I. The Chain of Events Since Sihanouk's Fall

The first step in understanding the present situation in Cambodia, and its ramifications for the future, is to recognize that there has been a pattern of action and reaction in the chain of events of the past few months. The following chronology, while by no means exhaustive, demonstrates the concurrent and interconnected character of the cross-border operations by South Vietnamese Armed Forces, the movement out of the sanctuaries deeper into Cambodia by North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces, the attitude of the Cambodian Government toward the North Vietnamese and Provisional Revolutionary Governments, the treatment of the ethnic Vietnamese living in Cambodia, and the reactions of Hanoi, Peking, Moscow, Saigon, and Washington.

MARCH

March 81 is a good point at which to begin examining the chain of events. On that day, 10 days before Sihanouk's replacement as Chief of State, demonstrations broke out in several Cambodian border areas in protest against the presence of North Vietnamese troops-demonstrations that, it now seems almost certain, were encouraged, if not organized, by the leaders of the present Cambodian Government. These demonstrations continued through March 10. The following day, the North Vietnamese and Provisional Revolutionary Government Embassies in Phnom Penh were sacked by a group of demonstrators, again organized by those who now head the Cambodian Government. Prince Sihanouk, while still Chief of State, was not in Cambodia at this time. He had left in early January for France. In the Cambodian capital, the affairs of government were being directed by Prime Minister Lon Nol and First Deputy Prime Minister Sirik Matak. On March 12, Lon Nol, in the name of the government, issued an ultimatum demanding that North Vietnamese and Vietcong troops leave Cambodia within 72 hours. At about the same time, Sirik Matak canceled the trade treaty between Cambodia and the Provisional Revolutionary Government.

On March 13, Prince Sihanouk, after stating that he would not receive emissaries Lon Nol and Sirik Matak had proposed sending to see him, left Paris and arrived in Moscow on his way to Peking. It is generally accepted that his purpose in going on to Moscow and Peking, rather than returning immediately to Phnom Penh, was to ask the Soviets and the Chinese to use their influence to persuade the North Vietnamese to make certain concessions with regard to their use of Cambodian territory.

On March 15, Lon Nol's ultimatum expired, its demands unmet. On the same day, the South Vietnamese army (ARVN) provided artillery support for Cambodian forces at Cambodian request. On March 16,

1 All dates given in this report are local dates, 1.e. date at the place where the event occurred.

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there occurred the first and only know formal meeting in Phnom Penh of representatives of the Cambodian, North Vietnamese, and Provisional Revolutionary Governments, a meeting called ostensibly to discuss Cambodian demands for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Cambodia. That day there were further demonstrations in Phnom Penh against the North Vietnamese and Vietcong. The following day, March 17, an ARVN task force penetrated 12 kilometers into Cambodia.

On March 18, Sihanouk was removed as Chief of State by unanimous vote of the Cambodian Parliament. He was informed of his ouster as he was leaving Moscow for Peking. In Saigon, President Thieu was reported by the American press to have said, on learning of Sihanouk's ouster: "If Cambodia and South Vietnam and her allies cooperate along the border, then I believe the Communists would find it impossible to stay." On March 19, a State Department spokesman said, in response to a question, that "the question of recognition does not arise" with regard to the new Cambodian Government.

On March 20, there were Vietnamese air strikes and ranger probes across the Cambodian border. On March 23, Peking released a statement by Sihanouk announcing his intention to form a National Liberation Army. On the same day, in Phnom Penh, the North Vietnamese and Provisional Revolutionary Governments informed the Cambodian Government that they would not attend a scheduled meeting to discuss Cambodian demands for the withdrawal of their forces, a step that marked the end of formal discussions on this subject. On March 25 and 26, there were pro-Sihanouk riots in several provincial towns.

On March 27, an ARVN armored unit, supported by South Vietnamese artillery and air strikes, penetrated Cambodian territory to a distance of 112 kilometers. South Vietnamese military spokesmen in Saigon denied the border crossing, according to press reports, while U.S. officials in Washington were quoted as saying that the raid was made without U.S. knowledge or approval. On the same day, most of the personnel of the North Vietnamese and Provisional Revolutionary Government Embassies in Phnom Penh left by air for Hanoi.

