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During the next day the "Mabel" remained fast in the ice, but on the day after, the men, nineteen in number, under the orders of Mr. Reed, first mate of the "Eliza," succeeded, after unshackling the chains of her anchor, etc., in navigating her into clear water.

Her course was then directed to Bering straits en route for San Francisco, but the navigation was not unattended with risk, as she had no chronometer, and Mr. Reed's acquintance with navigation was, as he himself admits, "limited."

Some three or four days afterwards, when the "Mabel" had reached Bering straits, she fell in with the bark "Rainbow" from which she obtained a supply of clothing for the men, of which they stood in need, a chronometer, and the services of Mr. Walston, fourth mate of the "Rainbow," who joined the "Mabel" to assist Mr. Reed in navigating her to San Francisco where she safely arrived after a Voyage of thirty-eight (38) days. The "Eliza" which had also effected her escape had preceded her by a few days.

It was not denied at the bar that the service performed by Mr. Reed and his men constituted a salvage service.

Whatever weight should be given to a consideration of the motives with which they originally went on board the "Mabel" and of the circumstances hich prevented their return to their own ship and compelled them to risk their lives upon the chance of saving the "Mabel," yet, from the moment when by falling in with the "Rainbow," on board of which their safety would have been secured, their service in bringing the vessel to this port and restoring her to her owners was unquestionably a salvage service-but it was not in my opinion a service of a high degree of merit.

When the salvors went on board the "Mabel" they had no thought whatever of saving her. The sole object was to add to their chances of surviving the rigors of an arctic winter, which they had then no hope of escaping, by replenishing the stores of the Eliza." Mr. Reed declares very emphatically that he would have returned to the "Eliza" had it been practicable. That they saved the "Mabel," and that but for them she would have been lost is undeniable. But they saved her under circumstances which without the exercise of any volition on their part had indissolubly bound up the preservation of their own lives with the safety of the vessel. Their conduct up to the time of making the "Rainbow" must have been the same, though they had known they were not to receive any pecuniary recompense whatever.

The case of the "Two Friends," 2d Wm. Rob., 349, has been referred to as bearing in some of its details a close resemblance to the case at bar. In the "Two Friends," the salvors had been obliged to abandon their own vessel which had struck upon a reef and they were making for the island of Cuba in the long boat or jolly boat, "having secured a sufficiency of provisions, some sails a compass, and having further provided themselves with two coils of rope for the purpose of saving their lives."

When about thirty-five miles from Havana they fell in with the "Two Friends" which had also struck upon a reef and had been abandoned by her crew. She was at once boarded by the salvors, who after weighing her anchors and throwing overboard a part of her cargo "succeeded in getting the vessel to sea, pursuing a course toward England, because they had no information as to the destination of the vessel and from the description on her stern they were led to suppose that she belonged to the Island of Jersey." The vessel reached Dartmouth after a voyage of from twenty-five to thirty days.

The value of the property was one thousand two hundred and thirty-seven pounds sterling. The court allowed three hundred pounds sterling.

In the protest it is stated, that they asked "for the benefit of the ship and cargo, and of all persons interested in the same, and for the preservation of their own lives."

The case does not disclose what were the circumstances which constituted the danger to the lives of a boat's crew provided with sails, provisions and a compass, in a tropical sea, and thirty-five miles distant from Havana.

But, admitting that the desire to secure their own safety in some degree influenced their conduct, it is, I think, evident that the service was substantially a salvage service, wholly unlike the involuntary and compulsory service performed by the libellants in getting the "Mabel" out of the ice, and taking her to Bering straits.

The appraised value of the property saved is five thousand three hundred and ninety-two dollars and twenty-five cents; but from this must be deducted the sum due the "Rainbow" for the clothes furnished the salvors. Mr. Walston, fourth mate of the "Rainbow," must, I think, be considered a co-salvor. The large number of the salvors (nineteen, not including the mate) will reduce the amount of their distributive shares. But I do not feel at liberty, on that account, to enhance the estimate of the value of the service; eight or nine men would have been abundantly sufficient for the navigation of the vessel. The large number on board must have sensibly diminished the arduousness of their labors.

