Among the cases holding such license fees as the one under consideration unreasonable, are the following:

ters. Com. Rep. 134, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep., ough v. American Natural Gas Co. 239 1380; Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co. Pa. 210, 86 Atl. 717; 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. v. Botkin, 240 U. S. 227, 60 L. ed. 617, 36 5th ed. p. 665; Atlantic & P. Teleg. Co. Sup. Ct. Rep. 261; Galveston, H. & S. v. Philadelphia, 190 U. S. 160, 164, 47 A. R. Co. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217, 52 L. ed. 995, 1000, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 817. L. ed. 1031, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 638; United States Exp. Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U. S. 335, 56 L. ed. 459, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 211; St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350, 59 L. ed. 265, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 99; Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Charleston, 153 U. S. 692, 38 L. ed. 871, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 637, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1094.

Where the municipality owns the fee in its streets, or other right therein, which authorizes a charge for the occupation thereof, license fees on poles placed therein, when reasonable, may be sustained as a rental.

St. Louis v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 148 U. S. 92, 37 L. ed. 380, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 485; Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Baltimore, 156 U. S. 210, 39 L. ed. 399, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 356.

Philadelphia v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 40 Fed. 615; Sunset Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. Medford, 115 Fed. 202; Saginaw v. Swift Electric Light Co. 113 Mich. 660, 72 N. W. 6; Atlantic Postal Teleg.-Cable Co. v. Savannah, 133 Ga. 66, 65 S. E. 184; Dill. Mun. Corp. 5th ed. p. 599; D. E. Foote & Co. v. Maryland, 232 U. S. 494, 58 L. ed. 698, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 377.

The right to use the streets for the erection of poles was granted directly by the state by § 1287 of the Virginia Code, supplemented by the ordinance of the city of March 16, 1889, and the grants there made, when accepted and performed by the appellant, constituted a contract which is protected by the Constitution against impairment.

But where the municipality has no ownership in the streets which author- Owensboro v. Cumberland Teleph. & izes a rental, the only power for license | Teleg. Co. 230 U. S. 58, 57 L. ed. 1389, fee exactions upon the instrumentalities 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 988; Boise Artesian of interstate commerce is derived from the police power.

Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Taylor, 192 U. S. 64, 48 L. ed. 342, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 208; Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. New Hope, 192 U. S. 55, 48 L. ed. 338, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 204; Atlantic & P. Teleg. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U. S. 160, 47 L. ed. 995, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 817.

The city of Richmond has no property right of any kind in the streets. Richmond v. Smith, 101 Va. 161, 43 S. E. 345, 13 Am. Neg. Rep. 465.

The Federal Constitution contemplates and permits only such state inspection taxes as are reasonable in amount, single in purpose, and assessed under a law designed for the safety of the community, as distinguished from a tax which, in whole or in part, levies tribute upon interstate commerce for the enrichment of the coffers of the taxing community itself.

Hot & Cold Water Co. v. Boise City, 230 U. S. 84, 57 L. ed. 1400, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 997; Louisville v. Cumberland Teleph. & Teleg. Co. 224 U. S. 663, 56 L. ed. 940, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 572.

Mr. H. R. Pollard argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee:

The city of Richmond has such proprietary rights in the streets of the city as to authorize it, under the charter and ordinances of the city, to grant to the appellant the right to plant poles and run wires thereon along the streets or alleys of the city.

Washington, A. & Mt. V. R. Co. v. Alexandria, 98 Va. 349, 36 S. E. 385; Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Norfolk & W. R. Co. 88 Va. 920, 14 S. E. 803; Hodges v. Seaboard & R. R. Co. 88 Va. 658, 14 S. E. 380; Danville v. Danville R. & Electric Co. 114 Va. 386, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 463, 76 S. E. 913; Norfolk & W. Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, R. Co. v. Bristol, 116 Va. 962, 83 S. E. 460, 6 L. ed. 678, 693; Robbins v. Tax- 421; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Richmond, ing Dist. 120 U. S. 489, 30 L. ed. 694, 1178 Fed. 310; St. Louis v. Western U. Inters. Com. Rep. 45, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. Teleg. Co. 148 U. S. 92, 100, 37 L. ed. 592; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 34 380, 383, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 485; Atlantic L. ed. 128, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 36, 10 & P. Teleg. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U. Sup. Ct. Rep. 681; Postal Teleg. Cable S. 160, 47 L. ed. 995, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. Co. v. Taylor, 192 Ú. S. 64, 48 L. ed. 342, 817; Richmond v. Southern Bell Teleph. 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 208; Western U. Teleg. & Teleg. Co. 174 U. S. 761, 43 L. ed. 1162, Co. v. Kansas. 216 U. S. 1, 54 L. ed. 355, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 778; Western U. Teleg. 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 190; Kittanning Bor-' Co. v. Atty. Gen. 125 U. S. 530, 548, 31

