the tax reduced accordingly. Rev. Laws 1912, § 3664. An attempt at such a showing was made, but the state court ation of $300 per mile, as fixed by the board, was not excessive. It may be that the showing was not complete, but, even if so, it was the company's showing and was all that was before the court. After examining it we think it discloses no ground for condemning the tax as a burden on interstate commerce. Judgment affirmed. the assessor under the statute, and the relative effect to be given to their acts, it is not reviewable here, and in so far as it relates to what really was the sub-concluded [169] therefrom that a valuject of the tax, we think it was right. See Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minnesota, 246 U. S. p. 454, 62 L. ed. 830, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 373. Evidently the company at one time took this view of the tax, for in an amendment to its answer we find an allegation that the state board "valued the property used by this defendant at the rate or sum of [168] $300 for every mile of railroad over which this defendant transacted business, and apportioned said assessment or tax to the various counties of the state in accordance with the number of D. CAMPBELL, Plff. in Err., V. and Nancy Alexander. miles of such railroad so situated with- ANNIE WADSWORTH, Maggie Beamore, in said county, and that the tax herein sued for was not otherwise levied or assessed." (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 169–178.) descent Seminole citizens. Indian allotments mixed A want of due process of law in the sense of the 14th Amendment is asserted because the valuation by the state board Neither the enrolled Creek widow of was made without notice to the company an enrolled Seminole Indian, nor the daughor according it an opportunity to be ters of such mixed marriage, born prior to heard. Assuming that the premise is December 31, 1899, who were also enrolled correct (as to which the record is not in their mother's tribe, can claim any rights entirely clear), we are unable to accept to the husband and father's share of the the conclusion. In Nevada the mode of Seminole lands allotted to him after his enforcing a tax such as this is by a death, which was subsequent to that date, since they were not "Seminole citizens," judicial proceeding wherein process is- within the meaning of the Seminole agreesues and an opportunity is afforded for ment approved by the Act of June 2, 1900 a full hearing Only after there is a (31 Stat. at L. 250, chap. 610), which directs judgment sustaining the tax is payment the Commission to the Five Civilized Tribes enforced. Rev. Laws 1912, 88 3659-in making the rolls of Seminole citizens to 3665. This, as repeatedly has been held, satisfies the requirements of due process of law. Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. 111 U. S. 701, 28 L. ed. 569, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 663; Winona & St. P. Land Co. v. Minnesota, 159 U. S. 526, 537, 40 L. ed. 247, 251, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 83; Gallup v. Schmidt, 183 U. S. 300, 307, 46 L. ed. 207, 213, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 162. place thereon the names of all children born [For other cases, see Indians, VIII., in Digest [No. 72.] Argued and submitted November 21, 1918. It also is asserted that the state board, in valuing the property, acted on inaccurate data and applied erroneous standards which resulted in a valuation so excessive as to make the tax a burden on interstate commerce. It is true that some inaccurate data and some computations following erroneous standards were presented to the board by a state officer in support of a suggestion that the property be valued at $500 or more per mile of line. But the suggestion was not adopted, and it is not shown that the board's valuation was based on the data and computations so presented. Besides, if the valuation was excessive, the company was entitled in the present i further proceedings. suit to show the true value and to have IN 'N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma to review a judgment which reversed a judgment of the District Court of Seminole County, in that state, in favor of defendant in a suit to quiet title. Reversed and remanded for See same case below, on first appeal, Okla. - 154 Pac. 60; on second ap-|ject-matter are considered and construed peal, 53 Okla. 728, 157 Pac. 713. together. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. O. Dale Wolfe submitted the cause for plaintiff in error: The language of this act is transparent, unambiguous, explicit, plain, and clear, and its meaning cannot well be mistaken. Where this is true, courts will not indulge in construction, as there is no room or necessity for construction, but they will enforce the statute according to its terms. Thornley v. United States, 113 U. S. 310, 28 L. ed. 999, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 491; Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U. S. 662, 32 L. ed. 1060, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 651; Lewis v. United States, 92 U. S. 618, 23 L. ed. 513; Doggett v. Florida R. Co. 99 U. S. 72, 25 L. ed. 301; United States v. Union P. R. Co. 91 U. S. 72, 23 L. ed. 224; Dewey v. United States, 178 U. S. 510, 44 L. ed. 1170, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 981; United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358, 2 L. ed. 304; 36 Cyc. 1106, 12, 1114,3; Walker v. Spokane, 62 Wash. 312, 113 Pac. 775, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 994; Smith v. Iron Mountain Tunnel Co. 46 Mont. 13, 125 Pac. 649, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 551; United States v. Colorado & N. W. R. Co. 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 167, 85 C. C. A. 27, 157 Fed. 321, 13 Ann. Cas. 893; Gardner v. Collins, 2 Pet. 58, 7 L. ed. 347; United States v. Goldenberg, 168 U. S. 95, 42 L. ed. 394, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 3; The Paulina v. United States, 7 Cranch, 52, 3 L. ed. 266; Ex parte Goodrich, 160 Cal. 410, 117 Pac. 451, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 56; Tremblay v. Murphy, 111 Me. 38, 88 Átl. 55, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1074; Mellen Lumber Co. v. Industrial Commission, 154 Wis. 120, L.R.A.1916A, 374, 142 N. W. 187, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 997. Nor may courts look to the consequences or what might be considered the injustice of the act if followed, in their interpretation of the act. That is the function of the legislature. Mellen Lumber Co. v. Industrial Commission, 154 Wis. 118, L.R.A.1916A, 374, 142 N. W. 187, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 997. The positive custom of the Seminole and Creek tribes was that the tribal membership of the mother determined the tribal membership of the children; or, in other words, the children, without exception, took the tribal membership of their mother. Lamb v. Baker, 27 Okla. 743, 117 Pac. 189; Hughes Land Co. v. Bailey, 30 Okla. 196, 120 Pac. 290. All statutes relating to the same sub United States v. Babbit, 1 Black, 55, Wall. 652, 20 L. ed. 235; United States 17 L. ed. 94; Henderson's Tobacco, 11 Viterbo v. Friedlander, 120 U. S. 707, v. Freeman, 3 How. 556, 11 L. ed. 724; 30 L. ed. 776, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 962; United States v. Farden, 99 U. S. 10, 25 L. ed. 267. absurdities, or consequences in direct A construction of a statute producing violation of its provisions, is always to be avoided. L. ed. 566. Where the same word or phrase is used in different parts of a statute, it will be presumed to be used in the same sense throughout. v. Behan, 7 Abb. Pr. 82; Spencer v. MetPitte v. Shipley, 46 Cal. 154; People ropolitan Bd. of Works, L. R. 22 Ch. Div. 142, 52 L. J. Ch. N. S. 249, 47 L. T. N. S. 459, 31 Week. Rep. 347. And where the meaning of the word will be given the same meaning elseor phrase in one instance is clear, it where in the statute. Gunning v. People, 86 Ill. App. 174, 12 Am. Crim. Rep. 563; Den ex dem. James v. Du Bois, 16 N. J. L. 285; Rhodes v. Weldy, 46 Ohio St. 234, 15 Am. St. Rep. 584, 20 N. E. 461; Raymond v. Cleveland, 42 Ohio St. 522; Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Farmville & P. R. Co. 96 Va. 661, 32 S. E. 468. An amending statute is regarded as a part of the original statute in this con nection. Browne v. Turner, 174 Mass. 150, 54 N. E. 510. The adjudication of the special tribunal empowered by Congress to hear and determine this particular question, the citizenship of the defendants in error, is quasi judicial and is impervious to collateral attack, and settles for all purposes in this case the fact that the defendants in error are Creek citizens, and not Seminole citizens. United States v. Wildcat, 244 U. S. 111, 61 L. ed. 1024, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 561. The contemporaneous construction of a statute by those charged with its exe cution is entitled to great respect, and ought not to be overruled without cogent reasons. United States v. Moore, 95 U. S. 760, 24 L. ed. 588; United States v. Johnston, 124 U. S. 236, 31 L. ed. 389, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 446; Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1, 35 L. ed. 363, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 699. Mr. Samuel Herrick argued the cause, and, with Mr. John S. Severson, filed a brief for defendants in error: The supreme court of Oklahoma, in awarding the allotment of Louis Cox, the land in controversy, to his legal widow and their children, is simply following the well-known and well-defined legal precedents already established as similar provisions governing inheritance of the lands allotted to the other tribes. Hughes Land Co. v. Bailey, 30 Okla. 194. 