The secretary has stated no reason satisfactory to the com

the people requires such removal. If, in his opinion, it discounts too little, or discounts too much; if it expands or con-mittee for not deferring this important step until the meeting of tracts its circulation too fast or too slow; if its committees are congress. He sets forth no emergency, no sudden occasion, not properly organized; if it claim damages on protested bills, nothing which, in their judgment, made immediate action by which it ought not to elaim; if, in his opinion still, it is guilty of him necessary. a wrongful meddling in politics, or if it do any thing else not consistent with his sense of the public interest, he has a right to visit it with a withdrawal of the public money from its custody.

If this claim of power be admitted, it would seem to the committee to be a fair result, that the secretary has power to withdraw the deposites, for no other reason than that he differs with congress upon its constitutional authority to create any bank, or upon the constitutionality of this particular bank, or upon the utility of continuing it in the exercise of its chartered powers and privileges, till its term shall expire. The committee, therefore, are of opinion that it was not the intention of the legislature to give to the secretary of the treasury a general guardianship over the public interests in all matters connected with the bank; but that his power is a limited one, and is confined to the safety, and the proper management of that portion of the public interest to which it expressly relates; that is to say, to the public moneys in deposite in the bank.

The secretary supposes it to have been his duty to act on the belief that the bank charter would not be renewed; as he refers to recent popular elections in support of this opinion. The committee believe it altogether unusual for reasons of that kind to be assigned for public and official acts. On such subjects, opinions may be very various. Different and opposite conclusions may be drawn from the same facts by different persons. One man may think that a candidate has been elected on account of his opposition to the bank; another may see, only, that he has been chosen, notwithstanding such opposition. One may regard the opposition, or the support, of any measure, by a particular candidate, as having been, itself, a promoting cause of the success of his election; another may esteem it as a formidable objection, overcome, however, by more powerful reasons; and others, again, may be of opinion that it produced little or no effect on the one side or the other. But if inferences, less uncertain, could be drawn from such occurrences, the committee still think, that for a public officer to presume what law the legislature will or will not pass, respecting matters of finance, from But the extent of the secretary's discretion, as asserted by the election of a particular person to be chief magistrate, imhimself, reaches even farther than the wide range which the plies a consequence from such election which the constitutional committee has here described. It is not confined to the pro-independence and dignity of the legislature do not allow to be tection of all the various interests which the government and admitted. the country have in the bank, or to a supervision and control over all the conduct of the bank, but it embraces all branches of the public interest, and touches every thing which in any way respects the good of the people. He supposes himself rightfully to possess the power of removing the deposites, whenever any causes, springing up in part of the whole wide field of the general interest, may appear to him to call for such removal. Notwithstanding he may suppose all the great interests confided to the bank to be perfectly safe; notwithstanding he may have no occasion to complain of any part of its conduct; notwithstanding, even, it may so have deineaned itself as to have become the object of his favor and regard; yet, if his coustruction be admitted, he may remove the deposites simply because he may be of opinion that he might place them, with a prospect of still greater advantage, in other hands. If he be of opinion that the commerce of the country, or its manufactures, would be benefitted by withdrawing the public money from one bank and placing it in many, that would be an exercise of authority entirely within the limits which he prescribes to himself. It would be a case in which he would only follow his own sense of what the general interest and convenience of the people re-shall continue till March, 1836. Where does the secretary find quired. He might think, too, that by withdrawing all the public treasure from the bank of the United States, and placing it in the hands of twenty or thirty state banks, to remain there during his pleasure, and to be drawn thence, again at his will, he might be enabled effectually to advance certain other objects) which, whatever others might think of them, he might consider to be essential to the good of the people. All this, if he be right, is within his just authority. A power necessarily running to this extent, is a power, in the opinion of the committee, which can never be admitted.

Having thus expressed an opinion upon the general extent of the power claimed by the secretary, the committee proceed to consider the reasons which he has reported to congress as the particular grounds on which the power has been exercised in the present case.

But if for this, or other reasons, the secretary had persuaded himself that the charter of the bank would not be renewed, still, it certainly did not follow that the deposites ought to be removed before congress had decided on the hands into which they should be transferred, and had made suitable regulation respecting their future custody. If there were good ground for thinking that congress would not recharter the bank, for that very reason there was equally good ground for supposing that it would make proper and seasonable provision for the keeping of the public moneys elsewhere. How could the secretary doubt that congress would omit to do that which he avers to be one of its appropriate duties? The question is, not what measures congress might be expected to adopt-whether the rechartering of the bank, or what other measures; but whether it ought not to have been presumed that it would adopt some measure, and that a seasonable and proper one, according to its power and its duties; and whether, therefore, this anticipation of the action of congress, on the eve of its session, is to be justified. The bank charter declares that the deposites of the public money shall be made in the bank and its offices and that the bank his power to decide that the deposites shall be so made but for seventeen years from the date of the charter, instead of twenty? Hf he may thus withdraw the deposites two or three years before the expiration of the charter, what should restrain him from exercising the same authority five years before its expiration, or ten years? A plain and cogent necessity, the existence of a case which admits of no reasonable doubt, and which is too urgent for delay till congress can provide for it, can alone justify an interference with the public moneys, lodged in the bank by law for the double purpose of sate keeping, and fulfilment of solemn contract.