L. ed. 790, 793, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 961, 224, Q. R. Co. v. Nebraska, 170 U. S. 57, 72, U. S. 160, 169-172, 56 L. ed. 710, 715- 42 L. ed. 948, 953, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 513. The courts of last resort, on the ques717, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 449. The ordinance imposing a rental fee tion at issue, have expressly held, withupon the poles and wires of the appel-out dissent, that the basis for a charge of lant for the use of the property right in the streets and alleys of the city of Richmond is not unconstitutional.

Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. New Hope, 192 U. S. 55, 59, 48 L. ed. 338, 339, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 204; 2 McQuillin, Mun. Corp. 783; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. New Hope, 187 U. S. 419, 47 L. ed. 240, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 204; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Richmond, 224 U. S. 160, 172, 56 L. ed. 710, 717, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 449; Atlantic & P. Teleg. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U. S. 160, 164, 165, 47 L. ed. 995, 1000, 1001, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 817; Wood v. Vandalia R. Co. 231 U. S. 1, 58 L. ed. 97, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 7; Missouri Rate Cases (Knott v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.) 230 U. S. 474, 57 L. ed. 1571, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 975; Minnesota Rate Cases (Simpson v. Shepard) 230 U. S. 352, 57 L. ed. 1511, 48 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1151, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 18; Kansas City, M. & B. R. Co. v. Stiles, 242 U. S. 111, 118, 61 L. ed. 176, 187, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 58; Williams v. Talladega, 226 U. S. 404, 57 L. ed. 275, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 116; St. Louis v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 148 U. S. 92, 37 L. ed. 380, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 485; St. Louis v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 149 U. S. 465, 37 L. ed. 810, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 990; Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Chicopee, 207 Mass. 341, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 997, 93 N. E. 927; Memphis v. Postal' Teleg. Cable Co. 76 C. C. A. 292, 145 Fed. 602; Ganz v. Ohio Postal Teleg. Cable Co. 72 C. C. A. 186, 140 Fed. 692; Michigan Teleph. Co. v. Charlotte, 93 Fed. 11; Toledo v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 52 L.R.A. 730, 46 C. C. A. 111, 107 Fed. 10; Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Baltimore, 79 Md. 502, 24 L.R.A. 161, 29 Atl. 819; 27 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 1021; Chester City v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 154 Pa. 464, 25 Atl. 1134; Philadelphia v. American U. Teleg. Co. 167 Pa. 406, 31 Atl. 628; Philadelphia v. Postal Teleg. Cable Co. 67 Hun, 21, 21 N. Y. Supp. 556; Philadelphia v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 32 C. C. A. 246, 60 U. S. App. 398, 89 Fed. 454; Taylor v. Postal Teleg. Cable Co. 202 Pa. 583, 52 Atl. 128; 3 Dill. Mun. Corp. 5th ed. § 1274; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 195 U. S. 540, 557, 566, 49 L. ed. 312, 318, 321, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 133, 1 Ann. Cas. 517; New York ex rel. New York Electric Lines Co. v. Squire, 145 U. S. 175, 190, 36 L. ed. 666, 671, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 880; Chicago, B. &

the sort now being discussed is founded on the fact that the right yielded to the telegraph company is a "proprietary right," and that, in determining the value of this right, the following may be considered:

(1) Compensation for the absolute, permanent, and exclusive appropriation of that part of the street which is occupied by telegraph poles, cross arms, insulators, and wires carried thereon.

St. Louis v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 148 U. S. 92, 97, 37 L. ed. 380, 382, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 485; Memphis v. Postal Teleg. & Cable Co. 91 C. C. A. 137, 164 Fed. 600, 16 Ann. Cas. 342; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. New York, 3 L.R.A. 449, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 533, 38 Fed. 552.

(2) Any increase in the force and apparatus of the fire department rendered necessary by the maintenance of poles and wires.

Philadelphia v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 32 C. C. A. 246, 60 U. S. App. 398, 89 Fed. 454.

(3) Expense to which the city may be put from time to time in connection with meetings of the council for the purpose of regulating the erection of poles and wires.

Ibid.

(4) The necessary or probable expense incident to the fixing of the location of the poles in the street.

