sults might be invoked to resolve its meaning; but we do not think it is ambiguous.

It must be conceded, indeed, it is conceded, that the words of the sections are grammatically broad enough to include all seamen, foreign as well as American, and advances and contracts, wherever made; and to the contention that Congress had in mind and was only solicitous for American seamen, the answer is again immediate: The contention would take us from the certainty of language to the uncertainties of construction dependent upon the conjecture of consequences, take us from the deck to the sea, if we may use a metaphor suggested by our subject. Language is the safer guide, for it may be defined; consequences brought forward to modify its meaning may be in fact and effect disputed,-foreseen, it may be, and accepted as necessary to the achievement of the purpose of the law. And the purpose is resolute, has been maintained for many years with increasing care, and the ship being in the waters of the United States, not the nationality of the seamen, selected as its test. And lest there might be impediment in treaties, they are declared, so far as they impede, to be abrogated.

But authority may be adduced against the contentions. In Patterson v. The Eudora, 190 U. S. 169, 47 L. ed. 1002, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 821, the Seamen's Act came under consideration, and it was contended, as it is contended now, that the title determined against the body [203] of the act, and that therefore the act did not apply to foreign vessels, not withstanding its explicit words. The contention was declared untenable, and the reasoning of the court exhausts discussion on that and the other contentions as to the purpose and power of Congress. Of the first it was said that it was to protect sailors against certain wrongs practised upon them, one of the most common being the advancement of wages; of the second it was said, quoting Chief Justice Marshall:

"The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute; it is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself." The Exchange v. M'Faddon, 7 Cranch, 116, 3 L. ed. 287. The nationality of the seamen does not appear, but the vessel was foreign, and the application of the statute to the latter constituted the ground of controversy.

Of course, the language of an act, though universal, may find limitation in the jurisdiction of the legislature; but'

certainly a ship within the harbors of the United States is within the jurisdiction of the United States, and making its exercise "apply to seamen on foreign vessels," and "the courts of the United States open to such seamen for its enforcement," was the judgment of Congress of the way to promote its purpose.

These considerations, we think, answer as well other contentions; that is, that the act "should be construed as applicable only to seamen shipping in an American port on vessels which remain for a time in or afterwards return to an American port to load or deliver cargo," or "to seamen of American nationality upon foreign or domestic vessels, irrespective of the port of shipment."

It is enough to say of the contentions, in addition to what has been said, that they impose on the statute qualifications and limitations precluded by its words and the purpose they express. There is a great deal said, and ably said, upon these contentions and the more pretentious one that the act would violate the Constitution of the [204] United States unless so "construed as not to apply to foreign seamen shipped on a foreign vessel in a foreign port, under a contract, valid where made

..."

We cannot concede the qualification nor doubt the power of Congress to impose conditions upon foreign vessels entering or remaining in the harbors of the United States. And we think that the case of the Eudora declares the grounds of decision. Its principle is broader than its instance and makes the vessel and its locality in the waters of the United States the test of the application of the act, and not the nationality of the seamen nor their place of shipment, nor contravening conventions, and precludes deductions of advances.

Nor is there obstacle in the penal provisions of the act. They may be distributively applied, and such application has many examples in legislation. It is justified by the rule of reddendo singula singulis. By it words and provisions are referred to their appropriate objects, resolving confusion and accomplishing the intent of the law against, it may be, a strict grammatical construction. United States v. Simms, 1 Cranch, 252, 2 L. ed. 98; Com. v. Barber, 143 Mass. 560, 10 N. E. 330; Quinn v. Lowell Electric Light Corp. 140 Mass. 106, 3 N. E. 200. The Seamen's Act especially invokes the application of the rule. The act applies to foreign vessels as explicitly and as circumstantially as it does to domestic vessels. Let the foreign vessel be in the

United States v. Union P. R. Co. 91 U. S. 72, 23 L. ed. 224; Aldridge v. Williams, 3 How. 24, 11 L. ed. 475; Preston ▼. Browder, 1 Wheat. 120, 4 L. ed. 51. A statute should also be read with reference to its leading idea; and its predominant purpose will prevail over the literal import of particular terms or clauses, operating as a reason for expanding the significance of doubtful clauses, so that all interpretations may accord with the spirit of the entire act. State ex rel. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 137 Wis. 80, 117 N. W. 846; People v. Long Island R. Co. 194 N. Y. 130, 87 N. E. 79; Iuka v. Schlosser, 97 Ill. App. 222; Groff v. Miller, 20 App. D. C. 353.

The primary rule of construction is that the legislature may be assumed to have meant precisely what, in the words of the law, it is commonly understood to import.

Endlich, Interpretation of Statutes, art. 2; United States v. Colorado & N. W. R. Co. 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 167, 85 C. C. A. 27, 157 Fed. 321, 13 Ann. Cas. 893.

The act was designed by Congress as a regulation of foreign commerce, as is apparent from a review of the whole statute and a consideration of Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23, and Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 12 L. ed.

702.

Mr. Roscoe H. Hupper argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents: Under the Act of 1884, advances to seamen on shipment on an American vessel in a foreign country were not unlawful.