But supposing it not reasonable for the secretary to have expected the interposition of congress, and admitting that he might consider the withdrawing of the deposites as an act which was to be done, at some time, by himself, how can it, nevertheless, be argued, that so early and so sudden a withdrawal was necessary? The cominittee can perceive no possible reason for this, in any state of facts made known to them.

The first reason assigned by the secretary, is the near approach of the period when the bank charter will expire. That period is the 4th of March, 1836, more than two years distant; Hearly two years and a half at the time of the removal. Three sessions of congress are, in the mean time, to be holden, and inasmuch as the secretary himself says that "the power over the place of the deposites for the public money would seem properly to belong to the legislative department of government," the committee think it might reasonably have been expected by him that congress would not fail to make, in season, suitable regulations on a subject thus admitted to be within the just ex-sible disturbance in the business of the community. Former ercise of its authority, and properly one of its duties.

The withdrawal of the money, left on deposite, from a bank whose charter is about to expire, is naturally one of the things longest postponed. It is as safe the last day of the existence of the bank, in common cases, as at any previous period. The bank expects the recall of its deposites, near the period of its expiration, and prepares itself accordingly. The operation, if made gradually, produces, when thus conducted, the least posexperience would seem to have held out a salutary light for the guidance of the secretary in this part of his official duty.

Why, then, should he not have waited till congress had seen fit to act upon the subject, or had manifested a disposition not At the time of the expiration of the charter of the former to act? The matter of the deposites had been before congress bank, Mr. Gallatin was secretary of the treasury, and the public last session, and congress had then thought no provision to be, deposites were in the bank. The charter of the bank was to as yet, necessary. Its undoubted sense was, that the public end on the 4th of March, 1811, and it does not appear that Mr. moneys should remain where they were. This was manifested Gallatin thought it necessary to make any provision whatever by proofs too clear to be questioned. Another session was fast for removing any part of the deposites, except by drawing on approaching; and was not the whole subject left where con- them for the common uses of government, until late in the gress had chosen to leave it at the end of its last session, to very month preceding the expiration of the charter. A large await the free-exercise of its legislative power at this session? amount of those deposites remained, indeed, in the vaults of It might have been fit for the executive to call the attention of the bank after the charter had expired, and until they were congress, at this time, to the necessity of some legal provisions wanted, in the general operations of the treasury. And why respecting the future custody of the public moneys; and it should it be otherwise? Why should that be done suddenly would, doubtless, have been proper for congress, without such now, which the secretary thinks could not be done suddenly call, to take up and consider the subject at its own suggestion; hereafter without great inconvenience? Is it not the just inbut the committee see no reason whatever, in the approaching terference, from his own argument, that the thing should not expiration of the charter, for a change so sudden, and producing have been done suddenly at all. As to the idea that the credit such important effects, made so long before that expiration, at of the paper of the bank will be depreciated near the time of a time when congress had recently had the subject before it. the expiration of its charter, or that it would be inconvenient and when, too, it was again about to assemble, and would na- for it, at that time, to be called on for the deposites, the comturally have reasonable and full opportunity to adopt any ne-mittee are utterly at a loss to see the slightest foundation for cessary legislative provisions. such an opinion. Experience is against it; and all reason, as

the committee think, is against it also. There is nothing to ren-crets to be kept by this committee. It is not easy to see what der it in any degree doubtful that the bills of the bank will be foundation there can be for this opinion. All those discounts in as good credit the last day of its charter, and even after that are matter of record. They appear every day in the books of time, if any shall be outstanding, as they are now, and there the bank. Every director, on or off the committee, sees them, is as little to render it doubtful that then, as now, the bank or may see them at pleasure. There is no secrecy, nor any would be competent to answer all demands upon it. In the motive for secrecy, so far as this committee can perceive. Very opinion of the committee, the withdrawal of the fund was both proper causes may have existed, for aught that can be known unnecessarily early, and unnecessarily sudden. It might have by the senate, for the omission of these particular directors from been made gradual; it might have been deferred; and it might this particular committee. Their services might have been have been, and ought to have been, as the committee think, not deemed more useful in other committees; or however respectaventured upon at all, until the attention of congress itself had ble in general character, or however useful in other parts of the been called to the subject. The committee therefore entirely direction, they may have been esteemed not so well acquainted dissent from this first reason, reported by the secretary. They as others with the business of foreign or domestic exchange. see nothing which proves to them the existence of the slightest And even if there were, or are, other causes for the omission, occasion for taking this important step, at the moment it was such as tend less to prove the existence of that harmony and taken. So far as it depends on this reason, the committee think mutual respect which it is so desirable should prevail in such a the removal was made without necessity, without caution or board, these causes cannot furnish any just ground for assertpreparation, with a suddenuess naturally producing mischieving, either that the business of exchange was illegally conductous consequences; and in unjustifiable anticipation of the le-ed, or that the constitution of the committee was proof of the gislation of congress. existence of any motive not fit to be avowed.

