initiated by inherited dispositions (De Potent, Q. 3, a. 9, ad. 7). The child resembles the parents in many personal traits (De Verit. Q. 23, a. 5) and many characteristics rooted in the organism are transmitted from parent to child, such as physical ability and keen minds (1-2ae, Q. 81, a. 2; De Malo, Q. 4, a. 8; 1-2ae, Q. 51, a. 1). Thus one will have a natural predisposition to science, another to bravery and another to temperance (1-2ae, Q. 63, a. 1). Inherited evil dispositions when gratified build up bad habits or vices; good inclinations repeated form good habits or virtues (1-2ae, Q. 49, a. 1; ibid., Q. 50, a. 2, a. 3). The task of the will is to control vicious inclinations and direct the lower appetites toward the Summum Bonum. In this work it can be helped or hindered by environment because of the tendency of individuals to imitate actions of their neighbors (2-2ae, Q. 83, a. 1; In Rom., lec. 7, c. 2; lec. 14, c. 2). Good example is more powerful than words (1-2ae, Q. 34, a. 1) and the will is assisted by the imitation of the Savior and the saints (In Heb. 12, lec. 1; 3a, Q. 48, a. 5, ad. 3; 4 Sent. dist. 14, Q. 1, a. 5).

III.

PLEASURE AND PAIN.

While love is the beginning of all action, practically speaking, the desire for spiritual or material pleasure is the first step in the mental process (1-2ae, Q. 31, a. 1). In this sense, pleasure is the conditioning element of all appetite and action just as good is their object. Intellecual pleasures are called gaudium; when accompanied by elation, pleasure is called laetitia; when expressed externally it is jucunditas; when it arises from the animal appetites it is called voluptas. Pleasure is necessary as an antidote for sorrow and men usually choose material pleasure because they cannot obtain or appreciate spiritual pleasures (1-2ae, Q. 31, a. 5). Pleasures may be ob

tained from Action well regulated (1-2ae, Q. 32 a. 1): Hope and Memory (ibid., a. 3, ad. 3) : Sadness and Hatred (ibid., a. 4, ad. 2 and ad. 3) : Praise and Flattery (ibid., a. 5) Charity (ibid., a. 6): Correcting and Scolding Others (ibid., a. 6, ad 3): Similarity (consciousness of kind) (ibid., 7): Wonder and Research (1-2ae, Q. 32, a. 8, ad. 3).

Pleasure has the following effects on desire: it causes a thirst or desire for itself (1-2ae, Q. 33, a. 2): material pleasures hinder the use of the imagination and thus fetter the reason (ibid., a. 3).

St. Thomas recognizes four degrees of pain. Sorrow or pain is always occasioned by evil with which the individual is brought into contact. If the evil lies in the misfortune of a friend, pity is aroused; if a man think the success of a neighbor is his own misfortune, envy is stirred up. The inability to avoid evil is perplexity, and paralysis is the complete depression of the mind and body in the face of evil (1-2ae, Q. 35, a. 2). When the presence of evil is perceived by the interior senses, the emotion is called sorrow; otherwise it is called pain (12ae, Q. 35, a. 3).

Sorrow and pain, while the opposites of pleasure, can be the cause of pleasure; on this principle is built the philosophy by which material pains and sorrows are borne with a pleasure based on higher motives (ibid.). In many cases the avoidance of pain may be a stronger motive than the pursuit of pleasure (ibid., a. 6).

Sorrow is caused by delay in procuring the objects of desire or when the hope of satisfying our desires vanishes (1-2ae, Q. 36, a. 2). Were we to crush desire, sorrow would also disappear (ibid., a. 4).

The remedies for pain and sorrow are:

Pleasure: Tears and Groans (1-2ae, Q. 38, a. 2): Friendly Sympathy (ibid., Q. 38, a. 3): Contemplation: Sleep and Bathing (Q. 38, a. 4).

The following table presents the entire analysis of St. Thomas in brief form:

1 Ellwood, Sociology in its Psychological Aspects, pp.109-123 and 198-288, contains an excellent critical summary of modern sociological and psychological literature on this field. Mercier, in his Psychologie, gives an excellent and sympathetic exposition of St. Thomas' doctrine in the light of modern psychology.

OBJECTIVE CLASSIFICATION OF DESIRES

IN ST. THOMAS.

I.

PRINCIPLES OF CLASSIFICATION.

In the mind of St. Thomas, desire is the motive force awakened when a good is perceived and sought. It is the power by which the will is brought into conjunction with objects which complete it and bring to it pleasure. Since desire takes on many forms it receives many names in the vocabulary of St. Thomas. Unbridled desire is called cupidity or concupiscence. Sometimes the word libido is applied to this form of ill-regulated desire, but ordinarily it relates to inordinate desire of the pleasures of touch, just as ambition and avarice signify inordinate desire of honor and wealth. Desire is strictly a movement of the sensile appetency. Craving for wisdom and other spiritual goods such as virtue or knowledge, is called desire either by way of a figure of speech or because the craving in the higher part of the soul is so strong that it affects the sensile appetite (1-2aé, Q. 30, a. 1). Again, St. Thomas distinguishes desires into natural and artificial or acquired. Natural desires or concupiscences are common to men and animals and are called common desires. Desires that are not natural but artificial, are found only in men who alone have the power to devise goods beyond those indicated by nature. Man alone can go beyond the fixity of nature in his desires. The greatest possible diversity is introduced among these artificial desires since men reason and judge differently concerning objects which they seek. St. Thomas remarks that natural desires can be satisfied without end, successively, because the needs which awaken them are recurrent. Artificial or acquired desires can be multiplied

indefinitely because it is practically impossible to exhaust the resources of reason (1-2ae, Q. 30, a. 4).

Going back from these specific to general aspects of desire, we find that our author relates, as has been already seen, all conation directly to the appetitive powers and indirectly to the apprehensive. Human action in its objective aspects relates always to objects which men consider good, that is, capable of perfecting their being and giving them pleasure while so doing. Thus it is that the objective classification of human desires brings us to the study of the ends of action.

The end of an action and the goodness of its corresponding object are really identical, although a theoretical distinction between them may be made (1a, Q. 5, a. 4). Thomistic philosophy is essentially teleological. All actions are performed in pursuit of some purpose. All action taken collectively is in accordance with some ultimate end. St. Thomas makes a fundamental distinction between the order of intention and that of execution. In the order of intention, the desirability of an external object is held in mind. In the order of execution, the end of an action is identical with the desirability of the object completing the motion of the appetite. The possession. of the object represented as good is, therefore, first in the order of intention and last in the order of execution. Thus we realize that the objective consideration of human action cannot be separated from the philosophy of purpose (Ethic., L. 1, lec. 2).

Any human action viewed teleologically is refracted prismatically into a dozen purposes. The analysis of human motives is notoriously difficult. It is practically impossible to explain our own actions to ourselves, let alone explaining those of others. Without a doubt, the average man will act in obedience to organic desires for health, wealth and companionship, but it is impossible to determine with accuracy why any particular person does a particular thing. There is all the difference in the world