Therefore it would seem (notwithstanding the attachment is for the benefit of all creditors, whether resident or not,) that if the plaintiff chose to discontinue the suit, before any other creditors had applied to the court or auditors, he would be at perfect liberty so to do; as the consent to be obtained, and the satisfaction to be made, as a pre-requisite, is to be obtained of and made to, such creditors only, who have shown a disposition to appropriate to themselves the benefits of the act by applying to the court or auditors. If any creditor, whether his debt be due or not, neglect or refuse to apply to the court or auditors, in the manner prescribed by the act, he is not entitled to any dividend or distributive share; but all the moneys arising from the sale of the defendant's goods and chattels, lands and tenements, must be distributed among, and his choses in action, rights, and credits must be assigned to, such of the creditors as may have duly applied to the court or auditors. But no plaintiff, or other creditor, can receive any divi. dend or assignment, as aforesaid, until he shall have entered into bond to the defendant, with one or more sureties, being freeholders and resident in this state, to be approved of by the court or by the auditors, or any two of them, in double the sum so to be received or assigned, with condition that he shall appear to any suit that may be brought against him by the said defendant, within one year next after the date of the said bond, and shall pay unto such defendant any sum of money which, by the judgment or decree of the court, shall appear to have been received by him, and not due or owing, with costs of suit; which bond is filed with the clerk of the court, for the benefit of the said defendant. If the defendant die after the return day of the writ, the action does not thereby abate, but the same may be carried on to judgment; a sale, transfer, and distribution of the estate and effects of the said defendant may be made in the same manner as if such death had not intervened; and all the proceedings and deeds, which shall be had and made, in such case, are as good, valid, and effectual, in law, as if they were had and made in the lifetime of such defendant; and so also the bonds entered into by the several creditors to the defendant, as above mentioned, may, notwithstanding his decease, be prosecuted in his name to judgment and effect, in the same manner as if he were living.

The above contains a full statement of the laws of attachment against absconding and absent debtors, and the mode of proceeding in the three higher courts, excepting such minutiæ and details of practice as it is deemed useless to mention. A short analysis of the proceedings before justices of the peace of the several counties, will complete all the law upon this subject.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE JUSTICES.

Where the demand of the plaintiff does not exceed fifty dollars, every justice of the peace of any county can entertain suit by attachment, and is authorized to issue such writ, under his hand and seal, directed to a constable, who must execute the same, in the manner prescribed to the sheriff, on the effects, rights, and credits of the defendant; and if the creditor make sufficient proof of the debt due to him, and also of the effects, rights, and credits in the hands of the garnishee, the said justice must give judgment therein for the plaintiff, and award and issue his execution therefor to the constable, either against the effects of the defendant, or against the garnishee, as in other cases cognizable before a justice; but the effects of the defendant thereon taken, cannot be sold in less than three months (unless the same are perishable,) to the end that the debtor or his friend may re

deem them; but in the mean time, the same must be inventoried and safely kept in such manner as the justice shall direct; and no judgment can be entered by such justice until after twenty days from the time of issuing such writ. After the issuing of the writ, the plaintiff must advertise in three of the most public places in the county, that such attachment has been taken out against such absconding or absent debtor, in order that any per son, having a greater demand than fifty dollars, may have an opportunity of taking out an attachment in the highest courts, for the recovery thereof. The attachment in the higher courts is a supersedeas to all attachments issued by justices of the peace, undetermined at the time of serving such writ from a higher court; and the sheriff may seize, upon his writ, all the estate and effects which any constable may have taken by virtue of his writ. Upon the return of any writ of attachment issued by any justice of the peace, he must appoint a day for the hearing of the cause, not less than twenty from the issuing of the writ; on or before which day it is the duty of the plaintiff to file a copy of his account or state of demand.

