the content of these symbols into a congruous whole, into something that is intelligible as a whole. And if we condemn such a work of art, it is not because the form has no content or because the ideas of the artist as such are incongruous (we may not know what those ideas are), but because the form as expressive of a content, or the idea as seen in the form, is unintelligible. "Ja, das Aeussere soll der Künstler darstellen!" exclaims Goethe. "Aber was ist das Aeussere einer organischen Natur anders, als die ewig veränderte Erscheinung der Innern? ........indem beide Bestimmungen, die äussere und die innere, im ruhigsten Daseyn so wie in der stärksten Bewegung, stets im unmittelbarsten Verhältnisse stehen."22 Form considered in this light—and we think it cannot be otherwise considered when there is question of a concrete work of art becomes a matter of great importance, of identical importance with the content. Thus Francis Thompson says well: "This is a concrete example of an abstract principle-the supreme necessity under which truth is bound to give itself a definite shape. Of such immutable importance is form that without this effigy and witness of spirit, spirit walks invisible among men."23 Some persons might object to the above by referring to different phases of art such as Futurist music, Cubist art, or Imagist poetry, which are frequently condemned for their lack of form, for an utter disregard or contempt of form on the part of the artists. But the latter do not ignore form, they cannot; they can only ignore the conventional rules of artistic form. If their form expresses just what is in their mind, it fulfills its office, and the question turns rather on the content that the form expresses, which may, as we said before, appear incongruous to the general mind, or even incomprehensible. Form is as it were a lens through which the intuition of the artist is visible. A misconception, however, may easily arise out of what we have said of the inseparability of content and form, unless we explain further. When Croce says that intuition and expression are identical and convertible, he refers to the internal expression in the artist's mind. That there is such an internal Stuttgart u. Tübingen 1885. 22 Sämmtliche Werke, v, 198. expression as soon as we have an intuition seems undoubtable, if we recall that intuition here means an immediate mental apprehension. When we spoke of form above, we meant rather the external expression of this internal expression, and by the inseparability of the form from content we meant, that no given concrete form can be said to be without content, not that a content can be expressed in only one definite external form. There may be, in fact, a great deal of difference between the external form given to the same intuition or internal expression by different persons or at different times, as another factor comes into play here, the technical skill of the artist. Some persons have made the essence of art consist in the technical skill by which an artist can portray symbols in a most perfect manner; and this opinion is the more readily taken up, just because no concrete form is devoid of content. But the accepted meaning of art requires something more than mere imitation on the part of the artist, something more personal, the impress of which is visible in the symbols he chooses, in their arrangement, etc.-in other words, it requires a mental content shining out of the whole. It is the technical skill which enables the artist to externalize his intuition, to reproduce his internal expression. That art would then be the most perfect as art in which the external form exactly reproduces the internal expression of the artist, or of his intuition if these two are really identical as Croce says.24 Technical skill, then, does not make the artist, and persons spend years in becoming proficient in it without becoming artists. Nevertheless it is indispensable for a perfect externalization of an artistic intuition and is therefore a necessary condition of true art. This fact Brownson apparently neglected, since he emphasized so much the importance of content and the insignificance of the form. James Sulley in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, article "Aesthetics," says that "aesthetic contemplation is marked off from the arduous mental work which enters into the pursuit of knowl 24 An opinion not infrequently found is that the external form never equals, but only approaches, the internal expression. Francis Thompson, e. g., writes: "In Painting and Music the same thing holds good. In both there is the conception (a term perhaps less suggesting unreality than the term 'ideal') with its material expression; and between these two stages a mental expression which the material expression cannot realize." Op. cit., iii, 85. edge;" again, "aesthetic experience is clearly marked off from practical life, with its urgent desires and the rest." He here touches upon a point that is often brought forth with regard to art, that a work of art should be intelligible at first sight under proper conditions. The same is well expressed by Saint Thomas when he calls the beautiful that which pleases when seen (i. e., perceived). This view of art, considered from the side of the artist, is just what Croce refers to when he says that artistic expression is intuition, that it is immediate apprehension. But we think he goes too far when he wishes to exclude reasoning and reflection from pure artistic expression. If the intuition is immediate apprehension of some idea or ideal, it may nevertheless be the result of a process of reasoning; it may happen that only after strenuous reflection does an idea strike us clearly and forcibly. Nevertheless this intuition, no matter how obtained, is commonly believed to be at the basis of all art. For, what is ordinarily meant when we say that an artist has an inspiration, unless