between the family meal taken in the privacy of the home and an elaborate banquet instituted to promote a candidate's prospects for office. Thus it is that a man's purpose in eating may be different from nature's purpose in giving him the desire for food. In the animal world and in the lower strata of human life, the purposes of nature and the purposes of the individual nearly coincide. The more nearly fundamental an instinct or function is in us, the less apt are we to be swayed by the purposes foreign to those of nature. St. Thomas clears up all of this confusion by his discussion of ends.

Throughout the system of St. Thomas, an end is represented as that on account of which an action is performed (1-2ae, Q. 1, a. 1, ad. 1). Nature has her purposes in all things and man in addition may have his own particular ends in what he does. Bodily processes continue, whether or not we advert to them, because of the end that nature has in view. Neither reflection nor attention can interfere with them. The ends of nature are the aims of God. He is the Author of nature. There are two aspects to every human action, the interior and the exterior. The terminus or end of the external act is its object. The terminus or end of the internal act is the intention. The act of deciding the means to be used in seeking the end is called election. The application of the means chosen is called use and the peace or quiet obtained from the possession of the object is called enjoyment (12ae, QQ. 12-17). The act of intention is found in only rational beings. As regards animals, intention is found only in the mind of the Creator. In man we find capacity of choice among means, wherein consists freedom of the will and the power to distinguish between the end of an action and the end of an agent, between the finis operis and the finis operantis. St. Thomas does not fail to call attention to the fact that not all actions of man are rational (1-2ae, Q. 1, a. 1).

The following chart illustrates what has been said concerning ends in human action.

The universe was created by God for a divine purpose. Man as a part of that universe must conform to the general plan of the Creator (1a, Q. 44, a. 4). The last end or summum bonum of man is determined by the Author of Nature since He created the faculties and determined them toward Himself as the summum bonum or full complement of life (Con. Gen. L. 1, c. 1). All men find their unity in this final destiny. The last end is the complete perfection of the faculties of man (Con. Gen. L. 3, c. 16). All progress depends upon the extent to which men are enlightened about the nature of their ultimate perfection and are faithful in seeking it through action or conduct which is called virtuous. It is impossible to seek our last end unless we know it (1 Eth. lec. 2). Thus St. Thomas defines it as that which is desirable on account of itself and on account of which all other things are desired. Irresistibly, all men desire to be happy. It is a matter of natural instinct and not of free will (1a, Q. 19, a. 10; 1a, Q. 26, a. 1).

Men seek this summum bonum or ultimate perfection. through contact with and the use of created things. Ob

jects which appear good to the individual stir within him, desires. These desires are particular manifestations of the all-governing desire to find ultimate perfection and happiness (1-2ae, Q. 1, a. 4). We are thus led to the consideration of the objects and relations which men desire during the process of seeking their ultimate happiness. The classification of such objects is made by St. Thomas in full consciousness of their relation to the summum bonum of man. His entire philosophy of life, of sin and virtue, and of progress can be understood only from this standpoint. In describing the objects which stir desire, he has two points of view in mind. First, he observes as a matter of fact the things which men actually desire. He then explains regulated and ill-regulated desire, or sin and virtue, in proportion as the process of actual desiring bears on the ultimate end of life.

St. Thomas is interested in individual objects of desire only in so far as they impede or help man in the acquisition of his perfect happiness. Hence we find the most exhaustive treatment of the objects of desire in those portions of his work in which he discusses the problems of happiness (1-2ae, Q. 2; Con. Gen. L. 3, cc. 25-40). In his mind, happiness is either perfect or imperfect. Perfect happiness is that which man could obtain only in a future life, in the possession of the summum bonum in which his capacity for life is ultimately and entirely filled. Imperfect happiness is the pleasurable experience possible to man in this world. When this experience of happiness serves his ultimate end, it is morally approved and it ministers to his real progress. When this pleasurable experience is not in line with his ultimate happiness, it interferes with his real progress and takes on the nature of sin. In describing this portion of the doctrine of St. Thomas, therefore, we confine the term "happiness" to human experience in this life. This imperfect happiness is found in the satisfaction of desires. The reasonable satisfaction of all forms of appetency brings to the indi

vidual, the happiness of which he is capable. The historian will describe men's desires as they are aroused and satisfied in fact. The moralist will describe them as they should be directed in line with the ultimate end of man.

