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F.C.

R. v. THE

CENTRAL CANE
PRICES BOARD
AND OTHERS,
Ex parte THE
COLONIAL SUGAR

REFINING
COMPANY
LIMITED.

21st April, and if by the Central Board, as soon as possible
after delegation or appeal from the Local Board. The power
of the Central Board, on delegation or on appeal, is co-extensive
with the jurisdiction of a Local Board-s. 5, subsec. 2, ss. 8, and
14-but the period of action must necessarily in some cases be
extended. The prosecutors were not refused a hearing. The
settling of issues is, by reg. 11, in the discretion of the Chairman.
Evidence was taken on the cost of production until it was
apparent that such evidence was unreliable and of no use, and
there is no rule which compels a Court to continue to receive
evidence which cannot be of assistance or value to it. Section
12 does not expressly or by implication require "inquiry
into cost of production." The returns made under the
regulations are sufficient. Regulations (General), regs. 1 to 4.
No benefit can possibly result by compelling the Board by
mandamus to receive evidence which is valuless or so unreliable
that it cannot be taken into consideration. Neither prohibition
nor mandumus nor certiorari lies to the Central Board. It is not
a Court. The mere refusal to hear evidence is not a ground
for
any of these remedies. R. v. The Justices of Ravenswood (1),
Ex parte Minister for Lands (2), Ex parte Bennett (3), Throop
on Public Officers, p. 839; Ex parte Alldrett (4), Spring Valley
Waterworks v. Bartlett (5), Halsbury, Laws of England, Vol. X.,
p. 151; The Queen v. Local Government Board (6), R. v.
Licensing Authority of Roma (7), Federated Sawmill Employees of
Australasia v. James Moore & Sons Proprietary Ltd. (8). Costs
should not be given against the Board. Rieken v. Yorke Peninsula
Justices (9), Clancy's Case (10), The King v. The Industrial
Court (11); The Sugar Growers Act, 1913; Local Government
Board v. Arlidge (12), Tramways' Case, No. 2 (13), R. v.
Yaldwyn (14), Leake on Contracts, 6th Ed., p. 492; Clifford v.
Watts (15), R. v. Arndel (16).

Wassell and Hobbs showed cause on behalf of certain canegrowers supplying cane to the Goondi and the Hambledon Mills. Stumm K.C., in reply: As to the remedy, The Queen v. Electoral

(1) 1903, St. R. Qd. 158, at p. 161.
(2) 1896, 17 N.S.W.L.R. 394.
(3) 1898, 19 N.S.W.L.R. 139.
(4) 1898, 15 N.S.W. W.N. 43.
(5) 63 Cala. 245.

(6) 1882, 10 Q.B.D. 309.

(7) 1908, St. R. Qd. 97.

(8) 1909, 8 C.L.R. 465.

(9) [1908] A.C. 454.
(10) 1904, 1 C.L.R. 181.
(11) 1915, St. R. Qd. 165.
(12) [1915] A.C. 120.
(13) 1914, 19 C.L.R. 43.

(14) 1889, 3 Q.L.J. 144.

(15) 1870, L.R. 5 C.P. 588.

(16) 1906, 3 C.L.R. 557, at p. 571.

1917.

Justices of Toombul (1), Clancy's Case (2), The Queen v. Local
Government Board (3), Tramways' Case, No. 1 (4), Halsbury,
Vol. X., pp. 151, 142; Baxter v. N.S.W. Clickers' Association (5),
Curlewis and Edwards on Prohibition, pp. 216, 217; Halsbury,
Vol. X., pp. 142-3; White v. Steele (6), R. v. Marsham (7),
Sydney Corporation v. Harris (8), Halsbury, Vol. X., p. 161;
R. v. Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, Ex parte
Broken Hill Proprietary Ltd. (9), In re Scadden (10), R. v.
Woodhouse (11), Leeds Corporation v. Ryder (12).

The judgment of the Court was read by

:

C.A.V.

