In the Thomas with sufficient basis of classification. system of St. Thomas we meet God everywhere. In the system of Ward we meet Him nowhere except to find His existence denied. According to St. Thomas, the fundamental purpose of nature is different in each form of existence. That is to say in each succeeding grade of life there is besides the purpose of the lower grades, another external purpose united with its own specific purpose. Thus if A represents the purpose of nature in vegetative life; B, that of nature for sensitive life; and C, that of nature for rational life, the purpose of nature in vegetative life is A. That of nature in sensitive life is A plus B, B conditioning A. The purpose of nature in rational life is A plus B plus C, C conditioning both A and B. Since man is A plus B plus C, we may say that one purpose of nature is the preservation of the individual and of the race. But we cannot say with Professor Ward that the fundamental purpose of nature including man, is the preservation of the individual and of the race. It does not escape St. Thomas' attention that the activities related to the preservation of the individual and of the race frequently interfere with and disturb the activities of intellect and will in man. It is the whole man that acts. Man is not pure reason nor pure animal. In the order of dignity and in relation to destiny the rational side of man is supreme. Hence in the mind of St. Thomas, the existence of the individual and of the race contributes to progress just in proportion as the individual is spiritualized, moralized, and kept through regulated conduct in touch with God and subject to his known moral law. "In all series of agents and causes of change, the end of the prime agent and mover must be the ultimate end of all, as the end of the general is the end of all the soldiers who serve under him. But among all the component parts of man we find the intellect to be the superior moving power: for the intellect moves the appetite, putting the object before it; and the intellectual ap petite moves the sensile appetites, the irascible and the concupiscible, the sensile appetite crowned by the consent of the will proceeds to move the body. The end, therefore, of the intellect is the end of all human actions. But the end and good of the intellect is truth. Therefore, the last end of the whole man and his activities and desires is to know the first truth which is God" (Con. Gen. 3, c. 25). When discussing the purpose of the individual as distinct from the purpose of the race our two authors agree in substance if not in spirit. Desires are understood in largely the same way as will be seen by a comparison of the table to follow. Both of our authors hold that happiness is the end of the individual. They agree in understanding the function of pleasure as related to desire. They disagree fundamentally in the functions placed upon desires and in the moral interpretation of the relation of these to life as a whole. "All motives whatever are desires, and their satisfaction becomes an end of conation. In man, too, the satisfaction of desire in general, which in each particular case is attended with, or rather consists in, pleasure, acquires, in consequence of the highly derivative and greatly varied character of his desires, a distinctive name, not applicable to animals, and is called happiness. So far as the direct purposes of the sociologist are concerned, therefore, the ultimate end of conation is happiness" (Dynamic Sociology, II, p. 94). Happiness is "Excess of pleasure or enjoyment over pain or discomfort" (Dynamic Sociology, II, p. 108). St. Thomas holds likewise that "Every action is the result of man's desire for happiness" (1-2ae, Q. 1, a. 1). Happiness, according to him, means the satisfaction of desires through action. Pleasure is the natural concomitant but pleasure coming from the satisfaction of desires to do God's will is often obtained at the cost of bodily pain. Pleasure is the object of action in a limited way but not alone physical pleasure. St. Thomas might agree with Ward in saying that happiness is the preponderance of pleasure over pain, but the latter would have in mind pleasure unrelated to God whereas the former, true to his system of thought, conceives of no pleasure as true pleasure except when interpreted in its ultimate relation to God in human life. The following table indicates the scope of Ward's classification and the places in St. Thomas where the subjects listed in Dynamic Sociology, Vol. I, are treated. PROFESSOR WARD A. ESSENTIAL FORCES ST. THOMAS I. Presevative Forces might be called nutri- (la, Q. 78, a. 1, a.2) (2) Negative securing protection (cold) Art (Industrial p. 486) Property (493) in the intelligent Parasitic Acquisition Robbery and theft (583) Priestcraft (587) Monopoly (590) II. Reproductive Forces operating for the (2-2ae, Q. 64) (ibid.) (1a, Q. 11, a. 1; 2-2ae, Q.25, a.7) (ibid. Q. 66) (1-2ae, QQ.90-108) (2-2ae, Q.66) (Opus. 20; 2-2ae, Q. 40) future (598) preserving the race (ibid.) (1a, Q. 78, a. 1, a. 2) and considered as (1) Direct-results flowing from sexual instinct (p. 603) (2) Indirect-dependent on generative (1a, QQ. 98-101) PROFESSOR Ward B. NON-ESSENTIAL FORCES-not indispensable to the life of either the individual or species (665). All are reducible to a physical basis (666) and are localized in the body (ibid.) and are divided into ST. THOMAS I. Aesthetic Forces-love of the beau- (1-2ae, Q. 27, a. 1, ad. 3) account for (1) Fine arts that appeal to the eye (669), Sculpture, Paint- (2) Fine arts appealing to the (ibid.) II. Moral Forces-meaning all the (la, Q. 81) sequences (675). (1) Love Forces (including op- (1-2ae, Q. 22–49) posite, hate forces-676) (2) Fear Forces (1-2ae; QQ. 41–45) Self Love (679) Physical anticipating bodily results (682) man (ibid.) animals (ibid.) inanimate na ture (686) and spiritual beings (687) or disease. (1a, QQ. 106–115) Psychical of a religious nature immortality, on which all religion is III. Intellectual-source of man's su periority (697) and include Love of acquiring knowledge (la, Q. 75, a.6) Our two authors disagree fundamentally in philosophy and in the moral interpretation of life. Ward concludes his thinking with a concept of race progress. This requires that he exalt individual and race preservation into primacy in his system. His conception of progress is expressed in the terms of a continually improving human race. The essence of this improvement lies in the increasing mastery of man over nature, the widening of the horizon of life of the individual which in turn is accomplished by the strengthening of the non-essential or ameliorating forces, namely, the esthetic, the moral and the intellectual powers. While both of them necessarily disagree in understanding the nature and function of free will, this difference does not result in important discrepancies in the descriptive portion of their systems in as far at least as the observation and explanation of desires are concerned. St. Thomas agrees in making the functions of the individual and race preservation fundamental in life. But this view of them is essentially moral or directive. He at no time separates these processes from their relation to the understanding and unfolding of the will of God in human life as a whole and the interpretation of life as the progressive revelation of the divine will on the part of the individual. St. Thomas does not present to us any clear conception of human progress as the term is now understood. He gives us a theoretical concept of it in which its standard is derived from the relation of the individual to the realization of the will of God for that individual. We miss in Ward the clearcut and suggestive analytical view of appetency which is the heart of the Thomistic exposition. On the other hand, we miss in St. Thomas the thoroughgoing recognition of the esthetic forces such as is found in the system of Ward. The two are practically agreed in their explanation of the nature and functions of pleasure, but St. Thomas is led irresistibly to throw the atmosphere of ultimate spiritual interpretation around his treatment. This we miss in the work of Dr. Ward, who does not carry the thought beyond a conception of race progress. The work of interpreting the thought of each in the language of the other is beyond present purpose. Opportunity to make that study conveniently is offered in the above table. In the main, this dissertation is prompted by the hope that modern sociology may find it to its advantage to acquaint itself more thoroughly with our old theological |