II.

CLASSIFICATION OF GOODS.

It will be recalled that St. Thomas describes three kinds of appetency. Natural appetency is that inclination in all created things to obey the laws of their being. Sensitive appetency is the inclination of a sensile creature toward the good which it apprehends through sensation. Rational appetency is the inclination toward a good apprehended finally in the intellect. Man has natural appetency in common with all created things and sensile appetency in common with sensile beings. Rational appetency is confined to man alone in the visible world. The following classification of objects which stir desire, is substantially adhered to, throughout the writings of St. Thomas:

The goods of the body
The goods of the soul
External goods

3;

Bona corporis.

Bona animae.

Bona exteriora.

This classification is found in this form in the following places : 1-2ae, Q. 84, a. 4; 2-2ae, Q. 73, a. 3; ibid., Q. 85, a. 3, ad. 2; Q. 104, a. 3; Q. 118, a 5; Q. 152, aa. 2, 4; Q. 186, a. 7; 3 Sent. dist. 9, Q. 1, a. 3, q. 3; 4 Sent. dist. 15, Q. 1, a. 4, q. 3; Con. Gen. 3, c. 141; De Malo, Q. 8, a. 1; De Virtut, Q. 3, a. 1; Quol. 5, 6; In Rom., lec. 1, prin.; Ethic, lec. 12, princ. Elsewhere we find the division of all objects of desire into two classes, corporal and spiritual. This classification is found as follows: 2 Sent. dist. 36, a. 4; 3 Sent. dist. 29, a. 5; De Verit, Q. 14, a. 2, a. 3; De Virtut., Q. 1, a. 9, ad. 7. Again we find St. Thomas calling the summum bonum absolute good and all created things which are the objects of human desire, relative goods. 1-2ae, Q. 114, a.

10; 2-2ae, Q. 23, a. 7. Elsewhere we find him speaking of things to be believed; things to be desired; things to be done (Opus. 4). Again we find our author dividing the objects of human desires into five classes: happiness, virtue, disciplined mind, health, external goods (Con. Gen. 3, c. 141). Whatever the variations found throughout all of the writings of St. Thomas, the classification indicated above as definite seems to have established itself permanently in his thought.

1. GOODS OF THE BODY.-By the goods of the body, St. Thomas means everything connected with the physical welfare and integrity of the organism. He means those goods which appeal to both the vegetative and the sensile appetites. They are of three classes. The first is the integrity of the body, which is impaired by killing or mutilation or injury. The second is the repose of the senses, that is sensile satisfaction, which is disturbed by anything which causes pain. The third is the pleasure of physical movement, that is the free use or movement of the limbs of the body, which is interfered with by bonds, prison or physical constraint of any other kind (2-2ae, Q. 65, a. 6). Elsewhere (Con. Gen. 3, c. 34), St. Thomas describes health, beauty and strength as the chief goods of the body. The faculties involved in the forms of pleasure here referred to are the external senses, the internal apprehensive senses, the nutritive, augmentative and generative faculties, the emotions of the irascible and the concupiscible appetites, the power of locomotion, The pleasure arising from the exercise of any one of these powers or from all of them is called by St. Thomas the bonum corporis.

The most intense pleasures of the senses are those resulting from the taking of food and the sex relations (Con. Gen. 3, c. 33); that is, pleasure resulting from the exercise of those faculties which relate to the preservation of the individual and the race; conservatio individui et speciei. St. Thomas finds in the intense pleasure.