At the time the master of the "Rainbow" permitted Mr. Walston to go on board the "Mabel," the cruise of the former vessel had not been finished. She proposed to continue it for a week or ten days longer. By parting with her fourth mate, she not only lost his services, but, by his absence, one of her four boats became unavailable. In point of fact, she took no more whales; but, had any been sighted, the absence of Mr. Walston might have occasioned a serious loss. I think the "Rainbow" is entitled to some compensation.

I think myself justified in slightly exceeding the percentage on the value of the property saved, allowed by Dr. Lushington, in "The Two Friends," in view of the high rate of wages which obtains on this coast, as compared with that prevailing in England

forty years ago. Had the imminent peril to which the salvors were exposed been voluntarily encountered in a gallant attempt to save the lives or property of others, I should have been greatly influenced by it. I shall allow to each of the seamen the sum of sixty dollars. To Mr. Reed and Mr. Walston, one hundred and fifty dollars each, and to the "Rainbow," one hundred dollars, together with the amount of her bill for supplies. The costs to paid by the claimants.

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SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA.

LANGWORTHY v. COLEMAN.

Filed December 16, 1884.

ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE-EXCEPTION-GROUND OF MUST BE STATED.-The ruling of the trial court on the admission of testimony, although excepted to, will not be reviewed on appeal, unless the ground of the objection or exception was stated.

DESCRIPTION IN DEED-CONSTRUCTION OF.-A description in a deed as one stockade cabin and adobe front; said cabin is known as the Egan cabin, and situated, etc.," will pass the land on which such buildings stood.

APPEAL from a judgment of the fifth judicial district court, entered in favor of the plaintiff, and from an order denying defendant's motion for a new trial. The opinion states the facts.

D. S. Truman, for the appellant.

Curler & Bowler, for the respondent.

LEONARD, J. This is an action to recover possession of a town lot and building thereon, with damages. Plaintiff alleges ownership in himself and ouster by defendant.

Plaintiff recovered judgment for the possession of the premises described in his complaint, together with one hundred and eight dollars damages, the value of the rents. Defendant appeals from the judgment and an order denying his motion for a new trial.

Plaintiff claims title through one Parker Belyea, by quit-claim deed, dated May 14, 1881.

Defendant asserts that the title is in his wife, by deed from Mrs. Hattie Belyea, wife of Parker Belyea, dated November 9, 1882.

Mrs. Belyea testified that, prior to her marriage, she paid one John Egan one hundred and fifty dollars for the property, and received a deed therefor in her name; that the money paid was her own, and that the property was purchased for herself alone; that the deed was put in a trunk and never recorded; that she had made diligent search for the same but could not find it; that Parker Belyea, her husband, had no authority or power to make the deed to plaintiff.

On the contrary, plaintiff testified that the deed from Egan was to Belyea, and not to his wife.

It was not claimed that Egan made two deeds, and the principal question of fact in the case was whether his conveyance was to Parker Belyea or to his wife.

The transcript shows that defendant objected to the oral testimony of plaintiff upon the point in question, that his objection was overruled, and that he excepted. But it is not shown that any ground of objection or exception was stated.

We cannot review the ruling under such circumstances: Sharon v. Minnock, 6 Nev., 382; Lightle v. Berning, 15 Nev., 389.

The record shows, also, that in view of the fact that plaintiff had testified that he had Egan's deed in his possession the court reserved its decision in the case until plaintiff had time, after the trial, to return the deed for inspection; that after going home plaintiff sent to the judge a deed from Belyea to Franklin, but said in his letter that he did not find any other, though he was confident he had in his possession the deed from Belyea to him.