APRIL-MAY

Around April 1, the North Vietnamese and Vietcong began to move against Cambodian border posts, a move subsequently interpreted in Washington and by the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) as designed to secure control of a corridor from the "Fishhook" area to the Gulf of Siam. On April 2, Secretary Rogers appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee in executive session. It was subsequently reported in the press that the Committee had been told that the Administration had "discouraged" South Vietnamese cross-border operations, had cautioned the South Vietnamese in this regard, and had made it clear that the United States considered such operations "inadvisable" for the moment. Three days later, on April 5, two South Vietnamese battalions penetrated 10 miles into Cambodian territory. An American spokesman said that there had been no U.S. support for the operation.

At this point, ethnic antagonisms began to erupt in Cambodia. It should be noted that Cambodia's population of 7 million includes some 400,000 ethnic Vietnamese, most of whom have lived in Cambodia all

of their lives. It is said that the vast majority of these Vietnamesemost observers say about 75 percent, although some Cambodian Government officials, and even some South Vietnamese officials, claim that the percentage is considerably higher-are sympathetic to North Vietnam. On April 19, 89 ethnic Vietnamese were killed in the Cambodian town of Prasaut. Cambodian officials claimed that they had been caught in a "crossfire," but reporters who were there at the time insist that Cambodian troops deliberately fired on the villagers. Beginning the following day, Vietnamese residents of Phnom Penh were subjected to a curfew from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m.

Meanwhile, the South Vietnamese continued their cross-border operations into Cambodia. On April 12, a South Vietnamese task force penetrated Cambodian territory to a distance of up to 8 kilometers and continued to do so for the following 4 days. On April 14, the first major combined ARVN-Cambodian Army operation was reported. At about this time, North Vietnamese troops began to move westward from the Parrot's Beak, a movement confirmed by Secretary Laird on May 14 when he told reporters that in mid-April enemy troops had begun moving "in the other direction for the first time" which, he added, made "the risk to American forces much less."

On April 15, an estimated 1,000 bodies-described as those of ethnic Vietnamese were reported floating in the Mekong. The following day, about 100 ethnic Vietnamese civilians were reportedly shot by Cambodian soldiers at Takeo. On April 17, a Cambodian military spokesman said that the North Vietnamese and Vietcong were in control of three of Cambodia's 17 Provinces and were occupying more than half of five other Provinces. On the same day, North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces took the town of Saang, 20 miles south of Phnom Penh. In Washington, it was announced that a specific request had been received from the Cambodian Government for arms and military equipment. On April 17, the South Vietnamese Foreign Minister issued a statement expressing concern at the treatment of the Vietnamese minority in Cambodia. The statement came as resentment mounted in Vietnam on this question.

On April 20, South Vietnamese armored squadrons and ranger battalions conducted an overnight operation in the "Parrot's Beak" area. The following day, ARVN forces penetrated a base area in Cambodia opposite Chau Duc. On the same day the Cambodian Government disclosed that Lon Nol had appealed, in a personal letter to President Nixon, for U.S. arms and for the assistance of Khmer CIDG forces ethnic Cambodians, native to South Vietnam, who had been serving in Civilian Irregular Defense Group teams with U.S. Special Forces in Vietnam.

On April 20, President Nixon, in announcing future U.S. troop withdrawals from Vietnam, referred to "the enemy's escalation in Laos and Cambodia"; stated that the enemy would be taking "grave risks" if they attempted to use American withdrawals to jeopardize remaining U.S. forces in Vietnam by "increased military action in Vietnam, in Cambodia, or in Laos"; and said that if they were to do so, "I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation."

On April 22, the Administration disclosed in Washington that captured weapons would be furnished to Cambodia. The following day it

was announced in Washington that the first shipment had been delivered in Phnom Penh by the South Vietnamese with U.S. knowledge and approval. On the same day, a "Conference of the Indochinese Peoples" began in southern China. The conference, which lasted 2 days, was attended by Pham Van Dong, Prime Minister of North Vietnam; Nguyen Huu Tho of the Provisional Revolutionary Government; Prince Souphanouvong, President of the Lao Patriotic Front; Prince Sihanouk; and, on the last day, by Chou En Lai, the Chinese Prime Minister.

On April 24, a White House spokesman stated that the North Vietnamese and Vietcong offensive in Cambodia was "a foreign invasion of a neutral country which cannot be considered in any way a pretense of a civil war."