120 Pac. 290. to Subsequent congressional legislation may be considered as an aid to the interpretation of prior legislation upon the same subject. Marchie Tiger v. Western Invest. Co. 221 U. S. 286, 55 L. ed. 738, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 578. The courts have been liberal in allowing the kindred, even though foreign by blood, an inheritance in the lands of their deceased relatives, both by blood and affinity. Bodle v. Shoenfelt, 22 Okla. 94, 97 Pac. 556; Hawkins v. Stevens, 21 Okla. 849, 97 Pac. 267; Lamb v. Baker, 27 Okla. 739, 117 Pac. 189; Armstrong v. Wood, 195 Fed. 137. Every rule of justice and reason should allow these two daughters and the widow to inherit because of the fact that the Seminole and Creek Indians are very closely related; in fact, they are a parcel of the same tribe, their history, traditions, and language being practically the same, and they are, for all intents and purposes, the same people. Hodge, American Indians, pt. 2 of Bulletin 30, Bureau of American Ethnology, pp. 500, 501. Because the children of Louis Cox were entitled to enrolment as Seminoles, the fact that they were subsequently enrolled as Creeks by their mother did not change their right to such inheritance, as that right became fixed at the death of their father and they became vested with their father's allotment at his death. If they afterwards became members of the Creek tribe, whether voluntarily or otherwise, their right to hold the land so acquired could only be questioned by the Seminole Nation, and certainly not by anyone claiming under the father. Manuel v. Wulff, 152 U. S. 505, 38 L. ed. 532, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 651, 18 Mor. Min. Rep. 85; Phillips v. Moore, 100 U. S. 208, 25 L. ed. 603. ion of the court: Mr. Justice Clarke delivered the opin The defendants in error brought suit to quiet title to the lands in controversy in this case, the facts involved being agreed upon as follows: final rolls of the Seminole Tribe of InLouis Cox, whose name appears in the dians, died intestate, on July 4, 1901, in error, Annie Cox, his widow, now and left surviving him the defendants Annie Wadsworth, and two daughters, Maggie Cox, now Maggie Beamore, and Nancy Cox, now Nancy Alexander. rolled on the Creek tribal roll in 1890, These three women were all duly enand in July, 1901, after the death of Cox, upon an application made in May, 1901, Creek Nation by the Commission to the they were enrolled as citizens of the three appears on the Seminole rolls. Five Civilized Tribes, but neither of the Certified copies of the "final" Seminole roll, bearing the name of Louis Cox, and of the Creek roll, bearing the names of his wife and daughters, are in the record. On the former is the notation, "Wife and family Creeks," and in the latter Louis Cox is described as an enrolled Seminole. No allotment of land had been made to Cox at the time of his death, but subsequently the land in controversy was allotted by the United States as his distributive share of the Seminole tribal lands. The plaintiff in error claims title through one Lucy Wildcat, the only surviving relative of Cox whose name appears on the approved Seminole roll. The widow and daughters claim as heirs of Louis Cox. The decision of the case depends upon the application to the facts thus stated of the second paragraph of the [171] agreement between the government of the United States and the Seminole Tribe of Indians, dated October 7, 1899, and ratified by Act of Congress June 2, 1900 (31 Stat. at L. 250, chap. 610), the essential parts of which are as follows: "First. That the Commission to the Five Civilized Tribes, in making the rolls of Seminole citizens, pursuant to the Act of Congress approved June twenty eighth, eighteen hundred and ninety-1502), which provided for the enrolment eight [30 Stat. at L. 502, chap. 517], of the citizens of the Five Civilized shall place on said rolls the names of all Tribes, which included the Seminole Nachildren born to Seminole citizens up to tion, there is a provision which reads as and including the thirty-first day