CHAPTER XI. Strength of the Army. Reinforcements. Divisions of the ArmyMarch from Puebla.-Hospitals of Puebla. - Volcano of Popocatapetl.Pass of Rio Frio. - View of Mexico. - Valley of Mexico.-Lakes.Inundations. Topography of the Valley.-Position of the Army on the 13th of August.-Reconnaissance of the Rifles.- El Penon.Mexicalcingo.-Turning of Lake Chalco. March to San Augustine.Skirmish at Buena Vista. Concentration.-Position of the Army on the 18th. We have already said that Scott's army in Puebla, on the 1st day of June, 1847, did not exceed five thousand effectives, that is, capable of marching and fighting. From Vera Cruz to Puebla, the road had been strewed with the sick, or languishing--the convalescent invalids, or the wounded, who had been left in depots or were in the moveable hospitals of the army. Here we should recollect, and consider carefully, the wide and important difference which exists between a mere detachment of an army, or light division moving rapidly through a country for temporary purposes, and a regularly organized army, equipped to remain in the midst of a hostile nation, and, therefore, obliged to supply all its own wants. The former being small, and moving rapidly for a short time, either has no sick and wounded, or depends upon transporting them in wagons or leaving them to the private kindness of the inhabitants of the country. On the other hand, a regularly organized army, subsisting in the heart of an enemy's country, must provide itself with hospitals and depots, either moveable or stationary; and must there leave all the provisions, guards, men, and equipments, which are necessary to maintain these depots, and secure their safety and comfort. If these are stationary in towns, (as they should be,) then garrisons must be left with them. If moveable, from camp to camp, they require a large number of wagons, a numerous body of teamsters, and a yet more numerous body of attendants. In either case, it is not too high an estimate to say, that an invading army, advanced within the territory of a hostile country, requires at least one-fourth of its original number to be enrolled as non-combatants. A part of these will be sick, a part wounded, and a large part engaged as attendants, convoys, or garrisons. If Scott had left Jalapa, then, with eight thousand effective men, he could not have had more than six thousand with which to leave Puebla. But far worse than this was the actual fact. The inhospitable climate of Mexico did not cease its ravages with the lowlands of the coast. The record of disease in the army has never been fully unfolded. In the more unhealthy positions on the Rio Grande, at Vera Cruz, Tampico, Perote,1 and many other places-even at Puebla-disease pursued the troops, and in the space of one year hurried thousands to the grave. Hundreds and thousands of the volunteer regiments also disappeared from the army, from the effects of disease, which caused their discharge, from voluntary absences, and from being cut off in small parties. Nor was this all. Desertions 1 The names were recently published of no less than seven hundred men, who died in a few months at Perote. STRENGTH OF THE ARMY. 223 from the regular army were frequent. No less than seventeen hundred were reported in a little more than a year.1 Such were the causes which rapidly diminished the number of effective troops in the field; but which could not be properly estimated by those who looked only to the muster-rolls at Washington. Three different bodies of reinforcements had left Vera Cruz for Puebla, and reached there in time for the march on Mexico. With these, and the garrison of Jalapa, the army of Scott, in the beginning of August, may be thus enumerated: ARMY ON THE 6th day of AUGUST, 1847. Nor was the want of men the only difficulty with the troops, in preparing for its march. Although the government (Congress) had, in the aggregate, provided amply for the troops; yet the difficulty of transmitting funds to distant posts, in a foreign country, without the Their names were recorded in the Police Gazette. aid of mercantile arrangements, was so great, that the officers of the different departments, and of the line, were frequently much embarrassed for funds. The merchants of Puebla, and of Mexico generally, deal almost altogether with England and France. They were willing to buy drafts on those countries, but not on our own. The consequence was, that the officers of the quartermaster's and commissary's departments, had often to get money discounted at a heavy rate, for the purchase of such supplies, in the country, as were needed at the moment. The following paragraph is from a letter written on the 6th of August, at Puebla : "General Pierce came up to-day with his command, bringing eighty-five thousand dollars in drafts, but rot one cent in money. The disappointment and vexation, both of the general-in-chief, and the quartermaster's and commissary's departments, is great in the extreme, and how they are to get along, is with them an unsolved problem. The paymaster's department is no better off; and the only way officers can get along to provide themselves with the necessaries of life, is to first procure a draft on one of the cities of our Union from the paymaster, and then have it shaved at the rate of twentyfive or thirty per cent. from its face. This is but a faint and imperfect sketch of the financial operations of our army." This was a consequence of one of the errors of the campaign, -not on the part of the army, or its cominander, but in the War Department. This error was, 1 Letter to the St. Louis Republican. in leaving the army too weak to maintain its communications. It is a rule of common sense, not less than of the military art, that at every step made by the army, it should leave such defences and depots in its rear, that there may always be a direct communication with its source of supply at home. When the army of Scott had arrived at Jalapa, the volunteer corps enrolled in May and June, 1846, began to disappear. Their places were not supplied till months afterwards. Thus the army moved on towards Mexico, without being able to keep open its communications. In fact, many places, such as the National Bridge, which it was important to defend, were abandoned. The army was too weak to move forward and leave garrisons behind. The consequence of this condition of things was an inconvenient derangement in the transmission of funds. Specie could only be carried safely with the large trains; while drafts on the government treasuries in the towns of the United States were at a discount in Mexico. Such was the state of the military chest, when it was determined to march from Puebla to Mexico. On the 5th of August a council of war was held, at which the heads of the different divisions and brigades were present; among whom were Major-Generals Worth, Quitman, and Pillow, with Brigadiers Twiggs, Shields, and Cadwallader. General Pierce did not arrive till next day. The general-in-chief (Scott) then laid down distinctly the plan of operations, the routes, and the mode, by which he proposed to reach, attack, and capture the city of Mexico and its defences. Subsequent events proved how ably and clearly these dispositions were made. |