But the secretary thinks there are other reasons for the removal, growing out of the manner in which the affairs of the bank have been managed, and its money applied, which would have made it his duty to withdraw the deposites at any period of the charter.

Of these reasons, thus arising from the alleged misconduct of the bank, the first is, that many important money transactors. Of these, twenty are to be chosen by the individual stocktions of the bank are placed under the control of a committee of exchange, of which committee, no one of the public directors, as they are called, is allowed to be a member, instead of being transacted by a board of seven directors. This charge consists of two parts; first, that the discounts of bills are made by a committee, and not by a quorum of the board; second, that the public directors are not allowed to be of this committee.

But the secretary entertains an opinion respecting the cbaracter and duties of the directors appointed by the president and senate, in which the committee do not concur. He denominates them "public directors," "officers of the government," &c. By the charter of the bank there are to be twenty-five direcholders, and tive appointed by the president, with the advice and consent of the senate. As the government owned one fifth of the stock of the bank, it was judged expedient to place in the hands of the president and senate the appointment of one-fifth of all the directors. But they are not called public directors, nor officers of the government, nor public agents; nor are they entitled, so far as the committee can perceive, to either of these appellations, any more than the other directors. The whole First. It is not alleged that, in the discounts of bills by this twenty five directors are joint managers of a joint fund, each committee, any indiscretion has been committed, or any loss possessing precisely the same powers, and charged with the incurred; or that, in consequence thereof, any facility to the same duties as every other. They derive their appointments, mercantile community has been withheld, or any duty of the it is true, from different origins, but, when appointed, their aubank to the government violated. The objection is, simply, thority is the same. There is not one word in the charter intithat bills are discounted by a committee. Supposing this to be mating, in the remotest manner, that the five directors appointan irregularity, or illegality, in the proceedings of the board, ed by the president and senate have any particular duty, or are how is it to be corrected by withdrawing the deposites? What the objects of any peculiar trust. The charter calls them not connexion is there between the two things? It is not pretend- government directors, not public directors, but simply the died that this mode of discounting bills endangered the deposites; rectors appointed by the president and senate. They are placed it is not pretended that it made the bank either less able, or less in the direction to consult with the other directors for the comwilling, to perform every one of its duties to government, mon good of the bank, and to act with these others, and vote How should the withdrawal of the deposites then be suggested with them on all questions. They are, what the law calls them, by the discovery of such an irregularity, real or supposed? The directors of the bank, not agents of the government. They are committee are not able to perceive the least propriety in ap joint trustees with others in a joint interest. If any thing illeplying the power of removal to a proceeding of this kind, even gal or improper takes place in the board, they are bound to reif it were admitted to be irregular or illegal. But is the practice sist it by the duty which they owe the individual stockholders, illegal? It is believed to be not at all unusual. It is believed to as much as by the duty they owe the government; because they be quite common, in banks of large business, for bills of ex-are agents of the individual stockholders, and have the same change, which are presented every day, and almost every hour authority to bind them by their acts as to bind the government; in the day, to be discounted either by a committee of the direc- and, in like manner, it is the duty of those directors who are tors, or by the president, or even other officers, acting under appointed by the individual stockholders, to give notice, as well such general orders and instructions as the directors, at their to government as to the stockholders, if any thing illegal take stated meetings prescribe. A large board of directors cannot place, or be threatened. All those directors act and vote togeassemble every day, perhaps not oftener than twice a week. ther on the smallest as well as on the highest occasions; and, If bills of exchange could only be discounted at these periodical by their joint votes, bind the corporation, and bind both the gomeetings, the business of exchange could not go on with the vernment and individual stockholders to the extent of their repromptitude and depatch so important to commercial men in spective interests in the corporation.

such transactions.

The committee suppose the truth of these remarks will be at once admitted by all who have knowledge of business of this kind.

If the directors appointed by the president and senate had been excluded by the charter from any part of the power exercised by the others; if it had been forbidden them to interfere, to the same extent, and with the same effect, as the rest in the common business of the bank, there might be some reason for supposing that an uncommon character-a character not vo much of action as of supervision and inspection, was intended to be conferred on them. But they do interfere, and justly, in all transactions of the bank. They do vote and act on all subcommon character of directors, and enjoying all its powers to the fullest extent, the committee know no form of argument by which an uncommon and extraordinary character is to be raised by construction, and superadded to the common character of directors which thus already belongs to them.