of De- follows: cember, eighteen hundred and ninetynine, and the names of all Seminole citizens then living; and the rolls so made, when approved by the Secretary of the Interior, as provided by said act of Congress, shall constitute the final rolls of Seminole citizens, upon which the allotment of lands and distribution of money and other property belonging to the Seminole Indians shall be made, and to no other persons. "Second. If any member of the Seminole tribe of Indians shall die after the thirty-first day of December, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, the lands, money and other property to which he would be entitled if living, shall descend to his heirs who are Seminole citizens, according to the laws of descent and distribution of the state of Arkansas, and be allotted and distributed to them accordingly; Provided, That in all cases where such property would descend to the parents under said laws the same shall first go to the mother instead of the father, and then to the brothers and sisters, and their heirs, instead of the father." Plainly the facts agreed upon bring the case within the scope of the second paragraph thus quoted, and whether Lucy Wildcat, the only surviving Seminole relative of the deceased, or the wife and daughters of Cox, inherited the land in controversy, depends upon the effect to be given to the phrase, "shall descend to his heirs who are Seminole Indians." [172] The supreme court of Oklahoma seemingly had little difficulty in concluding that this expression excluded "heirs" who were not Seminoles, and it adopted unanimously as its own, the opinion by the Commission, which found in favor of the plaintiff in error, containing the following: "The act under consideration says that such property 'shall descend to his heirs who are Seminole citizens.' Who are Seminole citizens as here designated? Section 1 of the act set out above provides for the enrolment of the Seminole citizens and says that in making out this roll the names of all citizens living on the 31st day of December, 1899, and all the children born to Seminole citizens up to that date, shall constitute the final rolls of Seminole citizens. In § 21 of the Original Curtis Act (Act Cong. June 28, 1898, chap. 517, 30 Stat. at L. ""The rolls so made, when approved by the Secretary of the Interior, shall be final, and the persons whose names are found thereon, with their descendants thereafter born to them, with such persons as may intermarry according to tribal laws, shall alone constitute the several tribes which they represent.' "From the reading of these two sections last above set out it plainly appears that neither the widow of decedent Louis Cox, nor their two children, can be denominated 'Seminole citizens.' The widow undoubtedly is not so included because she is of the Creek blood and a citizen of that tribe, and the two children are excluded because they were born before December 31st, 1899, and were not enrolled as Seminole citizens, and thus do not come within the provisions defining Seminole citizens." [— Okla. —, 154 Pac. 61.] But upon a rehearing of the case the court "withdrew" its former opinion and held that Congress intended that [173] the words "Seminole citizens," in the second paragraph of the act, should have a more elastic meaning than was in terms given to them in the first paragraph, and, by interpreting them so as to include the wife and daughters of the deceased, it found the title to the lands to be in the latter, subject to the dower estate of the former. [53 Okla. 728, 157 Pac. 713.] This judgment, being within the provisions of § 2 of the act approved September 6, 1916, amending § 237 of the Judicial Code (39 Stat. at L. 726, chap. 448, Comp. Stat. 1916, § 1214), is properly before us for review on writ of error. The first paragraph of the agreement which we have quoted prescribes the persons whose names shall go upon the Seminole roll, and it declares that the rolls so made, when approved by the Secretary of the Interior, "shall constitute the final rolls" of "Seminole citizens," and that to these "and to no other persons" shall allotment of property be made. This definition of "Seminole citizens" is followed in the second paragraph with the provision that the property of an intestate, such as we have in this case, shall descend to his heirs who are "Seminole citizens." There is nothing in the act to indicate an intention on the part of Congress or of the tribe that the words, "Semi nole citizens," as used in the second, shall have any other meaning than that specifically given to them in the first paragraph, but, on the contrary, both the natural and the legal