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able Absolute according actually admit affirm appears argument assertion association attributes become belief body Brown called cause cognize color common conceive conception condition consciousness consequently considered deny direct Discussions distinction distinguished doctrine doubt effect elements equally evidence example existence experience express extension external fact faculties feeling finite follow given gives greater ground Hamilton human idea immediate important impossible impression inconceivable inference infinite intuitive kind knowledge known laws Lectures less limited maintain manner Mansel matter meaning mental merely mind mode muscular nature necessary never notion object opinion organ original particular past perceive perception Permanent person philosophers positive possible present Primary principle prove qualities question reality reason reference regard Reid relation relative represent respecting seems sensations sense Sir W space suggested supposed theory thing thought tion touch true truth unknown whole
Stran 131 - Whatever power such a being may have over me, there is one thing which he shall not do — he shall not compel me to worship him. I will call no being good, who is not what I mean when I apply that epithet to my fellow creatures ; and if such a being can sentence me to hell for not so calling him, to hell I will go.
Stran 227 - Observing that the agreeable sensation is raised when the rose is near, and ceases when it is removed, I am led, by my nature, to conclude some quality to be in the rose which is the cause of this sensation. This quality in the rose is the object perceived; and that act of my mind by which I have the conviction and belief of this quality is what in this case I call perception.
Stran 116 - By the Absolute is meant that which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other Being.
Stran 262 - The truth is, that we are here face to face with that final inexplicability at which, as Sir W. Hamilton observes, we inevitably arrive when we reach ultimate facts ; and in general one mode of stating it only appears more incomprehensible than another, because the whole of human language is accommodated to the one, and is so incongruous with the other, that it cannot be expressed in any terms which do not deny its truth.
Stran 77 - That the sphere of our belief is much more extensive than the sphere of our knowledge ; and, therefore, when I deny that the Infinite can by us be known, I am far from denying that by us it is, must, and ought to be believed.
Stran 181 - ... the hands of the philosophers. Common Sense is like Common Law. Each may be laid down as the general rule of decision ; but in the one case, it must be left to the jurist, in the other, to the philosopher, to ascertain what are the contents of the rule ; and though, in both instances, the common man may be cited as a witness for the custom or the fact, in neither can he be allowed to officiate as advocate or as judge.
Stran 310 - Where two or more ideas have been often repeated together, and the association has become very strong, they sometimes spring up in such close combination as not to be distinguishable. Some cases of sensation are analogous. For example; when a wheel, on the seven parts of which the seven prismatic...
Stran 124 - We are compelled, by the constitution of our minds, to believe in the existence of an Absolute and Infinite Being, — a belief which appears forced upon us, as the complement of our consciousness of the relative and the finite.
Stran 122 - But the Infinite, if it is to be conceived at all, must be conceived as potentially everything and actually nothing ; for if there is anything in general which it cannot become, it is thereby limited ; and if there is anything in particular which it actually is, it is thereby excluded from being any other thing. But again, it must also be conceived as actually everything and potentially nothing; for an unrealized potentiality is likewise a limitation (3).