der sichtbaren Natur und im Leben der Menschen; diesselben sind die nothwendigen Normen aller seiner Gebilde:........weil sie [i. e., die Gebilde] aus Erscheinungen bestehen, welche gleichfalls dem Gebiete der Natur und des menschlichen Lebens angehören, und sich darum nicht anders als nach jenen Gesetzen bilden lassen."33 Thus the artist is limited to nature as he sees it within and without himself for the ways and means of externalizing his intuition. Knight says: "In so far as it deals with the actual world, all Art must spring from existing fact. It must rise from a basis of natural reality, and it must be true to fact even when it transcends it."34 This transcending of art above nature raises a question that has met with an immeasurable amount of discussion. Aristotle was probably the first to claim that true art is an improvement upon nature, that nature, especially man in all his activities, must be depicted not merely as he is, but as he ought to be. Brownson espoused this view heart and soul to the extent of denying true beauty-the essence of art for him-to any work that did not portray the natural in its proper relation to the supernatural. Brownson, indeed, claimed at times that art should present real life; but these works had a meaning of their own when he thus used them. Coleridge, in speaking of the Shakespearean drama, said that it "was to present a model by imitation of real life, taking from real life all that in it which it ought to be, and supplying the rest."35 Only in a similar equivoke did Brownson claim that art should portray real life, or life as it really ought to be. And when he claimed that youth should become acquainted with life as found in the world, he again made the reservation that this should be portrayed from the viewpoint of its eternal value. It seems to us that the question of realism and idealism is not so much one concerning the presence of artistic quality, but rather one concerning the degree in which that quality is present. If an artist intends to portray a phase of life just as he has found it, the reason is because this phase has impressed itself vividly on his mind, and because he wishes to communicate his impression through his art. In that way it may easily happen, as Brown 33 Aesthetik, 2. Bd., s. 133. Freiburg im Breisgan 1886. 34 Op. cit., ii, 56. 35 Essays and Lectures on Shakespeare, p. 178. Everyman's Library. son asserts, that the so-called realists who portray only the coarse side of life may inculcate the doctrine that this is the only aspect of life, that there is nothing higher. But even this does not destroy the presence of artistic quality in their work, in as far as it is the externalization of a mental impression. Realism, then, also has a tinge of the subjective in it, just as idealism cannot wholly abstract from objective nature but is to some extent limited to it. "Pray, sir," we read in Plato's Republic, "do not have the strange notion that we ought to beautify the eyes to such a degree that they are no longer eyes."36 From all that has been said so far, it is evident that the essence of art in its common acceptation, or rather of artistic activity, lies in the act of embodying in a sensible form some internal vision or intuition of the artist. It is hard, however, to make the whole of art, as Croce does, consist merely in this intuition just because the intuition is identical with internal expression. For that leaves out entirely the question of externalization, of skill in execution, which is after all a conditio sine qua non for the production of a work of art. The work of art, then, is the expression by means of sensible signs of some intuition arising or excited in the artist's mind. This definition leaves out of question many things that must still be discussed. It accords with Brownson when he says that art content may be morally good or bad, though not when he immediately turns about in a characteristic way to state that real art is always good and that the bad is not true art. The question of artistic activity leaves out of consideration the ethical quality of the intuition. The artistic activity, the externalization of an intuition or mental vision, is the factor that decides whether a work is art or not. It separates works of art from all other works. Ethics or morality has no word in deciding the presence or artistic activity in a work; and it is the recognition of this that gives rise to phrases like that of "perverted genius" -but genius nevertheless. Even he whose religious delicacy is most shocked by some parts of Byron's Vision of Judgment cannot deny the presence of great genius in the work. The intuitional activity that we claim for art is in some degree present for all men. All men have the faculty of im 36 The Dialogues of Plato, ii, 244. Boston (191?). mediate apprehension, though not to the same extent. However, artistic expression refers not to this ordinary intuition, but by common acceptation only to those intuitions that exceed the ability of the ordinary mind. The difference between the two kinds of intuition is not one of intensity, as Croce carefully points out, since every immediate apprehension as such must have clearness; but it is one of quantity or extent. The artistic genius is capable of visions beyond those of the ordinary mind; it reaches a field inaccessible to the latter. In contradistinction to the ordinary intuition, this power of artistic intuition is well termed creative. And that artistic genius is the greatest which possesses this creative power in the greatest degree, which is capable of intuitions that transcend the intuitive ability of the common man to the greatest extent. According to the amount of this intuition portrayed in them, works of art range from those of highest artistic genius to