Amendments made, or proposed and defeated, may also throw light on the construction of the act as finally passed, and may properly be taken into consideration. Repeals by implication are not favored. Black, Interpretation of Laws, § 107, p. 351; Washington v. Miller, 235 U. S. 422, 428, 59 L. ed. 295, 298, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 119; Ex parte United States, 226 U. S. 420, 57 L. ed. 281, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 170; United States v. 67 Packages of Dry Goods, 17 How. 85, 15 L. ed. 54. Also see United States v. 365 Caddies of Tobacco, 20 L. ed. 235, note. The Commerce Act and joint resolution are in pari materia and must be harmonized. Black, Interpretation of Laws, 331, 345, §§ 104, 105. If the plain meaning of the language. as written permits a construction which will not run counter to constitutional prohibition, the court should adopt such construction, and thus sustain the validity of the enactment. United States ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Delaware & H. Co. 213 U. S. 366, 407, 408, 53 L. ed. 836, 848, 849, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 527; Knights Templars' & M. Life Indemnity Co. v. Jarman, 187 U. S. 197, 205, 47 L. ed. 139, 145, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 108. The theory of the defense is that Congress has, under the Constitution, power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers by that instrument vested in the government. It is argued that Congress is given the power to make war; that this connotes the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the power of making war. This, of course, is true, subject, however, to the one fundamental, continuing, undeviating condition and qualification recogized in M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421, 4 L. ed. 579, 605, and consistently adhered to in every case construing this clause of the Constitution down to the present time. Wherever the broad rule of power to enact all necessary and proper legislation has been asserted, it has been coupled with the limitation first expressed by Justice Marshall, that the means must be such as are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 539, 20 L. ed. 287, 308; Legal Tender Cases, 110 U. S. 421, 441, 28 L. ed. 204, 212, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 122; Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, 36 L. ed. 429, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617; Boske v. Comingore, 177 U. S. 459, 44 L. ed. 846, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 701; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. 220 U. S. 107, 176, 55 L. ed. 389, 423, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 342, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1312; Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 88, 51 L. ed. 956, 970, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 655; United States v. Hoke, 187 Fed. 994; Stewart v. Kahn (Stewart v. Bloom) 11 Wall. 493, 20 L. ed. 176; United States v. Casey, 247 Fed. 362; Miller v. United States (Page v. United States) 11 Wall. 268, 20 L. ed. 135; Salamandra Ins. Co. v. New York L. Ins. & Trust Co. 254 Fed. 852. The taking of private property by civil agencies is not necessary to the waging of war successfully. McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 61, 49 L. ed. 78, 97, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 769, 1 Ann. Cas. 561. If this act confers the rate-making power, it confers an arbitrary power. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 456, 33 L. ed. 970, 980, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 209, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 462, 702; Re Gardner, 84 Kan. 264, 33 L.R.A. (N.S.) 956, 113 Pac. 1054. The right, whose existence is or may be abridged by the Postmaster General, is a property right. 16 Cyc. 620, 625; Jones, Teleg. & Teleph. Cos. §§ 249, 258; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 133, 24 L. ed. 77, 86; Allnutt v. Inglis, 12 East, 527, 104 Eng. Reprint, 206, 11 Revised Rep. 482; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 547, 42 L. ed. 819, 849, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418; Covington & L. Turnp. Road Co. v. Sanford, 164 U. S. 578, 596, 597, 41 L. ed. 560, 566, 567, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 198; Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, p. 7. The exaction of other than a reasonable rate from a consumer constitutes a taking of property without due process of law. Bailey v. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. 4 Harr. (Del.) 389, 44 Am. Dec. 602; McGehee, Due Process of Law, pp. 142, 143; Beale & W. Railroad Rate Regulation, p. 103; Story, Const. 