The general management and control, the authority of exa mining and supervising, of contracting or enlarging the amount of daily discounts, according to the state of the bank, and of giving every other order and direction on the subject, still remains with the directors, and is constantly exercised by them. They still manage the affairs of the bank, in the language of thejects like the other directors. Being, then, possessed of this charter, although they may depute to a committee the authority of inquiring and deciding upon the credit of persons whose names are on bills of exchange offered for discount, and on the rate of exchange, current at the day. The legal question would be, whether the directors, by rule or by law, may not authorise a small number of their own board to discount bills. The bank has been advised that it might rightfully do this; and if it be not clear that this opinion is right, it is certainly far from clear that it is wrong; and in this state of the question, the general practice of other banks, under similar provisions in their charters, may well relieve the directors from the imputation of intention al mismanagement.

If, in all this, the bank has violated its charter, what other banks of extensive business have not done the same thing? But the other subject of complaint, and that which seems to be regarded as the more offensive part of this regulation, is, that the public directors, as they are called, were not allowed to be on this committee.

It may be observed, in the first place, that if the discounting of bills of exchange by a committee, instead of the whole board of directors, be illegal, it would hardly be rendered legal hy placing any or all of these public directors on the committee as members. But the secretary seems to suppose that there was some particular object in this exclusion of these directors, as if there had been something wrong to be done, and therefore se

By granting the charter, and by accepting it, the government on the one hand, and the individual stockholders on the other, have agreed, that of the directors, as joint agents of all parties, the stockholders shall appoint twenty, and the government five. The interest of all parties is confided to this joint agency: and any distinction in their powers, as arising from their different modes of appointment, is, in the judgment of the committee, not to be sustained. They regard such distinction as entirely inconsistent with the nature of the agency created, and as deriving not the least countenance from any thing contained in the law.

The committee, nevertheless, to avoid misapprehension, wish to repeat, that it is undoubtedly the duty of the directors appointed by the president, and of all other directors, to give notice, both to government and the stockholders, of any violation of the charter committed or threatened.

The secretary of the treasury has thought proper to observe that the measures of the committee of exchange are, as it ap pears, designedly, and by system, so arranged as to conceal from the officers of the government transactions in which the publie

are deeply involved. This, it must be admitted, is a very se- ought to have acted, as the agent of government, or that it was rious charge. It imputes a corrupt motive. The committee its duty to take up the bill on account of government, then the have sought for the foundation, either in evidence or argument, damages will not be awarded to it. And in the worst aspect of on which this charge rests. They have found neither. They this case, how can its conduct, in this respect, be any possible find only the charge, in the first place; and then they find the reason to justify the removal of the deposites? What connexcharge immediately stated as a fact, and relied on as the basis ion has this occurrence with the safe keeping of the public of other charges. treasures, or with the remitting them from place to place, to The second reason specially reported by the secretary as aris-meet the convenience of government, according to the duty of ing from the conduct of the bank, respects the bill of exchange the bank under the charter? The bank thinks itself entitled to drawn by the secretary of the treasury on the government of damages on a protested bill purchased and held by itself, and France, and purchased by the bank. drawn by government. The secretary of the treasury thinks The general facts connected with this case, are these: otherwise. If there be no reason to doubt the sincerity of the By the late treaty of indemnity between the United States secretary's conviction, there is as little to doubt the sincerity of and France, it was stipulated that the French government should that entertained by the bank; and it is quite inconceivable to pay to that of the United States twenty-five millions of francs, the cozamittee that the pendency of such a difference of opinion, to be distributed among those American citizens who had claims on such a question, should furnish any reason whatever for against France for the unlawful seizure, capture and condem-withdrawing the deposites, unless it be at once admitted that nation of their vessels and property; the whole sum to be paid the secretary holds the power of removal as a perfectly arbitrain annual instalments of four millions one hundred and sixty-ry power, and may exercise it, by way of punishment, whensix thousand six hundred and sixty-six francs each, into the ever, in any particular, the conduct or the opinions of the bank hands of such persons as shall be authorised by the government do not conform to his pleasure. of the United States to receive it-the first instalment to be paid at the expiration of one year next following the exchange of the ratification.

The secretary does not argue this matter. He offers no reason in opposition to the legal right of the bank to the damages claimed. Indeed, he hardly denies the right. He commences On the expiration of the year, the secretary drew a bill of ex- his observations on the subject by saying that the ruling princichange, signed by himself as secretary, on the French govern-ple of the bank is its own interest; and closes them with anoment for the amount of this instalment, and sold it to the bank, ther declaration, that, as fiscal agent of the public, it availed like any other bill of exchange, and received the proceeds by itself of the disappointment of its principal for the purpose of credit of the amount to the account of the treasurer in the bank. enlarging its own profits. On presentment of this bill at the French treasury payment was refused; the bill was accordingly duly protested, and it was taken up by a third person for account of the bank. The damages accruing on this bill, according to law and to constant usage in such cases, are one hundred and fifty-eight thousand dollars.

If this bill had been transferred by the bank, as probably it was, the bank itself would have been answerable for damages even at a higher rate, if a third person had not taken up the bill for the honor of the bank.

On receiving information of the protest of the bill, the officers of the bank, as was their duty, gave immediate notice to the treasury department, and accompanied that notice with the information, always made in such cases, that the drawers of the bill would be held answerable for the damages. Such is the substance of the facts in this case.