that a mental vision has impresed itself forcibly on him? Again, when we speak of the unity in art, does it not mean that art is the expression of a mental vision apprehended as a single moment, and not of a process of reasoning as such, which is the essence of the scientific treatise? We said above that the inspiration or intuition of the artist may have struck him after a process of profound reasoning. It may also have been possible to him only on acount of his deep erudition; and then we may have a work of art that requires a high culture on the part of the beholder for its appreciation, and we have at times works that can never receive general appreciation. Thus arises what Tolstoi deprecates so vigorously-a species of art for the educated classes. We find here, too, an explanation of the fact that works of art range from the very simple to the very profound. In general, art should be intelligible to any person of sufficient culture by an act of immediate apprehension since it is the expresion of a single instant of mental vision. Here we again see the absolute importance of form and of a requisite technical skill, since it is the form alone that conveys this vision immediately to the beholder. It is this expression of an intuition in art, of a personal mental vision of the artist, that has given to artistic production the term creative. This point is emphasized strongly by Brownson, who makes it a distinguishing feature of art that it be the expression of a personal idea, and not imitation. That the highest form of art does not consist in mere imitation, "the mere photographic representation of external objects," as Francis Thompson calls it, is hardly a matter of discussion. "Every important piece of literature, as every important work of plastic art," says Mr. Brownell, “is the expression of a personality, and it is not the material of it, but the mind behind it, that invites critical interpretation."25 Mr. Woodberry voices a common sentiment when he says: "I should be ill-content if works of art, taken individually, yielded to the critic only a momentary experience of the senses and the feelings, as if they who merely disparate objects of nature. I desire to know their meaning to the soul."26 Even Pater, who is often hailed as a great exponent of art for art's sake, says, after mentioning the "absolute correspondence of term to import," of form to content, as the condition of all good art: "Good art, but not necessarily great art; the distinction between great art and good art depending immediately, as regards literature at all events, not on its form, but on the matter."27 We have distinguished between art as expressing a personal, spiritual content and art as mere imitation because the advocates of the latter viewpoint as a rule extol fineness of imitation to the extent of making the content a matter to be ignored. Ruskin calls that art greatest "which conveys to the mind of the spectator, by any means. whatever, the greatest number of the greatest ideas."28 The words "by any means whatever" include imitation; and all art does imitate in as far as it copies its symbols from nature. Just to what extent art can be satisfied with imitating nature is a question that leads to the discussion of the relation betwen art and nature. There is a bond of sympathy, writes Brother Azarias, between man and nature, which is strong and wholesome when properly regulated, but can develop into a kind of reverie in which the soul loses itself as it were in a sentimental abandonment.29 25 Criticism, p. 16. New York 1914. 26 Two Phases of Criticism, p. 31. Boston 1914. 27 Appreciations, pp. 35-6. New York 1897. 28 Works, iii, 92. London 1903. 29 Phases of Thought and Criticism, p. 37. Boston 1893. Chateaubriand speaks of "the instinctive melancholy" in a man who communes with nature, "which makes him harmonize with the scenery of nature.' "30 But nature also has something that refreshes and inspires. And if the artist seizes upon scenes that thus affect him, and tries to reproduce them with their effect, his work cannot be excluded entirely from art, as Brownson would require. Even if the poet sings: But imitative strokes can do no more Than please the eye-sweet Nature every sense. The cheering fragrance of her dewy vales, even if the philosopher concludes: "If Art were reduced to the imitation of Nature, to mere copying, Nature would soon supersede it, for the simple reason that the artist would be eliminated from his Art. His humanity and individuality, the interpretative glance that comes from within, the creation of the 'inner eye,' would be lost in the cold reflection or mirroring of external facts; "32-the exclusion of such work from art seems an extreme view. We believe that no serious man will select a scene of nature for reproduction unless it means something to him above the ordinary. And in so far as it does mean something above the ordinary to him, his work will come under the title of art, though it cannot rank high as creative art since the scope left to expressing himself is reduced to a minimum. Even in portrait painting, where the artist cannot well select the object to be painted, he is not satisfied with copying mere externals. He fixes in his mind the mental quality, the character trait, that is to shine through the portrait, and this he strives to embody as perfectly as possible. The relation between nature and art is really very close. The artist not only cannot ignore nature-and here we mean the world with all that is in it-but is unable to get along without nature, for from the latter alone does he draw the material with which he works. Jungmann says well of the artist: "Er studirt diese Gesetze ["des zufälligen Seyns"] und ihren Ausdruck in 30 Genius of Christianity, p. 302. Baltimore 1864. 31 Cowper, The Task, bk. i, 11. 426-431. 32 Knight, The Philosophy of the Beautiful, ii, 24. New York 1898. |