5th ed. 1950; Ekern v. McGovern, 154 Wis. 255, 46 LR.A. (N.S.) 796, 142 N. W. 595; Bennett v. Twin Falls North Side Land & Water Co. 27 Idaho, 643, 150 Pac. 339; Spring Valley Water Co. v. San Francisco, 165 Fed. 676; Rossmiller v. State, 114 Wis. 169, 58 L.R.A. 93, 91 Am. St. Rep. 910, 89 N. W. 839; Union Dry, Wall. 5, 21 L. ed. 787; Lane County v. Goods v. Georgia Pub. Service Corp. 248 Oregon, 7 Wall. 77, 19 L. ed. 104; Waite U. S. 372, ante, 309, A.L.R. P.U.R. v. Dowley, 94 U. S. 527, 533, 24 L. ed. 1919C, 60, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 117; Land 181, 182; Reagan v. Mercantile Trust Co. Comr. v. Kaskaskia, 249 Ill. 578, 94 N. E. 154 U. S. 413, 416, 38 L. ed. 1028, 1029, 970; American School v. McAnnulty, 187 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 575, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. U. S. 94, 47 L. ed. 90, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1060; McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U. S. 33; Fairfield Floral Co. v. Bradbury, 87 347, 41 L. ed. 461, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 85; Fed. 415; Hoover v. McChesney, 81 Fed. Hibernia Sav. & L. Soc. v. San Fran480. cisco, 200 U. S. 310, 50 L. ed. 495, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 265, 4 Ann. Cas. 934; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 42 L. ed. 819, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418; New England Teleg. Co. v. Essex, 206 Fed. 926; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Atty. Gen. 125 U. S. 530, 31 L. ed. 790, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 961; Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S. 688, 39 L. ed. 311, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 1, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 268, 360; Central P. R. Co. v. California. 162 U. S. 91, 40 L. ed. 903, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 766; Williams v. Talladega, 226 U. S. 404, 57 L. ed. 275, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 116. If to uphold the constitutionality of the resolution requires a construction that the government remains under the continuing duty to render the public adequate service at reasonable rates, then we say that Congress has not the power, under the Constitution, to fix intrastate rates, and therefore could not and did not delegate that power either to the President or to the Postmaster General. Black, Const. Law. § 154; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 27 L. ed. 835, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 18; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U. S. 347, 359, 30 L. ed. 1187, 1189, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 306, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1126; New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102, 9 L. ed. 648; Keller v. United. States, 213 U. S. 138, 144, 145, 53 L. ed. 737-739, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 470, 16 Ann. Cas. 1066; Re Pacific R. Commission, 32 Fed. 241; Cook v. Marshall County, 196 U. S. 261, 49 L. ed. 471, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 233; Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461, 39 L. ed. 223, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 590, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 154; House v. Mayes, 219 U. S. 270, 55 L. ed. 213, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 234; Covington & C. Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204, 209, 210, 38 L. ed. 962, 965, 967, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1087; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 32 L. ed. 346, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 232, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6; Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 274, 62 L. ed. 1101, 1106, 3 A.L.R. 649, 38 Sup. ('t. Rep. 529, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 724. Especially is the police power preserved as to regulation of intrastate rates. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561, 592, 50 L. ed. 596, 609, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 341, 4 Ann. Cas. 1175; Lake Shore M. S. R. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 286, 43 L. ed. 703, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 465; Arkansas Rate Cases, 187 Fed. 290. Subject only to the one limitation that it must not impair the efficient exercise of a Federal function, the police power of the state has been repeatedly asserted and fully sustained in the regulation of Federal agencies. First Nat. Bank v. Kentucky, 9 Wall. 353, 361, 19 L. ed. 701, 703; Thomson v. Union P. R. Co. 9 Wall. 579, 19 L. ed. 792; Union P. R. Co. v. Peniston, 18 The question of the dividing line is for the court, not for Congress. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437, 448, 50 L. ed. 261, 264, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 110, 4 Ann. Cas. 737; Union P. R. Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5, 21 L. ed. 787; Employers Liability Cases (Howard v. Illinois C. R. Co.) 207 U. S. 463, 496, 52 L. ed. 297, 308, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141; Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 62 L. ed. 1101, 3 A.L.R. 649, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 527, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 724. Regulation of rates by the individual states does not in truth or in fact hinder or retard the discharge of the stated Federal purpose. Cumberland Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. Memphis, 183 Fed. 877; Wainwright v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 253 Fed. 459. Congress could not delegate to the President power to decide between three separate capacities in which he might deal with the telephone and telegraph. Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. v. Clinton County, 1 Ohio St. 88; Re Oliver, 17 Wis. 685; Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 36 L. ed. 294, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 495; Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 136 Wis. 146, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 821, 116 N. W. 905; State ex rel. Buell v. Frear, 146 Wis. 291, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 480, 131 N. W. 832; State ex rel. Young v. Duval County, Fla. -, 79 So. 696; State ex rel. Montgomery v. Rogers, 71 Ohio St. 203, 73 N. E. 463; Sabre v. Rutland R. Co. 86 Vt. 347, 85 Atl. 701, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1269; State ex rel. Rusk v. Budge, 14 N. D. 532, 105 N. W. 724; State ex rel. Miller V. Taylor, 27 N. D. 77. 145 N. W. 425. The power to fix rates could not be delegated. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 136 Wis. 164, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 821, 116 Ń. W. 905; State v. Parker, 26 Vt. 357. A delegation such as claimed would also be void as an attempt to delegate arbitrary power. Sheldon v. Hoyne, 261 Ill. 222, 103 N. E. 1022; Cooley, Const. Lim. p. 50; Little Chute v. Van Camp, 136 Wis. 526, 128 Am. St. Rep. 1100, 117 N. W. 1012; Milwaukee v. Ruplinger, 155 Wis. 391, 145 N. W. 42; State ex rel. Garrabad v. Dering, 84 Wis. 585, 19 L.R.A. 858, 36 Am. St. Rep. 948, 54 N. W. 1104. Even if the joint resolution be construed as conferring upon the President the power to fix rates, the President has no power to redelegate the discretion confided in him. 239; People v. C. Klinek Packing Co. supra. Clauses giving the Postmaster General power are evidently a material inducement to valid parts of the proclamation, and therefore the whole proclamation is void. Little Chute v. Van Camp, 136 Wis. 526, 128 Am. St. Rep. 1100, 117 N. W. 1012; 36 Cyc. 976, 977; State ex rel. Walsh v. Dousman, 28 Wis. 541; Warren v. Charlestown, 2 Gray, 84; Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 304, 29 L. ed. 185, 197, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 903, 962: Sheldon v. Hoyne, supra. Nor can the presidential proclamation. be saved by resort to the preamble. Lackland v. Walker, 151 Mo. 210, 52 S. W. 414; 36 Cyc. 1132; Yazoo & M. Valley R. Co. v. Thomas, 132 U. S. 174. 188, 33 L. ed. 302, 307, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 68; Price v. Forrest, 173 U. S. 410, 427, 43 L. ed. 749, 755, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 434; Sutherland, Stat. Constr. § 341, p. 654. Contemporary construction of a doubtful statute is entitled to great weight and is decisive of the true construction. Lord v. Oconto, 47 Wis. 386, 2 N. W. 785; Smith v. Black, 115 U. S. 308, 319, 29 L. ed. 398, 402, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 50; Muir v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 247 Fed. 894; Rhodes v. Tatum, Tex. Civ. App. -,206 S. W. 114; 29 Cyc. 1433; Clark v. Washington, 12 Wheat. 40, 6 L. ed. 544; Kinney v. Howard, 133 Iowa, 94, 110 N. W. 282; Mechem, Pub. Off. § 567; Jacksonville v. Ledwith, 26 Fla. 163, 9 L.R.A. 69, 23 Am. St. Rep. 558, 7 So. 891; Arnold v. Pawtucket, 21 R. I. 15, 41 Atl. 578; Mechem, Agency, § 313; McQuillin, Mun. Corp. § 382; Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25, 24 L. ed. 989; State ex rel. Nehrbass v. Harper, 162 Wis. 589, 156 N. W. 941; Kohl v. Beach, 107 Wis. 415, 50 L.R.A. 600, 81 Am. St. Rep. 849, 83 N. W. 657; Hitchcock v. Galveston, 96 U. S. 341, 348, 24 L. ed. 659, 661; Thompson v. Schermerhorn, 6 N. Y. 92, 55 Am. Dec. 385; Birdsall v. Clark, 73 N. Y. 73, 29 Am. Rep. 106; Runkle v. United States, 122 U. S. 543, 557, 30 L. ed. 1167, 1171, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1141. The language of the presidential proc-mean "to act injuriously upon." Sutherland, Stat. Contr. §§ 472-474: Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 289, § 92. Mr. William I. Schaffer, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, and Mr. Bernard J. Myers, also filed a brief as amici curiæ: lamation confers all the discretion vested in him. People v. C. Klinck Packing Co. 214 N. Y. 138, 108 N. E. 278, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 1051; Muir v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 247 Fed. 894. The proclamation, construed as a legislative enactment, undertakes to confer greater discretion than the President himself received. Sheldon v. Hoyne, supra; State v. Butler, 105 Me. 91, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 744, 73 Atl. 560, 18 Ann. Cas. 487; Meade v. Dane County, 155 Wis. 639, 145 N. W. The identity of "police regulations" with the "police powers" has been established. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Fuller, 17 Wall. 560, 21 L. ed. 710; Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U. S. 59, 59 L. ed. 837, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 501; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561, 50 L. ed. 596, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 341, 4 Ann Cas. 1175. The word "affect" has a very elastic meaning in ordinary usage, but, accordword in statutory form, it is held to ing to all legal interpretation of the Ryan v. Carter, 93 U. S. 78, 23 L. ed. 807. The Postmaster General has been substituted for the operating heads of the several companies and is operating the properties in the place and stead of their former corporate officers, and is subject to the same provisions of law except in so far as the Wire Control Act provides otherwise and sets up substitute regulations and procedure. Muir v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 247 Fed. 888. No new remedy was provided for the enforcement of the taxing rights of the state, therefore none is needed for the enforcement of the rights of regulation. The remedies in each case are provided by state law, and it is altogether inconceivable that Congress intended to depart from the established principles of our legal institutions that wherever there is a right there exist clearly defined remedies. Reagan v. Mercantile Trust Co. 154 U. S. 413, 38 L. ed. 1028, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 575, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1060. To construe the resolution as vesting arbitrary authority in the President to change rates of telephone companies is to hold that Congress repealed pro tanto the provisions of the Interstate Cominerce Act. Nothing is better settled in the law, however, than that implied repeals are not favored; and this means that it is the duty of courts to so construe the acts, if possible, that both shall be operative. 1 Lewis's Sutherland, Stat. Constr. 2d ed. p. 465; Union P. R. Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5, 21 L. ed. 787. Exemption of Federal agencies from state taxation is dependent not upon the nature of the agents, or upon the mode of their constitution, or upon the fact that they are agents, but upon the effect of the tax; that is, upon the question whether the tax does in truth deprive them of power to serve the government as they were intended to serve it, or does hinder the efficient exercise of their power. A tax upon their property has no such necessary effect. It leaves them free to discharge the duties they have undertaken to perform. A tax upon their operations is a direct obstruction to the exercise of Federal powers. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 42 L. ed. 819, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418; Reagan v. Mercantile Trust Co. supra. There is no Federal police power; therefore, when Congress used the expression "police regulations," it must have done so in the sense in which that term has been defined in the several states. 36 Cyc. 1118. Congress has no power to regulate rates for telephone communication or traffic between points within the state of Pennsylvania. Federalist, No. 45; 8 Cyc. 771, 773, 774; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. ed. 588. The constitutions of the several states, unlike the Federal Constitution, are not grants of power. On the contrary, they are limitations upon the legislative powers of the states. Lewis's Appeal, 67 Pa. 153; Page v. Allen, 58 Pa. 338, 98 Am. Dec. 272; Philadelphia v. Field, 58 Pa. 320; 8 Cyc. 774. The maintenance of the authority of the states over matters purely local is as essential to the preservation of our institutions as is the conservation of the supremacy of the Federal power in all matters intrusted to the nation by the Federal Constitution. In interpreting the Constitution it must never be forgotten that the nation is made up of states to which are intrusted the powers of local government. And to them and to the people the powers not expressly delegated to the national government are reserved. Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 76, 19 L. ed. 101, 104. The power of the states to regulate their purely internal affairs by such laws as seem wise to the local authority is inherent, and has never been surrendered to the general government. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 276, 62 L. ed. 1101, 1107, 3 A.L.R. 649, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 529, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 724. The government of the United States being one of enumerated powers, the nonenumerated powers being reserved to the states, it follows that the police power, not having been delegated to the individual states, and belongs to them by Federal government, was left with the virtue of their general sovereignty, and has no limitations or restrictions except such as are found in the Constitution. 8 Cyc. 865. A state derives its power to regulate corporations engaged in conducting a business affected with a public interest not from a constitutional grant, but from the power inherent in government, and universally known as its police power. Wright v. Hart, 182 N. Y. 330, 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 338, 108 Am. St. Rep. 809, 75 N. E. 404, 3 Ann. Cas. 263; Metropolitan Bd. of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N. Y. 657. Congress, if it possesses any power over intrastate rates, expressly having reserved to itself in the foregoing provision the power to subsequently regulate them, has spoken affirmatively on the proposition that there is no regulatory power over intrastate telephone and telegraph rates. The Postmaster General, in the face of this act of Congress, cannot do that which Congress itself says shall not be done. Missouri P. R. Co. v. Larabee Flour Mills Co. 211 U. S. 612, 621, 52 L. ed. 352, 360, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 214; 1 Roberts, | versally used to include all exercise of Fed. Liabilities of Carr. pp. 68-71. the police power. The commerce clause of the Federal Constitution is confined to interstate commerce, and the power to regulate domestic or intrastate commerce resides in the states. 