The bank, it would appear, was willing to collect the bill on account of government, and to credit the treasury with the proceeds when received; a course of proceeding which had this to recommend it, that the money to be received on the bill was to be received by the government simply in trust for claimants under the French treaty, and was not ultimately destined to the ordinary uses of the treasury. On the contrary, indeed, before the dishonor of the bill was known, it had been made, already, the legal duty of the secretary to place the fund, so soon as received, at interest for the benefit of the claimants.

Assertions like these, however else they may be disposed of, cannot be made subjects of argument.

The last charge preferred against the bank, is, that it has used its means with a view to obtain political power, and thereby secure the renewal of its charter.

The very statement of such a charge, as a reason for removing the deposites, is calculated to excite distrust in the wisdom and propriety of that measure; because the charge, too general to be proved, is too general, also, to be disproved; and since it must always rest mainly on mere opinion, it might be made at any time, by any secretary, against any bank. It would be, therefore, always a convenient cloak under which to disguise the true motives of official conduct.

If proof be made out that the funds of the bank have been applied to illegal objects, the proper mode of redress and punishment should have been adopted; but what has this to do with the deposites? As in the case of the French bill, the secretary cannot justify the removal of the deposites on any such ground as this, unless it be conceded that he may use the power of removal as a punishment for any offence, of any kind, which the bank, in his opinion, may have committed. The committee have already expressed the opinion that no such latitude of power belongs to him; and the assertion of such a power, for such a cause as is now under consideration, shows that the power ought never to belong to any secretary; because the offence, on account of which it is here proposed to be exercised, is a political offence, incapable of definition, depending merely on the secretary's opinion, and necessarily drawing into its consideration all the exciting controverted topics of the day. The bank, it is said, "has sought to obtain political power." What is the definition of such an offence as this? What acts constitute it? How is it to be tried? Who is to be the judge? What punishment shall follow conviction? All must see that charges of this nature are but loose and vague accusations, which may be made at any time, and can never be either prov ed or disproved; and to admit them as sufficient grounds to justify the removal of the deposites, would be to concede to the secretary the possession of a power purely arbitrary. The main fact relied on for this cause of removal, shows how extremely unsafe all proceedings on any such reasons must be. That main fact is, that between December, 1830, and December, 1831, the bank extended its loans twenty millions of dollars; and it is further alleged that, as if to leave no doubt of the motive of this extraordinary conduct, it continued to add rapidly to its loans, until in May, 1832, while its petition for renewal was pending, those loans amounted to seventy millions. And the secretary declares that this extraordinary increase of loans made in so short a space of time, and on the eve of a contested election in which the bank took an open and direct interest, demonstrates that it was using its money to obtain a hold upon the people of the country, to induce them, by the apprehension of ruin, to vote against the candidate whom it desired to defeat.

But it was thought best to sell the bill, and to realize at once its amount into the treasury; and the bill was sold to the bank in preference to others offering to purchase, for no reason, it is to be presumed, except that the terms of the bank were more satisfactory. The bill was thus purchased by the bank, and its proceeds credited to the treasury. This was a mere transaction of the purchase and sale of a bill of exchange. There was no trust confided to the bank, and no fiscal agency in the whole matter. Indeed the agency of the bank had been declined, the secretary preferring to deal with it not as an agent, but as a purchaser, proposing to it not to collect the bill, but to buy it. On being remitted to Europe, and presented for payment, the bill was protested. By the universal commercial law, the government, on the occurrence of this protest, became amenable to the bank for the amount of the bill, with damages. These damages may be ultimately claimed, with justice, from the French government, if the bill was drawn upon sufficient grounds, and on proper authority; in other words, if the obligation of the French government was such that it was bound to accept and pay the bill; but unless there be something in the case to vary the general rule, which the committee do not perceive, these damages were part of the debt which had become due to the bank, as much as the principal sum of the bill. If this be so, how could the directors relinquish this part of the debt any more than the other? They are agents for the corporation; they act as trustees, and have no authority, without consideration, to release, either to the government or to indivi-This is strong assertion, but so far as the committee perceive, duals, debts due, or properly belonging to the corporation.

it is assertion merely. It is but the secretary's own inference from facts, from which very facts his predecessors in office have drawn no such conclusions.

It has been suggested that the bank should have taken up this bill, when protested, on government account. Two answers may be given to this suggestion: the first is, that the bill had This great extension of the loans, be it remembered, took been taken up by a correspondent abroad for account of the place in 1831. Why was it not then complained of? How bank, before it was known in the United States that it had been should it have escaped the vigilance of the secretary of that protested. The second is, that it would have been unlawful for day, at the time it took place? And, if it did not escape his vithe bank to have advanced such amount to the government, or gilance, why did he not remove the deposites? So, also, as to on account of government, for the purpose of taking up this bill, the amount of loans in May, 1832. That amount was perfectly or for any other purpose, without an act of congress. The ex-well known at the time, and if it proved any offence, why was press words of the charter forbid it.

