Narrow Escape of the Commanders-Conflagration and Explosion of the American Frigates-Rallying Efforts of Putnam and Governor Clinton-The Spy and the Silver Bullet-Esopus burned-Ravaging Progress of the Enemy up the Hudson THE expedition of Sir Henry Clinton had awaited the arrival of re-enforcements from Europe, which were slowly crossing the ocean in Dutch bottoms. At length they arrived, after a three months' voyage, and now there was a stir of warlike preparation at New York; the streets were full of soldiery, the bay full of ships; and water craft of all kinds were plying about the harbor. Between three and four thousand men were to be embarked on board of ships of war, armed galleys, and flat-bottomed boats. A southern destination was given out, but shrewd observers surmised the real one. The defenses of the Highlands, on which the security of the Hudson depended, were at this time weakly garrisoned; some of the troops having been sent off to re-enforce the armies on the Delaware and in the North. Putnam, who had the general command of the Highlands, had but eleven hundred Continental and four hundred militia troops with him at Peekskill, his headquarters. There was a feeble garrison at Fort Independence in the vicinity of Peekskill, to guard the public stores and work-shops at Continental Village. The Highland forts, Clinton, Montgomery and Constitution, situated among the mountains and forming their main defense, were no better garrisoned, and George Clinton, who had the command of them, and who was in a manner the champion of the Highlands, was absent from his post attending the State Legislature at Kingston (Esopus), in Ulster County, in his capacity of governor. There were patriot eyes in New York to watch the course of events, and patriot boats on the river to act as swift messengers. On the 29th of September Putnam writes to his coadjutor the governor: "I have received intelligence on which I can fully depend that the enemy had received a reenforcement at New York, last Thursday, of about three thousand British and foreign troops; that General Clinton has called in guides who belong about Croton River; has ordered hard bread to be baked; that the troops are called from Paulus Hook to King's Bridge, and the whole troops are now under marching orders. I think it highly probable the designs of the enemy are against the posts of the Highlands, or of some part of the counties of Westchester or Dutchess." Under these circumstances he begged a re-enforcement of the militia to enable him to maintain his post, and intimated a wish for the personal assistance and counsel of the governor. In a postscript he adds: "The ships are drawn up in the river, and I believe nothing prevents them from paying us an immediate visit but a contrary wind." On receiving this letter the governor forthwith hastened to his post in the Highlands with such militia force as he could collect. We have heretofore spoken of his Highland |