associated with these two forms of activity, nature's device to protect her purposes against too much interference on the part of the individual in making arbitrary choices. We see this in St. Thomas' doctrine of temperance, that virtue having for its mission the rational regulation of these two fundamental pleasures of man (Con. Gen. 3, c. 32). 2. GOODS OF THE MIND.-St. Thomas remarks frequently that since the nutritive and augmentative powers are common to man and plants, the distinctive pleasure of man cannot be in the exercise of these powers. Furthermore, since the sensile appetites are found in animals as well as in man, the distinctive happiness of the latter cannot consist in their exercise. Superior to the vegetative and sensitive appetites we have the rational appetite which is the crowning glory of man, in whose exercise his distinctive happiness must be found (Ethic. c. 1, lec. 10). Man's distinctive faculties are those of intellect and will. The pleasures that follow upon the satisfaction of these rational appetitive and apprehensive powers are peculiar to man. The natural appetency of the intellect inclines it towards truth or knowledge and nothing else. The natural appetency of the will inclines it toward good. Thus it is that knowledge and virtue are the goods of the mind, the objects in seeking which, man finds distinctive human happiness (1-2ae, Q. 3, a. 7; Q. 32, a. 8). a. KNOWLEDGE is either speculative, knowledge for its own sake, or practical, with a bearing on the conduct of life (1a, Q. 83, a. 1). Every individual true to his nature loves the truth and desires it more intensely than the other things of life (Opus. 73, prol.). It is only occasionally that a man hates the truth (1-2ae, Q. 29, a. 5; 22ae, Q. 15, a. 1, ad. 3). Though all men desire knowledge, many do not obtain it on account of their inability to study (2 Sent. dist. 22, Q. 2, a. 1, ad. 5). This inability arises from mental indisposition, distracting occupations or laziness (2-2ae, Q. 2, a. 4). Knowledge is ac quired through inborn genius and study (1a, Q. 117, a. 1; Poster, lec. 1), through invention and instruction (De Verit. Q. 11, a. 1). The emotional character of youth often hinders these processes to a certain extent, while moral virtues, especially chastity, facilitate them (2-2ae, Q. 15, a. 3; 4 Sent. dist. 33, Q. 3, a. 3). Knowledge is profitable when it is humble, retiring, certain, truthful, simple, charitable, useful, generous and effective (1 Cor. 8, lec. 1). It can be injurious when it hinders a man in performing his duty, makes him condemn divine things, inclines him to evil deeds (magic), when it goes to excess, or is useless (1a, Q. 22, a. 3, ad. 3; 2-2ae, Q. 167, a. 1). The whole range of knowledge falls under three classes, things to be believed, things to be desired and things to be done (Opus. 4). The most important of the practical sciences is civil knowledge. Metaphysics takes first place among the speculative sciences (Eth. lec. 2). The desire for knowledge may be re-enforced by intellectual habits or virtues-wisdom, understanding, science, prudence and art (1-2ae, Q. 57, a. 2; 2-2ae, Q. 4, a. 8). Wisdom is the greatest of the intellectual habits (1-2ae, Q. 57, a. 2), directing all others (3 Sent. dist. 34, Q. 1, a. 4). Both wisdom and knowledge are perfections of the mind (1-2ae, Q. 62, a. 2) and the absolutely wise man is he who knows the absolute highest cause. All other wisdom is relative (ibid.). b. VIRTUE. St. Thomas understands by natural virtues those moral habits by which the will is enabled to accomplish more easily the work of control over the other powers of the soul (1-2ae, Q. 55). Strictly speaking only the will or an appetitive power moved by the will can be the subject of a real habit (1-2ae, Q. 56, a. 3; 1-2ae, Q. 58, a. 1). Moral virtues are virtues strictly so-called and can be reduced (2-2ae, prol.) to the cardinal virtues, Prudence, Justice, Fortitude and Temperance (1-2ae, Q. 61, a. 2, a. 3) on which all moral life rests (3, Sent. dist. 33, Q. 2, a. 1, q. 1). These virtues help the will to regulate the passions (1-2ae, Q. 60, a. 5). In every virtue, because the will acts in view of the Final Good, one can perceive an intelligent agent, choice of good for God's sake and perseverance in good (1-2ae, Q. 100; 2-2ae, Q. 58, a. 1). For this reason also, virtuous acts are those over which the will can exercise sway and choice (1-2ae, Q. 94, a. 3). Virtues are the greatest goods in life to the man striving to live rightly (1, Sent. dist. 1, Q. 50). Moral virtues while inferior to supernatural faith, hope and love (theological virtues) (1. Tim., lec. 2) are more necessary in human life than intellectual habits (1-2ae, Q. 66, a. 3, ad. 1). The rule by which the will is guided in its government is two-fold, reason and the eternal law of God (1-2ae, QQ. 18-20). Of the moral virtues, prudence is supreme (3, Sent. dist. 33, Q. 2, ad. 1): it perfects the acts of the reason and the will (1 Sent. dist. 1, Q. 1, a. 2, ad. 2) and completes the other moral virtues (2-2ae, Q. 166, a. 2, ad. 1). No other moral virtue can exist without prudence (12ae, Q. 51, a. 5). While it is said to be an intellectual habit also it is, strictly speaking, the guide of the will in all particular things (3, Sent. dist. 33, Q. 2, a. 1), whether in the monastery, family, among citizens, soldiers or rulers (1-2ae, Q. 56, 6; 2-2ae, Q. 48). 