al, her owners." The decree in the circuit court of appeals adjudged (presumably through inadvertence) that the payment should be made by "the Estate of Luckenbach." The right to recover against all the owners, for the full amount, in case any of them was so liable, was not controverted. The decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals should be modified so as to render all the owners liable. Compare Pendleton v. Benner Line, supra. As so modified, the decree is affirmed. A mere change of title of a statutory office, made by an administrative official, is ineffective to change the duties and perquisites of such office. Glavey v. United States, 182 U. S. 595, 45 L. ed. 1247, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 891; Adams v. United States, 20 Ct. Cl. 115; United States v. Andrews, 240 U. S. 90, 60 L. ed. 541, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 349. Assistant Attorney General Thompson submitted the cause for appellee. Mr. Justice Brandeis delivered the opinion of the court: When an office with a fixed salary has been created by statute, and a person JENNIE MCCARTHY MACMATH, Admin- duly appointed to it has qualified and istratrix, Appt., clerk or weigher. compensation The performance of some or all of the duties of a weigher of customs by an appointee to the office of "clerk and acting United States weigher," an office lawfully created by the Secretary of the Treasury as part of a reorganization of the service, whereby four of the five positions of United States weigher were abolished, does not operate to promote him automatically to the statutory office of weigher, nor entitle him to the statutory salary attached to that office. [For other cases, see Duties, VI. d, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] [No. 79.] entered upon the discharge of his duties, he is entitled, during his incumbency, to be paid the salary prescribed by statute; and effect will not be given to any attempt to deprive him of the right thereto, whether it be by unauthorized agreement, by condition, or otherwise. United States v. Andrews, 240 U. S. 90, 60 L. ed. 541, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 349; Glavey v. United States, 182 U. S. 595, 45 L. ed. 1247, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 891. Section 3 of the Act of July 26, 1866, chap. 269 (14 Stat. at L. 289), provides that weighers at the port of New York shall receive an annual salary of $2,500. Section 2621 of the Revised Statutes (Comp. Stat. 1916, § 5359) authorizes collectors to employ, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, weighers at the several ports; and it does not prescribe their number. Section 2634 authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury Argued and submitted November 22, 1918. to fix the number and compensation of Decided December 9, 1918. APPEAL from the Court of Claims to review a judgment dismissing the petition in a suit to recover salary alleged to be due to a customs officer. Affirmed. See same case below, 51 Ct. Cl. 356. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. William E. Russel argued the cause, and, with Messrs. Seward G. Spoor, Louis T. Michener, and Perry G. Michener, filed a brief for appellant: An executive officer may not change the salary fixed by statute. Miller v. United States, 103 Fed. 413; Glavey v. United States, 182 U. S. 595, 45 L. ed. 1247, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 891; United States v. Andrews, 240 U. S. 90, 60 L. ed. 541, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 349. clerks to be employed by any collector. The statutes appear to have made no specific provision for the appointment of assistant or acting United States weighers. On May 12, 1909, plaintiff's intestate (who had been appointed on August 1, 1896, "assistant weigher of customs," at a salary, "when employed," of $3 per diem, and had later received a like appointment at $4 per diem) was appointed by the collector "clerk, class 3, new office, to act as acting United States weigher," with compensation at the rate [153] of $1,600 per annum. On August 18, 1911, he received a like appointment as clerk, class 4, at the rate of $1,800 per annum. He continued to perform the duties assigned and was paid the salary named until his death, October 8, 1913. In February, 1915, his admin Blucher, et al., Plffs. in Err., V. NAMPA & MERIDIAN IRRIGATION istratrix filed with the Auditor of the, JAMES G. PETRIE, Oliver O. Haga, R. F. Treasury, a claim for salary of her intestate as "United States weigher of customs" at the rate of $2,500 per annum, from May 12, 1909, to and including October 7, 1913. Upon disallowance of the claim she brought this suit in the court of claims for the amount, namely, $11,013.89. The court found for the defendant and entered judgment dismissing the petition. The case comes here on appeal. There is a fundamental objection to the allowance of the claim or any part thereof. MacMath was never appointed weigher and never held office as such. His only appointment was that of clerk; his oath of office being "as clerk and acting United States weigher, class 3." The Secretary of the Treasury clearly had the right to create and the collector to make appointment to the position of clerk, and to designate duties of the appointee. The fact that the incumbent performed also some or all the duties of a weigher does