No. 4. Our laws direct the capture of all armed vessels sailing under authority, or pretence of authority from the French republic. A vessel captured by the cruisers of France, must be considered as sailing under the authority of France; and it is scarcely to be supposed, that in times like the present, when few vessels sail without arms, a captured vessel in possession of the captors, will be so circumstanced as not to come under the description of an armed vessel, within the meaning of our laws. To justify a recapture, nothing is necessary but that the vessel be provided with such means of annoyance, as will render her dangerous to an unarmed Amecan vessel, in pursuit of lawful commerce. If, however, the vessel cannot be considered an armed vessel, within the meaning of our laws, you are not to recapture her, unless you should have probable cause to suspect, that the citizens of the United States, resident therein, have some interest in the vessel or cargo. It is always your duty to recapture American property, or property of persons resident within the United States, whenever found in possession of the French on the high

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seas.

These several acts and instructions, so far from being acts of war, are, it will be seen, entirely and purely defensive in fact, and are so called in their several titles, and were so regarded by the French. They were not adopted with a view to coerce satisfaction for the claims in question, but to protect other property from sharing a similar fate. Had indemnity for depredations already committed, been the object of our government in calling into action its naval force, reprisals would have been the proper and only course; and authority might have been given to capture French property indiscriminately, to the full amount of the depredations complained of: but even this would not have been war, nor even a legitimate precursor of war. Vattel B. 2, ch. 18, sec. 353, says, "A sovereign has no right to oppose, force, or to make war against him who, in such a case, by ordering the making of reprisals only exercises his just right."

It can hardly be necessary to adduce proof that our acts were neither reprisals nor war, since the French have not given to them such character; but the two following facts seem to claim admission in this place. 1st. That under these acts we captured eighty-three French vessels, of which eleven were acquitted and restored because not found armed, (this could not have happened if reprisals or war had been our object)-68 were condemned, one half to the captors, and the other half to the United States Treasury, (if reprisals had been the object, the citizens who had been plundered by the French would necessarily have been entitled to the captured property, and not the United States) and all the French government vessels were either restored, or their value paid in money, under the convention of 1800. And 2d. The convention of 1800 was not a treaty of peace. A treaty of peace is without limit: but this was limited to 8 years, therefore, if the question of peace or war had been at issue, the limitation would have made it only a truce: the result of which would tal in such case, does not restore the property in effect; because the waste, losses of time, and highly extravagant charges, in most instances consume the whole. Besides, many cases could not be carried up to the high court by appeal, by reason of the inability of the owners to furnish the required security, to say nothing of the impediments usually thrown in their way, to prevent appeal.

In the case of an American merchant vessel rescued from the French, by an armed United States' vessel, and then tamely yielded up by the latter to any British ship that might demand it-it would be difficult to convince her owner that he enjoyed the protection of his government, or that his prospect of redress was better than it would have been under the French capture: In either case, a total loss was the certain result.

It is not necessary now to call up the question,-whether after the owner traced his proproperty into the possession of the United States, (who afterward surrendered it to the English, without an effort for its protection) he would not have a right to demand indemnification from his own government. Nor need it be now stated how far the acts authorised by such instructions, comported with the neutrality we professed. As a practical illustration of the instructions referred to, I cite the following extract of a letter from the Secretary of the Navy to Captain Philips, dated February 20th, '99- there is no apprehension that the doctrine it contains will make converts at the present day.

"You are instructed not to molest the vessels of any nation, with whom we were at peace: not even to interpose to prevent the capture of our merchant vessels by the armed ships of any nation, except the French. Such were and such still are our laws. We arm only against the the armed vessels of France; against the armed vessels of other powers, ours have no right to act, except to repel insult, or injury offered to themselves. It was your duty therefore, not to attempt to defend against the British ships of war, the vessels under your convoy."!!!

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have been, the revival of war at the end of the eight years: such a thought has not been uttered. It was a convention too, and not a treaty. The distinction is, that the first is made without the authority of the Sovereign, and which he is understood by all the parties, to be at liberty to accept or reject at pleasure: while the latter can only be made under the full powers of the Sovereign, which he is bound to ratify. Hence the French could not have entered into a convention of peace. history of the world contains nothing of that kind. So much for the principle, which, however necessary to be established, in order to remove existing prejudices. is not material to the cause; since, as will be seen in due time, the convention of 1800 expressly recognised the existence of the treaties of '78 and '88, up to that period.