3. EXTERNAL GOODS.-St. Thomas understands by exterior goods objects of desire which are separate from the individual. The goods of the body and goods of the mind are identified with the individual organically. The external goods of the body are persons or things. He understands by things the sum total of objects to which we give the name wealth. His term is riches. He distinguishes two kinds : natural riches, namely, meat, drink, clothing, houses, that is consumption goods; artificial riches, forms of money, or other media of exchange which are symbols of wealth. The latter are not desired normally by man except in as far as they give him access to the former. Theoretically, artificial riches are not sought except in as far as by means of them consumption goods, understood in modern economics by the term wealth, may be obtained (1-2ae, Q. 2, a. 1, ad. 3; Con. Gen. 3, c. 30). There is much in the texts of St. Thomas in reference to persons as these are necessary to the happiness of the individual. He appears to look upon friends as valuable in associated life in enabling the individual to obtain the physical goods which he needs for his continued existence. In addition he needs them that he may act well, that he may do good to them and that he may receive kindly services from them. The normal conduct of active life as well as the works of contemplative life, show forth the necesity of friendly relations in the integrity of life (1-2ae, Q. 4, a. 8; 2-2ae, QQ. 23-46; Opus. De Dilectione). The second category of external goods is that of a higher order, relating to the mind. They are honors, fame, glory and power. HONOR is the testimony or recognition of a person's excellence (3a, Q. 25, a. 1; 2-2, Q. 25, a. 1), and is shown by external signs of respect (2-2ae, Q. 103, a. 1, ad. 3; Eth. 18, prin.). It is a laudable object of desire (2-2ae, Q. 129, a. 1, ad. 3), since it is among the greatest of man's external goods (2-2ae, Q. 103, a. 1, ad. 2). It is deordinate only when not referred to God or when it is made the principal end in life (2-2ae, Q. 131, a. 1). Men are happy when they are honored (1-2ae, Q. 2 ad. 2). They desire to be honored preferably by men of wisdom and position (ibid. ad. 3). FAME is also an object of universal desire and one of the greatest goods men can possess. It is reputation (1-2ae, Q. 2), a fickle thing easily ruined by gossip (ibid.). Fame or a reputation is necessary for us. It fits us for our daily duties and prompts us to acquire virtue. For our neighbors' welfare, it is also necessary for us to acquire reputation because otherwise they may be scandalized and led into sin (2-2ae, Q. 73, a. 2, a. 3). We have a right to our reputations and no one has the privilege of ruining them either by slander, exaggerating our deficiencies, revealing secret faults, questioning motives, minimizing our good influence or by malicious silence (2-2ae, Q. 73, a. 1, ad. 3). The desire for fame or reputation is sinful when it is made the end of existence (Quol. 10, 13). GLORY is reputation accompanied by praise (2-2ae, Q. 103, a. 1, ad. 3). To desire to be well spoken of is laudable (1-2ae, Q. 2, a. 2), but it must be referred to the glory of God, utility of our neighbor or our own advancement. It may not be taken as the end of life (2-2ae, Q. 132, a. 1, ad. 1). Glory is vain when we desire to be praised for our insignificant or sinful actions; when it is sought from men alone and not from God (ibid.; De Malo, Q. 9, a. 2, ad. 1). This vain glory is dangerous because it makes one presumptious and self-confident and weakens virtue (2-2, Q. 132, a. 3, ad. 3). The following table shows the relations of the various classes of goods described by St. Thomas as objects of human desire: CLASSES OF GOODS Goods of the Body.. Goods of the Mind.. (Body.... External Mind... Things... OBJECTS Food Pleasure (Con. Gen. 3, c. 27) Health (Con. Gen. 3, c. 32) Beauty (ibid.) Strength (ibid.) Activity (2-2ae, Q. 65, a. 3) Integrity (ibid.) [Knowledge (1-2ae, Q.3, a. 7; ibid.Q. 32, a .8) Meat (Ia, Q. 78, a. 2, ad. 4; Q. 97, a. 3, a. 4) Clothing (2-2ae, Q. 169, a. 1) Money (1-2ae, Q. 2, a. 1; 2—2ae, Q. 118) Persons.. {Friends (2—2ae; QQ. 23-46; 1—2ae,Q.4, a. 8) (Honor (1-2ae, Q. 2, a. 2) (Things...) Fame (1-2ae, q. 2, a. 2) Glory (Con. Gen. 3, c. 29) Persons.. Friends (2-2ae, QQ. 23–46) God (ibid.; De Dilectione) |