On April 27, Secretary Rogers testified again before the Foreign Relations Committee in executive session. It was later reported in the press that he had said that there had been several South Vietnamese incursions into Cambodia, which had been "fairly successful," and that a Communist take-over in Cambodia would increase the peril to the U.S. policy of withdrawing troops from Vietnam. On the same day, a White House press spokesman was quoted as saying that the United States had "an overriding interest" in Cambodia turning on "how a possible Communist takeover of Cambodia would affect the security of our forces in Vietnam and the Vietnamization program." On April 29, operation "Rock Crusher," a South Vietnamese operation conducted with the help of U.S. advisers and some U.S. tactical air support, air coordination, and logistical support, was launched in the "Parrot's Beak" area.

On April 30 (May 1 in Vietnam), the President announced that U.S. forces, "in cooperation with the armed forces of South Vietnam," would launch attacks during the week "to clean out major enemy sanctuaries on the Cambodian-Vietnam border." He said that "the enemy, in the past 2 weeks, has stepped up his guerrilla actions and he is concentrating his main forces in the sanctuaries where they are building up to launch massive attacks on our forces and those of SouthVietnam." He announced that U.S. and South Vietnamese units would immediately launch a combined operation to "attack the headquarters for the entire Communist military operation in South Vietnam." He stated that these attacks were "not an invasion of Cambodia" because "the areas in which these attacks will be launched are completely occupied and controlled by North Vietnamese forces." And he said that the attacks on the sanctuaries were "indispensable for the continuing success" of the program of withdrawing U.S. forces from Vietnam, were "essential" for keeping U.S. casualties in Vietnam at an absolute minimum and would serve the purpose "of ending the war in Vietnam and winning the just peace we all desire."

On May 5, Sihanouk announced in Peking the formation of a Royal Government of Nation Union. It was recognized by Communist China the same day and by North Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government the following day.

II. The View From Saigon

In the view of many of those whom we met in the course of our trip to the North Vietnamese and Vietcong the fall of Sihanouk posed a threat which was revealed almost immediately by the anti-North Vietnamese demonstrations arranged by the Cambodian Government, the Lon Nol ultimatum and the measures taken against ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia. The North Vietnamese apparently anticipated that these developments might mean that their sanctuaries would no longer be considered inviolate. Indeed, the South Vietnamese began to increase the nature and scale of their operations in Cambodia, in some cases in coordination with Cambodian forces, even before Sihanouk's fall.

Some captured documents, on which we were briefed in Saigon, showed that the North Vietnamese and Vietcong expected the United States and South Vietnamese to move into the sanctuaries in force. Other documents, we learned, supported the conclusion that the enemy expected that the United States would provide indirect support to the Lon Nol government but that there would not be direct American intervention. Still other documents, it was said later in Washington, indicated that enemy forces were massing in the sanctuaries in April for attacks on allied forces in South Vietnam, although we heard nothing about these particular documents in Saigon. There seem to be captured documents to prove almost any point or to support, retrospectively, almost any conclusion.

Regardless of which enemy forces had read which set of their own documents, we were told by U.S. military authorities in Saigon that soon after Sihanouk was deposed the North Vietnamese had gone into defensive positions in the sanctuaries and soon thereafter had begun to disperse further westward into Cambodia. There were various explanations offered for these enemy movements. Some U.S. officials asserted that the enemy was taking advantage of the opportunity presented by the new government in Phnom Penh, which they considered to be unfriendly and toward which they did not have to exercise the same restraint as heretofore, to "thicken" their chain of base areas in Cambodia and to give themselves more room for maneuver. Others were of the view that these redeployments were essentially defensive in nature. Still others apparently regarded these movements, particularly those in late April, as designed to increase pressure on the Lon Nol government in order to force an accommodation or, if they failed in that objective, to bring about its collapse. No U.S. official raised the possibility that the actions of the Lon Nol government and the escalation of ARVN cross-border operations into Cambodia after Sihanouk's fall might have provoked the enemy to move west.

From our conversations in Saigon, it appeared to us that the United States and South Vietnamese military regarded Sihanouk's fall as an "opportunity" to strike at enemy sanctuaries along the border. In fact, many U.S. military officers in Vietnam used this exact word and said