not operate to promote him automatically to the statutory office of weigher. And the fact that his appointment as clerk in 1909 was made as a part of a reorganization of the service, whereby four of the five positions of United States weigher were abolished, is immaterial, except as showing even more clearly that it was the intention not to appoint him weigher. No contention is or could successfully be made that the weighing should be paid for as an extra service, even if it was not a duty attaching to his position as clerk. See United States v. Garlinger, 169 U. S. 316, 42 L. ed. 762, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 364. We have, therefore, no occasion to consider whether effect should be given to the agreement by the intestate not to make claim to compensation as acting weigher, or [154] to his acceptance of the lower compensation without protest during the entire term of his service; nor need we consider the effect of § 2 of the Act of July 31, 1894, chap. 174 (28 Stat. at L. 162, 205, Comp. Stat. 1916, §§ 57, 3231), which provides that "no person who holds an office the salary or annual compensation attached to which amounts to the sum of two thousand five hundred dollars shall be appointed to or hold any other office to which compensation is attached unless specially heretofore or hereafter specially authorized thereto by law." The judgment of the Court of Claims is affirmed. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 154-158.) Federal question Error to state court 1. A Federal question which will sustain a writ of error from the Federal Su preme Court to review a judgment of a state statute, a proposed water-supply constate court approving, conformably to a tract between an irrigation district and the United States, was presented by the contention made by the owners of lands within the district, in their answer and cross complaint, that if such contract should be approved and entered into, they would be deprived of their property without due in violation of the 14th Amendment to the of law and without compensation, Federal Constitution. process Error to state court [For other cases, see Appeal and Error, 1898– Note. On the general subject of writs of error from the United States Supreme Court to state courts-see notes to Martin v. Hunter, 4 L. ed. U. S. 97; Hamblin v. Western Land Co. 37 L. ed. U. S. 267; Re Buchanan, 39 L. ed. U. S. 884; and Kipley v. Illinois, 42 L. ed. U. S. 998. On error to state court in questions involving due process of law-see note to Burt v. Smith, 51 L. ed. U. S. 121. can be brought up for review in the SuOn what adjudications of state courts preme Court of the United States by writ of error to those courts-see note to Apex Transp. Co. v. Garbade, 62 L.R.A. 513. On how and when questions must be raised and decided in a state court in order to make a case for a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the United States-see note to Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. McGrew, 63 L.R.A. 33. wholly immaterial to the inquiry presented 1528, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] [No. 47.] The proceeding involved is prescribed when such a petition is filed the court by the state statutes, which provide that shall fix a day for hearing, and shall notify the persons interested therein by publication, for four weeks, in a news Argued November 19, 1918. Decided De- paper published in the county. Any per IN cember 9, 1918. N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho to review a judgment which affirmed a judgment of the District Court of Canyon County, in that state, approving a proposed watersupply contract between an irrigation district and the United States. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See same case below, 28 Idaho, 227, 153 Pac. 425. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Oliver O. Haga argued the cause, and, with Messrs. James H. Richards and J. B. Eldridge, filed a brief for plaintiffs in error. Mr. B. E. Stoutemyer argued the cause, and, with Messrs. H. E. McElroy and Will R. King, filed a brief for defendant in error. Mr. Justice Clarke delivered the opin ion of the court: The board of directors of the Nampa and Meridian Irrigation District, a quasi municipal corporation, organized under the laws of Idaho (Pioneer Irrig. Dist. v. Walker, 20 Idaho, 605, 119 Pac. 304; Colburn v. Wilson, 23 Idaho, 337, 130 Pac. 381), filed an amended petition in the district court of that state, praying for the examination, approval, and confirmation by the court of a contract which it desired to enter into with the United States government, acting through the Secretary of the Interior, which provided that the United States should sell and the irrigation district should purchase, and in the manner prescribed pay for, a supply of water to irrigate an extensive tract of arid land within the district, and to supplement an insufficient supply for other lands, which the district had theretofore acquired from other sources. The proposed contract also provided that the United States and the district should share in the expense of constructing a system of drainage to reclaim considerable areas of land within the district which had become "water-logged" [156] through seepage from both the government and the district systems of irrigation, and to prevent threatened damage to other lands' from such