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he will have a degree of influence over the militia which cannot fail of being highly advantageous. I have intended him more particularly for the command of the militia, and I promise myself it will have a powerful tendency to make them turn out with more cheerfulness, and to inspire them with perseverance to remain in the field, and with fortitude and spirit to do their duty while in it."*

Washington highly approved of a measure suggested by Schuyler, of stationing a body of troops somewhere about the Hampshire Grants (Vermont), so as to be in the rear or on the flank of Burgoyne, should he advance. It would make the latter, he said, very circumspect in his advances, if it did not entirely prevent them. It would keep him in continual anxiety for his rear, and oblige him to leave the posts behind him much stronger than he would otherwise do. He advised that General Lincoln should have the command of the corps thus posted, "as no person could be more proper for it."

He recommended, moreover, that in case the enemy should make any formidable movement in the neighborhood of Fort Schuyler (Stanwix), on the Mohawk River, General Arnold, or some other sensible, spirited officer, should be sent to take charge of that post, keep up the spirits of the inhabitants, and cultivate and improve the favorable disposition of the Indians.

The reader will find in the sequel what a propitious effect all these measures had upon the fortunes of the Northern campaign, and with what admirable foresight Washington calculated all its chances. Due credit must also be given to the sagacious counsels and exccutive energy of Schuyler; who suggested some of the

*Schuyler's Letter Book.



best moves in the campaign, and carried them vigorously into action. Never was Washington more ably and loyally seconded by any of his generals.

But now the attention of the commander-in-chief is called to the seaboard. On the 23d of July, the fleet, so long the object of watchful solicitude, actually put to sea. The force embarked, according to subsequent accounts, consisted of thirty-six British and Hessian battalions, including the light infantry and grena. diers, with a powerful artillery; a New York corps of provincials, or royalists, called the Queen's Rangers, and a regiment of lighthorse; between fifteen and eighteen thousand men in all. The force left with General Sir Henry Clinton for the protection of New York, consisted of seventeen battalions, a regiment of lighthorse, and the remainder of the provincial corps. *

The destination of the fleet was still a matter of conjecture. Just after it had sailed, a young man presented himself at one of General Putnam's outposts. He had been a prisoner in New York, he said, but had received his liberty and a large reward on undertaking to be the bearer of a letter from General Howe to Burgoyne. This letter his feelings of patriotism prompted him to deliver up to General Putnam. The letter was immediately transmitted by the general to Washington. It was in the handwriting of Howe, and bore his signature. In it he informed Burgoyne, that, instead of any designs up the Hudson, he was bound to the east against Boston. "If," said he, "according to my expectations, we may succeed in getting possession of it, I shall, without loss of time, proceed to co-operate with you in the defeat of the rebel army opposed to you. Clinton is sufficiently strong


* Civil War in America, vol. i. p. 250.

to amuse Washington and Putnam. I am now making demonstrations to the southward, which I think will have the full effect in carrying our plan into execution."

Washington at once pronounced the letter a feint. "No stronger proof could be given," said he, " that Howe is not going to the eastward. The letter was evidently intended to fall into our hands. If there were not too great a risk of the dispersion of their fleet, I should think their putting to sea a mere manœuvre to deceive, and the North River still their object. I am persuaded, more than ever, that Philadelphia is the place of desti nation."

He now set out with his army for the Delaware, ordering Sullivan and Stirling with their divisions to cross the Hudson from Peekskill, and proceed towards Philadelphia. Every movement and order showed his doubt and perplexity, and the circumspection with which he had to proceed. On the 30th, he writes from Coryell's Ferry, about thirty miles from Philadelphia, to General Gates, who was in that city: "As we are yet uncertain as to the real destination of the enemy, though the Delaware seems the most probable, I have thought it prudent to halt the army at this place, Howell's Ferry, and Trenton, at least till the fleet actually enters the bay and puts the matter beyond a doubt. From hence we can be on the proper ground to oppose them before they can possibly make their arrangements and dispositions for an attack. That the post in the Highlands may not be left too much exposed, I have ordered General Sullivan's division to halt at Morristown, whence it will march southward if there should be occasion, or northward upon the first advice that the enemy should be throwing any force up the North River. General Howe's in a manner abandoning General Burgoyne, is so un




I can

accountable a matter, that, till I am fully assured it is So,
not help casting my eyes continually behind me.
As I shall pay
no regard to any flying reports of the appearance of the fleet, I
shall expect an account of it from you, the moment you have
ascertained it to your satisfaction."

On the 31st, he was informed that the enemy's fleet of two
hundred and twenty-eight sail, had arrived the day previous at
the Capes of Delaware. He instantly wrote to Putnam to hurry
on two brigades, which had crossed the river, and to let Schuyler
and the commanders in the Eastern States know that they had
nothing to fear from Howe, and might bend all their forces, Con-
tinental and militia, against Burgoyne. In the mean time he
moved his camp to Germantown, about six miles from Phila-
delphia, to be at hand for the defence of that city.

The very next day came word, by express, that the fleet had
again sailed out of the Capes, and apparently shaped its course
eastward. This surprising event gives me the greatest anx-
iety," writes he to Putnam (Aug. 1), " and unless every possible
exertion is made, may be productive of the happiest consequences
to the enemy and the most injurious to us.
The im-
portance of preventing Mr. Howe's getting possession of the
Highlands by a coup de main, is infinite to America; and, in the
present situation of things, every effort that can be thought of
must be used. The probability of his going to the eastward is
exceedingly small, and the ill effects that might attend such a
step inconsiderable, in comparison with those that would inevi
tably attend a successful stroke on the Highlands."

Under this impression Washington sent orders to Sullivan to
hasten back with his division and the two brigades which had
recently left Peekskill and to recross the Hudson to that post as

speedily as possible, intending to forward the rest of the army
with all the expedition in his power. He wrote, also, to General-
George Clinton, to reinforce Putnam with as many of the New
York militia as could be collected. Clinton, be it observed, had
just been installed Governor of the State of New York; the first
person elevated to that office under the Constitution. He still
continued in actual command of the militia of the State, and it
was with great satisfaction that Washington subsequently learnt
he had determined to resume the command of Fort Montgomery
in the Highlands: "There cannot be a more proper man," writes
on every account."


Washington, moreover, requested Putnam to send an express to Governor Trumbull, urging assistance from the militia of his State without a moment's loss of time. "Connecticut cannot be in more danger through any channel than this, and every motive of its own interest and the general good demands its utmost endeavors to give you effectual assistance. Governor Trumbull will, I trust, be sensible of this."

And here we take occasion to observe, that there could be no surer reliance for aid in time of danger than the patriotism of Governor Trumbull; nor were there men more ready to obey a sudden appeal to arms than the yeomanry of Connecticut; however much their hearts might subsequently yearn toward the farms and firesides they had so promptly abandoned. No portion of the Union was more severely tasked, throughout the Revolution, for military services; and Washington avowed, when the great struggle was over, that, "if all the States had done their duty as well as the little State of Connecticut, the war would have been ended long ago."*

* Communicated by Professor B. Silliman.

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