The State of Maine, 22 Fed. 734; Patterson v. The Eudora, 190 U. S. 169, 47 L. ed. 1002, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 821.

The insertion in the 1915 section of the words "while in waters of the United States" clearly got its impetus from Patterson v. The Eudora, supra, which held that a British vessel, while in waters of the United States, was subject to the prohibition against advances. The purpose of this insertion was to make it plain to foreign shipowners, particularly in view of the abrogation of treaties provided for by the Act of 1915, that while their vessels were in our ports, our statute against advances would be applied to them. See The Ixion, 150 C. C. A. 291, 237 Fed. 142; The London, 238 Fed. 645, affirmed in 154 C. C. A. 565, 241 Fed. 863. This did not reflect!

sels, the prohibition against advances should apply in foreign countries.

The very fact that our law applies to foreign vessels while in our ports is one of the strongest arguments why it should be held not to apply to our vessels while in foreign ports. In other words, we should recognize the law of foreign countries with respect to our vessels in their ports, just as we expect foreign countries to recognize our law with respect to their vessels in our ports. This but accords with the general doctrine that when a merchant vessel of one country enters a port of another for the purposes of trade, it subjects itself to the law of the place to which it goes.

Wildenhus's Case, 120 U. S. 1, 11, 30 L. ed. 565, 566, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383. If the statute as a whole does not apply, a single clause does not.

The Talus, 160 C. C. A. 570, 248 Fed. 670.

The 1884 section, when amended and re-enacted in 1915, carried with it into the 1915 section the interpretation which had been given it by the courts and the executive department of the government.

2 Lewis's Sutherland, Stat. Constr. 2d ed. § 403; Sessions v. Romadka, 145 U. S. 29, 42, 36 L. ed. 609, 614, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 799; Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, 302, 36 L. ed. 429, 442, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617; Fisk v. Henarie, 142 U. S. 459, 35 L. ed. 1080, 12 Sup. 110 U. S. 729, 739, 740, 28 L. ed. 308, Ct. Rep. 207; United States v. Ryder, 311, 312, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 196; McDonald 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 142; Black, Interpretav. Hovey, 110 U. S. 619, 28 L. ed. 269, tion of Laws, 1896 ed. p. 369; Sedgwick, 366; St. George v. Rockland, 89 Me. Stat. & Const. Law, 2d ed. pp. 365, 43, 35 Atl. 1033; United States v. TransInters. Com. Rep. 443, 7 C. C. A. 15, Missouri Freight Asso. 24 L.R.A. 73, 4 19 U. S. App. 36, 58 Fed. 58; United States v. Albright, 234 Fed. 202; Re Guggenheim Smelting Co. 121 Fed. 153.

Assistant Attorney General Brown argued the cause, and, with Mr. Robert Szold, filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiæ:

The statute declares a rule of policy of the forum forbidding the enforcement of such contracts.

The Kensington, 183 U. S. 263, 46 L. ed. 190, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 102; Knott v. Botany Worsted Mills, 179 U. S. 69, 45 L. ed. 90, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 30. There is no question of validity with

Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U. S. 13, 46 L. ed. 55, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1; Patterson v. The Eudora, 190 U. S. 169, 47 L. ed. 1002, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 821.

The fact that advances made in this country are criminally punishable is not sufficient reason for enforcing foreign advances in this libel for wages.

Knott v. Botany Worsted Mills, supra; United States v. 25 Packages of Panama Hats, 231 U. S. 358, 58 L. ed. 267, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 63.

It is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation.

United States v. Graham, 110 U. S. 219, 221, 28 L. ed. 126, 127, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 582.

A custom of the Department, however long continued by successive officers, must yield to the positive language of the statute.

Houghton v. Payne, 194 U. S. 88, 100, 48 L. ed. 888, 891, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 590.

Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of the court:

These cases were considered together in the courts below and may be disposed of in like manner here.

The facts are:

In the first case Paul Neilson and nine other seamen sue for the recovery of wages claimed to be due them from the bark "Rhine." It appears that they shipped on the American bark "Rhine" at Buenos Aires, October 7, 1916, for a voyage to New York, at the rate of $25 per month. It is stipulated that the shipping of seamen on sailing vessels at Buenos Aires is controlled by certain shipping masters, to one of whom the libellants, in accordance [212] with the usual custom, and as a means of securing employment, signed a receipt or advance note for one month's wages. These advance notes were presented to the American vice-consul at Buenos Aires before the libellants signed the articles, were by him noted on the articles, and, in the presence of the libellants, directed to be paid on account of the wages of the respective libellants. It was further stipulated that, in directing the master of the "Rhine" to honor such advance notes, the consul was acting in accordance with § 237 of the Consular Regulations of the United States. When the bark arrived at New York the libellants were paid the wages earned, less the $25 advanced. They now seek to re

of the terms of § 10 (a) of the Act of March 4, 1915 [38 Stat. at L. 1168, chap. 153, Comp. Stat. 1916, § 8392a], entitled, an "Act to Promote the Welfare of American Seamen in the Merchant Marine of the United States," upon the theory that such advances are unlawful and of no effect.