But, as a reason for removing the deposites, it appears to the committee quite immaterial whether the bank be right or wrong in claiming these damages. If wrong, it will not recover them. It is not judge of its own rights; and if the appropriate tribunals shall decide that the bank was acting on this occasion, or

not the punishment inflicted then? How should all other secretaries have slept over this great mischief?

It might further be well asked, what evidence is there of the existence of any such motive as is imputed to the bank, in this extension of its loans? There is no evidence, but the mere fact itself of the extension, and it cannot be denied that other and

causes of derangement. It has created unfriendly feelings, and it has duninished confidence. This change of the deposites is made on the strength of charges against the bank of a very grave and aggravated nature; such as, it true, would most seriously affect its credit for solvency and stability. It is proclaimed to the whole world as having converted itself into a political partisan, misapplied its funds, neglected its highest duties, and entered on a career of electioneering against the government of the country.

very different reasons for the extension may have existed; so that the charge is proved no otherwise than by inferring a bad motive, from an act lawful in itself, and for which good reasons may have existed. Nor is it either acknowledged, nor, so far as the committee know, proved that the bank took an open and direct interest, as a corporation, in the election referred to. The bank certainly was much interested in certain accusations which had been brought against it, and which became subjects of public discussion during the pendency of that election. It had been charged These serious charges necessarily put the bank on its defence, with great misconduct and gross violation of its charter. These and the extraordinary spectacle is exhibited of a warfare by the accusations must undoubtedly have called on the directors for national government on the national bank, notwithstanding answer. If made before congress, they were to answer before that the government is itself a great proprietor in the bank, and -congress; if made judicially, they were to answer in the courts; notwithstanding that the notes of the bank are the currency in if made in an official and formal manner, and in that manner which the revenues of the country are by law receivable. submitted to the judgment of the country, the directors were The true and natural relation between the government and bound to meet them before that country by every fair use of the bank is altogether reversed. Instead of enjoying the confact and argument, not only for the purpose of defending them-fidence of the government, it is obliged to sustain its most seselves as directors, but for the higher purpose of maintaining rious official assaults, and to maintain itself against its denunthe credit of the bank, and protecting the property entrusted to ciations. The banks selected by government as its agents are their care. If in thus defending the bank before the communi- themselves thrown, perhaps unwillingly, into an attitude of ty, the directors carried their measures beyond this fair object of jealousy and suspicion with the bank of the United States. defence, or if they resorted to dishonorable or indecorous modes They become cautious and fearful, therefore, in all their proof discussion; if they sought rather to inflame than to reason; if ceedings; and thus those who should co-operate to relieve the they substituted personal erimination for argument; if, even, public pressure, are considering mainly their own safety. Fearthey met invective and violence with corresponding invective ful of each other, and fearful of the government, they see the and violence; they followed bad examples, and are not to be distress continue, with no power of beneficial interposition. justified. But on their right to defend themselves before the It may be asked, why are not these deposite banks able to public against grave charges brought against them, and urged maintain as large a circulation on the nine millions of deposites before the public, the committee entertain no doubt; and they as the bank of the United States? And will they not be thus are equally clear in opinion that the secretary of the treasury is able when the present panic shall have subsided? The comnot constituted the judge of the mode of exercising this right, mittee think both these questions easily answered, and cannot justly remove the deposites merely because the conduct of the bank, in this particular, has not happened to

conform to his wishes.

The committee, therefore, consider this last reason of the secretary equally insufficient with the rest; and they regard it as the most objectionable of all, in its principle, inasmuch as it proceeds on grounds which, if admitted, would leave a very high official duty to be exercised from considerations connected with the political feelings and party contests of every day, with no guide but the individual opinion of the officer who is to perform the act; an opinion which, it is possible, may itself be no less tinctured with political motive and feeling than the couduct which it would reprehend.

If an unlimited power be conceded to the secretary to inflict penalties on the bank for supposed political motives, in acts legal in themselves, where is the security that the judge may not be found acting under the same impulses which he imputes to the party accused?

The committee entertain no doubt that the immediate cause of the existing public distress is to be found in the removal of the public deposites, and in the manner in which that removal has been made. No other adequate cause has been suggested: and those who justify the removal do not so much deny this to have been the cause, as insist that it was not necessary that any such effect should have followed from it. In other words, they argue that, notwithstanding the removal, the bank still possessed the power, if it had chosen to exercise it, of warding off the blow which has fallen on the country, or at least of mitigating its severity.