LUKIN J. These are a series of motions by the prosecutors to make absolute rules nisi calling upon the Central Sugar Cane Prices Board and the Chairman and the respective members thereof, and certain other persons-in each case the representatives of the growers to show cause why writs of prohibition and, cumulatively or alternatively, writs of certiorari and mandamus should not issue to such Board in connection with certain awards in respect of certain mills owned by the prosecutors, such awards being made under the provisions of the Regulation of Sugar Cane Prices Act of 1915 for the season of 1916, and the Central Board, purporting to act, either under delegated authority from, or on default of, or on appeal from Local Boards. The object of such motions is to procure relief against the operation of such awards, the validity of which is challenged on several grounds. Most of these grounds are common to all of the applications.

As a preliminary objection to all these motions, it was contended for the respondents that prohibition and the other forms of relief, for which the prosecutors are moving, do not lie in respect of decisions of this Board, on the grounds that it is not a judicial body. In our opinion that objection is untenable. We have no doubt that, on the authorities, such writs are issuable against the tribunal in proper cases. See Board of Education v. Rice (13), Perpetual Executors and Trustees Association v. Hosken (14).

(1) 1894, 6 Q.L.J. 88.

(2) 1904, 1 C.L.R. 181.

(3) 1882, 10 Q.B.D.309, at p. 321.

(4) 1914, 18 C.L.R. 54, at p. 71.

(5) 1909, 10 C.L.R. 114.

(6) 1862, 12 C.B.N.S. 383.

(7) [1892] 1 Q.B. 371.

(8) 1912, 14 C.L.R. 1.

(9) 1909, 8 C.L.R. 419.

(10) 1895, 16 N.S.W.L.R. 125.

(11) [1906] 2 K.B. 501.

(12) [1907] A.C. 420.

(13) [1911] A.C. 179, at p. 182.
(14) 1912, 14 C.L.R. 286.

F.C.

9

R. v. THE
CENTRAL CANE
PRICES BOARD
AND OTHERS,
Ex parte THE
COLONIAL SUGAR

REFINING
COMPANY
LIMITED.

Lukin J.

F.C.

R. v. THE

CENTRAL CANE
PRICES BOARD
AND OTHERS,
Ex parte THE
COLONIAL SUGAR

REFINING
COMPANY
LIMITED.

Lukin J.

VICTORIA MILL CASE.

We propose to deal with the case of the Victoria Mill first. On the 8th December, the Governor-in-Council created under the provisions of the Act a Local Board for the Victoria Mill and the lands assigned to such mill, and appointed a Chairman and certain persons as representatives of the millowners and

canegrowers.

The validity of the creation of this Board and other Boards, and of the appointments thereto, was confirmed by a specia! Act. The Local Sugar Cane Prices Boards Confirmation Act of 1915. This Board so constituted delegated its powers under s. 7 of the Act to the Central Board.

In the year 1916, no Order-in-Council was issued re-creating the Local Board; but, on the assumption that such re-creation was unnecessary, the elections were held, and the Governor-inCouncil purported to appoint two persons elected by the canegrowers and two persons nominated (under protest) by the prosecutors to be members of the Board. The Local Board, so constituted, met, and at such meeting the present prosecutors objected that the Board had no jurisdiction, as no application had been made for the constitution of, and no Order-in-Council had been made "constituting any Local Board for the Victoria Mill for the year 1916." This objection was over-ruled. The Local Board then delegated their power to make an award to the Central Board under s. 7, subsec. 11 of the Act. The Central Board, as soon thereafter as it reasonably could-that is to say, on the 20th June-took up the duties so delegated to them, and on the 4th July, 1916, made two awards-one for the year 1915, the validity of which is not now questioned; and one for the year 1916, the validity of which is now being questioned. We purpose now to deal with the objections as they were taken in this Court.

First, the applicants repeat the objection made before the Local Board of 1916, and contend that such Board had no legal existence, since, on the proper interpretation of the Act, it is necessary to re-create the Board every year by the issue of an Order-in-Council under s. 5, and therefore that the Centra! Board could not be clothed by the delegation of such an imperfectly constituted Local Board with the necessary authority to make an award. This contention is based on the assumption that the words, " constitution,' constituted," and "constitute " are issued throughout the Act and Schedule in the same sense.

1917.

It is, no doubt, usual, and it is a sound rule of constitution to give the same meaning to the same words occurring in different parts of an Act of Parliament" (per Cleasby B. in Courtauld v. Legh (1)—but it is quite possible, if sufficient reason can be assigned, to constitute a word in one part of an Act in a different sense from that which it bears in another part of an Act-per Turner L.J. in In re National Savings Bank Association (2)—and the words, "property," "rent," and "marry" have been held to bear different meanings in different sections of the Act in each case there under consideration. In re Smith, Green v. Smith (3), Doe d. Angell v. Angell (4), Regina v. Allen (5).

