2388. The Secretary of the Interior gave no permit fór entry of lands for town sites under the act of 1889. Again, the sections of the Revised Statutes plainly refer to an organized State or Territory, and Oklahoma was neither, on the twentysecond day of April, 1889. It was organized as a Territory May 2, 1890, 26 Stat. 81, and the special act to provide for town site entries in Oklahoma was not passed until May 14, 1890. 26 Stat. 109. Regulations for carrying out that act were promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior June 18 and July 10, 1890. 10 L. D. 666; 11 L. D. 24. It may be assumed that on April 22, 1889, it was supposed that the land now embraced in the city of Oklahoma City would be a town site, as it was stated on the argument at bar, and not disputed, that there was at that date a railroad station there, and there was every probability that a town would exist at that site. But there was no law for a present selection of land or lots for town sites on the twenty-second day of April, 1889. There was but a supposition that land actually selected on that day for a town site would eventually be approved. On May 14, 1890, more than a year after the lands were open to entry, and just twelve days after the act was passed providing for the temporary government of the Territory, an act providing for town site entries was passed. 26 Stat. 109. That act provided for trustees, to be appointed by the Secretary of the Interior, who were authorized to make entry for town sites on so much of the public lands, situate in the Territory of Oklahoma and then open to settlement, as might be necessary to embrace all the legal subdivisions covered by actual occupancy, for the purpose of trade and business, not exceeding twelve hundred and eighty acres in each case, for the several use and benefit of the occupants thereof, and the entry was to be made under the provisions of section 2387 of the Revised Statutes, as near as might be, and when such entry was made the Secretary of the Interior was to provide regulations for the proper execution of the trust by such trustees, including the survey of the land into streets, alleys, squares, blocks and lots when neces

sary, or the approval of such survey as may already have been made by the inhabitants thereof, the assessment upon the lots of such sum as might be necessary to pay for the land embraced in such town site, the costs of the survey, the conveyances of lots, and other necessary expenses, including the compensation of the trustees. The maps and plats of streets, etc., to be surveyed were to be approved by the trustees, or they might approve the survey already made by the inhabitants thereof.

It seems, therefore, plain that a mere agreement among a portion of the people selecting lots for or in a projected town site, on April 22, 1889, did not and could not vest an absolute and unconditional title in the persons who thus selected such lots. The persons going on the land on that date and under the circumstances then existing did not have any law for the vesting of title to a lot as within a town site, by the mere selection of land at that time. There was general confusion and there were thousands of people entering the territory embraced within the proclamation, on that date. In City of Guthrie v. Oklahoma, 1 Oklahoma, 188, 194, the Supreme Court of the Territory, in speaking of these crowds, said.

"They were aggregations of people, associated together for the purpose of mutual benefit and protection. Without any statute law, they became a law unto themselves and adopted the forms of law and government common among civilized people, and enforced their authority by the power of public sentiment. They had no legal existence; they were nonentities; they could not bind themselves by contracts, or bind any one else."

The whole thing was experimental and conditional.

The selection of the lots in a proposed town site, made on the twenty-second day of April, 1889, not being final, neither was the plat or map of the proposed town site, as then, or soon after, agreed upon by some of the people, final or conclusive. The agreement upon the plat or map was liable to alteration; there was no absolute right to any particular lot, as it was

When there

subject to future survey. It was all in the air. after, the trustees, under the statute, made a survey of the land into the streets, etc., or approved a survey already made by which the plaintiff's lot was placed in the public street of the city, it was his misfortune, where all had taken their chances, that he should draw a blank. The approval of a survey by the trustees, which placed this lot in a public street of the city, gives to the city the right to the possession of it, and to keep it open as such public street. The plaintiff not being an occupant of the lot at the time that the trustees made entry of the land, nor when the conveyance was made to the trustees by the Government, was not one of the parties included in the statute, which directed the entry for the town sites to be made by the trustees "for the several use and benefit of the occupants thereof."

The Supreme Court in City of Guthrie v. Beamer, 3 Oklahoma, 652, has held substantially the same views which we now state in the case at bar. We are unable to see any real difference in the principle governing the two cases, and we think the Beamer case was rightly decided.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma must be reversed, and the case remanded with directions for a new

trial.

Reversed.

CITY OF WORCESTER v. WORCESTER CONSOLIDATED STREET RAILWAY COMPANY.

SAME v. SAME.

SAME ET AL. v. SAME.

SAME ET AL. v. SAME.

SAME v. SAME.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME JUDICIAL AND THE SUPERIOR COURTS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS.

Nos. 144, 145, 146, 147 and 148. Argued January 23, 24, 1905.- Decided February 20, 1905.

The city is the creature of the State. A municipal corporation is simply a political subdivision of the State existing by virtue of the exercise of the power of the State through its legislative department. While a municipal corporation may own property not of a public or governmental nature which is entitled to constitutional protection, the obligation of a railroad company to pave and repair streets occupied by it based on accepted conditions of a municipal ordinance granting rights of location is not private property beyond legislative control. Chapter 578, Laws of Massachusetts of 1898, providing for taxation of street railway companies is not void, as violating the impairment of obligation clause of the Federal Constitution, so far as this case is concerned, because it relieved a railroad company from the obligation to pave and repair streets under the terms and conditions of certain municipal ordinances which the company had duly accepted.

THESE five cases were brought here by writs of error, sued out by the city of Worcester, for the purpose of reviewing the several judgments of the Supreme and Superior Courts of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, respectively, affirming the judgments of the trial courts in favor of the railroad company, the defendant in error. The five cases involve the same questions and were brought for the purpose of answering any possible objection to the particular mode adopted in any one case for the purpose of obtaining the relief sought by the plaintiff in error. 182 Massachusetts, 49. The first two cases were petitions for writs of mandamus against the railroad

company, which petitions were demurred to, and the demurrers sustained. Of the three other cases, two were suits in equity, and were brought by the city against the railroad company, and were heard upon the bills and demurrers thereto, the court sustaining the demurrers; the fifth case was an action on contract originally brought by the city against the railroad company, in the Superior Court and heard upon demurrer to the complaint, which was sustained and judgment ordered for defendant from which judgment plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth.

The defendant in error is a street railroad corporation, organized and doing business under the laws of the State of Massachusetts, and it owned and operated in the city of Worcester and in numerous outlying cities and towns a street railway system, parts of which had previously belonged to other similar corporations and had been acquired by the consolidated company in 1901, by the purchase of the franchises and properties of such other companies under the general provisions of the street railway laws of the Commonwealth. Under the general laws of the Commonwealth, as they existed, from 1891 to 1893, it was provided that a street railway company might apply to the board of aldermen of a city, or the selectmen of a town, for the location of the tracks of the railway company in the streets of the city or town, and, after hearing, it was provided that the board might grant the petition "under such restrictions as they deem the interests of the public may require; and the location thus granted shall be deemed and taken to be the true location of the tracks of the railway, if an acceptance thereof by said directors in writing is filed with said mayor and aldermen or selectmen within thirty days after receiving notice thereof." Section 7 of chap. 113 of the Massachusetts Public Statutes.

The law also provided (section 21 of above act) that the board of aldermen or the selectmen might, from time to time, "under such restrictions as they deem the interests of the public may require, upon petition, authorize a street railway