The reader will doubtless be surprised on viewing these acts of our government, taken in connection with Mr. Gerry's declaration before stated, "that the French government was sincere in a desire of reconciliation, and only wanted to gain time for ascertaining whether the United States were then disposed to make a treaty."

But these were high party times; and it is but just to say, that, while the champions of St. Dennis and St. George were marshalling their forces, a third party, truly contemptible in number, and placing the responsibility unfairly upon the President, whom they goaded, deceived and vilified, brought about a state of things, without a name, that astonished every individual of the nation, and which none were so rejoiced to see terminated as the instigators themselves. The mantle of oblivion has long covered them. A CLAIMANT.

No. XXXI.

As before stated, the French government, on being advised of our having authorized the capture of French armed vessels, laid an embargo on our vessels in their ports, declaring, "such is its repugnance to consider the United States as enemies, that, notwithstanding their hostile demonstrations, it means to wait until it be irresistibly forced to it by real hostilities."

On the 13th of August, '98, the French minister of marine addressed the following circular letter to the agents of marine in the general French ports: "I remark, citizen, by the correspondence of the greater part of the governors of the ports, that the embargo laid recently upon American vessels has produced the detention of their crews. The intentions of government have been ill understood by the adop tion of a measure, that in the first place compromits the safety of the vessels, and in the second seems to place us in a hostile attitude against the United States; when, on the contrary, the acts of government evince the desire to maintain a good understanding between the two republics. You are therefore required by me, citizen, to order, on the receipt of these presents, the discharge of all American prisoners, who might have been considered as prisoners of war, in consequence of the detention of their vessels."

On the 16th August, the Executive Directory passed the following decree:-"The Executive Directory considering, that notwithstanding the hostile manifestations of the government of the United States, which have occasioned a momentary embargo upon their vessels, it must be believed that unless abandoned to the passions of the British cabinet, that government, faithful to the interests of the American nation, will take measures conformable to the pacific dispositions of the French republic, after it shall receive a confirmation of them; and wishing to pursue the friendly and fraternal habits of France, towards a people whose liberty is defended, decrees as follows: Art. 1. The embargo laid upon the American vessel shall be immediately raised. Art. 2. The minister of marine and of the colonies, is charged with the execution of the present decree, which shall not be printed."

On the 18th of August, the minister of marine addressed the following circular to the officers civil and military of the ports. "Our political situation, with regard to the United States, citizen, not having undergone, up to this day, any change that might have an influence upon the attentions due to neutral nations, I think it unnecessary to bring to your recollection, that no attempt should be made against the security and liberty of persons, composing the officers and crews of every American vessel, that is found regular, and that the same course should be observed towards all passengers and other citizens of the United States, furnished with pass

ports or necessary protections. You will use the strictest vigilance, that the intentions of government, in this respect, be followed by all persons under your command, and if any of them have failed in the due execution thereof, you will do justice to the demand which will be addressed to you, as soon as you shall have ascertained their validity."

On the 22d of August, Mr. Skipwith, consul general of the United States, wrote to the Secretary of State: "I deem it my duty to observe, that from informal communications, which I have recently and repeatedly had with some of the best informed individuals of the government on the subject of American vessels and property, now under trial before the different tribunals of this republic, I have derived such information of the present disposition and intentions of the directory, as to be satisfied myself, that they will ere long endeavor to provoke in the legislature a revision of their maritime laws, and that such a system will be organized, as will secure the most important rights of neutrality upon the seas; this pleasing event is generally expected, and will I am persuaded, arrive before this can reach you. Though many of the late arretes of the directory have certainly encouraged the tribunals in the most pernicious applications of existing laws in regard to neutral property, captured and brought in for adjudication, yet it may not be unimportant to remark to you, sir, that the directory, however well disposed, cannot change the conduct of the tribunals in regard to American and other neutral vessels now before them, without legislative interference, and that owing to particular circumstances, it appears evidently, that some time is necessary for them to prepare and dispose that body to alter some laws and make others, which shall cause the tribunals and privateers to respect neutrals in general, and the flag of the United States in particular: but from the present manifest dispositions and endeavors of the directory to produce that end, I am happy to add, that the tribunal of cassation, before whom appeals have been made on most of the American property condemned in France, appear disposed to procrastinate pronouncing upon them until the sentiment of the legislature shall be declared upon the laws which are operating against their success."