In this Act it seems to us that the Legislature has used the word "constitution" in two different senses-that of the creating of the Board as an entity apart altogether from its members who are appointed subsequently, and that of the vitalising of the Board by the appointment of the members of the entity already created.

Sections 5, subsec. 1, 2, and 3, and Clauses 4 and 10 of the Schedule would seem to show an intention to use the term in the first sense, and s. 7 would seem to indicate its use in the second

sense.

It is, of course, to be regretted that the Act did not indicate the intention of the Legislature in plain language, and should have used the same term in two different senses, and should have still further intensified the difficulty of obscurity by the language in Clause 10 of the Schedule. Reading, however, the sections. in the light thrown on them by a consideration of the purposes for which the Act was passed, and for which the Board is created; of the provision that application for the constitution of a Board is to be made not later than the 31st January "in any year " (not in each year)—that is to say, in any year in which it is first created Clause 2 of the Schedule); of the provision that its Chairman holds office during the pleasure of the Crown, which suggests a longer term than one year (Clause 7 of the Schedule); that the other members of the Board, though appointed only for one year, may be re-appointed-a term hardly applicable to the appointment to a similar position on a new Board; of the power to amend and rescind the Order-in-Council at any time under

(1) 1869, L.R. 4 Ex. 126, at p. 130. (2) 1866, L.R. 1 Ch. 547, at p. 550. (3) 1883, 24 Ch.D. 672, at p. 678.

(4) 1846, 9 Q.B. 355.

(5) 18.2, L R. 1 C.C. R. 367, at p. 374

F.C.

11

R. v. THE CENTRAL CANE PRICES BOARD AND OTHERS, Ex parte THE COLONIAL SUGAR REFINING COMPANY LIMITED.

Lukin J.

!ps QUEENSLAND LAW REPORTER, JANUARY, 1917.

F.C.

R. v. THE CENTRAL CANE PRICES BOARD AND OTHERS, Ex parte THE COLONIAL SUGAR REFINING COMPANY LIMITED.

Lukin J.

s. 21; and of the absence of any reason or necessity for its re-creation in every year;-in view of all these matters, we think that once a Local Board is created, it exists until the Order-inCouncil is rescinded or amended.

Moreover, even if it be granted that in s. 7 of the Act and Clause 10 of the Schedule the word constitution" refers to the original creation of the Board, the most that can be urged is that the Act has omitted to make provision in respect of matters necessary or expedient to give effect to it." But in that case the omission, if any, can be supplied by the regulations-see s. 22 of the Act and so far as s. 7 and Clause 10 of the Schedule are concerned, have been so supplied by the regulations see regs. 1 to 27, inclusive.

As to reg. 28, upon which the prosecutors also relied, the words, "the parties who applied for the constitution of the Board," in that regulation, should, we think, be construed as referring to the "millowners or "canegrowers," as the case may be; and so construed, seem to us, to create no difficulty. This ground of objection therefore fails.

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The second objection, stated shortly, is that the award is contrary to s. 12, subsec. 4, in that "the mode of ascertaining the amount payable in respect of cane supplied to a mill shall, in the award, be the same with respect to each and every canegrower supplying cane to that mill."

The part of the award here objected to provides "payment to growers for cane supplied on the group system shall be 25s. per ton on delivery, the balance at the end of the season, based on the average of the commercial cane sugar contents of the group cane in accordance with the above scale."

We think this objection overlooks the definition of canegrowers in the interpretation clause, which defines "canegrower

66

66

as

any person, company, co-operative firm, or association, etc."" Surely, a group acting together by agreement comes within the words firm or association" of that definition. The argument that, by grouping, the prosecutors may be prejudicially affected in their right, under subsec. 7 of s. 12, to reject cane containing only 7 per cent. or under 7 per cent. commercial cane sugar, in that a single canegrower may mix his under 7 per cent. cane with that of others, and thereby force its acceptance, seems to us to have no weight. It incorrectly assumes, we think, that by the mixture of cane, a canegrower can force the acceptance of such part of his

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