seepage. sons interested in the subject-matter may demur to or answer the petition, and the rules of pleading and practice prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure of the state (Idaho Rev. Codes, vol. 1, title 14, chap. 4, §§ 2397, 2398, and 2401) are made applicable. The required notice having been given, the plaintiffs in error, owners of lands within the irrigation district, filed an "answer and cross complaint" in which they denied many allegations of the petition and affirmatively alleged: That if the contract should be entered into they would be obliged to pay an assessment of $75 upon each acre of their land for water rights which they did not require. because they had a sufficient supply from other sources; that neither the United States nor the Secretary of the Interior nor the irrigation district had authority, under the laws of the United States, to enter into the contract, and that, for these reasons, if it were approved and entered into, the plaintiffs in error would be deprived of their property without due process of law and without com pensation, in violation of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. A permanent injunction was prayed for, restraining the petitioners from entering into the proposed contract and from levying assessments to carry it into effect. The district court approved the contract, upon a full finding of facts, and its judgment was affirmed by the supreme court of the state in a judgment which we are asked to review upon this | writ of error. [157] A motion to dismiss the writ of error was postponed until the hearing upon the merits which has now been had. The statement which we have made of the issues presented by this record shows that the first ground of the motion-that a Federal question was not presented-cannot be sustained. Tregea v. Modesto Irrig. Dist. 164 U. S. 179, 185, 41 L. ed. 395, 397, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 52. But the second ground of the motion to dismiss is valid, viz., that, even if it be conceded that the supreme court decided a Federal question against the plaintiffs in error, nevertheless, the court decided against them also upon an independent ground, not involving any PURE OIL COMPANY, Plff. in Err., V. STATE OF MINNESOTA. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 158-164.) state inspection law gress has not made any conflicting regulation, and a fee reasonably sufficient to pay the cost of such inspection may constitutionally be charged, even though the property may be moving in interstate commerce when inspected. Federal question and broad enough to, is wholly on state statutes and procedsupport the judgment, and for this rea- ure, is broad enough to sustain the judgson the Federal question involved will ment rendered, irrespective of the not be considered on this writ of error, disposition of any Federal question inunder a series of decisions by this court, volved, and therefore the writ of error extending at least from Klinger v. Mis- will be dismissed. souri, 13 Wall. 257, 263, 20 L. ed. 635, 637, to Enterprise Irrig. Dist. v. Farmers' Mut. Canal Co. 243 U. S. 157, 164, 61 L. ed. 644, 648, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 318. While the state supreme court finds that the United States, acting through the Secretary of the Interior, could lawfully enter into the proposed contract, and that the approval and confirmation of it by the court would not deprive the 1. In the exercise of its police power plaintiffs in error of their property without due process of law or without com- a state may enact inspection laws which pensation, yet the court also holds that are valid if they tend in a direct and subthe "cross complaint," in which these stantial manner to promote the public safeFederal rights are asserted, was filed ty and welfare, or to protect the public from frauds and imposition when dealing prematurely under the statutes and prac-in articles of general use as to which Contice of the state of Idaho, and that no charge or burden would be imposed upon the lands of the plaintiffs in error by the approval of the contract, assuming that it should be executed. This for the reason that the state statute provides that any assessments upon such lands to of the carry into effect the purposes contract must subsequently be made by the board of directors of the irrigation district on the basis of benefits conferred, at a meeting of the board, to be held at a time and place of which the owners of the lands to be [158] charged must be notified by postal card and by newspaper publication (Idaho Rev. Codes, vol. 1, title 14, chap. 4, § 2400). At such meeting the landowner may object to any proposed assessment on his land, and if the objection is overruled by the board, and he does not consent to the assessment as finally determined, such objection shall, without further proceeding, be regarded as appealed to the district court, and shall there again be I. In general, 180. heard in proceedings to confirm the asII. Discrimination, 185. sessment. It is expressly provided that upon such hearing the court shall dis-III. Inspection fees, 185. regard every error, irregularity, omission which does not affect the sub or stantial rights of any party, and shall correct any error which may be found in such assessment, or any injustice which may result from it. For this reason the court held that the claims stated in the "cross complaint" were prematurely asserted, were "wholly immaterial" to the inquiry presented by the petition of the district, and "should have been stricken from the answer." We cannot doubt that this conclusion of the state supreme court, based as it [For other cases, see Commerce, VI. c, in Di- ment 2. The discretion of the legislature in determining the amount of an inspection fee will not lightly be disturbed by the courts when testing the validity of a state law which is asserted to be a revenue rather than an inspection law. [For other cases, see Courts, I. e, 3, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Note.