The defendant in attachment may effect his appearance to the suit, on or before the day appointed for the hearing of the cause, by filing with the justice a bond to the plaintiff, executed by one or more sufficient sureties, and resident in the county in which such attachment issued, in double the value of the property attached, conditioned for the due and safe return of the goods and chattels, rights and credits, moneys and effects seized and taken by virtue of such writ, in case judgment should be rendered for the plaintiff. Upon the filing of the said bond, the defendant must also file his plea, copy of account or set-off; when the cause is thereafter considered in all things in like manner as if the same had been commenced by summons or warrant. The justice acts in the place of the auditors; no authority having been given to him to appoint such. Where the defendant has appeared, by filing bond as aforesaid, either party may appeal to the next court of common pleas, from any judgment that may be rendered by said justice, in like manner as if the suit had been originally commenced by summons or warrant. So also in actions against a garnishee, either party may appeal as aforesaid, from any judgment rendered by the justice.

By the above statement of the law of attachment in New Jersey, it will be perceived, that a full and adequate remedy is given to creditors, resident as well as non-resident, against absconding and absent debtors; while, at the same time, every security is given the defendant against false and improper demands. Full publicity is given to the proceedings, that the defendant, if he chooses, may appear and contest the claims of his several creditors; and his estate is vested in the hands of discreet and impartial men, three in number, who are compelled to make reasonable and legal distribution thereof. A delay in the sale and disposition of the real estate is required, which can work no injury to a plaintiff and creditors, while it secures to the defendant a full opportunity, by the length of time intervening, of entering his appearance to the action. The act also possesses the merit of having extended its benefits to all creditors alike, who choose to appropriate them; so that by no connivance between the debtor and a favorite creditor (who, perhaps, may be the most undeserving) can any of the estate be obtained for the payment, exclusively, of that creditor's debt. And it is especially declared by the law that the act shall be construed in all courts of judicature in the most liberal manner, for the detection of fraud, the advancement of justice, and the benefit of creditors.

MERCANTILE LAW DEPARTMENT.

LAW OF PENNSYLVANIA COMMISSIONING ELOKERS-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBTTARIFF, WOOLLEN GOODS-LIAFILITY OF TENANTS IN CASE OF FIRE-COLLISION— BOTTOMRY-ENGLISH LAW OF WRECKS SALVAGE SERVICES ACTION FOR FREIGHT-LEGAL RATES OF INTEREST IN THE DIFFERENT STATES AND TERRI

TORIES.

LAW OF PENNSYLVANIA COMMISSIONING BROKERS.

An act has been passed by the legislature of Pennsylvania for the regulation of stock brokers in that commonwealth, which contains some important provisions. It went into operation on the first day of July, 1840. The business of a stock broker is not to be carried on without a commission being first obtained from the governor, and this to be in force for one year. Any individual who may wish to avail himself of the benefit of this act, if within the city or county of Philadelphia, is required to pay two hundred dollars; and if in the city of Pittsburgh, or the county of Alleghany, one hundred dollars, aud if in any other part of the commonwealth, fifty dollars. A person thus qualified, will have authority to purchase and sell, as an agent, every description of stocks, or other securities, authorized by the laws of the United States, or any separate state, and to perform all acts incident to the business of a stock broker. The compensation for such services to be determined by the respective parties. In like manner, and on payment of the sums before respectively stated, the governor shall grant a commission to any person so applying, which shall be an authority for one year, to purchase and sell the bills, notes, or other legal obligations of any lawful corporation or company; bills of exchange, and other personal securities. It will be perceived that there are thus constituted two distinct classes of brokers, the one for stocks and the other exchange brokers. The sum stipulated in the respective cases, is to be paid in advance; and if the party to whom the commission is granted, shall die, remove, or cease to exercise the business of a broker before the term specified expires, the benefit of the commission for the remaining time is to be continued to the legal representative or assignee of such party. An application for this purpose must be made to the governor, accompanied by an oath or affirmation taken by the applicant, and acknowledged before a judge of a court of record, in the proper city or county, stating the circumstance of death, or removal, or withdrawal. The governor shall, by his endorsement on the commission, authorize such legal representative, or assignee, to exercise the said business in the city or county named, for the unexpired term. No person holding such commission is to use or occupy more than one office or place of business for the exercise of the occupation of a broker. Any individual may, however, at the same time, hold a commission as stock broker, and another as exchange broker, on paying the respective amounts stated.