Taylor v. Postal Teleg. Cable Co. 202 Pa. 583, 52 Ati. 128, affirmed in 192 U. S. 64, 67, 48 L. ed. 342, 343, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 208; Chester City v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 154 Pa. 465, 25 Atl. 1134.

(5) The necessary expense incident to constant inspection of maintaining a poles and wires for the purpose of seeing that they are safe.

Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Taylor, 192 U. S. 64, 69, 48 L. ed. 342, 344, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 208; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. New Hope, 187 U. S. 419, 426, 47 L. ed. 240, 244, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 204; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. New York, 3 L.R.A. 449, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 533, 38 Fed. 552.

(6) The liability of the city for injury to individuals caused by defective poles and wires.

Chester City v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 154 Pa. 464, 25 Atl. 1134; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. New Hope, 187 U. S. 419, 425, 47 L. ed. 240, 243, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 204.

249 U. S.

The ordinance of the city of Richmond, imposing a license tax of $300 upon the appellant for maintaining an office in the city of Richmond is not unconstitutional. Bradley v. Richmond, 227 U. S. 477, 482-484, 57 L. ed. 603, 605, 606, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 318; Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Charleston, 153 U. S. 692, 38 L. ed. 871, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 637, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1094; Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Norfolk, 101 Va. 134, 43 S. E. 207; General R. Signal Co. v. Virginia, 246 U. S. 500, 510, 62 L. ed. 854, 858, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 360; Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Norfolk, 118 Va. 455, 87 S. E. 555; Wood v. Vandalia R. Co. 231 U. S. 1, 58 L. ed. 97, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 7; Missouri Rate Cases (Knott v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.) 230 U. S. 474, 57 L. ed. 1571, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 975; Osborne v. Florida, 164 U. S. 650, 41 L. ed. 586, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 214; Maine v. Grand Trunk R. Co. 142 U. S. 217, 35 L. ed. 994, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 807, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 121, 163; Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 Ú. S. 594, 33 L. ed. 1025, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 593; Ficklen v. Taxing Dist. 145 U. S. 1, 36 L. ed. 601, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 79, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 810; St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350, 364, 59 L. ed. 265, 272, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 99; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Missouri, 190 U. S. 412, 47 L. ed. 1116, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730; Adams Exp. Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. 194, 225, 41 L. ed. 683, 696, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 305; Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minnesota, 246 U. S. 450, 62 L. ed. 827, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 373; United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321, 62 L. ed. 1135, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 748; Marconi Wireless Teleg. Co. v. Com. 218 Mass. 558, 106 N. E. 310, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 214; Dalton Adding Mach. Co. v. Com. 118 Va. 567, 88 S. E. 167; Kehrer v. Stewart, 197 U. S. 60, 68, 49 L. ed. 663, 667, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 403; Armour Packing Co. v. Lacy, 200 U. S. 226, 50 L. ed. 451, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 232; Dalton Adding Mach. Co. v. State Corp. Commission, 236 U. S. 699, 59 L. ed. 797, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 480.

[256] Mr. Justice Clarke delivered the opinion of the court:

The appellant, the Telegraph Company, in its bill filed in the district court of the United States for the eastern district of Virginia, sought to enjoin the city of Richmond and its officers from collecting an annual license tax of $300, imposed upon the company by ordinance "for the privilege of doing business within the city of Richmond, but not including business done to or from points

without the state, and not including any business done for the government of the United States, its officers or agents," and also from attempting to collect an annual fee of $2, imposed by another ordinance, for each telegraph pole which the company maintained or used in the streets of the city.

The allegations of the voluminous bill essential to be considered are: That the company accepted the Act of Congress of July 24, 1866 [14 Stat. at L. 221, chap. 230, Comp. Stat. 1916, § 10,072], entitled, "An Act to Aid in the Construction of Telegraph Lines," etc., and is engaged in transmitting messages by telegraph, intrastate and interstate,this is admitted; and the following which are denied, viz., that the cost of doing the intrastate business transacted by the company at Richmond is greater than the receipts from it, and that since both taxes must be paid, if at all, from receipts from interstate commerce, they constitute such a burden upon that commerce of the company as to render them unconstitutional and void.

The evidence introduced on the trial was largely in the form of affidavits, together with a transcript of the evidence taken in a former case, which was stipulated into the record.

The district court held the taxes valid and dismissed the bill. On the constitutional questions involved a direct appeal brings the case into this court for review.

[257] Except for the contention that this record shows affirmatively and clearly that the taxes complained of are necessarily unreasonable and a burden upon interstate commerce, the case could well be disposed of without discussion, on the authority of decided cases.