Without recognizing the propriety of such practice, it is enough to say that the contents of plaintiff's letter cannot be considered as evidence in the case, and the result of, the whole matter is this: Oral testimony was admitted on behalf of the defendant, without objection, that the deed in question was from Egan to Mrs. Belyea: and equally positive testimony was admitted on behalf of plaintiff, no grounds of objection or exception having been stated, to the effect that the deed was to Mrs. Belyea.

The court evidently gave credit to plaintiff's statement and found accordingly, although that fact does not appear to have been found

in terms.

It is our duty, however, to presume it, since there is no finding opposed to it, and such finding is necessary to support the judgment: More v. Lott, 13 Nev., 380; Sadler v. Immel, 15 Nev., 270.

Counsel for appellant contends that the deed from Belyea to plaintiff was inadmissible because it did not show a conveyance of the premises sued for; that it conveyed no title to lot eighteen, described in the complaint; that by it Belyea did not attempt to convey more than a stockade cabin and adobe front; that no land was conveyed, or, at most, only so much as was actually occupied by the buildings described.

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The language of the deed referred to is as follows: "That said party of the first part for and in consideration of * does by these presents * * * forever quit-claim unto the said party of the second part * * * all that certain lot, piece or parcel of land situated and particularly described as follows, to wit: One stockade cabin and adobe front; said cabin is known as the Egan cabin, and situated gether with all and singular the tenements Then follows the habendum clause usually contained in conveyances of real estate.

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The objection now made was not made in the trial court. It cannot be presented and considered here for the first time.

So far as the record shows, the deed was admissible to show title in plaintiff to the property described therein, whatever it was, and

no more.

We are not required to go further than to hold that the grantor intended to convey the land on which the buildings described stood, in order to uphold the judgment.

Construing the deed most favorable to the grantee, and considering the character of the property and all the circumstances surrounding the parties, we have no doubt that the intention of Belyea was to convey not only the stockade cabin and adobe front, but at least the land on which they stood as well.

It was conceded at the trial, and admitted in the pleadings, that the buildings occupied lot eighteen, in block twenty-nine, and, for aught that appears in the record to the contrary, the buildings may cover the entire lot. We certainly cannot presume that they do

not.

It is said that the written portion of the deed must control the printed. But there is no evidence before us showing what part is written and what printed. The entire instrument may be in writing.

It is said, also, that plaintiff ought not to recover, because he showed two valid outstanding titles, so far as he is concerned, either of which defeats him, as they are both superior to his from Belyea, and that he failed to connect himself with either.

It is said, first, that he showed title in the Alexander company, dating from a survey made by one Lefler, December 31, 1877, and deed from Lefler to the company, dated March 22, 1878.

For some reason not revealed, plaintiff was not allowed to introduce a deed of this property from the Alexander company; but without objection, his agent, Mr. Stocker, gave the following testimony. "I was acting as Mr. Langworthy's agent in this matter. I went to the Alexander company to get the deed from them to these premises for Mr. Langworthy, and got it."

The deed was undoubtedly the best evidence of a conveyance of the property, but Stocker's testimony having been admitted without objection, it cannot be said there was no evidence of a conveyance of the title to plaintiff by the Alexander company: Sherwood v. Sissa, 5 Nev., 349; Dalton v. Dalton, 14 Nev., 426.

Besides, in his answer, and by the testimony of his witnesses, defendant alleged and asserted that Egan went on to lot 18, and erected a cabin under a contract with the Alexander company, and had power to convey the property to Mrs. Belyea. In fact, defendant did not claim any title superior to Egan's. If Mrs. Belyea got a valid title, as against plaintiff, by acquiring Egan's interest, it is difficult to see why plaintiff did not get the same, as against her and her grantee, if he received a valid deed from Belyea of Egan's

interest.

It is said also that the deed sent by plaintiff to the judge, after the trial ended, shows that the title was conveyed by Belyea to Franklin long prior to date of the deed from Belyea to plaintiff.

If plaintiff sent such a deed it was not put in evidence, and the court had no right to consider it in deciding the case.

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