It must be kept in mind that St. Thomas viewed his work in social philosophy as a subsidiary portion of his theological view of life. In his mind, all life is a journey from God to God. He was interested in secular knowledge and utilized it only as it took position and served purpose in his cosmic philosophy. The moral spiritual point of view governed him.

St. Thomas' discussions of the subjective and the objective classifications of human desire are found chiefly in the Summa Theologica. In this great work, he constructs a scientific Christian philosophy of life. He does this by working into harmony the rational philosophy of Aristotle and the traditional Catholic theology which reached for the first time, full expression in his great work. Much material is to be found also in the Contra Gentiles, his Commentaries of Aristotle's Books, in his Scripture Commentaries, and Questiones Disputatae. In order to find the exact mind of St. Thomas regarding both the subjective and the objective classifications of desires, it was necessary to make a search of all of his writings. While his system of thought came to complete expression in only the Summa, he drew upon his vast range of information and his remarkable insight very frequently in the occasional writings which he left. There are to be found from time to time apparent discrepancies throughout the thirty-six volumes which he left, which after careful examination prove to be mainly nominal. Not only that, but in the course of his lifetime, St. Thomas had occasion to change his views. He takes great care to inform his reader of this whenever it occurs. The exposition of his doctrine which is here offered is the result of as careful a search of all of his writings as has been possible and of a faithful endeavor to discover the final views which he developed in his maturer life and to which he held.

A moral purpose governed St. Thomas in all of his study of human action whether individual or social. He

discusses and classifies human desires because ill regulated desire leads to sin and properly regulated desire leads to virtue. Sin and virtue are the ultimate terms in which he thinks of and describes human conduct. Modern sociology is in the main analytical and descriptive. Attempts to classify human desires result from the wish to discover categories of human action, methods by which we may classify and through classification understand the marvellous complex of life known as human society. An interesting discussion of the relations of ethics and sociology may be found in Small, General Sociology, pp. 653ff. See also Chicago University Decennial Publications, 1 S. vol. IV. Small, The Significance of Sociology for Ethics.

SUBJECTIVE CLASSIFICATION OF DESIRES IN

ST. THOMAS.

I.

PRINCIPLES OF CLASSIFICATION.

St. Thomas refers human action to the human soul. (1-2ae, Q. 37, a. 1). This simple spiritual substance is the remote principle of all action. In order to exercise its inherent powers it uses different channels or faculties. These are called the powers of the soul and are the proximate sources of action (1a, Q. 77, a. 1). These powers are distinguished from the essence of the soul although they are inherent in it (ibid.). They are related among themselves (1a, Q. 77, a. 7), being distinct from one another and of different dignities (1a, Q. 77, a. 4). These faculties are of two kinds; through some of them the soul executes an action while through others it is acted upon by another agent.1 (De Verit., Q. 25, a. 2; Q. 16, a. 1.) The powers of the soul are drawn into action by the stimulus of their proper objects. They in turn stir the soul to action.

The soul is the vivifying principle of the material body; hence, it is the sustaining element of the body's vegetative and sensile life. It has also its peculiar spiritual activity. St. Thomas holds that human action is the combined result of interaction of soul and body and that, therefore, it is not correct to say that the intellect understands and the will wishes. His definite principle covering this point is, "Actiones sunt suppositorum." Man acts. It is the concrete individual who understands through the intellect and wishes through the action of the will. St. Thomas teaches that human action is neither en

1 Modern Psychology in general repudiates this faculty theory of the soul, substituting for it a function theory. The most distinguished defender of it according to the mind of St. Thomas is Cardinal Mercier, who is the leader of the Neo Scholastic movement.

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tirely angelic nor totally animal, but that it is on the confines of the spiritual and the bodily natures and that both kinds of powers meet in the soul (1a, Q. 77, a. 2). Its simple spirituality can be reconciled with its varied activities only by assuming the existence of many different powers distinguished from one another by the nature of the object which stimulates them to act. In other words, the faculties of the soul are distinguished by their activities, and these activities are distinguished by their proper objects (1a, Q. 77, a. 3). Thus we see that the subjective and the objective classifications of desires are fundamental throughout the system of St. Thomas. Certain faculties, intellect and will, are complete acts of the soul and are situated in the soul itself; others, the vegetative and sensile faculties, are situated in the composite being (1a, Q. 77, a. 5). All of them depend on the soul as their principle of emanation (1a, Q. 77, a. 8).