That the city of Richmond has authority, under the statutes of Virginia and its charter, to impose an occupation or license tax on the business of the telegraph company done within the city, is clear enough. Va. Code, § 1042; charter of city of Richmond, § 67; Postal Teleg.-Cable Co. v. Norfolk, 101 Va. 125, 43 S. E. 207; Postal Teleg.-Cable Co. v. Norfolk, 118 Va. 455, 87 S. E. 555. Assuming the existence of this power in the city, since interstate and government service are expressly excluded from liability for the license charge, the following cases sustain the validity of the tax: Postal Teleg.-Cable Co. v. Charleston, 153 U. S. 692, 38 L. ed. 871, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 637, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1094; Emert v. Missouri, 156 U. S. 296, 39 L. ed. 430, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 68, 15 Sup.

Ct. Rep. 367; Kehrer v. Stewart, 197 U. S. 60, 49 L. ed. 663, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 403; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Richmond, 224 U. S. 160, 56 L. ed. 710, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 449; Williams v. Talladega, 226 U. S. 404, 416, 57 L. ed. 275, 280, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 116.

sary to justify a finding that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void.

There remains to be considered the fee, as it is called in the ordinance imposing it, of $2 for each pole maintained or used in the streets of the city of Richmond. This character of tax has The principle of these cases, and of also been the subject of definite decision many others cited in the opinions, is by this court, and has been sustained that, as against Federal constitutional where not clearly shown to be a direct limitations of power, a state may law- burden upon interstate commerce or unfully impose a license tax, restricted, as reasonable in amount, having regard to it is in this case, to the right to do local the purpose for which it may lawfully business within its borders, where such be imposed. St. Louis v. Western U. tax does not burden, or discriminate Teleg. Co. 148 U. S. 92, 37 L. ed. 380, against, interstate business, and where 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 485; Western U. Teleg. the local business purporting to be taxed, Co. v. New Hope, 187 U. S. 419, 47 L. ed. again as in this case, is so substantial 240, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 204; Postal Teleg.in amount that it does not clearly appear Cable Co. v. Baltimore, 156 U. S. 210, that the tax is a disguised attempt to 39 L. ed. 399, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 356; Attax interstate commerce. Such a tax is lantic & P. Teleg. Co. v. Philadelphia, not, as is argued, an inspection measure, 190 U. S. 160, 47 L. ed. 995, 23 Sup. Ct. limited in amount to the cost of issuing Rep. 817; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. the license or supervising the business, Richmond, 224 U. S. 160, 56 L. ed. 710, but is an exercise of the police power 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 449. These decisions of the state for revenue purposes, re- do not conflict with Postal Teleg.-Cable stricted to internal commerce, and there- Co. v. New Hope, 192 U. S. 55, 48 L. ed. fore within the taxing power of the 338, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 204, or Postal state. Postal Teleg.-Cable Cò. v. Charles- | Teleg.-Cable Co. v. Taylor, 192 U. S. 64, ton, 153 U. S. 692, 38 L. ed. 871, 4 Inters. | 48 L. ed. 342, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 208. In Com. Rep. 637, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1094; the former of these [259] cases the deWilliams v. Talladega, 226 U. S. 404, cision of this court rests upon its conclu416, 57 L. ed. 275, 280, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. sion that the jury found the tax unrea116; and [258] Western U. Teleg. Co. v. sonable in amount, and in the latter the Alabama Bd. of Assessment (Western U. ordinance involved was disposed of on Teleg. Co. v. Seay) 132 U. S. 472, 473, exception to the affidavit of defense, ad33 L. ed. 409, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 726, mitting the allegations of the bill that no 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 161. inspection of the poles or wires or supervision of the business of the company had been, or was intended to be, made by the borough, and that, if made, the cost could not reasonably be one twentieth of the tax imposed. This showing, taken with other facts in the case, it was held, rendered the charge unreasonable and void.

A statute of Virginia requires all telegraph companies doing business in the state to transmit all messages, state or interstate, which are tendered by other companies or by individuals, upon payment of the usual charges. This requirement that the appellant shall engage in intrastate business, construed with the ordinance imposing the license tax, results, it is argued, in imposing a burden upon its interstate business, for the reason that the net receipts from its intrastate business are insufficient to pay the tax, and therefore payment, if compelled, must be made from interstate receipts. If the facts were as thus asserted, it well might be that this tax would be invalid (Pullman Co. v. Adams, 189 U. S. 420, 47 L. ed. 877, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 494; Williams v. Talladega, 226 U. S. 404, 416, 417, 57 L. ed. 275, 280, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 116); but a careful examination of the record fails to convince us that it contains that clear and convincing evidence that the tax thus falls upon interstate commerce which is neces-'