The bank of the United States has a credit more general, it may be said, more universal, than any state bank does possess. The credit of the bank of the United States is equally solid, its bills and notes received with equal confidence, for the purpose of circulation and remittance, in every quarter of the country. No paper circulation, so far as the committee know, which ever appeared in the world, has approached nearer to the value and uniformity of a specie currency than the notes and bills of the bank of the United States. To the state banks these notes and bills have performed the office of specie. All the state banks have discounted, upon the possession of them, with the same freedom and boldness as they would have done on an equal amount of the precious metals. The curtailment of their circulation, therefore, is not merely a withdrawing of the amount curtailed from the general mass of circulation-it is removing, rather, to the amount curtailed, the basis of the general circulation; and although the actual amount of notes and bills has not been recently greatly diminished, there is reason to suppose that the amount held by state banks has been greatly diminished. The removal of the deposites has operated directly on the amount of the circulating medium, at a moment when that amount could not bear any considerable reduction, suddenly made, without producing sensible effect. It has diminished prices, and in some instances, it has had this effect to a very material degree. It has operated on the internal exchange, and has, most manifestly, been attended with very serious and heavy inconveniences in that important branch of the national interest. More than all, it has acted on opinion; it has disturbed the general confidence, it has weakened the public faith in the soundness of the currency, and it has alarmed men for the secredit of the country in Europe. Perhaps it is not easy to anticipate those effects; but if causes which operate here should be found to have been efficient there also, a still greater degree of pressure and distress than has yet been felt may be expected. The committee, therefore, cannot but regard the removal of the deposites, on the whole, as a measure highly inexpedient, and altogether unjustifiable. The public moneys were safe in the bank. This is admitted. All the duties of the bank connected with these public moneys were faithfully discharged. This, too, is admitted. The subject had been recently before the house of representatives, and that house had made its opinion against the removal known by a very unequivocal vote. Another session of congress was close at hand, when the whole matter would again come before it. Under these circumstances, to make the removal, with the certainty of creating so much alarm, and of producing so much positive evil and suffering, such derangement of the currency, such pressure and distress in all the branches of the business of private life, is an act which the committee think the senate is called on to disprove. The reasons which have thus been stated apply to the whole proceedings of the secretary, relating to the public deposites, and make it unnecessary to consider whether there be any difference between his power over moneys already in the bank, and his power to suspend future deposites. The committee forbear, also, to consider the propriety of the measures adopted by the secretary for the safe keeping of the public money since their withdrawal from the bank. They forbear, too, from entering into any discussion, at present, of the course of legislation proper to be adopted by congress under the existing state of things. In this report, they have confined their consideration to the removal of the deposites, the reasons assigned for it, and its immediate consequences; and or these points they have formed the opinions which have now been expressed.

Nothing could have been .. ally expected but that the bank, deprived of the deposites, and denounced by the execu-curity of property. As yet, we hardly know its effects on the tive government, would feel itself called on to take just care of its own interest and its own credit. Of the means necessary to the attainment of these ends, the directors alone were judges, and the committee have no evidence before them to show that they have not exercised their judgment fairly, and with a real solicitude to accommodate the commercial community, in the altered state of things, as far as has been practicable consistently with the security of the institution which it is equally their duty to the public, and the stockholders to maintain. They are certainly under every obligation of duty, in the present distressed state of the country, to do every thing for the public relief which is consistent with the safety of the bank, and with those considerations which the approaching expiration of its charter makes it important for the directors to regard.

The removal itself, and the manner of effecting it, are causes entirely sufficient, in the judgment of the committee, to produce all the consequences which the country has experienced, and is experiencing, and these consequences, they think, are to be referred to those causes as their just origin. How could any other result have been expected? The amount of the deposites was mine millions of dollars. On this amount in deposite there was sustained, no doubt, a discount of far greater magnitude. The withdrawal of this sum of nine millions from the bank necessarily compelled it to diminish its discounts to the full extent of all that part which may be supposed to have been sustained by it. It is to be remembered, too, that this was done at a moment when business of every kind was pressed with great activity, and all the means of the country fully employed."

The withdrawing of so large an amount at such a time, from bends actually holding and using it, could not but produce derangement and pressure, even if it had been immediately placed In other banks, and if no unfriendly feeling, and no want of confidence, had attended the transaction. But it is quite obvious that the operation to which the secretary has resorted has been attended with both these additional and powerful

They recommend to the senate the adoption of the resolution which has been referred to them.

FOURTH SERIES. No. 26—VOL. IX.] BALTIMORE, FEB. 22, 1834.

[VOL. XLV. WHOLE NO. 1,170

THE PAST THE PRESENT FOR THE FUTURE.

EDITED, PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY H. NILES, AT $5 PER ANNUM, PAYABLE IN ADVANCE.