On the 28th August, M. Talleyrand wrote Mr. Pichon, Secretary of the French Legation, at the Hague: "I see with pleasure, citzen, that the intercourse of society has procured you some political conversations with Mr. Murray [American minister at the Hague] &c-what, therefore, is the cause of the misunderstanding, which, if France did not manifest herself more wise, would henceforth induce a violent rupture between the two republics? Neither incompatible interests. projects of aggrandizement divide them, After all distrust alone has done whole. The government of the United States has thought that France wanted to revolutionize it. France has thought that the government of the United States wanted to throw itself into the arms of England. It does not require much skill to divine which is the cabinet interested in the two events producing each other; and which invisibly puts in motion all the expedients calculated to make them take effect. Let us open our eyes on both sides. It concerns a republic, founded on the system of representation, to support, and not to weaken similar establishments. The stability of this system abroad is a necessary example at home. France, in fine, has a double motive, as a nation, and as a republic, not to expose to any hazard the present existence of the United States. Therefore, it never thought of making war against them, nor exciting civil commotions among them: and every contrary supposition is an insult to common sense. The excess even of provocation has deadened their effect. The government of the United States surrounds itself with precautions against an imaginary attack. To stretch the hand to deluded friends is what one republic owes to another, and I cannot doubt, that the dignity of that attitude will convince the President of our pacific intentions. A single word will suffice for the rest. We want nothing but justice on the part of the United States: we ask it: we offer it to their government: it may depend upon the candor of the Executive Directory. You will not doubt, citizen, that I approve of the communications which your zeal has caused you to seek with Mr. Murray, since I enable you to resume them with official elucidations." And again of the28th of September."You were right to assert that whatever plenipotentiary the government of the United States might send to Paris, in order to terminate the existing differences between the two countries, he would be, undoubtedly received with the respect due to the representative of a free, independent and powerful nation. The President's instructions to his envoys at Paris (Messrs. Pinckney, Marshall and Gerry,) which I have only been acquainted with, by the copy given to you by Mr. Murray, announce, if they contain the whole of the American governments intentions, dispositions, which can only add to those the

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directory has always entertained and notwithstanding the posterior acts of that go vernment, notwithstanding the irritating and almost hostile measures which they have adopted, the directory has shown that it persisted in the dispositions consigned, as well in my correspondence with Mr. Gerry, as in my letter to you, of the 28th August, and which I have herein before repeated in the most explicit manner. Carry therefore, citizen, to Mr. Murray, these positive expressions, to convince him of our sincerity, and request him to transmit them to his government." On the 12th of October, Mr. Murray transmitted the above letter to the Secretary of State, and adds, "Since, the more I have reflected, the more empty it appears to me! The renewal of the ties of friendship, may have an allusion to what, for one, I hope can never be realized; a revival of the old treaty, which has been so fairly got rid of: a piece of good fortune which money could not have purchased, and the like of which I do not remember to have happened in any other case of equal importance to any nation. The enclosed was delivered to me from the French Post on the 7th inst. Such as it is, I thought it my duty to send it to you sir, although one place has a little of 'the British' in it, yet it is more free from that insult than any I have seen from the same hand. The assurances are not made in the manner which the message of the 21st June, I presume, indicated."

This letter was not intended for the public eye; it is marked "Private," and breathes a strong desire to lessen the character of its enclosure, by suggesting doubts which it does not justify and even a reluctance to send it. He was evidently opposed to a reconciliation and preferred a war with France. The person he addressed entertained the like sentiments, and in an attempt to maintain them sacrificed his office and his fame. Mr. Murray was particularly unfortunate in all the conclusions contained in the sentence just cited, save one-the immense value of the treaty referred to. Could he imagine that we could get fairly rid, or rid at all, of a responsibility which money could not have purchased, by a legislative act of our own making? Could a matter of so great value have been realized without some equivalent? Could an individual, the maker of a promissory note for instance, absolve himself by a declaration that he would not pay it and look to the laws of any country for his justification? France held our national bond which we declared we would not pay; France insisted; and the laws of nations also insisted-how then were we absolved? Mr. Murray has himself subsequently answered these questions, by recognising the existence of that same treaty, (the act of Congress to the contrary notwithstanding) and giving as the price of its abrogation an immense value, to wit: in the convention of 1800, where he acted as one of the negotiators. And both houses of Congress with the President sustained him in this recognition and consideration, by ratifying that convention.