The facts in relation to the case of the Barkentine "Windrush" differ from the above only in respect of the fact that the advance notes are not in evidence, but are noted on the articles.

The district court decided in favor of the libellants. 244 Fed. 833. The circuit court of appeals reversed the decrees. C. C. A., 250 Fed. 180. The cases are here on writs of certiorari.

The section of the statute is the same as that involved in the case of The Talus, No. 392, just decided [248 U. S. 185, ante, 200, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 84]. The ditference is that the advances were made by the master of an American vessel in a South American port, whereas in the Talus the advancements were made to foreign seamen in a British port. The same general consideration as to the interpretation of the statute which controlled in the decision of the case of the Talus are applicable here and need not be repeated.

That American vessels might be controlled by congressional [213] legislation as to contracts made in foreign ports may, for present purposes at least, be conceded. It appears that only by compliance with the local custom of obtaining seamen through agents can American vessels obtain seamen in South American ports. This is greatly to be deplored, and the custom is one which works much hardship to a worthy class. But we are unable to discover that, in passing this statute, Congress intended to place American shipping at the great disadvantage of this inability to obtain seamen when compared with the vessels of other nations, which are manned by complying with local usage.

The statute itself denies clearance papers to vessels violating its terms. This provision could only apply to domestic ports, and is another evidence of the intent of Congress to legislate as to advances made in our own ports. Affirmed.

Mr. Justice McKenna, with whom concur Mr. Justice Holmes, Mr. Justice Brandeis, and Mr. Justice Clarke, dissenting:

These cases were submitted with No.

The facts are set out in the opinion of the court. In these cases, as in others, we are constrained to dissent. The principle of decision should be, we think, that declared in our dissent in The Talus, 248 U. S. 185, ante, 200,. 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 84. The facts of these cases put more tension upon it, that is, an adhesion to the words of the statute as determinative of its purpose rather than some of its consequences. We have here the somewhat appealing force of a picture [214] of an American ship only able to escape practical internment in a foreign port by a violation of the law, if it be as we have declared it. And this under the sanction of the United States consul, acting under the following regulation of the Department of State:

"237. Advances to seamen shipped in foreign ports.-The shipment of seamen in foreign ports cannot be considered as within the intention, and hence not within the proper construction of the act referred to in the next preceding paragraph [inserted in the margin]. The final clause of the act, which declares that this section shall apply as well to foreign vessels as to those of the United States, and that in case of violation a clearance shall be refused them, is a clear indication that Congress did not in this section refer to the shipment of seamen in foreign ports, but had in view acts done in the United States alone. The provision of the statute as to payment of advance wages is not intended to apply to seamen shipped in foreign ports. In the settlement of wages due seamen in such cases, therefore, consular officers will take into account what has been paid in advance. The State of Maine, 22 Fed. 734."

[215] We are unable to assent. We regard the act of Congress as clear, and 1236. No advance wages.-Except in case of whaling vessels, it is not lawful to pay any seaman wages before leaving the port at which such seaman may be engaged in advance of the time when he has actually earned the same, or to pay such advance wages to any other person, or to pay to any one except an officer authorized by act of Congress to collect fees for such service, any remuneration for the shipment of a If any such advance wages or remuneration shall have been paid or contracted for the consul, in making up the

seaman.

command is that advances shall not be deducted from wages of seamen on vessels, American or foreign, while in the waters of the United States. Where they were made or under what circumstances made are not factors in judgment. They are the mere accidents of the situation, and if they reach the importance and have the embarrassment depicted by counsel, the appeal must be to Congress, which no doubt will promptly correct the improvidence, if it be such, of its legislation. We have already expressed our view of the control of the language of the law, and that it is a barrier against alarms and faultfinding.

It hence follows that we are of opinion the judgment of the circuit court of appeals in each case should be reversed and that of the district court affirmed.

INTERNATIONAL NEWS SERVICE, Petitioner,

V.

ASSOCIATED PRESS.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 215-267.) Appeal

objections waived below. 1. The objection that the individual rights of members of a co-operative newsgathering and publishing organization may not be enforced in an equity suit brought will be regarded by the Federal Supreme by the organization as a corporate entity Court as waived, where the suit in substance was brought for the benefit of complainant's members, and no specific objection based upon the want of parties appears to have been made below.

[For other cases, see Appeal and Error, VIII. k, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Literary property -news.

2. As between rival news-gathering and publishing agencies news must be regarded account of wages due the seaman upon his discharge, will disregard such advance payment or agreement and award to the seaman the amount to which he would be entitled if no such payment or agreement had been made. Nor should consuls permit the statute to be evaded indirectly, as by part payment in advance and then stating rate of wages too small. Rev. Stat. §§ 4532, 4533; 23 Stat. at L. 55, chap. 121, § 10, Comp. Stat. 1916 § 8323; 24 Stat. at L. 80, chap. 421, § 3, Comp. Stat. 1916, § 8323; The Samuel E. Spring, 27 Fed. 764."