St. Thomas presents his fundamental classification as follows (1a, Q. 78, a. 1):

Utrum quinque genera potentiarum animae sint distinguenda. Respondeo dicendum quod quinque sunt genera potentiarum animae, quae numerata sunt;-tres vero dicuntur animae;-quatuor vero dicuntur modi vivendi.

Et hujus diversitatis ratio est, quia diversae animae distinguuntur secundum quod diversimode operatio animae supergreditur operationem naturae corporalis. Tota enim natura corporalis subjacet animae, et comparatur ad ipsam sicut materia et instrumentum. Est ergo quaedam operatio animae quae in tantum excedit naturam corpoream, quod neque etiam exercetur per organum corporale; et talis est operatio animae rationalis. Est autem alia operatio animae infra istam, quae quidem fit per organum corporale, non tamen per aliquam corpoream qualitatem; et talis est operatio animae sensibilis; quia etsi calidum, et frigidum, et humidum, et siccum, et aliae hujusmodi qualitates corporeae, requirantur ad operationem sensus; non tamen ita quod mediante virtute talium qualitatum operatio animae sensibilis procedat, sed requiruntur solum ad debitam dispositionem organi. Infima autem operationum animae est quae fit per organum corporeum, et virtute corporeae qualitatis. Supergreditur tamen operationem naturae corporeae; quia motiones corporum sunt ab exteriori principio; hujusmodi autem operationes sunt a principio intrinseco, hoc enim commune est omnibus operationibus animae. Omne autem animatum aliquo modo movet seipsum; et talis est operatio

animae vegetabilis. Digestio enim, et ea quae consequuntur, fit înstrumentaliter per actionem caloris, ut dicitur in 2 de Anima, text. 50.

Genera vero potentiarum animae distinguuntur secundum objecta. Quanto enim potentia est altior, tanto respicit universalius objectum, ut supra dictum est, quaest. praec., art. 3, ad. 4. Objectum autem operationis animae in triplici ordine potest considerari. Alicujus enim potentiae animae objectum est solum corpus animae unitum; et hoc genus potentiarum animae dicitur vegetativum; non emim vegetativa potentia agit nisi in corpus cui anima unitur. Est autem aliud genus potentiarum animae quod respicit adhuc universalius objectum, scilicet omne corpus sensibile, et non solum corpus animae unitum. Est autem aliud genus potentiarum animae quod respicit adhuc universalius objectum, scilicet non solum corpus sensibile, sed etiam universaliter omne ens. Ex quo patet quod ista duo secunda genera potentiarum animae habent operationem non solum respectu rei conjunctae, sed etiam respectu rei extrinsecae. Cum autem oporteat operans aliquo modo conjungi suo objecto, circa quod operatur, necesse est extrinsecam rem, quae est objectum operationis animae, secundum duplicem rationem ad animam comparari. Uno modo secundum quod nata est animae conjungi, et in anima esse per suam similitudinem; et quantum ad hoc sunt duo genera potentiarum, scilicet sensitivum respectu objecti minus communis, quod est corpus sensibile; et intellectivum respectu objecti communissimi, quod est ens universale. Alio vero modo secundum quod ipsa anima inclinatur et tendit in rem exteriorem; et secundum hanc etiam comparationem sunt duo genera potentiarum animae: unum quidem, scilicet appetitivum, secundum quod anima comparatur ad rem extrinsecam ut ad finem, qui est primum in intentione; aliud autem motivum secundum locum, prout anima comparatur ad rem exteriorem sicut ad terminum operationis et motus. Ad consequendum enim aliquod desideratum et intentum omne animal movetur. Modi vero vivendi distinguuntur secundum gradus viventium. Quaedam enim viventia sunt in quibus est tantum vegetativum, sicut in plantis. Quaedam vero, in quibus cum vegetativo est etiam sensitivum, non tamen motivum secundum locum, sicut sunt immobilia animalia, ut conchilia. Quaedam vero sunt quae supra hoc habent motivum secundum locum, ut perfecta animalia, quae multis indigent ad suam vitam; et ideo indigent motu, ut vitae necessaria procul posita. quaerere possint. Quaedam vero viventia sunt in quibus cum his est intellectivum, scilicet in hominibus. Appetitivum autem non constituit aliquem gradum viventium: quia in quibuscumque est sensus, est etiam appetitus, ut dicitur in 2 de Anima, text. 27.

From this text we find that our author describes five different kinds of objects around which the power of the soul is focused. The soul cares for the material welfare of the body which stands between it and the outer world. This class of powers is called vegetative. It includes