inference from their being used in such juxtaposition is that the same meaning shall be given them, and that if a different or more comprehensive meaning had been intended, it would have been expressed. But there are other cogent reasons why courts should not modify these final rolls by liberal interpretation of this statutory provision. The rolls of the Seminole Tribe were compiled by the Commission to the Five Civilized Tribes, a quasi judicial tribunal, to which large powers were given by statute for [174] that specific purpose, and the action of the Commission, when approved by the Secretary of the Interior, made "final" by the statute, so conclusively settles all questions within its jurisdiction as to membership in the tribe and as to the rights of the Indians to tribal property, that they are subject to attack, as the judgments of courts are, only for fraud and mistake,-of which there is no suggestion in this record. United States v. Wildcat, 244 U. S. 111, 61 L. ed. 1024, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 561. The principal reason given by the Oklahoma supreme court for its second conclusion is that, the daughters of Cox, being children born to a Seminole citizen prior to the 31st day of December, 1899, were entitled to enrolment as Seminole Indians under the first paragraph of the agreement, and, if so enrolled, would be strictly within the terms of the act, and would inherit the land. We think it very clear that this reason is not sound. The Seminole Tribe was derived from the Creek, and the tribal customs and traditions of the two had much in common. While this record does not show specifically what the tribal custom of the Seminoles was with respect to tribal recognition of children born of mixed marriages, it does show definitely that by the Creek Indians (and it is with enrolled Creek Indians that we are dealing), the children of mixed marriages were treated and enrolled as members of the tribe of their mother, for the names of the daughters of Cox are found on the tribal roll of the Creek Indians of 1890, when they were very young children; and again in 1901, when Maggie was twenty years of age and Nancy was seventeen, apparently on their own application, they and their mother were placed by the Commission on the final roll of the Creek Tribe. This Creek roll also shows that the father of the children, Louis Cox, was a Seminole, and the Seminole roll on which Cox's name appears bears the notation, "Wife and family Creeks." Thus it is plain that it was not through any mistake or [175] oversight that the children of Cox were omitted by the Commission from the Seminole roll and were placed upon the Creek roll, but that this was done for the sufficient reason that tribal custom and tradition required their enrolment as Creeks, and the law nowhere provided for their enrolment in more than one tribe. The final rolls, alike of the Seminoles and of the Creeks, thus made up by the Commission, were placed by the act of Congress, as we have seen, beyond amendment by the courts on such a record as we have here, and it is impossible for us to conclude that the daughters of Cox were entitled to enrolment as members of the Seminole Tribe, or that, having been enrolled as Creeks, they may now be given the rights of enrolled "Seminole citizens." The supreme court also says that "only the most powerful and impelling reasons" could induce it to hold that it was the intention of the Indians to exclude their own children from participation in the distribution of their property after death. While it is true that it seems unnatural for the Indians to have preferred more distant relatives to their own children in providing for the descent and distribution of their property, yet from the terms of the act before us, and also from the provisions of the Supplemental Creek Agreement that "only citizens of the Creek Nation, male and female, and their Creek descendants, shall inherit the lands of the Creek Nation" (32 Stat. at L. 500, chap. 1323), it is clear that with the Indians the interests of the tribe were paramount to those of the family, and it was with a knowledge of the mode of life of their primitive people, better and more intimate than the courts can now command, that they determined that this paramount purpose would best be served by giving to children born of mixed marriages the tribal status of their mother. As we have said, this record does not show affirmatively that the Seminoles had a custom similar to this one of [176] the Creeks, but such is believed to have been the fact. The supreme court of Oklahoma, in its first opinion, said: "The defendants have presented the |