31 Cyc. 903; 37 Cyc. 1630; Cooley, Const. Lim. p. 837, chap. 16; Com. v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53; People v. Brazee, 183 Mich. 262, L.R.A.1916E, 1146, 149 N. W. 1053; State ex rel. Haeussler v. Greer, 2 Elliott, Railroads, 690; Louisville, 78 Mo. 194; Thorpe v. Rutland & B. N. O. & T. R. Co. v. Mississippi, 133 R. Co. 27 Vt. 140, 62 Am. Dec. 625; U. S. 587, 33 L. ed. 784, 2 Inters. Com. Sonora v. Curtin, 137 Cal. 583, 70 Pac. Rep. 801, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 348; Western 674; Sloan v. Pacific R. Co. 61 Mo. 24, U. Teleg. Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460, 26 | 21 Am. Rep. 397; Roanoke Gas Co. v. L. ed. 1067; Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. Roanoke, 88 Va. 810, 14 S. E. 665. 485, 24 L. ed. 547; Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304, 4 L. ed. 97. The attempt to regulate rates cannot be sustained as a revenue measure. v. United States ex rel. Michels James, 13 Blatchf. 207, Fed. Cas. No. 15,464; Hubbard v. Lowe, 226 Fed. 135. The Postmaster General has no power to regulate and fix rates of telegraph and telephone companies under the war powers of the President conferred by the Constitution. Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 18 L. ed. 281; Edmondson v. Union Bank, 33 Ga. 91; Horn v. Lockhart, 17. Wall. 570, 21 L. ed. 657; Raymond v. Thomas, 91 Ú. S. 712, 716, 23 L. ed. 434, 435, Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115, 14 L. ed. 75; Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 382; Eifort v. Bevins, 1 Bush, 460; Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 62 L. ed. 1101, 3 A.L.R. 649, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 529, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 724. Federal power to regulate rates or to prescribe rates, whatever its limits may be, is a legislative power exclusively. Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co. 212 U. S. 1, 53 L. ed. 371, 378, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 148. Messrs. Hal H. Smith, David H. Crowley, and Clarence D. Wilcox also filed a brief as amici curiæ: The regulation of rates of railroads and public carriers is but the logical result of the application of the principle that the state, through its police power, could regulate public callings. The regulation of rates in the various employments dates back to medieval times. Beale & W. Railroad Rate Regulation, chap. 1. Nor is it proper to argue thus: i. e., rate regulations are not police regulations because the police power cannot be bartered away, and the power to regulate rates is bartered away; therefore, it is not a part of the police power. New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Louisiana Light & H. P. Mfg. Co. 115 U. S. 650, 668, 29 L. ed. 516, 523, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 252. This is not a proceeding against the government. American School v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94, 47 L. ed. 90, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 33; Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115, 137, 14 L. ed. 75, 85; Waite v. Macey, 246 U. S. 606, 62 L. ed. 892, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 395; Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch, 170, 2 L. ed. 243; Caldwell v. Robinson, 59 Fed. 653; Fairfield Floral Co. v. Bradbury, 87 Fed. 415; 12 C. J. p. 894; Magruder v. Belle Fourche Valley Water Users' Asso. 219 Fed. 72, 133 C. C. A. 528; Hemmer v. United States, 123 C. C. A. 194, 204 Fed. 904; Cooper v. Alden, Harr. Ch. (Mich.) 72; United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 27 L. ed. 171, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 240; Cunningham v. Macon & B. R. Co. 109 U. S. 466, 27 L. ed. 999. 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 292, 609; Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 52 L. ed. 714, 13 L.R.A.(N.S.) 932, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 441, We are now dealing, as already point-Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 56 L. ed. 570, 32 14 Ann. Cas. 764; Philadelphia Co. v. ed out, with an authority conferred on Congress and derived from delegated U. S. 525, 58 L. ed. 1440, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. Sup. Ct. Rep. 340; Lane v. Watts, 234 "It should never be held," says this court in Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137, 47 L. ed. 108, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 92, 12 Am. Crim. Rep. 506, "that Congress intends to supersede or by its legislation suspend, the exercise of the police powers of the states, even when it may do so, unless its purpose to effect that result is clearly manifested. powers. New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 139, 9 L. ed. 662; Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 62 L. ed. 1101, 3 A.L.R. 649, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 529, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 724. "Police regulations" is the phrase uni 965. Messrs. H. Findlay French and Ogle Marbury also filed a brief as amici curiæ: Unless Congress, by the use of the |