-On review of questions of fact on writ of error to state court-see note to Smiley v. Kansas, 49 L. ed. U. S. 546. On judicial notice, generally-see note to Olive v. State, 4 L.R.A. 33. Inspection laws as regulations of com merce. The earlier cases on this question will be found in a note to New Mexico ex rel. McLean v. Denver & R. G. R. Co. 51 L ed. U. S. 78. I. In general. A state law which provides for the inspection of naval stores by state inspectors in accordance with a prescribed standard conforming to that fixed by the Federal government, and imposes an inspection fee, and forbids the sale with248 U. S. inspection fees or inspection law inspection. 5. Findings of fact by a state trial court that the inspection of gasolene provided for by a state statute protects the community from frauds and imposition and promotes the public safety are accepted as conclusive by the Federal Supreme Court on writ of error. [For other cases, see Appeal and Error, 2175 4. The fees prescribed for oil and gasolene inspection by Minn. Gen. Laws 1909, chap. 502, under which the yearly ratio of expenses to receipts, excluding some expenses not susceptible of exact determination, varied in different years from 87 per cent to 63 per cent, cannot be said, in a suit to recover such fees, to be so in excess of the cost of inspection as to render the statute a revenue law, and hence invalid when applied to oils and gasolene in transit Argued November 21 and 22, 1918. Dein interstate commerce, where the reduced in the state or the shipment out of the state of the inspected products except where inspection has not been made within thirty days after demand, does not interfere with interstate commerce. Jackson v. Cravens, 235 Fed. 212. A statute providing for the inspection of all cotton-seed meal, cotton-seed cake, linseed-oil meal, linseed-oil cake, and feeding stuff, by-products of starch factories, glucose, cereal, and breakfastfood factories, breweries, distilleries, meat-packing establishments, and slaughterhouses, sold or offered for sale in the state, and making a level charge of 25 cents per ton on all such products without discrimination as to value of the product, and providing for an actual inspection of such products, is valid as an inspection law. George H. Lee Co. v. Webster, 190 Fed. 353. 2208, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] [No. 74.] cided December 9, 1918. Globe Elevator Co. v. Andrew, 144 Fed. 871, interlocutory order affirmed in 84 C. C. A. 376, 156 Fed. 664. Interstate commerce is not unconstitutionally burdened by applying to grain received from or shipped to points without the state the provisions of a state grain inspection and weighing law, that such products, when received in or discharged from public warehouses, shall be weighed by public weighers where there are such, and that no one else shall issue certificates or make charges for weighing under such circumstances. Merchants Exch. v. Missouri, 248 U. S. 365, post, 300, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 114. or Provisions of a state grain inspection and weighing law which regulate the weighing of grain received from shipped to points without the state were not superseded by the United States Grain Standards Act of August 11, 1916, since that act relates exclusively to the establishment by the Secretary of Agriculture of standards of quality and condition, and manifests the purpose of Congress not to supersede such state laws, but to co-operate with state officials charged with their enforcement. Ibid. See also infra, II., State v. McKay, 137 Tenn. 280, 193 S. W. 99, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 158. So important a matter as fixing the grade by which grain in interstate transportation can be sold, and without which it cannot be sold on any large scale, admits of one uniform system or plan of regulation, and only one, and therefore falls within the exclusive power of Congress; and statutes passed by the state of Wisconsin, providing for the inspection, and grading of grain intended for delivery, storage, manufacture into flour, and reshipment in the state, which system of inspection was intended to and would have the effect of overthrowing the standard of inspection by which all sales and purchases of grain in interstate commerce had for many years been made 566. according to the inspection system of The prohibition against sales by imMinnesota, were a regulation of com- porting purchasers of concentrated commerce between the states, and invalid. 'mercial feeding stuffs in the original Food and drugs. A state statute requiring a disclosure of the ingredients of a stock food does not conflict with the Federal Food and Drugs Act. Savage v. Scovell, 171 Fed. |