those that take their position just above the border line, that are just beyond the limits of mere "photographic reproduction." If in the definition of the greatest genius as the one who possesses the greatest creative power, we should substitute for 'creative power' the 'power of seeing the highest beauty as identical with truth and goodness,' we should almost be using Brownson's exact words. With his idea of genius we thus agree in as far as the nature of the activity is concerned. But why the same high degree of intuition should not be the mark of genius when the intuition is not that of highest beauty, we cannot understand. Genius then, the faculty of extraordinary intuitions, is hardly something that can be acquired; and a natural foundation must always be in the mind before a genius can be developed. Development is only a natural result of the proper exercise of any faculty. However, the development of the genius also means the general development of the artist's mind and soul, so that he is better able to act as judge regarding his own intuitions and the advisability and the manner of their externalization. We do not consider this genius in an artist to be anything very different from that which is commonly termed his personality. "The intervention of genius," writes Mr. Woodberry, "has charged phenomena with something new, vital and trans forming, namely, with its own personality."37 That which marks off the genius of the artist is at the same time the mark of his personality, as it is of his originality. For any mark that points to great intuitional power also shows us what is distinctive of the person possessing that power, and these two combined decide the originality. We agree with Brownson that originality does not consist alone in expressing things that were never expressed before. "The most peculiar and characteristic mark of genius is insight into subjects which are dark to ordinary vision," said Patmore,38 and he should probably have added more explicitly: not always insight into subjects ordinarily dark but often a new view of a subject well known-"a fresh aspect of something old, not a discovery of something new," as Wright expressed it.39 Guyau makes the "ensemble des idées et sentiments de son époque" constitute the matter of the artist, and he adds: "la marque de génie est précisément de trouver une forme nouvelle que la connaissance de la matière donnée n'aurait pas fait prévoir."40 In the above paragraphs almost nothing was said of restrictions to be laid on art. And in so far as the artistic activity is concerned there are practically no limitations. "The world of art," as Mr. Woodberry says, "is the place of the spirit's freedom; there the soul criticizes the world, accepts and rejects it, amends it, has its own will with it as if it were clay, and remakes it."41 And Marshall says: "This art impulse is blindly instinctive in its simplicity, with no end in view at all beyond the completion of its work."42 That may be true as far as the 'impulse' is concerned, but there are other considerations which the artist himself cannot neglect if he wishes to be successful. The artistic activity is only one side of artthe basic consideration, if you will, which distinguishes art from non-art. But no artist producing works is without the hope of having his art appreciated by others. Without an audience to which it is to address itself, art really has little reason for existing. Judging from this side, we can say, not 37 Op. cit., p. 21. Boston 1895. 38 Principle in Art, p. 44. London 1890. 41 Op. cit., p. 30. 42 Op. cit., p. 164. without right, that a work of art is nothing but what it means to those who behold it, has little value beyond its meaning to the artist's fellowmen. The matter is not closed when we say that the artist's creative ability must surpass that of the ordinary man; for the work of art necessarily must be confined within reach of the receptive ability, if not of all men, always of some, and must be judged also from the manner in which it affects its beholders. This side of art must also be considered by every theory of aesthetics that aims at completeness. In fact, for the critic of art it is by far the more important side, and probably for this reason was emphasized so strongly by Brownson. 3.-ART IN ITS EFFECT Art does not exist, then, merely as an activity on the part of the artist. The latter externalizes his intuitions for the purpose of communicating them to his fellowmen. His mental vision, his inner experience, has a special value for him, a value that also exists for others; and he produces his work of art in order to have his fellowmen experience what he saw or felt. The intuition communicated is always a single crosssection of life, a real or imaginary vision of some concrete instance of life. Even if the intuition is that of a general truth, of a universal principle of life, it is only under the guise of an individual manifestation, a concrete example, that art by its very nature can portray these general ideas or truths. Art in its form or symbols copies from nature; and as in nature, especially human nature, each individual action is the manifestation of an attitude of life underlying it, so also in art. The latter cannot avoid the issues of individual life. Whatever vision an artist communicates to his audience is accompanied by an attitude of life. It is this accompaniment of art that gives to it a mission, if we should really use the term. Brownson insisted very strongly on the individuality of art, and on the fact that, as a natural consequence of this, a work of art like every other human activity has a social, ethical bearing. Even if the inculcation of views is not the avowed purpose of the artist, this effect will always exist at least as an unconscious |