The decisions cited, sustaining this character of tax, proceed upon the principle that, although the occupation of its streets by a telegraph company engaged in interstate commerce, which has accepted the Act of Congress of 1866, cannot be denied by a city, yet, since the use of its streets for its poles by such a company is necessarily, in a measure, permanent and exclusive in character, and different in kind and extent from that of the general public, and since such use imposes contingent liabilities upon a city, it is competent for it, in the exercise of its police power, to exact reasonable compensation "in the nature of rental" for the use of its streets, having regard to the duties and responsibilities

the amount stated does not seem excessive for the service which should be rendered, and which witnesses for the city testified was rendered, in looking after the many poles of the appellant, part of which, at least, carried many wires. As great or greater charges were sustained in St. Louis v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 148 U. S. 92, 37 L. ed. 380, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 485; Postal [261] Teleg.-Cable Co. v. Baltimore, 156 U. S. 210, 39 L. ed. 399, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 356; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Richmond, 224 U. S. 160, 172, 56 L. ed. 710, 717, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep.

449.

which such use imposes on the munic- cially in time of storm, become crossed ipality. Even if the net returns from with wires carrying high tension curthe intrastate business should not equal rents, and thus cause fires and loss of such tax, and it must be paid from in- | life and property. There is conflict in terstate earnings, this alone would not the evidence as to the cost to the city be conclusive against its validity. If of such inspection and regulation, but the method of doing interstate business necessarily imposes duties and liabilities upon a municipality, it may not be charged with the cost of these without just compensation. Even interstate business must pay its way, in this case for its right of way and the expense to others incident to the use of it. St. Louis v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 148 U. S. pp. 98 et seq., 37 L. ed. 383, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 485, supra; Atlantic & P. Teleg. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U. S. 160, 163, 47 L. ed. 995, 999, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 817; St. Louis v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 149 U. S. 465, 37 L. ed. 810, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 990. Such compensation should [260] also include the expense of inspection of the poles and wires used, and of such supervision of the business of the company conducted in the streets, as may be reasonably necessary to secure the safety of life and property of the inhabitants and of the users of the streets; but with the authority in the courts, on proper application, to determine whether, under the conditions prevailing in a given case, the charge made is reasonably proportionate to the service to be rendered and the liabilities involved, or whether it is a disguised attempt to impose a burden on interstate commerce. St. Louis v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 148 U. S. 92, 37 L. ed. 380, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 485; St. Louis v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 149 U. S. 465, 37 L. ed. 810, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 990; Postal Teleg.-Cable Co. v. Baltimore, 156 U. S. 210, 39 L. ed. 399, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 356; Atlantic & P. Teleg. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U. S. 160, 163, 47 L. ed. 995, 999, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 817; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 195 U. S. 540, 566, 49 L. ed. 312, 321, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 133, 1 Ann. Cas. 517; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Richmond, 224 U. S. 160, 169, 56 L. ed. 710, 715, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 449.

These decisions and principles dispose of the "pole tax” before us.

The total amount of this tax was in 1911, $344, in 1914, $384, and in 1915, owing to the extension of the city limits, it became $666. There is evidence which must be credited, that poles and wires in the streets of a city require official inspection and supervision to secure their being kept in proper position and repair, so that they will not interfere with street traffic, and may not, espe

The contention cannot be allowed that formula, devised by an officer of the the ordinance is shown to be void by a appellant and pressed upon our attention, for determining the division of costs and expenses between interstate and intrastate business, which it is claimed shows that the pole tax must be paid wholly from receipts from interstate business.

Regardless of obvious criticisms which might be advanced to this formula and to the inadequacy of the data furnished by the record for testing its validity, the charge imposed upon the company, as we have seen, was so moderate in amount, having regard to the necessary burdens which the poles and wires in the streets must impose upon the city, and is so well within the prior holdings of this court, which we have cited, that it cannot be accepted as a sufficient basis for declaring the ordinance invalid.

There is no disposition on the part of this court to modify in the least the law as it has been stated in many cases, that "neither licenses, nor indirect taxation of any kind, nor any system of state regulation, can be imposed upon interstate any more than upon foreign commerce; and that all acts of legislation producing any such result are to that extent unconstitutional and void." Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, 62, 35 L. ed. 649, 654, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 851; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1, 54 L. ed. 355, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 190. But municipal ordinances which, for constitutional inquiry, are deemed state laws, will be declared void only where clearly shown to be uncon