The President, so far from considering M. Talleyrand's overtures "empty," (which were in the very words of the message), regarded them as of the very last importance; and although the little third party resisted him to the utmost stretch of opposition and at every sacrifice-he burst through the bonds which had long bound him, and by virtue of said empty overtures, realised a reconciliation with France which he afterwards declared would afford him consolation in his last hour. A CLAIMANT.

No. XXXII.

BEFORE I enter upon the important negotiations which led to the convention of 1800 I find it necessary to dispose of a few preliminary facts, in order to keep up in some tolerable degree the chain of events.

On the 13th December, '98, M. Talleyrand gave to the minister of justice his written opinion upon the French demand, that American vessels should be furnished with a role d'equipage. He explicitly acknowledges that the treaty of '78 does not make a role necessary; and that if it should be continued to be required as the privateers demand, "it would occasion numbers of confiscations and revive in the United States the general discontent hitherto the greatest, and I could say the only force of the Americans against us." This letter was transmitted by Mr. Skipwith to the Secretary of State who says in reply, "The letter of the minister of foreign

private

*This is an unequivocal recognition of liability for all the depredations committed.

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relations to the minister of justice relative to the role d'equipage is valuable for its confession that our treaty with France did not require it.”

On the 18th of March, '99, the French government passed the following decree: "The Executive Directory having examined its decree of the 2d of March, '97, concerning the navigation of neutral vessels loaded with merchandise belonging to the enemies of the republic, and the judgment on the trials as to the validity of maritime prizes; considering that the 4th article of that decree, in what relates to the roles d'equipages with which neutral vessels ought to be furnished, has had improper interpretations so far as concerns the roles d'equipages of American vessels and that it is time to do away the obstacles resulting therefrom to the navigation of the vessels of that nation: After having heard the minister of exterior relations and the minister of justice declare that, by the 4th article of the said treaty it was not understood that the navigation of American vessels relatively to the form of their roles d'equipages, was subjected to other conditions than those imposed on all neutrals by the 12th article of the ordinance of 1794, and by the 9th article of that of the 26th July, 1778."

On the 14th of August, '99, Mr. Murray, from the Hague, wrote to the Secretary of State, 66 From what I can collect there is no change since their [the French] knowledge of the late nomination [of Messrs. Ellsworth, Henry and Murray as ministers to France] on any one point that is in contact between the two governments. None in the class of grievances, under sea letter and the role d'equipage: though they have not that I can discover in any case admitted the idea of the annulling of the late treaties and consular convention. Affecting still to act under these, they pursue the same system of gross violation, though they have published arretes which held up the idea that the role d'equipage arrete of March '97, shall be restrained to a more just interpretation and in analogy with that of 1748, but there is not, 1 believe, any alteration in practice." And again on the 26th December, '99, "The enclosed report, made lately to the consuls of the French republic by their then minister of justice. Cambaceres, on the legislation of prizes, is so important in my eyes as to justify me in transmitting it by post through Mr. King. It is an official concession that may have good effects, that he should declare that, "In a word, privateering had become brigandage," and that the laws which regulated it were either inadequate or bad.' He declares the law of 18th January, '98, to be at once vague and arbitrary;" but he is clear that "" enemy property wherever found is fair prize," though they have treaties for free bottoms, free goods. No arrete of the consuls has yet passed to reduce his plan of an appeal court into practice, but it is expected. This I hope will be done as I have understood that many of the cases of our captured vessels have been suspended; and such, if this tribunal be well filled, (Cambaceres himself being now second consul,) may have a better chance than in tribunals where the government could not, even if they had been inclined, exert official influence. Tribunals, however, can do nothing remed dial; the laws and views of the republic must be changed. However, sir, as an official declaration on some points extremely interesting to us, I consider this report as useful."

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In 1798-9, a correspondence was opened by the Executive of the United States with the black rebel chief at St. Domingo, Touissant Louverture, with a view to the opening of certain ports in that island to American trade; and this object was accomplished, aided by and in conjunction with the British commander on that station, General Maitland. This act was highly offensive to the French government; our joining with her enemy could in no view be regarded as a friendly act, and its object, though doubtless, trade only, was charged with a design to countenance and aid her rebellious colonists. The President's proclamation, authorising the trade to said ports, was dated the 26th of June, 1799. Similar propositions were made to the chiefs commanding other French colonies, particularly the Isle of France; these several acts were the source of much irritation to the French government, who imputed to the United States the intention to seduce the fidelity of its colonial officers. A CLAIMANT.

*It is to be regretted that this report has not been published. Its import can be collected only from the above communication.