All persons who shall exercise either or both these vocations in any part of Pennsylvania, without being first qualified according to the provisions of this act, shall forfeit and pay, on conviction, a sum not less than one hundred, nor more than one thousand dollars, one half for the use of the guardians of the poor, in the city or county where the offence was committed, and the other half for the use of the commonwealth. If any individuals so commissioned, shall, in any manner, directly or indirectly, be interested in the portions of any loans or securities, which they may so purchase or sell, by virtue of such authority, (excepting their compensations,) the parties offending, shall, on conviction, forfeit and pay, for each offence, a sum not less than one hundred dollars, nor more than one thousand, to be divided between the guardians of the poor and the commonwealth.

The last section provides, that from and after the first day of July, if any person or persons shall make or enter into any contract or agreement, whether written or oral, for the purchase, receipt, sale, or transfer of any public loan, or

of any stocks whatever, to be consummated at any future period exceeding three juridical days after the date of such agreement, then the said agreement to be null and void. The persons making any such contract shall, on conviction, forfeit and pay for every such offence, any sum not less than one hundred, nor more than one thousand dollars, one half of the penalty to the use of the guardians of the poor, and the other half to the use of the commonwealth.

IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT.

In the January number of this magazine, we discussed briefly the condition of the law of imprisonment for debt, in the state of New York. We rejoice in the opportunity of giving to our readers the law of congress, as approved January 14th, below. The manacles of the unfortunate debtor are now broken in the state of New York. No man can now be committed in the empire state, upon a simple contract debt, unconnected with fraud. We think we see in the future great good growing out of this state of things. Credit, hereafter, must be dependent upon good character: while the law of imprisonment existed, the character of the debtor was of less importance. Now, it must be all-important; and the result, we think, must be favorable to a wholesome business, and good morals. The progress of opinion, on this and kindred subjects, is onward. We have said before, and we repeat it, that a crowning act by the national legisla ture will be the passage of a general bankrupt law. The passage of such a law may be deferred. It may be opposed and impeded. Its opponents may hang upon it like the scythe of death, and may mow down many an unfor tunate debtor, ere relief comes. But come it will, and those legislators who give to the measure their support, will be remembered for good in after years. The following is the law referred to:

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That the act entitled 'An act to abolish imprisonment for debt in certain cases,' approved February twenty-eight, eighteen hundred and thirty-nine, shall be so construed as to abolish imprisonment for debt on process issuing out of any court of the United States in all cases whatever, where, by the laws of the state in which the said court shall be held, imprisonment for debt has been, or shall hereafter be, abolished."

TARIFF-WOOLLEN GOODS.

In the United States Circuit Court, Judges Thompson and Betts presiding.—The United States vs. Ten cases of Shawls, Hadden & Co. claimants.— This case is brought up on a writ of error, from the District Court of the Southern District of New York. It was on information filed in the Court below, alleging a forfeiture of the goods in question, under the 14th section of the Act of Congress of the 14th of July, 1832. (8 vol. L. U. S. 701.) The information contained three counts, to meet the three classes of cases supposed to be embraced within that section of the law. That section declares, "That whenever upon the opening and examination of any package or packages of goods, composed wholly or in part of wool or cotton, in the manner provided by the 4th section of the act of 28th of May, 1830, the said goods shall be found not to compare with the entry thereof at the customhouse-and if any package shall be found to contain any article not entered, such article shall be forfeited; or if the package be made up with the intent to defraud the revenue, the package shall be forfeited, and so much of the said section (4th, act of 1830) as transcribes a forfeiture of goods found not to correspond with the invoice thereof, be, and the same is hereby repealed." The first count in this information assumes, under the 14th section of the act of 1832, a forfeiture of the goods attached, if upon examination it shall be found that the goods do not correspond with the entry at the customhouse. And this presents the question, whether such is the construction to be given to this branch of the section. Looking to the provisions of the act of 1830 on this point, an alteration or amendment of which was intended by the act of 1832, it is not improbable that some mistake has occurred. But as the act now stands, it does not declare any