So heavy is the pressure of current matter, that, with which, however, casts a burthen on another class of per our limited means, we must abstain from such full notices sons whose prosperity, if not subsistence, depends upon of just passed or passing events as that we have vainly at- such enterprizes. The reports of the committees of metempted, for some time past. Our closely printed and chanics and other working men of New York and Philacapacious pages will not take in nearly the whole-and delphia, who have visited Washington, shew that very if they could, the greater expedition of the daily press few contracts have yet been entered into for the erection would render the contents of this paper into a mere re- of new buildings, in the ensuing season, though the precord, in the estimation of a very large proportion of our sent is the time when such contracts are not only genefriends, and much to our own injury; for variety is desir-rally formed, but in their actual operation. It is thus also ed, and something new expected by every one. For many in Baltimore. These are mere examples of what is going years, we had room enough for all the leading purposes on, in all the departments of business; and, though much of this publication-but the times have changed, and we less money to carry on heavy operations is needed, bemust change with them. We shall endeavor to keep up cause they are not now freshly attempted, the quantity of a sufficient history of the events of every week, but give the circulating medium, in use, seems insufficient even more attention to documents proper, and statistics, and for the ordinary transactions between man and man; and now and then make space for "original" essays and arti- thousands of persons, small dealers and mechanics, who, cles, and pieces on miscellaneous subjects, which have twelve months ago, always had the means of accommobeen latterly neglected. dating their neighbors, are hard pressed to pay their own debts, though they have reduced their expenses or dismissed their workmen to the lowest possible amount, consistent with a preservation of their run of business, and the supply of their regular customers.

The affairs of the bank, and of the various points made for or against it, have taken up a great many pages-subsequent proceedings, or facts as they are developed, shall not be disregarded; but we think it useless (for us) to pursue these subjects to the extent heretofore allowed them, and shall restrict the articles inserted to a reasonable length-not, however, permitting important things to pass by unobserved, especially those of a documentary character. There are several other matters that we wish to present to our readers; and which, from the very nature of this work, we think ought rather to be done. This remark does not include in it any thing like a determination to retire from the course latterly pursued; we mean to say only that it shall be more closely restrained:-and more time and room given up to please, in the variety of our matter: for which a great abundance of materials is at immediate command. We intimated this necessity some weeks ago. It was hoped that we might work through it but that hope is now given up in despair. Every day adds to the press of papers before us and there is no present prospect that an accumulation of them will speedily cease.

We have sketched a curious, and, as some will think it, a bold article on the circulation of values, and which places what we have called the PRINCIPLE of aggregaTION in a new and striking light, and shews the effect of expansions or contractions of the currency in a way that cannot be mistaken; as well as how highly important it is that the currency should be not only sound, but also sufficient in quantity. We intend to publish this article in

our next.

We have some more items of foreign news, including the speech of the king of France on opening the chambers, which are inserted.

It will be seen that the affairs of Spain and Portugal are by no means settled. In the former, especially, the civil war is extending. It may be expected that Carlos and Miguel will make a common cause, in doing all that they can to support one another, without committing themselves. The French king, however, speaks of these The proceedings of congress in the present week are affairs as likely to be soon adjusted. It is not easy to asvery interesting, and though we have expended much la- certain the true state of things in Europe, because of bor in condensing them, they occupy a considerable part agitators on one hand, and c proceedings on the of the present sheet. The yeas and nays in the house of other. The first make n y false reports, and the serepresentatives, on the deposite question, will be care-cond conceal truth. Europe, however, would seem to fully examined. The votes given, though not decisive of the result of the main question, nevertheless indicate that a small majority is opposed to a restoration of the deposites; while it is manifest that if the removal had not taken place, a large majority would not now advise it. Instead of being a matter of expediency, or of principle, it has unfortunately run into a party question; and yet it is not a little remarkable that the house, constituted as it is, with so large a majority generally in favor of the present administration, is so nearly divided on the great leading measure of the administration.

There are still some reports afloat as to a compromise. We know nothing of the truth of them-but think that the president, himself, will not be a party to any proceeding with respect to the continuation of the present bank, or establishment of a new one.

We publish a large table shewing the state of the safety fund banks of New York, and shall give similar ones shewing that of the banks of Pennsylvania, &c. They present statistical facts always interesting, but more especially so, at this particular time. We have caused the amounts to be added up, to afford a general view.

While some think that the money-market is easier, others feel the pressure of it more severely than heretofore. A certain degree of ease has been obtained by one class of persons by abstaining from new enterprizes, VOL. XLV-Sin. 29.

us like a slumbering volcano. The mighty military establishments that are kept up shew that peace exists in the ability to make war; and the fear of all parties that a war, if made, will become general, and as destructive, perhaps, as either of those which followed the revolution in France, in 1789.

A richly gifted and eminently good man has fallen! WILLIAM WIRT, esq. died at Washington, on Tuesday last, the 19th inst. aged about 62 years.

He had proceeded to Washington to attend to business in the supreme court; and though long much indisposed, shewed some apparent improvement in the state of his health.

Soon after his decease was known, a meeting of the gentlemen of the bar of the supreme court was held, and Mr. Butler, attorney general of the U. S. called to the chair, and John Sergeant, esq. of Philadelphia, appointed secretary. Mr. Webster, with much feeling and power, announced the departure of Mr. Wirt, and concluded by submitting certain resolutions, which were passed unanimously; and the proceedings of this meeting being reported to the supreme court by the attorney general, they were feelingly ordered to be inserted on the records of that court, &c. as stated in a subsequent page. gress also adjourned that the members might attend the interment of his remains-an unprecedented mark of re

Con