forfeiture to attach upon the mere want of correspondence between the goods and the entry, as a substantial and independent ground of forfeiture. The effect or consequence of such want of correspondence is not declared. And if this was intended as a distinct ground of forfeiture, there must be an omission of some words indicating such intention, and which cannot be supplied by intendment in a penal statute. By the fourth section of the act of 1830, it is provided, that if upon the examination any package shall be found to contain any article not described in the invoice, or if such package or invoice be made up with intent to defraud the revenue, the same shall be forfeited. The disjunctive particle or being used, the forfeiture declared may attach to the want of correspondence, as well as to the fraudulent intent. But in the act of 1832, the conjunctive particle and is used in the like connection, and which in a penal statute cannot be construed or. But independent of this consideration, if the want of correspondence is a distinct ground of forfeiture, it will include the second class, and render that provision entirely unnecessary. For if the package contained any article not entered, there would certainly be a want of correspondence between the goods and the entry. But although this section of the law is somewhat inartificially drawn, I am inclined to think there has been no omission or mistake in the phraseology. The 14th section of the act of 1832, was intended as an amendment or alteration of the 4th section of the act of 1830. Under that section, if on examination any package was found to contain any article not described in the invoice, it worked a forfeiture of the whole package. But under the act of 1832, the forfeiture only attached upon the article not entered. And if under the act of 1832, the want of correspondence is a distinct ground of forfeiture, it would work a forfeiture of the whole package and defeat the alteration intended to be made in this respect. And I think the construction to be given to this 14th section of 1832, is that the collector is to make the examination required by the act of 1830. And if the goods shall be found not to correspond with the entry at the customhouse, then the article or articles not entered, and which occasioned the want of correspondence, shall be forfeited. I think, therefore, that the decision of the District Court upon this point was correct. The ruling of the court was placed upon the decision of this court, in the year 1834, in the case of the United States vs. Five cases.of linen tablecloths, Wright & Sturges, claimants. I have not been able to find the opinion given in that case, and do not recollect the grounds on which it was put, and have accordingly considered it as a question now for the first time raised. Since this opinion was drawn up, I have been furnished with the opinions delivered in the case of Wright & Sturges vs. U. States, and find that that case turned substantially upon the same course of reasoning adopted in the present case. The ruling of the court in the second count in the information was, I think, correct; that count claims the forfeiture by reason of a misdescription of the whole package, whereas the 14th section of the act of 1832 looks to the case where certain articles contained in the package were not entered, and attaches the forfeiture to such articles only.

Under the act of 1832, if the package be made up with the intent to evade or defraud the revenue, the whole package shall be forfeited.

The entry of the goods was of worsted shawls, and the evidence was that they were part cotton.

The

This, I think, was competent evidence, under the count, charging the package to have been made up with intent to evade or defraud the revenue. evidence, however, was not excluded-and the opinion of the court with respect to it, was only our opinion upon the fact, that the shawls being part cotton, was not in itself competent evidence, tending to prove that the package was made up with intent to evade or defraud the revenue. It might have been more correct for the judge to have told the jury that the evidence was not, in his opinion, sufficient to establish the fraud. But as this was the only evidence tending in any manner to show a fraudulent intent, and was so obviously insufficient to establish the fraud, I think the judgment ought not to be reversed on this ground. The judgment must accordingly be affirmed.